Foreign involvement in the Myanmar civil war (2021–present)

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Various countries and international organizations have influenced the Myanmar civil war (2021–present) to various extents.

List by country and region[edit]

United Nations[edit]

NUG's UN Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun talks in an interview in 2022

In June 2021, the United Nations General Assembly passed a non-binding resolution asking member states to impose an arms embargo on Myanmar.[1] Two hundred international organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have continued to press the UN and its member states to adopt a global arms embargo.[2][3]

ASEAN and East Timor[edit]

Myanmar absent at the US-ASEAN Summit 2022 in Washington, D.C

ASEAN has blocked Myanmar from participating in regional summits since the 2021 coup.[4] For instance, during the 2022 ASEAN summit, Myanmar's chair remained empty.[5] This condition persisted until New Zealand invited the junta to two ASEAN summits hosted in Wellington in April 2024.[6] ASEAN member-states have not taken a consistent, coordinated approach with respect to the ongoing civil war, due to internal divisions. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore are strongly opposed to the military junta.[7][8] Sasa, a cabinet minister with NUG, stated the group had failed to act even after the SAC "blatantly disregarded ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus", which stipulates an end to the violence, undermining the bloc's standing.[9]

Thailand was a key ally of the junta; former Prime Minister of Thailand Prayut Chan-o-cha used back-channel contacts in mid-2021 to shape Thailand's diplomatic options, especially as these related to ASEAN.[10][11] On 30 June 2022, when the Myanmar Air Force allegedly violated Thai airspace, Thailand scrambled a defence attache. Later, Prayuth said that the incident was "not a big deal".[12] After the 2023 Thai general election, the new Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin has shown support for the military's Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement urging all parties in Myanmar to stay on the path for peace and stability.[13] In April 2024, Thavisin remarked in an interview with Reuters that the Tatmadaw's power was weakening, and expressed support for stability in Myanmar, which borders Thailand.[14]

Singapore initially emphasised the importance of separating business from politics, but subsequently became wary of doing business with Myanmar.[15] Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong described the use of lethal force in the suppression of anti-junta protestors as "just not acceptable" and "disastrous".[16] In 2022, Lee continued supporting the exclusion of the military regime from ASEAN meetings until the regime cooperates on ASEAN's peace plans.[17] Currently, Singapore does not recognise the military junta.[18] During the war, Singapore has remained a major equipment supplier for the junta's weapons factories. Several Singapore-based firms have also served as intermediary companies for the junta, collectively shipping 254 million US dollars' worth of arms to the junta between 2021 and 2023.[19][20]

As of December 2023, East Timor remains the only government to have openly expressed sympathies to the anti-regime forces in Myanmar.[21] In August 2023, the State Administration Council expelled the East Timorese ambassador in retaliation for the East Timorese government meeting with the NUG.[22]

Bangladesh[edit]

See also: Spillover of the Myanmar civil war (2021–present)

Bangladesh recognizes the military junta, but does not support its actions, in part because the Rohingya genocide has led to around 1 million Rohingya refugees fleeing to Bangladesh. In the first week of September 2020, Bangladeshi forces reported that the Tatmadaw started amassing troops and doing unusual buildups in three different locations on the Bangladesh–Myanmar border. As a consequence, Bangladesh's foreign minister summoned Myanmar's ambassador, calling for him to desist from such activities and to work for mutually beneficial relations between the two countries.[23] As a result, Bangladesh revealed that is ready to face any situation, deploying the 34 Border Guard Bangladesh battalion on the border with Myanmar. This battalion asked their counterparts to arrange a flag meeting but they received no response.[24]

In August 2022, Bangladesh strongly protested territorial violations when two Myanmar Army mortar shells hit a Rohingya refugee camp in Bangladesh and when a junta helicopter entered Bangladeshi airspace and fired a shell.[25] Aung Kyaw Moe, the ambassador of Myanmar to Bangladesh, was summoned by the Bangladesh ministry of foreign affairs four times in 2022 due to multiple violations of Bangladesh's airspace in the Naikhongchhari border area by the Myanmar Army.[26]

On 3 February 2024, intensifying clashes between the Arakan Army and Tatmadaw in Rakhine state lead to mortar shells and bullets landing in Bangladesh, injuring civilians and prompting local villagers to flee. Bangladeshi authorities closed schools and madrasas in border villages. As tensions increased, Bangladesh strengthened the Bangladesh Police and Bangladesh Coast Guard to be stationed to resist any intrusion through the borders.[27] Three hundred and twenty-seven Myanmar Border Guard Police personnel sought refuge in Bangladesh, where they were disarmed and sheltered by the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB).[28] Two days later, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina instructed the Bangladesh Armed Forces and BGB to have patience regarding the situation in Myanmar.[29] On 7 February BGB Director Mohammad Ashrafuzzaman Siddiqui recommended suspending the naval route to St. Martin's Island in Bangladesh due to the increasing border tensions,[30] accordingly, sea travel to St. Martin's Island is indefinitely closed down by the district administration of Cox's Bazar from 10 February.[31] On 8 February 2024, the Tatmadaw agreed to send a ship to take back the stranded BGP personnel in Bangladesh.[32][33]

China[edit]

In 2023, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Myanmar's Foreign Minister Than Swe jointly meet the press after the eighth LMC Foreign Ministers' Meeting

Since the coup d'état, China and Russia have supported the military junta and have been its main arms suppliers. China is Myanmar's largest trading partner.[34][35] China has also been accused of tacitly supporting the junta. China and Russia have blocked any substantive action against Myanmar's military at the United Nations Security Council, while the country's security forces have reportedly used Chinese and Russian-supplied weapons to perpetrate human rights violations.[36]

Chinese support for the junta has led to a rise in popular anti-Chinese sentiment in Myanmar.[37][38]

In December 2022, China's special envoy to Myanmar, Deng Xijun, engaged with the military junta in Naypyidaw.[39] After his visit, the Burmese military pulled 30 battalions from the Northeastern Command, and redeployed them to launch major offensives against pro-democracy forces in other areas.[40] However, concerns later grew over allegations of China no longer 'restraining' the influence of the insurgents, which some viewed as a response to the Burmese military's inaction over Chinese citizens being forced to work in scam centres in northern Shan state.[41]

China is particularly sensitive to Western support for EAOs along the Burmese–Chinese border, and has moved to simultaneously support the military junta and powerful EAOs like the United Wa State Army, which has supported pro-democracy forces.[39] In response to the BURMA Act passed by the United States in 2022, the Government of China increased diplomatic efforts to engage EAOs and the military junta, to protect Chinese business and geopolitical interests,[42] though the country claimed that it does not intend to normalise relations with the military junta.[43] Annual cross-border trade between China and Myanmar before the coup was estimated to over 5 billion (in U.S. dollars) annually.[44]

The fact that the Three Brotherhood Alliance's Operation 1027 in late 2023 was carried out near the China–Myanmar border may indicate a shift in China's stance.[45] The status quo in that area had previously been guaranteed by a China-mediated ceasefire. This change in stance was attributed by analysts to concerns about cyber-scam centers, the pursuit of favorable concessions from the junta on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, and the opportunity to influence the PDF in light of evolving dynamics between NUG and EAO groups.[46] On 13 November 2023, China issued arrest warrants for junta-aligned Ming Xuecheng and his family members for their involvement in online scamming operations. According to The Diplomat, this move signaled China's "tacit support for the removal of the Kokang SAZ's leadership".[47] China issued more arrest warrants in December for ten high-ranking Kokang officials and business leaders for being members of "family criminal gangs", including the founder of the Kokang region's Border Guard Forces, Bai Xuoqian.[48][49] The junta signalled its unhappiness at China's role in Operation 1027 and allowed anti-China demonstrations outside the embassy in Yangon in November.[43]

The International Crisis Group said China seeks to maintain relations with all the main parties to preserve its leverage and stop geopolitical rivals from capitalising on turmoil.[43]

On 6 December 2023, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi urged to "achieve domestic reconciliation" and "continue the political transformation process" in Myanmar during a meeting with Myanmar's Foreign Minister Than Swe.[50] On 4 January 2024, which is Myanmar's Independence Day, China opted to remain silent and did not send a congratulatory message, unlike prior years when Chinese president Xi Jinping personally sent such congratulatory messages.[51] NUG had written to Beijing officially to request China to stop providing arms to the ruling military junta, and received an acknowledgement of receipt without substantive reply.[52]

India[edit]

India, which represents Myanmar's fourth-largest export market and fifth-largest import partner, has continued a business-as-usual approach to cross-border relations and continues to recognize the military junta.[36] State-owned and private Indian companies, including Yantra India, supplied arms and raw materials to the junta, enabling the military to conduct surveillance and boost its artillery and missile stocks. A 2023 UN report alleges that these arms were likely to be used in the commission of international crime and that companies have avoided sanctions through shell companies.[53] The India–Myanmar border is 1,021 miles (1,643 km) in length and runs from the tripoint with China in the north to the tripoint with Bangladesh in the south.[54] Amid escalating clashes in Rakhine, India urged its citizens to avoid travel to Rakhine State in early February 2024.[55]

Russia[edit]

Min Aung Hlaing meets Head Rais Rustam Minnikhanov of Tatarstan in Russia, June 2021.

Russia has embraced deeper ties with the Burmese military junta, as the civil war has progressed. Russia has provided materiel, military training for over 50 Myanmar Air Force pilots, and diplomatic backing to the regime.[56] Min Aung Hlaing has visited Russia several times, personally meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin in September 2022. The military junta backed the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[4] Russia was among the few countries[a] to send a congratulatory message to the junta on Myanmar's Independence Day.[57] In March 2024, Tom Andrews, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar, saw Russia still being the number one source of weapons for the junta.[58]

European Union and NATO countries[edit]

American foreign policy director Derek Chollet meets NUG's Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung, February 2024.

The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the European Union have, in response to the ongoing violence, sanctioned individuals and organisations associated with the Burmese military.[59][60] However, the effectiveness of these sanctions has been undermined by poor coordination among the governments and the lack of sanctions against high-impact targets.[60] As of February 2023, only 13% of Burmese sanctions targets were sanctioned by the US, the UK and the EU.[60] Further, the UK and US governments have not sanctioned Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), which is the country's largest source of foreign currency.[61] Burmese sanctions targets have also evaded international sanctions by channeling funds through affiliated firms.[62] For instance, a subsidiary of Myanma Economic Holdings Limited, a sanctioned military-owned conglomerate, created a new affiliated firm to import palm oil.[62]

On 23 December 2022, the US Congress passed and US President Joe Biden signed the Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act (BURMA Act) into law, which provides the president with additional discretionary authority to make policy changes with respect to Myanmar.[63] The law enables the president to provide "non-lethal assistance" to NUG, EAOs, PDFs, and pro-democracy organisations, to provide humanitarian aid to the country, to impose new sanctions, including on MOGE, and enables the secretary of state to assist civilian and international entities with identifying and documenting war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Myanmar.[63]

American foreign policy director Derek Chollet claimed the U.S. has provided nearly $400 million USD in non-lethal aid to pro-democracy groups in Myanmar. He has already met with NUG's Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung[64] and several armed group leaders, including representatives from the Kachin Independence Army.[65]

A passage from The Diplomat thought the U.S. would gain an enormous strategic advantage vis-à-vis China if the U.S. provided just a little more support to Myanmar's resistance forces, hasting the downfall of the junta and the restoration of democracy in Myanmar.[37]

In April 2024, the European Union condemned the public executions held by MNDAA "in the strongest term", calling them "an inhuman and degrading punishment that represents an ultimate denial of human dignity", and added that upholding the rule of law in accordance with international standards is an "effort integral to the aspirations for federal democracy".[66]

Non-state militant groups[edit]

On 24 March 2024, the Rising People's Party (RRP) based in Nagaland, India accused factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), a Naga insurgent group active in Northeast India with headquarters in northern Sagaing Region, of having a "tacit understanding" with the military junta, helping with conscription and attacks on PDF's.[67]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ Belarus, Cambodia, North Korea, Russia, and Syria sent congratulatory messages to the State Administration Council for Myanmar's Independence Day on 4 January 2024.

References[edit]

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  67. ^ "Nagaland: NSCN factions have tacit understanding with Myanmar military junta, claims RPP". Northeast Now. 24 March 2024. Archived from the original on April 3, 2024.
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