Template talk:Iranian military commanders

Scope of the template

Regarding this version of the template, additional to the points raised in User talk:Hosseiniran#Iranian Generals and User talk:Hosseiniran#Iranian Military Commanders, I would say that Achaemenid Empire or other dynasties mentioned are not the modern country which is today known as "Iran". This template's articles are not properly related to eachother. Pahlevun (talk) 14:32, 30 June 2016 (UTC)

Basij is not a force of IRGC nowdays

I present two sources for this fact.
first source:
The Basij was the IRGC's front line against social and political change. It played a decisive role in the 2009 post-election crisis, but its brutality also escalated tensions and pushed Iran to the brink of popular revolt. Its crude tactics further eroded what little confidence much of Iranian society had in the militia. In order to improve its effectiveness and refurbish its tarnished brand, the IRGC began to restructure the Basij. The plan aimed to widen its appeal and better position it to fight the soft-war. To oversee this project, Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi as the Basij's new commander. Soon, Naqdi —a stern figure, who wears a keffiyeh in solidarity with the Palestinian movement (a fashion popular within the Basij and IRGC)— began a press tour to explain the changes the organization would undergo. Framing it as a response to the “Wisdom” and objectives set forth by the supreme leader, Naqdi advanced a general plan that would transition the militia away from martial activities and expand its efforts in society, scientific research, and culture work. This, along with a corresponding name change, was an attempt at a rebrand of the organization. The “Basij Resistance Force” became the “Basij Organization of the Oppressed” (literally the “Organization of the Mobilization of the Oppressed,” sazman-e basij-e mostazafin), a name that echoed the organization's original, pre-war ethos. The new name connoted the militia's long-standing involvement in social and cultural causes…

second source:

In the aftermath of the disputed 2009 election, the IRI implemented radical changes in the structure of the Basij. The organization changed its name again, from the Basij Resistance Force back to its original term, the Organization for the Mobilization of the Oppressed (Sazeman-e Basij-e Mostazafan). This name change symbolized the transformation of the Basij from a military force to a mass organization more focused on internal suppression and on defending the IRI against the alleged “soft war” or “cultural war” which essentially involves nonmilitary measures and includes both cultural and political elements, such as promoting Western culture and the American lifestyle. The new Basij commander, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi, explained this change, saying:

The word “force” (nirou) has military connotations, and the Basij is an entity which goes far beyond just military affairs… This change [to “organization”] was aimed as helping us to become free from military work, which… took up a lot of the organization's time and energy. Therefore in order for us to be able to pay sufficient attention to the other aspects our work and plan ahead for them, the military dimensions of the Basij's work were transferred to the Ground Forces of the IRGC… In this manner, the Basij will be more involved in the social, scientific, and developments arenas, and will make endeavors to ensure continual and systematic progress in the country's developmnet.

In other words, the IRI has been trying to transform the Basij from a military force into a specialized organization spread throughout society. The aim is to control and monitor society and suppress the regime's internal opponents. Moreover, according to the most recent development plans, the Basij organizational structure (centers, districts, and areas) will also develop vastly. The increased number of resistance regions and bases in Tehran —from six to twenty-three in just a few months after the popular uprising in 2009— indicates the importance of the Basij to Iran's leaders. The Basij's shift from a force to an organization has also helped the IRI justify the Basij's involvement in politics and its use by the IRI as a voting machine…

Benyamin-ln (talk) 23:36, 14 March 2018 (UTC)

References

Basij is constitutionally an armed force of Iran, getting increasingly (and officially) engaged in non-military activiteis does not mean that it is no more a military/paramilitary organization. I think the sources you mentioned were hoisted by your own petard, because both are suggesting that this transformation is against the backdrop of Basij! The first source says it was "an attempt at a rebrand of the organization", while the second says it was to "justify the Basij's involvement in politics and its use by the IRI as a voting machine". Pahlevun (talk) 09:56, 16 March 2018 (UTC)

Unfortunately you are changing the subject to other discusses, such as recent.
Please discuss the subject. According to the second source, the military dimensions of the Basij's work were transferred to the Ground Forces of the IRGC from 2009. So basij is an organization of IRGC from 2009, not fifth force of IRGC. If you have any other documented comment, I hear. Benyamin-ln (talk) 11:33, 16 March 2018 (UTC)

What "other discusses" did I switched to, exactly? You want Basij removed from the template and your argument is that its was restructured and renamed in 2009, missing the point that it does not change its nature as an armed force. It doesn't matter wether it is called a force or an organization, it is regarded among the five military branches of the IRGC, and is involved in Syrian Civil War. What you call "According to the second source", is a quotation from Mohammad Reza Naqdi, that the author uses to make a point.

Aside from the 2015 source cited in the article (The Military in Post-Revolutionary Iran: The Evolution and Roles of the Revolutionary Guards by Hesam Forozan), I draw your attention to these sources:

The leader appoints the IRGC commander directly, and upon recommendations of the IRGC Commander, he appoints the deputy commander of the IRGC, the chief of IRGC Joint Staff, the chief of the IRGC Strategic Center, and commanders of the five forces: ground forces, air forces, navy, the Basij, and the Qods Force.

— Bayram Sinkaya (2016). The Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics: Elites and Shifting Relations. Routledge, p. 57.

In 1990, Supreme Leader Khamenei ordered the IRGC to incorporate the Basij as its fifth branch, along with the Air Force, Ground Force, Navy, and al Quds Force. Today, some elements of the Basij are largely an internal security force. They are used to suppress opposition movements and create counter-demonstrations

— Anthony H. Cordesman, Bryan Gold (2014). The Gulf Military Balance: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions. Rowman & Littlefield, p. 143.

—Pahlevun (talk) 13:07, 16 March 2018 (UTC)

I discuss Military organization. Suppose a source said IRGC Cooperation Bonyad and Khatam-al Anbiya Construction Headquarters involved in Syria. Should we consider them as fifth and sixth forces of IRGC?

Good! You found a source for level upgrade of Basij on 1990. Did Khamenei changed instinct of Basij? Not at all. I discuss about level changes. Basij consisted of several Divisions Before 2009 while divisions transferred to the Ground Forces and now Basij includes battalions. Head of Basij is a Chairman and is not at the same level (either higher or lower) of commanders of quad forces. (Naqdi, Gheybparvar) Benyamin-ln (talk) 21:23, 16 March 2018 (UTC)

I discuss Military organization. Suppose a source said IRGC Cooperation Bonyad and Khatam-al Anbiya Construction Headquarters involved in Syria. Should we consider them as fifth and sixth forces of IRGC? Absolutly not, but if there are reliable sources saying that they are military branches, we would consider them. You claimed that military dimensions of the Basij's work were transferred to the Ground Forces and I provided a source that says Basij is militarily engaged in Syria to show you that this is nor right. You said Good! You found a source for level upgrade of Basij on 1990. But actuallty, there is not a source, there are three sources, and the one you are emphasizing is saying that "Today... (2014) some elements of the Basij are largely an internal security force". The two other sources are published in 2015 and 2016 (all after 2009) and state that Basij is one of the five military branches of the IRGC (no matter it is named a force or an organization). And none of the two sources you've given conclude that Basij is not a miliatary branch, but vice versa. I have answers for the rest of your remarks (Head of Basij is a Chairman...), however I consider them OR thus my answer would be also OR. Pahlevun (talk) 12:20, 20 March 2018 (UTC)

As I said, Basij includes of 22 class-organizations and several battalions. Military engagement does not describe the size and level of that unit. As level change was done on 1990, it is possible other changes made on later years. Some sources mentioned the newer changes and some other haven't paid attention. The first level of Sepah includes Ground Forces, Navy, Aerospace and Quds Forces. So Basij is same-rank with Intelligence and Intelligence Protection organizations. Benyamin-ln (talk) 15:07, 23 March 2018 (UTC)

Now that I provided the sources you asked for, you are making arguments based on OR. Such ping-pong discussions can endlessly continue with no conclusion. I suggest initiating a dispute resolution process to whether keep or remove Basij in the template. Pahlevun (talk) 16:33, 23 March 2018 (UTC)

Misunderstanding occurred. Structure Changes are widely covered in media. The new Structural pattern was approved on 18 October 2009. All your explains are about the essence of the changes, which is not the main subject. I asked you for focus on the main subject, but you began other topics. OR is in this behavior. Benyamin-ln (talk) 17:23, 23 March 2018 (UTC)

I don't think that continueing this conversation would reach us to a result, so a DR may decide. Pahlevun (talk) 14:32, 30 March 2018 (UTC)