Pyusawhti militias
Pyusawhti militias (Burmese: ပျူစောထီးပြည်သူ့စစ်အဖွဲ့များ Burmese pronunciation: [pjù.sɔ́.tʰí pjì.θu̼ sɪʔ.tæʔ.mjá]), also spelt Pyu Saw Htee) are loosely organised networks of pro-military and pro-junta villagers operating in Myanmar. The term was first used in 1956, after U Nu's government created Pyusawhti paramilitary units to assist the military with counterinsurgency operations. After a coup in 1958, the army tried to disband them, as they had become loyal to local ruling-party politicians . However, their attempt was not completely successful.[2]
In the 2000s, the Burmese media started to employ the term to refer to pre-existing networks of irregulars mobilized by the military. The militias became increasingly active in 2021, as supporters of the military of Myanmar and those suspected to be supporting it, who feared attacks by the resistance forces(most of which later turned into the People's Defence Forces), formed militias for self-defence.[3] Pyusawhti militias conducted attacks on people against the military.[4] They were given some assistance by the military of Myanmar, which in turn utilized them to compensate for its lack of local knowledge and intelligence, as well as its shortage of manpower.[3] Observers have noted ties with extremist nationalist groups like the Patriotic Association of Myanmar.[4]
History[edit]
The name comes from Pyusawhti, a legendary king in Burmese history. In 1956, the Burmese government under U Nu devised a local village and town defence scheme, which used paramilitary units called 'Pyusawhti' to assist the Burmese military in counterinsurgency operations.[5] The army attempted to disband and disarm them after the 1958 coup with mixed success.[3] The Pyusawhti quickly became the personal militaries of local leaders appointed by the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, the dominant political party at the time. They would rampage rural areas to force votes during the 1956 and 1960 elections. After the 1962 Burmese coup d'état, Ne Win would replace them with his own Kakweye (Burmese: ကာကွယ်ရေး) militia units, making the Pyusawhti obsolete.[2]
The term 'Pyusawhti' re-emerged in the 2000s, used by Burmese media in reference to pro-military networks and groups.[3] Burmese security forces had previously deployed similar networks, including swan ar shin (စွမ်းအားရှင်, lit. 'masters of force'), during the crackdown on the Saffron Revolution in 2007.[3] Observers have noted ties with extremist nationalist groups like the Patriotic Association of Myanmar.[4]
During the 2021 Myanmar civil war, the Pyusawhti militias often fought with Tatmadaw troops and helped to occupy contested areas.[6][7] In the wake of the 2021 Myanmar coup d'état and ensuing Myanmar civil war (2021–present), Burmese security forces have leveraged Pyusawhti militias for reinforcements, military intelligence, and knowledge of local terrain, especially in the Dry Zone theater.[3] Many new Pyusawhti militia groups emerged out of existing local networks of Buddhist nationalists, members of the military's proxy party, Union Solidarity and Development Party, and army veterans[8] formed in the lead-up to the 2020 Myanmar general election.[3] The militias became increasingly active in May 2021, as new Pyusawhti militias were formed in response to attacks on pro-regime figures and suspected supporters of the military. Police forces armed the otherwise poorly armed Pyusawhti militias with seized hunting guns and other older weapons.[3] By January 2024, the military began transfering assault rifles to them and allowed them more autonomy.[9]
Effect on local communities[edit]
Increase in communal violence[edit]
Pyusawhti militias target resistance members and participate in atrocities committed by regime forces. Such actions lead to retaliations by the resistance. Consequently, both sides engage in reprisals against suspected supporters of the opposite side.[3]
Forcible Recruitment[edit]
Pyusawhti militias are accused of forcibly recruiting local people. Locals claimed that they and soldiers of the military of Myanmar threatened to cut off food and water supply or seize houses if they didn't agree to join them.[10][11]
References[edit]
- ^ "A Silent Sangha? Buddhist Monks in Post-coup Myanmar". Crisis Group. March 10, 2023. Archived from the original on March 11, 2023. Retrieved 2024-04-16.
- ^ a b c Pho Thar Aung (Jan 2003). "From Pyusawhti to the Present". The Irrawaddy. Vol. 11, no. 1. Yangon. Archived from the original on March 19, 2023.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i "Resisting the Resistance: Myanmar's Pro-military Pyusawhti Militias". Crisis Group. 2022-04-06. Archived from the original on March 15, 2023. Retrieved 2023-03-15.
- ^ a b c "'A threat to the revolution': Pyusawhti returns to post-coup Myanmar". Frontier Myanmar. 2021-07-14. Archived from the original on March 15, 2023. Retrieved 2023-03-15.
- ^ Thang, Lian Bawi (9 March 2023). "As the Conflict Worsens, Myanmar's Junta Arms the Populace". The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 11 March 2023. Retrieved 2023-03-15.
- ^ "Thirty Junta Soldiers reportedly killed in Upper Myanmar". The Irrawaddy. 1 February 2022. Archived from the original on February 4, 2023. Retrieved 1 February 2022.
- ^ Wah, Maung Shwe (December 19, 2021). "At least 20 killed in air raid on Magway village". Myanmar NOW. Archived from the original on April 5, 2023.
- ^ Loong, Shona (July 5, 2022). "The Dry Zone: an existential struggle in central Myanmar". The Myanmar Conflict Map. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Archived from the original on July 5, 2022. Retrieved April 16, 2024.
- ^ Loong, Shona (March 2024). "Myanmar's regime shrinks further towards the centre". The Myanmar Conflict Map. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Archived from the original on March 31, 2024. Retrieved April 17, 2024.
- ^ "Conflict between Myanmar's proxy forces may outlast a political resolution". Radio Free Asia. 2022-05-18. Archived from the original on 2022-05-19. Retrieved 2024-04-17.
- ^ Ye Mon (2023-12-06). "Cannon fodder: Inside Myanmar's Pyusawhti militias". Frontier Myanmar. Archived from the original on 2024-01-05. Retrieved 2024-04-17.