Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Sincere expectation criterion

The following discussion is an archived debate of the proposed deletion of the article below. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page (such as the article's talk page or in a deletion review). No further edits should be made to this page.

The result of the debate was no censensus.Soothing R 20:58, 19 February 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Sincere expectation criterion[edit]

POV; original research; few Google hits Markus Schulze 09:46, 14 February 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Delete. This article is problematic because of the following reasons:

Original research. Few Google hits. This criterion is only known at the Election Methods mailing list.
Obviously, the only thing the author of this article wants to say is that, when MinMax(pairwise opposition) is being used, then ranking an additional candidate sometimes helps but never hurts an already ranked candidate. But to say this, there is no need to invent a new criterion. You could simply say that MinMax(pairwise opposition) satisfies later-no-harm and violates later-no-help.
The article is POV. The author of this article uses this criterion to argue against "Condorcet methods where the strength of pairwise defeats are assessed by the votes for the winning side". He mentions MinMax(pairwise opposition) as an example. But MinMax(pairwise opposition) isn't a Condorcet method in the proper sense because it doesn't satisfy the Condorcet criterion. When I asked the author for a concrete example of a Condorcet method that violates the sincere expectation criterion, he was unable to give such an example.

Markus Schulze 10:12, 14 February 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Keep. Regardless of whether one believes in whether the criterion causes a differentiation between methods using margins and winning votes (see Talk:sincere expectation criterion for that discussion), this was the original intention. The discussion arguing the merits of both method types figures prominently at the Condorcet method article, under the section Defeat strength, so it's in the interest of NPOV to give and expand on the counter argument against those criteria in favor of winning votes, especially since Mike Ossipoff single-handedly created a whole bunch of them and these also have been given Wikipedia articles.

The fact that the criterion has only been mentioned on the election methods mailing list doesn't itself make it original research, but is rather a testament of the esoteric nature of the discussion. Given this, it was introduced more than 7 years ago and has since then been regularly referred to and even been generalized by others, so it can be considered to be standing the test of time. Still, if one is interested in a source besides the mailing list, see [1], where Blake Cretney gives a future-to-be informal description of the criterion:

[...]winning-votes only works by making it bad strategy to leave candidates unranked at the end of the ballot. It has no special insight into the true preferences of voters. In effect, it simply reduces the value of all incomplete ballots, in that they would on average be much better at achieving the voter's goal if completed, randomly if necessary.

-- Dissident (Talk) 16:16, 14 February 2006 (UTC)[reply]

But Blake Cretney's quotation can be summarized as follows: "MinMax(pairwise opposition) satisfies later-no-harm and violates later-no-help. Therefore, when MinMax(pairwise opposition) is being used, then it makes sense to give different rankings to the least preferred candidates even when you are indifferent between them." Blake Cretney's criticism doesn't require the introduction of a new criterion. Markus Schulze 18:36, 14 February 2006 (UTC)[reply]

From the context of the 1998 discussion between Blake Cretney and Mike Ossipoff one can deduce that the discussion was between margins and (what is now called) winning votes, since Ossipoff was first of all promoting a Condorcet method. It's true that in above linked article Blakey Cretney's phrasing has mistakenly been too strong, such that he's claiming later-no-harm plus the violation of later-no-help ("In fact, in winning-votes it is never justifiable, even for strategic reasons, to leave candidates unranked, as long as your goal is to elect the best possible candidate from your perspective."), but the sincere expectation criterion is a different criterion, as it makes a zero-info strategy claim based on expected utility. -- Dissident (Talk) 21:36, 14 February 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Similarly, IRV supporters usually argue that, when a Condorcet method is being used, then the probability that an additional ranking hurts an already ranked candidate is higher than the probability that an additional ranking helps an already ranked candidate and that, therefore, the voters will use bullet voting. It makes a big difference whether someone makes a prediction about how the voters will vote under a concrete election method or whether someone proves that a concrete election method violates a given criterion. What you call sincere expectation criterion is not more than a hypothesis about how the voters will vote under a certain family of Condorcet methods. However, it is not a criterion in the proper sense because without additional presumptions it is not possible, just by looking at the underlying algorithm, to say whether a given election method satisfies it. Markus Schulze 15:28, 15 February 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Delete per WP:NOR. Stifle 00:42, 15 February 2006 (UTC)[reply]

keep but needs work as in above discussion Mccready 16:53, 15 February 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Delete original research... by this fella: Blake Cretney... for this project Electoral Reform Project. --Vizcarra 17:20, 15 February 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Comment. The debate hinges on whether the Internet Election Mailing List is a reputable source. If it's moderated for content and has more than 5000 subscribers, it probably meets the notability guidelines; otherwise it doesn't. Does anyone know more? ikkyu2 (talk) 21:42, 15 February 2006 (UTC)[reply]

The Election Methods mailing list is not moderated. Markus Schulze 10:31, 19 February 2006 (UTC)[reply]

By the way: The sincere expectation criterion was mentioned by Blake Cretney only in a single thread. And this thread is more than 7 years old [2]. Markus Schulze 13:21, 19 February 2006 (UTC)[reply]

The above discussion is preserved as an archive of the debate. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page (such as the article's talk page or in a deletion review). No further edits should be made to this page.