Talk:World War II/Archive 59

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2nd version Collaboration & Resistance

Hello Paul Siebert (talk), please have a lookover at your earliest convenience for guidance and suggestions. Additionally, under the section 4.3 in World War II, the sentence "Although the Axis victory was swift, bitter and large-scale partisan warfare subsequently broke out against the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia, which continued until the end of the war.[125]" could be now deleted. There are probably loads of others, but that's a start. Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 02:02, 6 September 2019 (UTC)


                                                       COLLABORATION

“The final verdict on how well we withstand the moral and ethical challenges of the war is not that of a judge, who determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. But it was — and remains — too easy to blame just Hitler and the Nazis.”

Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War Il, Chapter 1, p. 38 — István Deák

Collaboration is commonly used as a moniker for cooperating with the enemy, and to deny its existence would deny the complete history of World War II.[1][2][3][4][5] ‘‘Collaboration’’ is a cooperation between the vanquished territories and the Axis Powers[6][7] since the German Army needed local collaboration[8][9] for some degree of control.[10] Many were impelled by various motives and eager to collaborate;[11][12] some with reservations, others by force, and many by deception.[13][14][15] Collaboration consisted primarily in participation of hostilities on the Axis side. Nazi ideology-driven collaboration was a factor, of which there are four main reasons: 1) support for Nazi-fascist culture, 2) antisemitism, 3) anticommunism, and 4) a nationalistic desire for establishing an independent fascist-type state.[16][17] At times, there was a combination or shared beliefs in antisemitism, hatred of Soviet communism, enthusiasm for National Socialist ideology, and hope for a united Europe under German Supremacy.[18][19][20][21] Operation Barbarossa initiated collaboration on a scale which could not be compared to in Northern or Western Europe[22][23] and assumed an ethnic character. Ukrainians, the Baltic states, Caucasians, Russians and members of some Asian nationalities assembled ethnic units and served the Germans as armed militiamen,[24] as seen with Ukrainian, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian policemen.[25] Auxiliary forces patrolled the shores (Schutzkommandos) while others were concentration camp guards; low-level administrators and professionals cooperated as well.[26] Waffen-SS volunteers formed divisions, brigades, legions, or battalions bearing the names of historical heroes, as seen in the Croatian/Bosnian Muslim, Scandinavian, Dutch, Belgian, and French.[27] Workers and laborers survived the occupation in factories, the docks, train stations and airfields.[28] The British (Singapore)[29] and American (Philippines) colonies[30] could not resist.[31] See Collaborationism and Collaboration during World War II

The first reason for ideology-driven collaboration, Nazi-inspired symapthies, evolved after World War I[32][33][34] with the dissolution of the Central Powers, multi-nationalism, the collapsed German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires, the partitions of Poland, the rise of communism, sowing the seeds for deep resentment.[35][36][37][38] Collaboration by paramilitary groups or armies which supported Nazi ideology, particularly in Western Europe included France's Marcel Déat and Milice française,[39] the 33rd Waffen SS in France,[40] Belgium's Léon Degrelle and the Légion Wallonie,[41] Norway's Vidkun Quisling[42] with Nordic countries including Denmark, and Dutch Waffen-SS units in the Netherlands.[43][44]

The second reason for ideology-driven collaboration was antisemitism and the identification and killing of ethnic and religious groups, or “undesirables,”[45] throughout Europe, particularly in Western Ukraine,[46] Lithuania,[47] and Byelorussia.[48][49] The Holocaust, or the Final Solution to the Jewish Question, and the Third Reich’s determination to murder all the Jews of Europe, developed over time[50] and could never have been accomplished with the “efficiency and completeness that it was without the assistance of many Europeans.”[51][52][53][54] The Trawniki men, Soviet POW’s trained in Western Ukraine, tortured and shot hundreds of thousands of Jews under German supervision.[55][56] Even the Channel Islands cooperated with the Germans who handed the Jews over to the Gestapo.[57] Mass killing of Jews after the start of Operation Barbarossa was perpetrated by specialised troops composed of local volunteers who could not have succeeded without the collaboration of many non-German Europeans.[58] Conversely, the survival of many Jews would have been inconceivable without the opposition of many non-Germans[59][60] who were executed for sheltering Jews.[61][62] Ultimately, those who collaborated in Hitler’s Final Solution did so as “collaborators, cooperators, or as accommodators,”[63] including the Judenrat who served in the Jewish police as spies of German intelligence. However, they “sought to escape their doomed fate and were not committed collaborators.”[64][65][66] Waffen-SS divisions implicated in the persecution and execution of the Roma (Gypsy) and Jews were seen in Eastern European collaborators, Western Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania, France, and Poland, where the highest German-recorded number of Jews were sent to concentration camps, including the Latvian Waffen SS, Estonian Waffen-SS, the paramilitary, and Einsatzgruppen.[67][68]

The third reason for ideology-driven collaboration was communism. Countries where communism flourished were manipulated by German propagandists igniting ethnic unrest, as in the Baltic countries, Ukraine and Russia. Bronislav Kaminski in Russia’s autonomous Lokot Republic administered an entire district for the Germans.[69] Former military and police fought the communist threat as seen in Latvia’s 2nd SS Infantry Brigade[70] and the Ukrainian Galician Division.[71] Fear of Stalin terror and forced collectivisation, mass executions and deportations inspired many against the Soviets, including the paramilitary groups known as Hilfsfreiwillige,[72] while a Russian army was created within the German Wehrmacht (Vlasov Army).[73][74] In Greece, Ioannis Rallis’ Greek Security Battalions fought communist ELAS partisans.[75][76]

The fourth reason for ideology-driven collaboration was the desire for establishing an independent fascist state. European countries subsumed by Waffen SS divisions where ideology-driven sympathies festered, aspired to establish an independent fascist country to partner with Nazi Germany. These include Vidkun Quisling in Norway, Ferenc Szálasi in Hungary, Anton Mossert in the Netherlands, Pierre Laval in France, and Stepan Bandera in Ukraine.[77] Auxiliary police (Estonian Auxiliary Police) and paramilitary forces (Einsatzgruppen and Feldgendarmerie), were responsible for containing resistance.[78][79] In the Balkans, Georgios Tsolakoglou of Greece's collaborationist government and the allies of the Axis, such as Slovakia and Croatia, from dismembered Yugoslavia, sought independent fascist states.[80][81][82] The Croatian Handschar Waffen-SS which included Moslems from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavian, and Greek Security Battalions engaged communists. Detention and execution of POWs, either semi-voluntarily or compulsory, also occurred.[83] See Collaboration with the Axis Powers


                                                           RESISTANCE

“Occupied countries had a resource nearer home: their own peoples.” Ch. 1, p. 4 — M.R.D. Foot

Resistance: European Resistance to Nazism 1940-45

Resistance by local populations took place in Axis occupied countries due to their repressive nature. A resister was anyone who resisted by a) not cooperating with their occupiers or b) endangering themselves or others; either passively or actively.[84] Resisters came from all walks of life[85][86] and the “changes at the battle front made resisters out of collaborators”[87] who were empowered by Axis defeats incurred at El Alamein, Stalingrad and the simultaneous invasion of North Africa by the United States.[88][89] Some printed illegal newspapers or used the wireless to communicate and receive radio messages from London.[90] Widespread partisan movements kept German divisions occupied, such as the Free French Army, Polish Underground, Norwegian resistance, Greek Resistance, Yugoslav Partisans[91] and Mihailović's Chetniks,[92][93][94][95][96][97] Russian partisans, including the Italians who changed sides and joined the Allies in 1943.[98][99] “German policies in Byelorussia resulted in the second-largest resistance group in Europe, following Tito's resistance in Yugoslavia.”[100] Noteworthy was the Polish Underground's “monumental undertaking of the Warsaw Uprising[101][102] and Europe’s only underground organisation dedicated to assisting the Jews (Żegota).[103] At times, resistance was complicated depending on one’s nationality, religion, or ethnicity, particularly in the Balkans and Eastern Europe.[104][105]

Extensive, Allied-assisted partisan warfare was the aim of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), which Churchill said “would set Europe ablaze.”[106] The American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) adapted the British model upon Churchill's insistence to Roosevelt, who appointed “Wild Bill” Donovan as its chief. The OSS would eventually rival the SOE, setting up training camps in the United States and overseas, successfully “sending thousands of agents around the globe.”[107] At times, the Allied intelligence services cooperated with resisters, such as the ‘Jedburgh Teams’ and were sent to Occupied France prior to the D-Day invasion, comprised of “one OSS or SOE officer, one French officer, and one British or American radio operator, and playing a crucial role.”[108] In the Balkans, both Churchill and Roosevelt aimed to keep Greece and Yugoslavia free from Stalin's attempt at control.[109] Churchill's gamble paid off, because both never entered the Soviet bloc.[110] At times, both nationalist and communist forces acted in unison to defeat the Axis, such as the destruction of the Gorgopotamos Bridge linking the Athens to Thessaloniki railway by EDES (nationalists) and ELAS (communists) under the leadership of the SOE.[111][112]

In Southeast Asia, resistance was more complex as the dynamics were different than in Europe. The Japanese also presented themselves as liberators of colonial peoples, and this was accepted by at least parts of the local independence movements. In reality it was much different, since the Japanese sought its own colonial empire and intended to subjugate every country they invaded. However, in the last weeks of the war, the Indonesian independence movement was able to leverage its limited collaboration with the Japanese to gain their support; enough to declare the Netherlands East Indies free, which doomed the Dutch attempts to resume control after World War II ended.[113][114] In French Indochina, the communist Viet Minh gave rise to an anti-Axis partisan movement. This initiated Vietnam’s anti-colonial movement, in which the American OSS became a key player.[115] See Resistance during World War II


Do you mean the link at the end of the first paragraph to be to Collaboration with the Axis Powers rather than Collaboration during World War II?ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 15:19, 6 September 2019 (UTC)
Perhaps, good point. We'll look into it. Thanks! Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 20:57, 6 September 2019 (UTC)
I generally agree with the above text (plus or minus a few of details). In the actual article, I would like to place 'resistance' first and then 'collaboration' as most people in occupied countries did not support the occupation of their homelands. Also, regarding the length of the text, we need to make sure that this one topic does not bulge out and create undue weight issues with in the article. A couple of paragraphs each for 'resistance' and 'collaboration' should be more appropriate, in line with other sections in this article. --E-960 (talk) 15:14, 8 September 2019 (UTC)
On placing 'resistance' first and then 'collaboration' - I think we need to be guided by facts rather than whether we upset people's feelings. Using France as an example, post-war there was a "talking-up" exercise that sought to emphasise resistance, and only the most obvious collaborators were exposed. I don't think the article should defer to this sort of public relations exercise. The remark "most people in occupied countries did not support the occupation of their homelands" is not relevant - because it is what people did (collaborate or join the resistance - oh, and some did both) that the article is about, not what they thought.ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 16:15, 8 September 2019 (UTC)
Well, it's not a 'public relations exercise' as you say it, since the overwhelming majority of occupied countries had governments in exile, even in countries such as Norway or Denmark which had puppet governments, the people resented the occupation and supported the resistance, consider the widespread Danish factory strikes and civil disturbances against German domination, held under a puppet government no less. That's a fact not an opinion. As for France, it's also debatable, since with de Gaulle and the Free France you still can't argue that France was all collaboration. --E-960 (talk) 05:23, 9 September 2019 (UTC)
Given this is a high level summary article with no room for nuance or detailed explanations, I don't think the Chetniks should be mentioned under either resistance or collaboration in this article. To list them under resistance but not under collaboration would give the wrong impression to our readers, but listing them as both would require more explanation that we have room to provide. We would also be doing true resistance movements a disservice by lumping the Chetniks in with them. Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 07:25, 9 September 2019 (UTC)
We do need to condense the text, it is bit too long for a summary article like this one, let's remember that this was a war fought between nation states, resistance and collaboration in varying degrees were secondary. I would say two or three solid paragraphs for each at the most. --E-960 (talk) 08:40, 9 September 2019 (UTC)
User:E-960, I am not asserting that France was "all collaboration", just that there was a big exercise in re-emphasising the extent of resistance activity. For instance: "After 1945, with regard to its role in the use of the ports in occupied France, the French navy derived benefit from the official myth that everybody was somehow connected to the Resistance." (Hellwinkel, Lars. Hitler's Gateway to the Atlantic: German Naval Bases in France 1940-1945 . Seaforth Publishing). There were thousands of French dockyard workers supporting the German navy (versus a German workforce in France that was about a tenth of the size); Luftwaffe training aircraft were made in France, then there were the Milice, etc. and the Vichy forces that fought (albeit for a short while) against Operation Torch.ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 15:50, 9 September 2019 (UTC)
Chetniks lead as it stands now is a huge missrepresentation going totally against the conclusions from the Wikipedia talk:Requests for mediation/Draza Mihailovic which dealt preciselly with the issue of collaboration of Chetniks, and concluded that their collaboration was sporadic and oportunistic in nature. Peacemaker67, although a very productive editor in other areas, has been very radical when the issue has been Chetniks, continuously keeping the anti-Chetnik narrative portraying them as collaborators and deniying their resistance nature, activities, even claiming USA condecorations were just politically motivated. FkpCascais (talk) 23:19, 9 September 2019 (UTC)

This is utter nonsense. Unlike many editors in the space, I take a neutral approach to Yugoslavia in WWII and use academic sources that are independent of the subject, and oppose the use of pro-Chetnik propaganda. What would be "radical" would be listing the Chetniks as a resistance group (which they were in long-term intent but not in actual practice, after late 1941) without also explaining that they collaborated with the Axis extensively and in most parts of the country, including taking part on the Axis side in the largest anti-Partisan offensive in WWII. That is not an "anti-Chetnik narrative", that is what the reliable sources say they did. The Chetniks should be removed from these sections, in line with my earlier comment. Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 02:04, 10 September 2019 (UTC)

Hello FkpCascais (talk), thank you for your straightforwardness regarding you prior posts. Nonetheless, I must make it perfectly clear that I have no “stand” one way or the other regarding the former Yugoslavia’s collaboration, resistance, or retribution. Wikipedia’s impartiality will not be sacrificed on the altar of one’s ethnic ambition or pride.
Hello Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me), the words penned by this user regarding Mihailović and his Chetniks in the “Resistance” section is that of a resister along with the other main resisters. No nuance here. I refer you to a few scholarly historians/writers on Mihailović[116][117][118][119][120][121] and Tito.[122]
I am truly grateful regarding your conveyance of a prior Wikipedia mediation discussion. It does not qualify nor does it pertain to the current dialogue. It only served to confirm my expectations regarding some Wikipedians. Moreover, Mihailović was found guilty of collaboration: not on the charge of resistance. The role of the Soviets to demolish his credibility is not the purpose of this subsection.[123][124]
In closing, ethnocentric vendettas run counter with Wkipedia’s 5 pillars. On a small scale, preemptively pouncing upon one or another's prose is similar to Tito’s attacks on Mihailović or vice versa: both would fight each other and not the Germans, the main target. On that note, let us all strive to hit the mark as meaningful contributors to World War II for the greater good: the worldwide community. Besides, Mihailovic is merely mentioned; I allowed Tito an entire sentence.[125] If you both care to take this up further, please do so on User talk:Bigeez.
Perhaps, we could also strive to be as one’s username suggests. Respectfully, Eli Bigeez (talk) 18:52, 10 September 2019 (UTC)
Respectfully? When you are implying I am on some "ethno-centric vendetta"? I'm Australian, and have no connection to any side in Yugoslavia. I have also written dozens of balanced and neutral FAs on Yugoslavia in WWII. I could provide just as many reliable sources that say the Chetniks collaborated, using the same books in some cases. My point is that this section should be an overview, and should not mention the Chetniks because they both resisted (briefly, mainly in 1941) and collaborated extensively (throughout the rest of the war, with the Italians, Germans and NDH), and there is no space in this article to explain the details of how they did both things. I oppose this whole section until the Chetniks are removed, because it gives too much weight to their resistance, and none to their collaboration. Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 23:13, 10 September 2019 (UTC)
I agree that Chetniks should not be included. The same relates to other resistance movements whose contribution had a moderate scale and had no significant political consequences.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:00, 11 September 2019 (UTC)
I apologise gentleman if this seemed as some vendetta, I assure you it is not, it is rather bringing to the atention of WWII-content editors one WWII participant who has carried controversy which affects our articles here as well. I hope our treatment of them will match how the majority of scholar sources do. Chetniks ended the war as a loosing side in the civil-war against Partisans, being left in a situation where even their supporting base found itself forbitten to exercise any support to them, or defend them, while were subject of diabolisation campaign which lasted 5 decades under Tito regime. As monarchists, they also suffered lack of simpathy and support on behalve of all those who saw the monarchy as simbol of Serbian domination of Yugoslavia. The trial communist regime subjected Mihailovic to which ended with his accusation and execution, is overwelmingly considered unfair regardless of his guilt, or not. Tito, regardless of his popularity, was a dictator, and he dealt with cruelty with the opposition, specially in this early times when he was Soviet allied. At the end of the war, he refused to share power with the governament-in-exile as it was agreed, and accused Chetniks of collaboration to remove them as rival force. While all collaboration forces were escaping to Austria, the fact that Mihailovic and his Chetniks did not and were present does indicate they had clear conscience. Tito betrayed the agreement and took all power by force seing no one was able to stop him. He had to accuse Chetniks to justify their execution and elimination. Thus, the trial can´t be considered a fair trial. USA highly condecorated Mihailovic and the Chetniks. Mihailovic award by Truman is a perfect exemple where you gentleman can see the problem present in our articles, where Peacemaker67 claims it only refers to airman rescued and denies the initial part saying clearly he was awarded for organising and leading important resistance forces. See the text by yourselves, here, it is short and clear. Other evidence is that Mihailovic had Germans hunting him and offering major ammounts of monney for bringing him dead, or alive. However, our articles overwelmingly focus on the insistance that they were collaborators. Although they found themselves in an extremelly difficult scenario, specially agravated with Partisans (as if resisting Germans and all others wasn´t already hard enough). Tito Yugoslavia made huge efforts to influence historiography in a way to glorify Partisans and diminish or ignore Chetniks. Chetniks, if mentioned, were only to be mentioned negativelly. Some historiographers were influenced by this narrative, others were not, while domestic ones were all obligated to follow the regime´s version. The mediation was carried out to establish what scholar sources mostly say, and the conclusion was opposite to Peacemaker67 claims which he ignores. The articles are currently in a version mostly created by him and he promtly reverts any changes. You can see the articles Chetniks and Draža Mihailović and perceve how much effort was done to make the point trough selective manipulation of sources that they just resisted initially and were mostly collaborators. I just ask how is that the mediation concluded otherwise, how so many scholars claim otherwise, and even how USA was so wrong? I hope you are willing to find out if our project here is being fair and taking a stance which is majoritarilly shared by scholars, or not, and also to decide if they should be mentioned, or not, here at this article. Bare in mind that ignoring them was also the goal of anti-Chetnik policies. FkpCascais (talk) 22:23, 11 September 2019 (UTC)
User:Bigeez, overall I think the text is well written and accurate, but a bit too detailed and long for this article — considering the length of other sections and the entire article. If you recall, every so often there was an effort to shorten the article in order to make it more managable to read. I would suggest we keep each topic to 2 or 3 solid paragraphs. Also, 'resistance' should go first, from a logical point. We have a section titled 'occupation' which naturally states that countries were taken over against their will, which led to resistance, if collaboration and support out-weight resistance than in the grand scheme of things, why did those countries defended themself first, and puppet governments were set up instead of having the original governments in place, going in to exile was the first act of resistance which showed the country as a whole does not side with Nazi Germany (side note: there were indeed few countries which joined the axis powers freely). --E-960 (talk) 07:31, 10 September 2019 (UTC)
Hello E-960 (talk), thank you for your constructive and cooperative comments. Yes, it was longer than I had anticipated. I narrowed it down to encompass the main theme without scrificing the crucial points. On your second aspect, most historians place collaboration first since that is what happened first, depending on one's moral compass, then resistance. This was followed by retribution. We will take this into consideration, however. Of course, those countries who were allies, namely Italy, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Croatia, and Bulgaria, and co-belligerent Finland, are a different lot. Perhaps Paul Siebert (talk), and Nick-D (talk) might guide us on this issue, which I know you once asked about and should have responded earlier, mia culpa. Respecfully, Eli Bigeez (talk) 18:52, 10 September 2019 (UTC)

References

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Next step

I think the overal structure is becoming more clear, and now it is a time to discuss how all of that can fit into the article. The major task it to make all of that much much shorter. To this end, I propose to discuss each paragraph separately. Again, the main question is what should be removed (imo, 80% should go, because we simply cannot afford a luxury to add so long pieces of text to this, already huge, article). First of all, I think "Collaboration and resistance" title is correct, because collaboration was more massive, and, importantly, in a modern political situation in Europe there is a tendency to understate collaboration and overstate resistance. --Paul Siebert (talk) 03:56, 11 September 2019 (UTC)

Not sure where to fit these remarks, but taking a step back:
"‘‘Collaboration’’ is a cooperation between the vanquished territories and the Axis Powers[6][7] since the...." This is the sort of Wikipedia text that would be copy-edited without comment in another article. (1) You cannot define collaboration as just occurring in WW2; (2) it is not an act by the "territory" but the people who live there. Regardless of what the cited references say, we need correct and precise language here.
It should be totally clear that collaboration covers a whole range of activities, rather than only mentioning the sensational (and reprehensible) actions of those who participated in, for instance, the holocaust. The person who turned up to work every day - such as on the railways - was a collaborator, as was the building contractor who bid for work to build barracks for U-boat crews away from heavily bombed ports. It should also be clear that their motivation is not necessarily ideological - it could just be that they needed to make a living. Without this activity, the occupation of large amounts of Europe would have been much more onerous on the occupying power. Obviously the direct and obvious collaboration is the most important bit, but the story is not complete without mention of those with less "headline", but operationally essential involvement. I suggest a sentence like: "World War 2 collaboration covered a whole range of activities, from fighting on the enemy side, through participating in the holocaust, to repairing and maintaining Nazi warships and keeping the railways in occupied countries working." ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 08:22, 11 September 2019 (UTC)
I agree. Collaboration is defined as traitorous cooperation with the enemy[1]. We don't define slave labourers or conscripts as collaborators, they had no choice so they cannot be considered traitorous. The Red Cross regularly cooperated with the enemy to facilitate the humanitarian welfare of prisoners of war, etc, they aren’t collaborators in the sense indicated here because their intent is not considered ‘’traitorous’’. Finland did not consider Nazi Germany as the enemy so their cooperation wasn't considered traitorous either. Similarly the Baltic states considered the Soviet Union as the greater enemy due to their occupation of their countries and Germany was seen as liberating them from that Soviet occupation, so cooperating with Germany to prevent Soviet re-occupation certainly wasn’t seen as traitorous from the Balt’s point of view. There has to be an element of treason in the cooperation to qualify as collaboration in the context of WW2. --Nug (talk) 21:45, 11 September 2019 (UTC)
It seems Nug either does not completely understand the point ThoughtIdRetired is trying to make or he actually disagrees with what ThoughtIdRetired says. Actually, I am more inclided to agree with Nug, because "repairing and maintaining Nazi warships and keeping the railways" in, e.g., occupied France can hardly be considered as collaboration. Indeed, the Northern France was de facto incorporated into the German Reich, and people had to return to their normal activity to survive, for noone knew how long all of that would last (there was a possibility that that state would have become permanent). Obviously, railway workers were maintaining railways, etc. In general, since the economy of most occupied countries became an integral part of the Reich's economy, any economic activity of local population contributed to the Axis war efforts, and, if we stick with ThoughtIdRetired's approach, we must call all economically active people in Nazi occupied Europe collaborators, which is nonsense.
By saying that, I disagree with other Nug's points. To make a stress on "traitorous" is a little bit controversial: for example, was Bandera a Nazi collaborator? He had never considered himself a Soviet citizen, he sinserely believed Nazi allied fascist Ukraine was the best scenatio for his country - how can he considered a traitor? The same can be said about Baltic, Dutch or Norwegian WaffenSS fighters. In reality, different people in Europe are playing with the term "Collaboration/collaborationism" to whitewash the deeds of their own nations during WWII.
I also cannot understand what relation Finland has to this story: it had never been occupied by Germany, it pursued its own interests during WWII, the term "collaboration" is totally irrelevant here: we can speak only about allied/co-belligerent relations, not about collaboration.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:21, 11 September 2019 (UTC)
I hardly think that the Oxford English Dictionary could be considered a controversial source, it is their definition of "Collaboration", we simply can not omit "traitorous" from the definition because it doesn't suit the present discussion. Bandera is a controverial case but certainly he was considered a traitor by the Soviet Union of which Ukraine was an internationally recognised constituent republic. The distinction between Baltic, Dutch or Norwegian WaffenSS fighters was that the Baltic Waffen-SS divisions were recognised by Nuremburg and HICOG as conscript formations distinct and separate in ideology and purpose from the other Waffen-SS divisions. --Nug (talk) 23:06, 11 September 2019 (UTC)
It is ok to use a dictionary as a source for a definition. It is not ok to claim the event X was (or was not) collaboration based on your own logical conclusion from what the dictionary says. If reputable sources call someone Nazi collaborator, and if this collaboration passes our notability criteria, it should be described in the article as such.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:00, 12 September 2019 (UTC)
Looking at Nug's comments, I think we have to acknowledge that there is a somewhat fuzzy definition of what a collaborator is. We have a dictionary definition (but that relies on what you understand by the word "traitorous" - which is a matter of opinion - often the opinion of the victor). For instance, the Imperial War Museum photo library has film of the female consorts of German soldiers having their heads shaved - they are labelled as collaborators ([2]). People in occupied territories knew collaboration when they saw it: "On 20 May 1941 almost three thousand [French] people attempted to protest against the Vichy regime’s policy of collaboration." (Hellwinkel, Lars. Hitler's Gateway to the Atlantic: German Naval Bases in France 1940-1945 . Seaforth Publishing. This is a book that has an entire chapter titled "the Significance of French Collaboration".) The French dockyard workers were a major part of the effort to keep the Battle of the Atlantic going. This is definitely war work (in that the Geneva Convention would not allow POWs to do it). A few of these Naval Arsenal personnel objected and were allowed to leave to the Vichy area. Most stayed at work, of their own free will. Then you have to consider the military impact, as per this Kriegsmarine opinion: "..... if the French left, all repairs on surface ships would come to a standstill, and U-boat repairs would be cut by up to 30 per cent." (same source) And note, this is the German navy considering the possibility that the French workforce might stop work (as a result of deaths in air raids). As for railway workers, I think many people would say that driving a train bound for a concentration camp is collaboration, but not so for one taking German soldiers home on leave. Again, a matter of opinion - and unfortunately Wikipedia is not very good at handling "shades of grey" and is a lot happier with black and white. But the definition of collaboration should not exclude those voluntarily doing war work - like essential repairs to warships. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 08:33, 12 September 2019 (UTC)
Re "This is definitely war work (in that the Geneva Convention would not allow POWs to do it)" If I understand that correctly, they were not POWs, they were emploryees of shipyards, and they were doing the same work as before the occupation. I doubt it would be easy for them to find another job in that situation. Again, I see not much difference between a military shipyard worker and just a civilian railway worker, or even a farmer. The border between collaboration and understandable attempts to survive was really thin in Nazi occupied Europe.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:00, 12 September 2019 (UTC)
"...war work...". Those involved in these situations probably saw them more clearly than we can now. So, when French engineering officers refused to help salvage the scuttled French destroyer Cyclone for the Kriegsmarine, they saw this order as action to help the Germans in the conduct of the war. POWs recognised these sort of situations clearly (which is why I mentioned them) - for instance Sam Kydd refusing to dig trenches for German troops preparing to receive a Russian counter-attack (he rapidly changed his mind, which is why he lived to write about it) - but the Geneva Convention gives useful guidance on what is "war work". (Kydd's fellow prisoners did lots of farm work for the Germans, but never suggested that was "war work".) The Scharnhorst would probably have been decommissioned in Brest if French shipyard workers had not renewed her defective boiler tubes: the necessity of this work was apparent to all dock workers at Brest because the defective tubes were dumped on the quayside for all to see. French workers converted trawlers into armed trawlers; they worked on the engines of German auxiliary cruiser Widder in October 1940; the completion of machinery repairs to the destroyer Richard Beitzen in January 1941 had only been possible with recourse to the workshops of the French arsenal; they serviced and repaired pumps and other vital machinery on U-boats.
Those individual decisions to work for the Germans are, to some extent, a matter of conscience for the employee. They were exposed to a change in circumstances - their ultimate employer was now doing something that they probably did not agree with. The label of "collaborator" has been applied to French naval arsenal employees by those who have studied the subject in detail. (So, I take the view this is WP:RS based.) Furthermore, I don't think any allied merchant seaman who was torpedoed in the Battle of the Atlantic would disagree with that label if he knew who had repaired machinery for the U-boat or mixed the concrete for the U-boat pen. Think again to the link to the IWM film of French girlfriends of Germans having their heads shaved. What effect did they have on the outcome of the war? (Very little, I suggest.) But they were labelled as collaborators then (and now, by the indexing of the UK's national museum of warfare - surely an impeccable source). This is why the full range of meaning of this word is so important for the reader of Wikipedia to take on board. It would be a deficient encyclopedia if that range was not apparent.ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 19:37, 12 September 2019 (UTC)
Your statement that "People in occupied territories knew collaboration when they saw it" is precisely my point about traitorous co-operation. Take the case of the Baltic states. During the Soviet occupation most Baltic government members and the entire military high command were deported and/or executed. The subsequent arrival of German forces was initially seen as liberation from that Soviet occupation, while those who had cooperated with the Soviet occupation forces were seen as Soviet collaborators. When it became apparent that the Germans had no interest in restoring Baltic independence those members of the Baltic government that had survived the Soviet occupation went underground and passively opposed German rule and the Germans had to to resort to increasingly draconian measures to get the populace to cooperate. By 1944, when it was clear that Germany was in retreat and the threat of Soviet re-occupation was imminent, those underground governments came out in support of the German mobilisation call and at that time many were conscripted into the Baltic Waffen-SS legions. This is in contrast to Dutch or Norwegian case, where their governments from the outset militarily opposed the German invasion, and thus those Dutch and Norwegian citizens who subsequently joind the Waffen-SS were seen as traitors by their own people. In the case of the Baltic states, it is clear that those who cooperated with the Nazis in implementing their racist policies betrayed that section of their own citizenry who happened to be Jewish traitorously cooperated with the Germans and thus were collaborationist. However the cooperation of those who joined the German military to oppose the Soviet occupation, particularly after the call by those surviving members of the last legitimate government before that occupation, wasn't considered traitorous by the Baltic people. --Nug (talk) 22:43, 12 September 2019 (UTC)
I don't think the Baltic story is a good example. It is a very specific case that in many aspects cannot be generalized. In addition, the rest of the Western world has a lot of questions to how the people in Baltic state approach the collaboration issue, including their view of Holocaust participation. I suggest you not to open this can of worms on this talk page.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:11, 13 September 2019 (UTC)
To take up Nug's point: the history of conflict tends to be written by the victors - and this is the way the label collaborator often gets applied. It is similar to: your "terrorist" is my "freedom fighter". Perhaps Wikipedia should, in complex situations like this, use language like "...[people from group X] were viewed as collaborators by [group Y] for assisting [group Z]...".ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 07:44, 13 September 2019 (UTC)
Indeed you are correct. I'm not sure what questions Paul Siebert was alluding to. The issues of the Holocaust in the Baltics has been comprehensively covered in reliable sources, I know of no open questions in that regard. It isn't really such a specific case. It was Soviet aggression in 1939 following the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact that drove the Finns to militarily support the Germans, the same with respect to the Baltic states. The bigger question in the West is the extent of Soviet collaboration with the Nazis via the German–Soviet Credit Agreement (1939), the German–Soviet Commercial Agreement (1940) and the German–Soviet Border and Commercial Agreement. While French workers repaired Nazi warships, Soviet oil fueled the Luftwaffe and U-Boats in their attacks on Britain. --Nug (talk) 07:56, 13 September 2019 (UTC)
This sort of parsing is unnecessary if we use academic-quality reliable sources that are independent of the subject (generally not heavily weighting sources from the country being discussed, as there is almost always a certain amount of bias in local sources, and some of the local and emigre historiography is heavily biased and virtually unusable). Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 08:03, 13 September 2019 (UTC)
Agreed. With regard to Nug's point, which seems to be a view of a significant part of local Baltic people, it has some obvious logical flaws. It contains mutually inconsistent statements:
  1. Collaboration is only traitorius cooperation with the enemy (i.e. cooperation agains interests of one's nation);
  2. Baltic people were forced to serve in WaffenSS;
  3. They fought bravely against the Soviets, and they did that consciously, because to stop Soviets was in interests of their own nations. That is why they should not be considered collaborators, and shoukld be considered freedom fighters;
  4. That does not make them Nazi collaborators, because they were forced to serve in WaffenSS, whereas the Baltic states themselves declared neutrality.
Obviously, this local POV is totally ridiculous, and the attempt to change global views of collaboration to accommodate Baltic vision is hardly correct. In that situation, an outside opinion has much bigger weight. A good summary of the situation is provided by, e.g. Yehuda Bauer here. He correctly points out that the attempts to equate Stalinist and Nazi policy in Baltics are totally incorrect, whereas teh attempt to represent pro-Communist Baltic people as traitors are incorrect, for local Communists were quite influential, and many Baltic Communists emigrated to USSR after the civil war was lost.
In addition, ThoughtIdRetired's analogy with terrorism is hardly frelevant here, because the term "terrorism" is really poorly defined, in contrast to collaboration. And yes, history is usually written by victors, but in this situation the victors are anti-Axis coalition, and I don't see why they cannot decide who was collaborating and who was not. (We are not going to promote pro-Nazi views here, aren't we?)--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:31, 13 September 2019 (UTC)
My dear fellow, Paul Siebert (talk), I should hope not. The historians/writers referenced are pretty straightforward regarding defining collaboration and in keeping with the article's wording. Also, do you think it flows easier? It's a bit lighter and more coherent now (see your sandbox)? Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 21:16, 13 September 2019 (UTC)

The assertion that local sources or emigre historiography is heavily biased as to be useless at face value seems reasonable enough, but I don't think anyone is using such sources, if they exist. WP:RS gives us sufficient tools to assess the reliability of sources without having to add the author's ethnicity into the mix however. Latvian emigre Andrew Ezergailis is one of the leading scholars on the Holocaust in Latvia, there is nothing I have seen that calls his work into question. If we go down that slippery slope we would have to treat authors like Rolf-Dieter Müller with caution with respect to German military history because he is, well, a German. Paul Siebert's contention that his dot points represent "a view of a significant part of local Baltic people" isn't really supported by the Yehuda Bauer source. Bauer mentions the equation of Soviet and Nazi genocide but we are not discussing that here. Bauer does discuss collaboration, but in the context of the Holocaust (which I don't think anyone is disputing), the only mention he makes of the Baltic Waffen-SS units was to say they were formed by conscription after all the Jews were of all intents and purposes annihilated. If he is referring to me as "local Baltic people", then that simply isn't the case, like Peacemaker67 I am Australian. The dot points are supported by reliable sources independent of the subject, for example Richard Rashke writes in his book Useful Enemies: America's Open-Door Policy for Nazi War Criminals

"In September 1950, the DPC made a controversial decision that opened America’s door for a group of Latvian and Estonian Waffen SS who had survived the war. In doing so, the DPC was following the lead of both the Nuremberg tribunal and the U.S. High Commission in Germany. Both bodies had ruled that the 30,000 Estonian and 60,000 Latvian soldiers who had served in the Baltic Legions were conscripts, not volunteers. For that reason, Nuremberg and the High Commission defined them as freedom fighters protecting their homelands from a Soviet invasion and another Soviet communist occupation. As such, they were not true members of the criminal Waffen SS."

No one can accuse Richard Rashke of being connected with any Baltic emigre historiography and as a journalist I think he is sufficiently qualified to report the post-war judgement by the victors (being the anti-Axis coalition) on the issue and certainly not a pro-Nazi view. I agree the term "collaboration" is better defined than "terrorism", as the Oxford English Dictionary demonstates. --Nug (talk) 03:51, 14 September 2019 (UTC)

I think the status of the Estonian Waffen-SS is slightly more nuanced than "they were all conscripts", despite Nuremberg. This has been under discussion at Talk:20th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (1st Estonian), and recent expansion of the article makes this clear. There were substantial numbers of volunteers in the units that were absorbed by the legion, brigade and division, although the numbers were made up by a large amount of conscripts, particularly later in the war. Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 05:44, 14 September 2019 (UTC)
Yes, it is indeed more nuanced. Equally we cannot say "they were all collaborators" either. --Nug (talk) 06:12, 14 September 2019 (UTC)
I didn't say we could. The Estonian Waffen-SS volunteers certainly were collaborators though, regardless of why they volunteered, they still chose to strengthen the Germans against the Soviet Union, which is the essence of collaboration. You can't say the same of the conscripts, as they had no choice. Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 06:21, 14 September 2019 (UTC)
The original 500 volunteers that joined Estonian Legion in 1942 were certainly collaborators as they were enamoured by Nazi ideology, since the majority of others chose to join the Wehrmacht instead. The Legion was then increased to 1280 with draftees from the police forces, certainly a number of those would have been implicated in war crimes during their time in the police. The Legion was transformed into a Brigade with an additional 5,300 conscripts in 1943. Then it was expanded again in 1944 into a division with the addition of a significant proportion of the 38,000 conscripts drafted that year. So of the nominal 15,000 men (plus the roughly 9,000 replacements for losses), at most probably 500-1000 were actually real volunteers, assuming all survived until 1944.
The essence of collaboration is cooperation with the enemy. Anyone subscribing to Nazi ideology, implementing the Holocaust or other war crimes would be considered an enemy of humanity, let alone an enemy of the anti-Axis coalition, and those that cooperated in those crimes were most definitely Nazi collaborators. But given the deep cultural affinity (Lutheranism being the predominant religion and German being the language of administration and education for hundreds of years prior to independence) Germany wasn't considered the enemy in the defence against the Soviet Union given the experience of the Soviet occupation in 1940, and those soldiers were not considered Nazi collaborators by HICOG as Gerald Steinacher writes in Humanitarians at War: The Red Cross in the Shadow of the Holocaust. --Nug (talk) 07:48, 14 September 2019 (UTC)
It is a little more complex than your numbers indicate. The legion/brigade/division was expanded using quite a significant number of units that were originally drawn from volunteers. The original Security/Eastern/Estonian battalions, the original Schuma/Estonian Police battalions, the Finnish battalion and the returning Narwa battalion were all drawn from volunteers. There were no doubt other volunteers. Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 08:08, 14 September 2019 (UTC)
However the Nurmemburg ruling relates to direct volunteers into the Waffen-SS. They didn't consider it criminal to volunteer for units of the Police or Wehrmacht, and the men subsequently had no choice when their units were folded into the Waffen-SS in 1944. Finnish battalion was originally formed from draft dodgers of the 1943 conscription call (a call explicitly for the SS brigade), and returned to Estonia following the 1944 general mobilsation call, not all 38,000 drafted went into the Waffen-SS, they had no choice where they ended up. --Nug (talk) 08:37, 14 September 2019 (UTC)
I'm not talking about criminality, I'm talking about collaboration. Volunteering for the police or Wehrmacht is still collaboration. Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 09:09, 14 September 2019 (UTC)
Not according to Rolf-Dieter Müller in The Unknown Eastern Front: The Wehrmacht and Hitler's Foreign Soldiers, p258:
"It is evident that the common notion of ‘collaboration’ is unsuited to capturing the phenomenon of foreign ‘helpers’ in Hitler’s Wehrmacht in all their varieties and complexity. Unpolitical in it literal meaning (‘to work together’), during the war the term came to be used by the anti-Hitler coalition as a label for the enemy - the purported traitors in their own ranks or from the occupied territories."
As I've been saying, nobody saw fighting the Soviets as traitorous, so the epithet "collaborator" isn't really applicable. However, the question of whether or not these eastern volunteers to Wehrmacht can be called collaborators is moot, since once they were drafted into the Waffen-SS division in 1944 any remaining choice was taken away. --Nug (talk) 12:06, 14 September 2019 (UTC)
Well, I see only two possibilities (correct me if I am wrong):
  1. Baltic citizens were forced to fight Soviets, they did that against their will and not in interest of their nations. Therefore, they were collaborators, although this collaboration was forceful, similar to collaboration of POWs, so it was not collaboration sensu stricto.
  2. The fight against the Soviets did not contradict to the interests of the Baltic nations, and, therefore, the Baltic conscripts should not be considered as collaborators. In that case, the whole nation should be considered Nazi collaborator or Nazi co-belligerent, despite declared neutrality.
As I already explained, I see no other ways to present the Baltic case. The historiography of Baltic nations is attempting to combine both views ("they were acting in interests of their own nation, but they did not collaborate with Nazi"), which is a totall nonsense from the point of view of formal logic. Moreover, taking into account that many Estonians obeyed German orders because their leaders instructed them to join Wehrmacht (or, at least, not to evade the conscription), it would be more correct to move the story of Estonians fighting in Eastern front to the "Collaboration" section.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:08, 14 September 2019 (UTC)
Baltic Waffen-SS veterans guarding top Nazis during the Nuremberg Trials.
It has nothing to do with the "historiography of Baltic nations". We can't ignore sources like the OED, Rolf-Dieter Müller and the conclusions of the Nuremburg trails, and instead present a false dilemma as a "point of view of formal logic". We even have photographic evidence that veterans of Baltic Waffen-SS divisions were not considered Nazi collaborators. --Nug (talk) 20:01, 14 September 2019 (UTC)
The Nuremberg trial's documents, as well as this photo are just primary sources. Political situation in 1946, when tensions were growing between former Allies, dictated some steps that may be considered questionable now. Regarding "false dilemma", by labelling it as such you by no means refuted it.
Regarding "historiography of Baltic nations", yes, that is definitely what is happening: there is a worrying tendency in some EE states to understate their own collaboration during WWII. Equation of Nazism and Communism is a part of these efforts (see the source I cited).
And, yes, the international community DOES have many questions to how the WWII history and Holocaust in particular are described in Baltic states, and I can present quite reliable sources to support this my statement. --Paul Siebert (talk) 20:28, 14 September 2019 (UTC)
PS. I checked the image, a description says "baltic guards" (not ex-WaffenSS). In addition, the link is dead. Since it was you who uploaded this image, could you please provide a correct link to a source, and double check the original description? If not, I'll take some steps to fix it by myself.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:39, 14 September 2019 (UTC)
PPS. A brief google scholar search provides no information about ex Waffen SS guards at Nuremberg. A google search gives a reference to the Holocaust memorial site, where they speak about "Baltic guards", without any connection to their Nazi past. Don't you mind to drop a link? This claom definitely needs a solid verefication.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:41, 14 September 2019 (UTC)
In one Master Thesis, I found a notion that ex-Latvian legionnaries served as guards at Nuremberg, and:
"... on September 2, 1946, US 3rd Army HQ in Heidelberg, Germany in its decree No. 29 to all US units in area publicized a statement recognizing the Latvian and Estonian Waffen–SS units that fought against the Red Army as separate from both Waffen–SS and Wehrmacht entities." (ref to Mirdza Kate Baltais, The Latvian Legion: Selected Documents (Toronto: Amber Printers and Publishers, 1999) pp 94-5)
The problem is, however, that you mix collaboration and military crimes. It was quite normal to utilize ex-Axis personnel and ex-collaborators for some purposes. Second, the decree No. 29 said that the Legion was not considered as hostile by the US. Meanwhile, that does not mean that the Legion was not hostile to all Allies. For example, Spain was not at war with Britain and US, but it was de facto at war with the USSR. Finland was at war with the USSR, but not with US. That does not mean Finland was not the Axis co-belligerent. Participation in hostilities with one Ally on the Axis side is a collaboration, and we have sources that support this statement.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:56, 14 September 2019 (UTC)

Regarding war crimes, it seems Nuremberg trial is not the last word (as I suspected). Thus L. Kazyrytski in his article published in Criminal Law Forum (2016) 27:361–385Ó (DOI 10.1007/s10609-016-9286-3) analyses all evidences and concludes:

"Nowadays, despite a broad consensus in the academic environment (my emphasis, P.S.) regarding the admittance of the fact that Latvian police battalions participated in the commission of crimes against the civilpopulation, some researchers insist that the Latvian SS-Legion assuch was not engaged in war crimes and crimes against humanity. Ithas been argued that although Latvian police battalions were activelyinvolved in punitive operations, after the creation of the Latvian SS-Legion in 1943, Latvian soldiers did not participate in any of themand were engaged solely on the battle-front. This position is also based on the assertion that none of the Latvian legionnaires has everbeen hold responsible for crimes committed during the existence of the Legion or on the indication that there was only one case when commission of war crimes was connected with the Latvian SS-Legion.
Thus, in view of the foregoing considerations, there are certain doubts about the objective position, according to which the Latvian SS-Legion should be considered only in the context of military formations. There is much evidence indicating that Latvian legionaries as well as their units were involved in the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, for which reason there arises the need to revise the issue of the glorification of their struggle and the possibility of acknowledging the Latvian SS-Legion as a criminal organisation. Hence, the international community should increase pressure on the Latvian authorities in order to completely ban the annual processions of Waffen-SS legionaries, because it not only impairs the rights of victims of Nazism, but also creates a reliable platform for its rehabilitation."

In other words, not only they were collaborators, they are, most likely, war criminals, and you are advocating a minority (local POV).--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:56, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

Leaving WaffenSS beyond the scope, the article authored by Anton Weiss-Wendt, Uğur Ümit Üngör (Collaboration in Genocide: The Ottoman Empire 1915-1916, the German-Occupied Baltic 1941-1944, and Rwanda (1994) Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Volume 25, Number 3, Winter 2011, pp.404-437) describes Baltic collaboration quite well. I was not going to open this can of worms (and I suggested you not to do that), but you preferred not to listen.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:16, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

Your last sentence ”I was not going to open this can of worms (and I suggested you not to do that), but you preferred not to listen.” Is really quite strange, as if I would personally be worried about the exposure of war crimes of some natives of some far away country, which is just nonsense.
There is nothing new in Leanid Kazyrytski's paper, in which he appears to be advocating re-opening the Nuremberg Trials to revise the result with respect to the Latvian Waffen-SS. Wikipedia isn't a platform for advocacy. It has been long known that while the Latvian Waffen SS divisions were only involved in frontline combat activities, some elements such as former Police battalions that were folded into the Divisions did previously commit war crimes. The Nuremburg Trials did take that into account by limiting the exemption of conscripts from their judgement to those who had not personally committed any war crimes. As I understand it, conscription into the Latvian divisions was even more draconian than in Estonia.
The original photo can be found in the web archive here. There are other related photos here, here and here. There are numerous sources that discuss the utilisation of Baltic Waffen-SS veterans at Nuremberg, for example Prit Buttar writes in ‘’Between Giants: The Battle for the Baltics in World War II’’ p336
”Many of the Latvian and Estonian soldiers who succeeded in surrendering to the Western Powers at the end of the war found themselves deployed in a surprising role, acting as guards during the Nuremberg Trials. Others served as guards of US facilities during the Berlin Blockade, and although the SS was condemned by the Allies as a criminal organisation, exceptions were made for men of non-German nationalities who were conscripted into its ranks.”
The British also utilised former Baltic Waffen-SS men. Of course the allies utilised local de-nazified Germans to assist in the administration of allied-occupied Germany, but not to the extent of re-arming them to guard top Nazis. Can you imagine the Western Allies re-arming veterans of the 3rd SS Panzer Division Totenkopf, let alone the Wehrmacht, to guard top Nazis during the trial? Of course not. Yet the fact that the Allies trusted the veterans of Baltic Waffen-SS divisions underlines the real distinction the Allies drew between them and the Waffen-SS in general. —Nug (talk) 07:49, 15 September 2019 (UTC)
All these arguments have been analyzed in the article I cite. Interestingly, it seems you incorrectly explain the reason why LL was excluded at Nuremberg.
"The only groups of people deemed criminal are those that at the moment of joining the SS and becoming its members had either already committed crimes againstpeace, war crimes and crimes against humanity or knew that this organisation was used for commission of these crimes. However, in the latter case, persons are not liable to criminal persecution if they were forced to join the SS, in violation of Article 23 of the Hague Convention and if they did not commit the specified crimes."
In connection to that, it is interesting to read these quotes:
"In the territory of Latvia, from the first days of occupation byGermans troops, began the creation of so-called police battalions(Lettische Schutzmannschafts-Bataillone) consisting of Latvian citizens, whose main task was to maintain order in occupied territories and fight against any manifestation of resistance against the new regime. Formation of Latvian police battalions was carried out on a voluntary basis, at least within the first 2 years of the occupation. Many Latvians decided to cooperate with the Nazi regime in view of the negative consequences of the Soviet occupation in 1940–1941, when thousands of Latvian citizens fell victims to political repressions. (....)
"The creation of the Legion took place with the support and participation of various Latvian institutions and the Latvian self-administration cooperating with the Nazi regime, who, by taking this step, hoped to obtain greater autonomy for the future Latvian government under the protectorate of Germany.
According to Gimmler’s order issued on 26 May 1943, the Latvian Legion was a collective formation which included all Latvian units subordinate to the SS as well as police formations. This fact is of great importance for assessment of actions implemented by the Legion. It should be taken into consideration that, starting from May 1943, any actions implemented by Latvian police battalions and other Latvian SS-units on the front or in the territory occupied by German troops shouldbe regarded as activities carried out by the Latvian SS-Legion as such.
There exists an opinion that study of activities of the Latvian Legion should be almost exclusively connected with conscription into the 15th and the 19th Latvian SS-Divisions. These divisions were the core element of the Legion and the main participants of battles on the front, which is why it has been suggested to scrutinise activities of theLegion virtually limiting them to the theatre of war. Nevertheless, it should once more be underlined that officially the Latvian Legion included all Latvian units, that is, it is a question of both: military formations deployed on the front and police formations whose main task was to maintain order in the occupied territory and fight against partisans."
The fact that some Baltic military were allowed to be guards at Nuremberg means they were not seen as criminals by US or British administration. That does not impliy that they were not considered as former collaborators, and that LL as whole was not a criminal organization, and that by no means implies there were no massive collaboration between Baltic nationals and Nazi. All authors agree that they had a common goal with Nazi, for a defeat of the Soviets was in their interest, and Nazi Germany was seen as lesser evil. Actually that follows even from what you are saying.
Let me re-iterate, if you read this article in full you see all your arguments have been taken into account and analyzed in by the author, and have been convincingly debunked.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:47, 15 September 2019 (UTC)
Valdis O. Lumans in his book Latvia in World War II on page 490 presents a comprehensive bibliographic survey on literature published in English, German, Latvian and Russian on the Latvian Legion, and addresses what the sources say in regard to whether most members of the Latvian Legion were collaborators:
”And finally, debate goes on about the status of legionnaires - were they collaborators or patriots? These questions may go unanswered for some time - at least not satisfactorily - since an authoritative, balanced work on the Legion is still to be written. Nothing on the Latvian Legion comparable to Ezergailis’s examination of the Holocaust exists. Virtually all existing literature sympathises with the legionnaire dilemma and depicts them mostly as ardent patriots, at worst misguided and naive German sympathisers - except for Soviet accounts that expectedly and unequivocally vilify them as treacherous criminals”
So given Lumans’s bibliographic survey, it would seem Leanid Kazyrytski’s POV is clearly in the minority. --Nug (talk) 03:12, 16 September 2019 (UTC)
Yes, from the viewpoint of some Baltic scholars, their views represent majority, and the views of their compatriots' victims, as well as the views of foreign authors in general, are minority. A brief look at the Luman's Bibliography section shows that about 80-90% of all authors he cites have a Baltic origin (the chapter about the Holocaust is an exception). In contrast, the literature cited by Kazyrytski includes:
Report on Latvia of European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, CRI(2012) 3, Fourth monitoring cycle (9 December 2011)http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Latvia/Latvia_CBC_en.aspaccessed 30 March2015. C. MuddeÔRacist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe’East EuropeanPolitics and Societies19 (2) (2005) 161–184, p. 171.E. Anders,Amidst Latvians during the Holocaust(Riga: Occupation Museum Association of Latvia, 2011); I. Feldmanis,The Latvian Legion: the Most TopicalResearch Problems, Lecture at the opening of the 7th volume of the Works of theInternational Committee of Historians, (Ministry of foreign affairs of the Republicof Latvia, 2003)http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/information-on-the-history-of-latviaaccessed 30 March 2015; I. Feldmanis,ÔLatvia under the Occupation of NationalSocialist Germany 1941–1945’, in V. Nollendorfs and E. Oberla ̈nder (eds),TheHidden and Forbidden History of Latvia under Soviet and Nazi Occupations 1940–1991, Selected Research of the Commission of the Historians of Latvia(Riga: Instituteof the History of Latvia, 2005) 77–91; and I. Feldmanis and K. Kangeris,TheVolunteer SS Legion in Latvia, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic ofLatvia, 2014)http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/information-on-the-history-of-latviaaccessed 30 March 2015. Anders (n. 4 above); Feldmanis (n. 4 above); I. Feldmanis,ÔWaffen-SS Units ofLatvians and Other Non-Germanic Peoples in World War II: Methods of Forma-tion, Ideology and Goals’, in V. Nollendorfs and E. Oberla ̈nder (eds.),The Hiddenand Forbidden History of Latvia under Soviet and Nazi Occupations 1940–1991, Se-lected Research of the Commission of the Historians of Latvia, (Riga: Institute of theHistory of Latvia, 2005) 122–131; and Feldmanis and Kangeris (n. 4 above); V.Lacis,The Latvian Legion according to Independent Observers(Latvian Relief Soci-ety, 2006).11A. Ezergalis,The Latvian Legion: Heroes, Nazis, or Victims? A Collection ofDocuments from OSS War-Crimes Investigation Files,1945–1950(Riga: The His-torical Institute of Latvia, 1997) 94. A. Ezergailis,ÔCollaboration in German Occupied Latvia: Offered and Re-jected’, in A. Cune, I.Feldmanis, H. Strods and I. Sˇneidere (eds.),Latvia under nazigerman occupation 1941–1945,Materials of an International Conference 12–13 June2003,Vol.11 (Riga: Latvijas Universit�ates Latvijas vestures instituts, 2004) 119–140;V. Lumans,Latvia in World War II(Fordham University Press, 2006) 139; and V.Rolmane,ÔThe resistance in Latvia Turing the Nazi occupation (July 1941–May1945)Ô, in A. Anusˇauskas (ed)The Anti —Soviet resistance in the Baltic States(Vilnius: Pasauliui Apie Mus, 2006) 131–148.18Anders (n. 4 above) 48; and S. Drobiazko,Pod Znamenami Vraga. AntisovetskieFormirovanija v Sostave Germanskih Vooruzhennyh Sil 1941–1945(Moskva: Eksmo,2005) 245.19K. Kangeris, K.,ÔClosed’ Units of Latvian Police –Lettische Schutz-mannschafts-Bataillone: Research Issues and Pre-History’, in V. Nollendorfs and E.Oberla ̈nder (eds.),The Hidden And Forbidden History Of Latvia Under Soviet AndNazi Occupations 1940–1991, Selected Research of the Commission of the Historiansof Latvia, Vol. 14 (Riga: Institute of the History of Latvia, 2005) 104–121; andLumans (n. 13 above) 266.20A. Zunda,ÔCollaboration in German-Occupied Latvia: assessments of the his-torical literature’, in D. Gaunt, P. A. Levine and L. Palosuo (eds.), Collaboration andResistance during the Holocaust: Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania(Peter Lang,2004) 111–126. (I copypasted just a fraction of references, because they were presented as footnotes, not as a separate list)
This list includes Lumans's book too, by the way. Clearly, this list is more balanced, because it includes, for example, modern Belorussian sources (Belorussia is the country that suffered the most at hands of Latvian collaborators, and the opinion of Belorussians on LL is as important as an opinion of Jews on SS.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:45, 16 September 2019 (UTC)
The same author correctly notes that Nuremberg verdict should not be considered as an unequivocal proof, because:
"By the time the Nuremberg Trials were opened, there was not enough information about the engagement of the LatvianSS-Legion in the commission of war crimes and crimes againsthumanity. The main aim of the Nuremberg Tribunal was to condemnthe Nazi regime and the SS organisation as such as well as their seniorofficers and commanders.
He also argues that the US authorities were not interested to investigate the truth about LL, because:
"... after the end of World War II many former legionaries found shelter in western countries, including the USA, where they created various organisations used for propaganda purposes against the USSR in the context of the cold war. In this regard, it is no wonder that in the 1950s the Senate and the Congress of the USA singled out Latvian SS-units from other Waffen-SS formations and highlighted the fact that they had been formedin a different way.
He also correctly notes that to conseal Baltic collaboration was in Soviet interests too:
"...it should also be taken into consideration that after the war the Soviet authorities were not interested in the search for the whole truth regarding the degree of collaboration of some republics of the USSR. The aim of the Soviet ideology was to present all the socialist republics in the context of complete unity in the fight against the enemy. That is why the low degree of attention paid by the mass media and the justice system to the Latvian collaboration was conditioned by the ideological function, i.e. not to discredit the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic and its people in the fight against Nazism.
To summarise, the author identifies a number of reasons why the collaboration of Baltic nationals with Nazi was dramatically underestimated during Cold war era literature.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:03, 16 September 2019 (UTC)
Oh, okay, I didn’t know the authors Valdis O. Lumans cites in his literature survey, like Alexander Pronin, Heinz Kuhnrich, Leonid Grenkevich, Matthew Cooper, John Armstrong, Werner Haupt, Rodger Bender, Hugh Taylor, etc, etc, etc, are all Latvian scholars writing about their compatriots. --Nug (talk) 04:13, 16 September 2019 (UTC)
Don't twist my words. This book is about Latvia in WWII, not about LL. I would like to see proofs that the section about Latvian collaboration is written from international (not only Latvian) perspective.
In contrast, the work I cite is written specifically about LL and collaboration, it is more recent, it was published in a peer-reviewed journal dedicated to the advancement of criminal law theory, practice, and reform throughout the world, and the author is a lecturer at the Law school. I think that is sufficient to believe the publication has to be treated seriously.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:24, 16 September 2019 (UTC)
You do understand what a literature survey is don't you? Lumans devotes a chapter to the published bibliography on the topic of Latvia in WW2, including the Holocaust and the Latvian Legion. And you do know that the aim of scholars like Kazyrytski is to publish new and novel perspectives in peer-reviewed journals to maintain tenure, and thus does not necessarily represent the majority viewpoint. --Nug (talk) 04:44, 16 September 2019 (UTC)
"....to maintain tenure" is an oxymoron, do you understand that? As you probably know, tenure is not something that needs efforts to maintain. In addition, if his views contradicted to a mojority viewpoint, he would openly write that "in this article, I am challenging the existing viewpoint about ....".
Let's return to the Luman's statement:
"Virtually all existing literature sympathises with the legionnaire dilemma and depicts them mostly as ardent patriots, at worst misguided and naive German sympathisers - except for Soviet accounts that expectedly and unequivocally vilify them as treacherous criminals”
It's first part implies that fighting at Nazi side was seen patriotic. Doesn't it mean Latvian society was de facto Nazi ally?
Regarding Soviet historiography, whereas it is correct that in rare cases when LL was mentioned in the works of Soviet historians or in mass media they were depicted as Nazi collaborators and criminals. However, similar to the OUN case, the main tendency of Soviet historiography was to understate the degree of collaboration, for the reason described by Kazyrytski. --Paul Siebert (talk) 09:28, 16 September 2019 (UTC)
Kazyrytski's assertion about the Soviets understating the degree of collaboration is hogwash, and is easily contradicted by numerous scholars. For example Eva-Clarita Pettai in Memory and Pluralism in the Baltic States writes of fifty years of Soviet memory manipulation and historical falsification to the extent that the Soviet stereotype of the "Baltic fascists" is still to be found to this present day on internet forums and blogs (and no doubt on Wikipedia talk pages too). While Rolf-Dieter Müller writes in The Unknown Eastern Front:
"For Stalin, these were criminal activities by treasonous Soviet citizens. The term ‘collaboration’ had already acquired a negative connotation among the anti-Hitler coalition during World War II. The image of homegrown fascists, mercenaries and traitors has continued to hold in Western scholarship and was thoroughly cultivated for half a century by Soviet historical propaganda."
It is now clear that the accepted definition of the term ‘collaborator’ in the context of WW2 is that of fascist, mercenary and traitor. We already have a reliably sourced literature search by Lumans that says most of the published sources agree that the majority of members of the Baltic Waffen-SS divisions were not considered collaborators. Like it or not, that is the majority viewpoint per Wikipedia policies. --Nug (talk) 03:00, 17 September 2019 (UTC)
Taking into account Lumans's own personal history, a possibility cannot be ruled out that this author may be (but not necessarily is) biased. To check that, I made a very brief jstor serach, and the second review on his book (the first one was in German) says:
Indeed, it is not so much that Lumans is loyal to the myths of Latvian history his even handed approach towards those who fought on both sides of the Second World War and his denunciation of Ulmanis belie such an accusation-the problem is that Lumans remains loyal to some of the myth-makers of Latvian history. Lumans is well-versed in material published up to the turn of the twentieth century, but, although works are cited between the years 2001 and 2005 he is clearly more comfortable with elderly emigre texts and these keep featuring at key moments of his narrative. The serial publications of the Latvian Historical Commission, the most important source for re-evaluating Latvian history during the past decade, are scarcely referred to. This is a great pity. Although Lumans is determined to remove the myths from Latvia's history, several myths are perpetuated in this book and that seriously weakens this ambitious account." (Reviewed Work(s): Latvia in World War II by Valdis Lumans. Review by: Geoffrey Swain. Source: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 6 (Sep., 2007), pp. 1057-1059).
I think that puts all dots on "i".--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:43, 17 September 2019 (UTC)
It seems this content is more relevant to my sandbox

Collaboration

The amount of work is impressive, but I have a feeling majority of that the text should go to another, more specialized article. Bigeez, just make an experiment: create a sandbox and move the whole WWII article there. Then add your text to it, and let's see how the article will look like. I am pretty sure the whole article's structure will be imbalanced and distorted. --Paul Siebert (talk) 04:09, 11 September 2019 (UTC)

First

“The final verdict on how well we withstand the moral and ethical challenges of the war is not that of a judge, who determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. But it was — and remains — too easy to blame just Hitler and the Nazis.”

Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War Il, Chapter 1, p. 38 — István Deák


Collaboration is commonly used as a moniker for cooperating with the enemy, and to deny its existence would deny the complete history of World War II.[1][2][3][4][5] ‘‘Collaboration’’ is a cooperation between the vanquished territories and the Axis Powers[6][7] since the German Army needed local collaboration[8][9] for some degree of control.[10] Many were impelled by various motives and eager to collaborate;[11][12] some with reservations, others by force, and many by deception.[13][14][15] Collaboration consisted primarily in participation of hostilities on the Axis side. Nazi ideology-driven collaboration was a factor, of which there are four main reasons: 1) support for Nazi-fascist culture, 2) antisemitism, 3) anticommunism, and 4) a nationalistic desire for establishing an independent fascist-type state.[16][17] At times, there was a combination or shared beliefs in antisemitism, hatred of Soviet communism, enthusiasm for National Socialist ideology, and hope for a united Europe under German Supremacy.[18][19][20][21] Operation Barbarossa initiated collaboration on a scale which could not be compared to in Northern or Western Europe[22][23] and assumed an ethnic character. Ukrainians, the Baltic states, Caucasians, Russians and members of some Asian nationalities assembled ethnic units and served the Germans as armed militiamen,[24] as seen with Ukrainian, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian policemen.[25] Auxiliary forces patrolled the shores (Schutzkommandos) while others were concentration camp guards; low-level administrators and professionals cooperated as well.[26] Waffen-SS volunteers formed divisions, brigades, legions, or battalions bearing the names of historical heroes, as seen in the Croatian/Bosnian Muslim, Scandinavian, Dutch, Belgian, and French.[27] Workers and laborers survived the occupation in factories, the docks, train stations and airfields.[28] The British (Singapore)[29] and American (Philippines) colonies[30] could not resist.[31] See Collaborationism and Collaboration during World War II

Discussion

I don't think we can include the quote, that contradicts to the overall article's style. I also think the para should be reduced to just 1-2 sentences. It is absolutely necessary to explain the reasons for collaboration and remove concrete examples leaving just the most important ones, because otherwise they will be permanent seeds of conflicts ("why you include this but exclude that?"). The text should be something like:

"During the war, large territories were under Axis occupation, so collaboration consisted primarily in participation of hostilities on the Axis side. The factors driving collaboration included: 1) support for Nazi-fascist culture, 2) antisemitism, 3) anticommunism, and 4) a nationalistic desire for establishing an independent fascist-type state.[32][33] At times, there was a combination or shared beliefs in antisemitism, hatred of Soviet communism, enthusiasm for National Socialist ideology, and hope for a united Europe under German Supremacy.[34][35][36][37] Operation Barbarossa initiated collaboration on a scale which could not be compared to in Northern or Western Europe[38][39].

"and assumed an ethnic character" is incorrect, because, e.g., the Serbo-Croatian conflict started before Barbarossa.

I don't claim this text is the only text that should stay, I am just trying to show what, in my opinion, is the most essential part of the paragraph and give an idea on how the paragraph can be made shorter.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:09, 11 September 2019 (UTC)

Second

The first reason for ideology-driven collaboration, Nazi-inspired symapthies, evolved after World War I[40][41][42] with the dissolution of the Central Powers, multi-nationalism, the collapsed German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires, the partitions of Poland, the rise of communism, sowing the seeds for deep resentment.[43][44][45][46] Collaboration by paramilitary groups or armies which supported Nazi ideology, particularly in Western Europe included France's Marcel Déat and Milice française,[47] the 33rd Waffen SS in France,[48] Belgium's Léon Degrelle and the Légion Wallonie,[49] Norway's Vidkun Quisling[50] with Nordic countries including Denmark, and Dutch Waffen-SS units in the Netherlands.[51][52]

Discussion

Third

The second reason for ideology-driven collaboration was antisemitism and the identification and killing of ethnic and religious groups, or “undesirables,”[53] throughout Europe, particularly in Western Ukraine,[54] Lithuania,[55] and Byelorussia.[56][57] The Holocaust, or the Final Solution to the Jewish Question, and the Third Reich’s determination to murder all the Jews of Europe, developed over time[58] and could never have been accomplished with the “efficiency and completeness that it was without the assistance of many Europeans.”[59][60][61][62] The Trawniki men, Soviet POW’s trained in Western Ukraine, tortured and shot hundreds of thousands of Jews under German supervision.[63][64] Even the Channel Islands cooperated with the Germans who handed the Jews over to the Gestapo.[65] Mass killing of Jews after the start of Operation Barbarossa was perpetrated by specialised troops composed of local volunteers who could not have succeeded without the collaboration of many non-German Europeans.[66] Conversely, the survival of many Jews would have been inconceivable without the opposition of many non-Germans[67][68] who were executed for sheltering Jews.[69][70] Ultimately, those who collaborated in Hitler’s Final Solution did so as “collaborators, cooperators, or as accommodators,”[71] including the Judenrat who served in the Jewish police as spies of German intelligence. However, they “sought to escape their doomed fate and were not committed collaborators.”[72][73][74] Waffen-SS divisions implicated in the persecution and execution of the Roma (Gypsy) and Jews were seen in Eastern European collaborators, Western Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania, France, and Poland, where the highest German-recorded number of Jews were sent to concentration camps, including the Latvian Waffen SS, Estonian Waffen-SS, the paramilitary, and Einsatzgruppen.[75][76]

Discussion

Fourth

The third reason for ideology-driven collaboration was communism. Countries where communism flourished were manipulated by German propagandists igniting ethnic unrest, as in the Baltic countries, Ukraine and Russia. Bronislav Kaminski in Russia’s autonomous Lokot Republic administered an entire district for the Germans.[77] Former military and police fought the communist threat as seen in Latvia’s 2nd SS Infantry Brigade[78] and the Ukrainian Galician Division.[79] Fear of Stalin terror and forced collectivisation, mass executions and deportations inspired many against the Soviets, including the paramilitary groups known as Hilfsfreiwillige,[80] while a Russian army was created within the German Wehrmacht (Vlasov Army).[81][82] In Greece, Ioannis Rallis’ Greek Security Battalions fought communist ELAS partisans.[83][84]

Discussion

Fifth

The fourth reason for ideology-driven collaboration was the desire for establishing an independent fascist state. European countries subsumed by Waffen SS divisions where ideology-driven sympathies festered, aspired to establish an independent fascist country to partner with Nazi Germany. These include Vidkun Quisling in Norway, Ferenc Szálasi in Hungary, Anton Mossert in the Netherlands, Pierre Laval in France, and Stepan Bandera in Ukraine.[85] Auxiliary police (Estonian Auxiliary Police) and paramilitary forces (Einsatzgruppen and Feldgendarmerie), were responsible for containing resistance.[86][87] In the Balkans, Georgios Tsolakoglou of Greece's collaborationist government and the allies of the Axis, such as Slovakia and Croatia, from dismembered Yugoslavia, sought independent fascist states.[88][89][90] The Croatian Handschar Waffen-SS which included Moslems from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavian, and Greek Security Battalions engaged communists. Detention and execution of POWs, either semi-voluntarily or compulsory, also occurred.[91] See Collaboration with the Axis Powers

Discussion

Hello Paul Siebert (talk), I am grateful for your instructions. I have 1) deleted the text boxes, 2) deleted the concrete specifics, and 3) included the Resistance section in a subpage I created on my sandbox with allowance for Discussions. Please continue to advise freely, as well as Nick-D (talk). Without both of your clearsighted and unbiased opinions, I'm afraid we would not be this far along. Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 19:53, 11 September 2019 (UTC)
That is not what I meant. To demonstrate my idea, I created a sandbox in my user space. I added your text as a separate section into the whole article to give you an impression of how will your text look like. Feel free to edit it to bring the C&R section in accordance with the whole article's style.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:21, 11 September 2019 (UTC)
Understood, thank you. Look at sandbox. We can work on it together. Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 21:49, 11 September 2019 (UTC)
You still are not understanding. Format the text exactly as you want it to be shown in the main article, decide if it will be a section, subsection, subsubsection, find the place where it is supposed to be in the article, etc. We need to see how will the article look when (or if) this text will be added there: will it be readable?, will it be balanced?, etc.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:28, 12 September 2019 (UTC)
Hello Paul Siebert (talk), I do apologise for the miscommunication. Please have a look/see on your sandbox. I think where it is currently positioned is quite appropriate, or rather, less perfectly apropos by placing it under "Impact." I feel it flows rather uniformly now. You be the judge. I condensed a few sentences already. I hope we have emulated WS's King Lear, "Have more than thou showest, speak less than thou knowest." Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 18:38, 12 September 2019 (UTC)

Arbitrary break

Bigeez, I think, from what I see in my sandbox it is clear that

  1. C&R takes too much space even in the TOC;
  2. C&R should be in the same section (two separate subsections of the same section);
  3. "Resistance" should say more about Asia (although that can be done by other users and later; we just have to keep that in mind, and leave some space for that)
  4. The role of Britain and US is overemphasized, and the role of Communists (in Italy, Yugoslavia etc) is underemphasized.
  5. Some content from the Course of the war should be moved here: thus, the whole story about Warsaw uprising or Slovak uprising (except a brief mention) should be moved to Resistance, the story of Estonian conscripts should be moved to Collaboration (along with the reservations about a specifics of that case). I also think the separation onto different types of/reasons for collaboration should not be that explicit: this is an encyclopedic article, not a monograph, and in this form, it creates an impression that this classification is universally accepted, which is not necessarily the case.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:27, 13 September 2019 (UTC)
Hello Paul Siebert (talk), getting better all the time ... . Look at your sandbox, some adjustments still required. Thank you for your insightful comments. Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) Bigeez (talk) 16:26, 14 September 2019 (UTC)
Eli, the first two sentences seem not completely correct. You say
"‘Collaboration’’ was the cooperation between the peoples in vanquished territories and the Axis Powers.[297][298] During the war, large territories were under Axis occupation, since the German Army required local collaboration[299][300] for some degree of control."
However, "collaboration" is a much more general term. As I already explained, the Axis occupied large territories at the first period of the war, and these territories were under its control almost until the end of the war (for example, China was still occupied by Japan by the moment it surrendered). In contrast, the Allies did not occupy foreign territories almost until the very end of the war. That is the reson why we can focus on collaboration with the Axis only, not because "collaboration" was defined in that way. That is not what this section says currently.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:52, 14 September 2019 (UTC)
Hello Paul Siebert (talk), I may be mistaken, but we thought we proposed to narrow the scope of this subsection to just collaboration of local population of some occupied or subordinated territory with the enemy. In addition, taking into account that during WWII the foreign territories were occupied primarily by the Axis, we can speak about collaboration with the Axis only. Is the current writing not proposing this? If so, what do you think and what do you have in mind to improve the writing? In other words, what explicit statement would be all-encompassing for what we hope to achieve? Always, I am at your disposal. Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 17:25, 14 September 2019 (UTC)
Yes. However, the first sentence created a wrong impression that the term "Collaboration" means specifically the collaboration of local population with the Axis. Which is not correct. Maybe, we can omit the first sentence completely.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:30, 14 September 2019 (UTC)
Hello Paul Siebert (talk), see your sandbox. I am in agreement. I have deleted the first sentence: it does flow better. The other mentions about the Warsaw uprising, etc., we'll also arrive at a match. Still, let us continue ... . Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 19:40, 14 September 2019 (UTC)
Allow me gentleman, please, to congratulate you all for the time and effort you are all giving in turning this article the finnest possible. From the sandbox I see an extraordinarilly complete article comming out, the result it´s really impressive! It is so nice to have such dedicated editors, thank you so much.
The effort of making a balanced inclusion of all events is really notorious. To turn it even better, I must say I agree with Pauls recomendations, and giving a view on what I am most familiarised with, I must say that Paul is right about the Yugoslav Partisans role being underemphasized. One aspect makes Yugoslav front deserving more mentions, which is that Yugoslavia was the only country in Europe that liberated itself mostly by its own forces. That same fact is the one that gave Tito such a privileged reputation after the war, allowing him to become an independent player during Cold War. By now, Yugoslavia is only mentioned when invaded, and cited in the Soviet intevention, which leaves an unfair impression of Soviet importance, while compared to all other countries, was minimal. Soviets entered Yugoslavia by time Partisans had already put Axis forces on the run. Tito Partisans are important, first, because they burried much more German troops then expected in the Yugoslav front (Seven Enemy Offensives), and then, because progressivelly became a formidable army, one of the strongest in Europe. Soviets, in total sinthony with Tito, only liberated the eastern parts of the country, including the capital Belgrade, and it happened that way only because Tito counted with Soviets backing for his acceptance as leader after betraying the agreement with Allies of sharing power with the government-in-exile and proclaiming absolute power and eliminating and executing Mihailovic and other Chetnik leaders which were the forces monarchists had on the field. For Tito, it was much easier to take full power and justify Chetniks elimination with Soviets presents backing him up, then without them. Till then, Partisans were notable for the major defeats inflicted on Germans, while Chetniks operated on their own strategy, becoming notable for their rescue of Allied pilots during last years of the war (in my view this would be worth mention). Yugoslav Partisans participated in what was the last of all battles of WWII, the Battle of Odžak. Partisans are also considered by some historians to be the most effective resistance movement. They definitelly deserve at least a few more mentions because from Brittish or American perspective they may seem less relevant, but for much of Central, Eastern and Mediterranean Europe, directly, or indirectly, they had quite an impact. Let me know if anyhow I can help, best regards, FkpCascais (talk) 05:38, 14 September 2019 (UTC)
Hello FkpCascais (talk), thank you. Without unfailing support from participants like you, we would be amiss. Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 16:26, 14 September 2019 (UTC)
FkpCascais, regarding Soviet importance, you are not completely right. Whereas it is correct that Yugoslav partisans were tying down substantial amount of Wehrmacht troops, however, the primary reason of German defeat in Yugoslavia was that there was a danger that German troops would be cut from Germany due to the advance of the Red army in Romania, Bulgaria and Austria. Yes, partisans liberated Yugoslavia mostly by themselves, an the military role of the Red Army in Yugoslavia was less important. However, liberation of Yugoslavia became possible only because of the events that happened north of Yugoslavia.
It is, probably, correct to say that partisans made greater contribution in liberation of Yugoslavia that Free French in liberation of France, but mostly because the Balkan theatre was seen as unimportant by OKH, as a result of Soviet advance.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:07, 14 September 2019 (UTC)
Oh Paul Siebert, I agree, Soviets influenced the outcome without any doubts, specially having in mind that in Yalta it was agreed that in Yugoslavia the power was to be shared 50%-50% between Tito and the monarchist government-in-exile. Tito took advantage of the Soviet presence in Belgrade to betray the agreement and take all power to himself. The outcome was Yugoslavia becoming a communist regime. What I was reffering is that in comparison with other countries, Soviets were much less influencial in liberating the country from Germans and their allies. By time Soviets arrived much of the country was already liberated, and Allied victory in Yugoslavia was guaranteed. Soviets arrived in a time when Partisans and Chetniks were pushing Germans out and Soviet presence just accelerated events. Although there were joint actions of Chetniks and Soviets against Germans, it became clear Soviet presence favoured Partisans and gave them the support needed for making the overthrowing of the monarchy and the communist revolution. The article was leaving much more the idea that Soviets liberated Yugoslavia, a description which is correct to most other countries in which Soviets played a crucial role, while in Yugoslav case this ends up being a bit unfair, since underemphasizes Yugoslav resistance and fails to point out Soviets were influential in a different aspect, helping communists take all power. FkpCascais (talk) 17:31, 15 September 2019 (UTC)
Imo, the difference between Yugoslav partisans and, e.g. Home Army, was that Poland was situated between Germany and USSR, so this direction was strategically important. That is why the amount of German troops always was very significant there. That is why Warsaw uprising was doomed. In contrast, there was no reason to spend very limited resources to hold Yugoslavia, so the troops stationed there had limited reinforcement, and that is why partisans were capable of liberating themselves. It is correct that they did it, by and large, by themselves, but that became possible due to a combination of several factors, one of them was the Soviet offensives and fall of Bulgaria and Romania, and another was the fact that the Balkan theatre was of secondary importance.
Regarding Chetniks, I know virtually nothing about their military capabilities in 1944. Were they still an important military force by the moment Yugoslavia was liberated?--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:29, 16 September 2019 (UTC)
I apologise for giving so late answers, I have seen limited time because of my real life duties, so I understand this unable´s me of participating in an active discussion as this one is. However, having in mind this is such a complex discussion taking place for much longer than usual, I tank you very much for your atention and I believe I am still in time of clarifying this particular question.
There is one aspect unmentioned which I believe makes a difference. Most occupied countries had a resistance which was limited in visibility, staying mostly underground, and waiting for the moment to make a coordinate action with the major Allied powers. This is described by some historians as Tomasevic of having been the Brittish suggested model. In Yugoslavia, after Chetniks initially started an open resistance in 1941, German reprisals were so cruel that obligated them to stop and rethink their strategy, and, consequently, in line with Brittish intelligence contacts, addopt the very similar strategy common to other resistance movements, of a more underground one, aiming to fortify and become prepared for a major action coordinated with Allies when time comes. However, Partisans refused to slow down, they saw their chance of taking the lede, and continued with open agressive actions. In my view, this does make Yugoslav Partisans different and worth mention in comparison to other resistances in Europe. While most resistance movements were underground making sabotage actions and staying in hide, Yugoslav resistance case was much more similar to the Soviet one (once they entered war against Germans), because in Yugoslavia resistance, although guerilla in style, made open front with military confrontation since early stages, and menaged to liberate, take and keep control of large portions of the territory. While most resistance in Europe was either urban, or local/regional, in Yugoslavia resistance took a shape of a national movement establishing control over considerably large territories and creating a direct frontline. I certainly don´t want to take any credit to resistance movements in Europe, but in Yugoslavia they were one step ahead regarding strenght, organisation and power.
Chetniks, official name Yugoslav Army of Fatherland, suffered immenselly from being a loosing side in an internal dispute of power. Representing the old monarchic regime, once Partisans took power, they needed to justify the execution of their leaders and the persecution of their simpatizers with intensive propaganda. Knowing communists were ruthless in most cases troughout history, believing they were not against their rivals in Yugoslavia, is naive. Both Partisans and Chetniks were present in Belgrade after liberation, and with Soviet support, Partisans felt confident to take all power and eliminate their rivals. While no one can take credit to Partisans of their heroic strugle against Axis, their demonisation of their ideological rivals Chetniks is controversial. In Yugoslavia nationalities inevitably play a role. The major victims of Axis invasion were Serbs who saw immediatelly apon the occupation their territory maximally minimazed, and a terror imposed in the western half by Croatian genocidal policies of 1/3 Serbs killed, 1/3 converted, 1/3 expelles, while in east Albanians, Bulgarians and Hungarians took large portions of territory killing and expelling Serbs, while a small Serbia with direct German control was formed in which Germans applied a 50 Serbian civilians killed for each German soldier wonded, 100 for each killed. It is in this circunstances that Chetniks stop their resistance activities (continued by Partisans) and decide it is unworthless to resist if that is driving Serbs to exctinction. Serbs had already lost a fifth of its population in WWI and earlier major losses were suffered in Balkan wars and liberation from Ottomans. Surrounded by enemies, and occupied by Germans who blaimed Serbs for WWI and were particularly revengfull seing Serbs as Little Russians and as such an inferior race able to be killed without consequences or remorse, it is this circunstances without any perspective in Axis-dominated world that Serbs find themselves in that drives them to resist, and, as being the biggest nationality in Yugoslavia, that has a national impact. This is why Axis occupation was a reality perceved completelly differently by Serbs who perceved it as genocide and extinction, than by Hungarians, for exemple. Croats, for instance, saw in Axis accupation their country being vastly enlarged and becoming independent, a millenial dream they had, thus the reception of Germans in Zagreb with local population cheering them and giving flowers is not hard to understand. Despite all, Chetniks still followed a Yugoslav idea, named their army the Yugoslav Army of Fatherland, and despite being overwelmingly Serbian they did count on solidarity and included Montenegrins, Bosniaks, even Slovene Chetniks existed. However, regardless of the nationality, the population was divided ideologically, with many Serbs and others feeling simpathetic towards leftist ideals of power for workers and peasants. I am saying this just to break a missleading idea Chetniks were Serbian and Partisans Yugoslav, both were initially overwelmingly Serbian because of the already mentioned reasons why Serbs feared Axis-dominated world, it is just that Partisans were more appealing later to other nationalities, which overwelmingly joined them by time Allied victory seemed evident. Chetniks initially opened direct resistance towards Germans, however, when reprisals became so hard, they slowed their actions. Initially, some joined Chetnik-Partisan actions existed, but with Partisans fighting for communist overtaking of power, a collaboration became impossible. Chetniks were under control of the king and the government-in-exile which were in London in direct cooperation with Britain, and they agreed to addopt the more passive model of Brittish resistance, to fortify and wait for joined Allied action. However, Partisans open actions obligated Chetniks to do more, simply because population was unhappy under Axis imposed regimes, and wanted to resist. It is by abandoning the Brittish strategy that Chetniks end up finding themselves in an extremelly hard position, fighting simultaneously a civil war and against much stronger Axis powers. Chetniks ended collaborating, and it is this the main controversy regarding this issue. It is logical that once Partisans took power they insisted in highlighting that Chetniks collaborated, while many historians say their collaboration was limited to ocasional opportunistic actions only motivated to eliminate Partisans. The mediation was made to decide exactly what description would be neutral, because we have historians saying different things. While some isnsist the collaboration was considerable and lasting, it is hard to understand why would Chetnik leader Mihailovic have his head hunted by Germans all time, and why would Chetniks engage in any strategical collaboration since there was no future for them in Axis-dominated world. The collaboration could not be nothing beyond just being a time-out to focus against Partisans, and then return to animosity. At the emdiation we saw Chetnik resistance activity all years of the war, and despite loosing Allied support to Tito in December 1943, Chetniks kept their resistance activities until the end, even including joined actions with Soviets. This comment of mine is already too long, if you could have time in some near future, I would be extremelly gratefull if you could assist and help solving the WP:UNDUE problem regarding Chetniks, since we have editors insisting in their negative description insisting communist accusations are real, while others say otherwise and point out inconsitences in the acusations. Chetniks never gave up resistance, they even wear the beard as compromise not to cut it until the country was liberated, just because Partisans ended being more effective and intentionally underrated their activities, they, as loosing player while on the winning side, deserve a carefull atention. In conclusion, I certainly believe Partisans deserve all their credit, they were formidable in their fight against Axis, really impressive, and Chetniks don´t deserve having their efforts undermined just because they were unable to be so impressive. I think many people today fail to see the horror that WWII was and how all this people were really brave for having made resistance. I may be biased as Serb and having partially Jewish ancestry, which makes me take this issue really seriously, but I assume it, and I wish this entire issue ends up being the most objectivelly and neutrally described, so truth prevails. I am willing to help, provide sources, and even change my mind if I am wrong in anything, but by now I stand that in this article Yugoslav resistance overall could have a better description, and Chetniks overall in Wiki articles are written full of bias and not in according with what most neutral scholar sources say, which was confirmed at the mediation. FkpCascais (talk) 01:19, 18 September 2019 (UTC)
Talk a bludgeoning people with walls of text. There are Chetnik-related articles that need work, certainly, but not the sort of work you are suggesting. The articles I have been involved in reflect the academic consensus on the Chetniks, not some post-war apologia from the Chetnik diaspora. And could you please stop referring to a "mediation" that happened ten years ago? The encyclopaedic has moved on, editors have come and gone, our coverage of the war in Yugoslavia has improved. Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 04:33, 18 September 2019 (UTC)
Agreed. It's not even clear to me why there's a detailed discussion of the Chetniks here. It would be best if people focused on the text which has been proposed. Nick-D (talk) 11:06, 18 September 2019 (UTC)
Hello Paul Siebert (talk), see your sandbox regarding some additions/corrections. Thank you for your unfailing guidance.
On a different note (the Balkans, for example), I feel we should include the collapse and changing of sides of Romania in late summer '44 in the World War II under subsection Allies close in (1944), as this was also a main reason the Germans beating a hasty retreat from Greece/Yugoslavia (especially without petrol). Romania's change of sides hastened the end of the war by months, yet its nowhere in the main article (at least not where its supposed to be chronologically). Presently, the sentence is as follows:
In September 1944, Soviet troops advanced into Yugoslavia and forced the rapid withdrawal of German Army Groups E and F in Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia to rescue them from being cut off.
is best prefaced by adding a statement about Romania's (also Bulgaria and Finland) bowing out. Something along this line, perhaps:
In September 1944, Soviet troops advanced into Yugoslavia. Coupled with Romania's changing of sides on 23 August 1944, it forced the rapid withdrawal of German Army Groups E and F in Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia to rescue them from being cut off.[92]
See Reference (templates unable to be displayed)
Second, the sentence under subsection Mediterranean (1940–41),
"Although the Axis victory was swift, bitter and large-scale partisan warfare subsequently broke out against the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia, which continued until the end of the war."
could now be removed; it is superfluous. The other excesses we'll find. Additonally, I've added one sentence on Estonian conscripts; I would leave the present sentences on Estonian conscripts/defense and Warsaw Uprising the way they are presently in the article. They flows perfectly fine where they are in those other parts of the article "as is", and I'm afraid that removing the sentences completely, from where they are in those other subsections, there might be left a void where the reader might not grasp the thought conveyed, like an unfinished melody. Lastly, regarding the Slovak uprisings/resistance movements would have been too long. I found, too often, was what consumed them was the infighting between Protestants and Catholics on the future of Czechoslovakia; pro-Czech resisters confronted the antiNazi resisters who favoured an independent Slovakia. As a result, the latter found themselves on Tiso's side, the resister's biggest enemy, but an advocate of absolute Slovak independence. This all take takes up space, where little is to be had. In fact, as far as the Hungary/Romania "at eachother's throats" fued, I could have gone on for another two paragraphs; but alas, no space. It's similar to almost every country. You have the final say, of course. Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 08:59, 15 September 2019 (UTC)
Romanian coup d'etat has already been mentioned, as well as Finland. Please, read the Allied close in section. I am not sure we need to duplicate this info.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:52, 15 September 2019 (UTC)
Hello Paul Siebert (talk), I missed it entirely, all is well; do not duplicate. About the other points, are they correct and concise (sandbox)? At your service, Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 17:59, 15 September 2019 (UTC)
Or, Paul Siebert (talk), can you delete on your sandbox what you think is not required? Or to strike through it? Someway for me to know what it is that is superfluous. I made some adjustments on your (sandbox). Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 02:13, 16 September 2019 (UTC)
Eli, I am somewhat busy now, I'll do that by the end of the week.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:29, 16 September 2019 (UTC)
Hello Paul Siebert (talk), understood. Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 21:25, 16 September 2019 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ Rein, Leonid (2011), "Prologue", The Kings and the Pawns: Collaboration in Byelorussia during World War II, New York: Berghahn Books, p. xx, ISBN 978-1845457761
  2. ^ Rein, Leonid (2011), "1", The Kings and the Pawns: Collaboration in Byelorussia during World War II, New York: Berghahn Books, p. 12, ISBN 978-1845457761
  3. ^ Howard, Michael; Andreopoulos, George J.; Shulman, Mark R. (1997), "8", The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, p. 116, ISBN 978-0300070620
  4. ^ Deák, István (2018), "1", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 21, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  5. ^ Gordon, Bertram (1972), "1", Collaborationism in France During the Second World War, New York: Cornell University Press, p. 20, ISBN 978-0801412639
  6. ^ Rein, Leonid (2011), "1", The Kings and the Pawns: Collaboration in Byelorussia during World War II, New York: Berghahn Books, p. 12, ISBN 978-1845457761
  7. ^ Littlejohn, David (1972), The Patriotic Traitors: A History of Collaboration in German-occupied Europe, 1940-1945, New York City: Doubleday (publisher)
  8. ^ Littlejohn, David (1972), The Patriotic Traitors: A History of Collaboration in German-occupied Europe, 1940-1945, New York City: Doubleday (publisher)
  9. ^ Deák, István (2018), "Introduction", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 2, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  10. ^ Rein, Leonid (2011), "1", The Kings and the Pawns: Collaboration in Byelorussia during World War II, New York: Berghahn Books, p. 24, ISBN 978-1845457761
  11. ^ Deák, István (2018), "Introduction", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 12, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  12. ^ Littlejohn, David (1972), The Patriotic Traitors: A History of Collaboration in German-occupied Europe, 1940-1945, New York City: Doubleday (publisher)
  13. ^ Rein, Leonid (2011), "Introduction", The Kings and the Pawns: Collaboration in Byelorussia during World War II, New York: Berghahn Books, p. 2, ISBN 978-1845457761
  14. ^ Rein, Leonid (2011), "Preface", The Kings and the Pawns: Collaboration in Byelorussia during World War II, New York: Berghahn Books, p. xix, ISBN 978-1845457761
  15. ^ Rein, Leonid (2011), "1", The Kings and the Pawns: Collaboration in Byelorussia during World War II, New York: Berghahn Books, p. 14, ISBN 978-1845457761
  16. ^ Deák, István (2018), "3", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 45, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  17. ^ Dear, I.C.B; Foot, M.R.D. (1995). The Oxford Companion to World War II. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0192806703.
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  19. ^ Deák, István (2018), "4", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 75, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  20. ^ Snyder, Timothy D. (2010), "Preface", Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, New York: Perseus Books Group, p. viii, ISBN 978-0-465-0-3147-4
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  22. ^ Deák, István (2018), "4", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 68, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  23. ^ Snyder, Timothy D. (2010), "6", Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, New York: Perseus Books Group, p. 189, ISBN 978-0-465-0-3147-4
  24. ^ Rein, Leonid (2011), "1", The Kings and the Pawns: Collaboration in Byelorussia during World War II, New York: Berghahn Books, p. 45, ISBN 978-1845457761
  25. ^ Rein, Leonid (2011), "1", The Kings and the Pawns: Collaboration in Byelorussia during World War II, New York: Berghahn Books, p. 46, ISBN 978-1845457761
  26. ^ Littlejohn, David (1972), The Patriotic Traitors: A History of Collaboration in German-occupied Europe, 1940-1945, New York City: Doubleday (publisher)
  27. ^ Deák, István (2018), "4", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 71, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  28. ^ Littlejohn, David (1972), The Patriotic Traitors: A History of Collaboration in German-occupied Europe, 1940-1945, New York City: Doubleday (publisher)
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  31. ^ Beevor, Antony (2012), "28", The Second World War, New York: Little, Brown & Company, p. 419, ISBN 978-0316023757
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  33. ^ Dear, I.C.B; Foot, M.R.D. (1995). The Oxford Companion to World War II. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0192806703.
  34. ^ Deák, István (2018), "4", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 78, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  35. ^ Deák, István (2018), "4", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 75, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  36. ^ Snyder, Timothy D. (2010), "Preface", Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, New York: Perseus Books Group, p. viii, ISBN 978-0-465-0-3147-4
  37. ^ Deák, István (2018), "4", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 75, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  38. ^ Deák, István (2018), "4", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 68, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  39. ^ Snyder, Timothy D. (2010), "6", Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, New York: Perseus Books Group, p. 189, ISBN 978-0-465-0-3147-4
  40. ^ Deák, István (2018), "2", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 38, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
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  44. ^ Deák, István (2018), "4", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 78, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  45. ^ Rein, Leonid (2011), "1", The Kings and the Pawns: Collaboration in Byelorussia during World War II, New York: Berghahn Books, p. 19, ISBN 978-1845457761
  46. ^ Deák, István (2018), "3", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 426, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  47. ^ Beevor, Antony (2012), "28", The Second World War, New York: Little, Brown & Company, p. 419, ISBN 978-0316023757
  48. ^ Beevor, Antony (2012), "28", The Second World War, New York: Little, Brown & Company, p. 430, ISBN 978-0316023757
  49. ^ Beevor, Antony (2012), "28", The Second World War, New York: Little, Brown & Company, p. 430, ISBN 978-0316023757
  50. ^ Beevor, Antony (2012), "28", The Second World War, New York: Little, Brown & Company, p. 433, ISBN 978-0316023757
  51. ^ Beevor, Antony (2012), "28", The Second World War, New York: Little, Brown & Company, p. 431, ISBN 978-0316023757
  52. ^ Deák, István (2018), "6", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 132, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  53. ^ Beevor, Antony (2012), "28", The Second World War, New York: Little, Brown & Company, p. 421, ISBN 978-0316023757
  54. ^ Beevor, Antony (2012), "13", The Second World War, New York: Little, Brown & Company, p. 212, ISBN 978-0316023757
  55. ^ Beevor, Antony (2012), "13", The Second World War, New York: Little, Brown & Company, p. 213, ISBN 978-0316023757
  56. ^ Rein, Leonid (2011), "3", The Kings and the Pawns: Collaboration in Byelorussia during World War II, New York: Berghahn Books, p. 102, ISBN 978-1845457761
  57. ^ Rein, Leonid (2011), "1", The Kings and the Pawns: Collaboration in Byelorussia during World War II, New York: Berghahn Books, p. 20, ISBN 978-1845457761
  58. ^ Beevor, Antony (2012), "Introduction", The Second World War, New York: Little, Brown & Company, p. 4, ISBN 978-0316023757
  59. ^ Snyder, Timothy D. (2010), "6", Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, New York: Perseus Books Group, p. 196, ISBN 978-0-465-0-3147-4
  60. ^ Deák, István (2018), "Foreword", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. xiv, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  61. ^ Deák, István (2018), "19", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 292, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  62. ^ Beevor, Antony (2012), "19", The Second World War, New York: Little, Brown & Company, p. 292, ISBN 978-0316023757
  63. ^ Deák, István (2018), "4", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 72, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  64. ^ Snyder, Timothy D. (2010), "7", Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, New York: Perseus Books Group, p. 256, ISBN 978-0-465-0-3147-4
  65. ^ Deák, István (2018), "3", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 59, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  66. ^ Snyder, Timothy D. (2010), "11", Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, New York: Perseus Books Group, p. 413, ISBN 978-0-465-0-3147-4
  67. ^ Deák, István (2018), "Introduction", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 4, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  68. ^ Deák, István (2018), "Introduction", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 12, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  69. ^ Deák, István (2018), "6", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 137, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  70. ^ Grabowski, Jan (2013), "13", Hunt for the Jews: Betrayal and Murder in German-Occupied Poland, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, p. 154, ISBN 978-0253010742
  71. ^ Deák, István (2018), "Introduction", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 2, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  72. ^ Deák, István (2018), "2", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 40, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  73. ^ Snyder, Timothy D. (2010), "7", Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, New York: Perseus Books Group, p. 236, ISBN 978-0-465-0-3147-4
  74. ^ Grabowski, Jan (2013), "Appendix", Hunt for the Jews: Betrayal and Murder in German-Occupied Poland, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, p. 188, ISBN 978-0253010742
  75. ^ Beevor, Antony (2012), "13", The Second World War, New York: Little, Brown & Company, p. 212, ISBN 978-0316023757
  76. ^ Rein, Leonid (2011), "1", The Kings and the Pawns: Collaboration in Byelorussia during World War II, New York: Berghahn Books, p. 7, ISBN 978-1845457761
  77. ^ Deák, István (2018), "4", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 73, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  78. ^ Deák, István (2018), "4", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 73, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  79. ^ Beevor, Antony (2012), "28", The Second World War, New York: Little, Brown & Company, p. 417, ISBN 978-0316023757
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  81. ^ Deák, István (2018), "4", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 369, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  82. ^ Rein, Leonid (2011), "3", The Kings and the Pawns: Collaboration in Byelorussia during World War II, New York: Berghahn Books, p. 65, ISBN 978-1845457761
  83. ^ Deák, István (2018), "3", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 65, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  84. ^ Beevor, Antony (2012), "35", The Second World War, New York: Little, Brown & Company, p. 543, ISBN 978-0316023757
  85. ^ Deák, István (2018), "3", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 65, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  86. ^ Beevor, Antony (2012), "24", The Second World War, New York: Little, Brown & Company, p. 360, ISBN 978-0316023757
  87. ^ Littlejohn, David (1972), The Patriotic Traitors: A History of Collaboration in German-occupied Europe, 1940-1945, New York City: Doubleday (publisher)
  88. ^ Beevor, Antony (2012), "28", The Second World War, New York: Little, Brown & Company, p. 435, ISBN 978-0316023757
  89. ^ Deák, István (2018), "3", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 63, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  90. ^ Littlejohn, David (1972), The Patriotic Traitors: A History of Collaboration in German-occupied Europe, 1940-1945, New York City: Doubleday (publisher)
  91. ^ Deák, István (2018), "6", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 115, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9
  92. ^ Deák, István (2018), "5", Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II, UK: Routledge, p. 94, ISBN 978-0-8133-4789-9

C&R Images

Bigeez, just wanted to to raise the topic of image selection based on those currently in the 'sandbox' draft. I think that we should refrain form using images of posters in the article, in order to maintain consistency across all sections (staying with photographic images) — using a color poster for this one subject, highlights it quite a bit. Also, there is a bit of an undue weight in both C&R section on images related to France. Overall, I think there should be two images in each section. --E-960 (talk) 07:05, 30 September 2019 (UTC)

Hello E-960 (talk), thank you for your well thought-out points. Acknowledged, you are right, the color poster is not the best to choose. Please recommend others; I think we can find something, and for the other photos if you prefer. I thought by inserting these photos it would break up the section naturally, and flow better instead of one lumped para. Any other things? Please advise us. Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 16:38, 30 September 2019 (UTC)
Collaboration. Perhaps this image: [3] for Vichy France, and one image of foreign SS volunteers since those volunteers were most tied to Nazi ideology and freely enlisted (also the SS was specifically involved in the Holocaust): [4], [5], or [6]. --E-960 (talk) 17:35, 30 September 2019 (UTC)
  • I'll also go ahead and look for a couple of images for resistance and get back to the discussion. --E-960 (talk) 17:50, 30 September 2019 (UTC)
Hello E-960 (talk), thank you, very "uber." I may use/replace a couple to envision what it would look like. Keep checking Paul's (sandbox) and critique. Many thanks. Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 23:53, 30 September 2019 (UTC)
Bigeez, I made some minor adjustments to the images, just keeping the size standard and staying with no more than three pictures per section. Also, I still would like to reiterate the point that the two C&R texts need to be trimmed quite a bit, as these are secondary topics which fall under 'Occupation', and in terms of length are quite long in comparison to other sub-sections. --E-960 (talk) 08:11, 7 October 2019 (UTC)
Hi E-960 (talk), many thanks. And yes, the article does need some reining in ... where exactly, I am not so sure. I am waiting for a couple of other editors who are on holiday before making any drastic changes. However, if you care to propose anything substantial, please list them below; I would be in your debt. Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 22:51, 8 October 2019 (UTC)
Bigeez, can I also suggest a change to the format of the C&R text in the sandbox, right now we have the long reference source citations, which make editing extremely difficult, perhaps it might be a good option to switch to the short-hand version used in the rest of the article, so that the text is continuous--E-960 (talk) 10:41, 16 October 2019 (UTC).
Hello E-960 (talk), many thanks again for your input! I'm not familiar with the "shorter" way of citing; mia culpa. Is there another way? When I began editing, a colleague of mine told me to copy a template from the page Wikipedia:Citation templates in order to "keep things neat and readily recognisable and in this way, to use the Google books links for the url." She said, "the reader will be instantly able to access the sentence or page from which the reference is obtained, rendering the article fully readable and, irrefutable." But to be perfectly honest, I did not think there was any other way until I saw the rest of the article, and yikes ... the other references are shorter! Perhaps it is best to wait for Paul Siebert (talk) and Nick-D (talk, who are on holiday. Please advise unsparingly, since your comments, as are my mentors, Paul's and Nick's, indispensable. Back to my day job, Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 18:15, 16 October 2019 (UTC)

Bigeez, for example instead of writing the reference source citations vertically, you can adjust them horizontally, like this: |last= |first= |title= |publisher= |location= |year= |isbn= |url= |format= .

Instead of:

| last =
| first =
| author-link =
| title =
| publisher =
| volume =
| edition =
| date =
| location =
| pages =
| isbn =

This way you don't have a break between actual sentences, where you have to scroll down when you hit each citation. --E-960 (talk) 15:43, 18 October 2019 (UTC)

Hello E-960 (talk), oh, I see, I didn't realise it would be easier that way and also for others to edit. Allow me to work on it. Many thanks for pointing that out. Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 20:25, 18 October 2019 (UTC)
Hello E-960 (talk), sorry again, so no spaces next to the "vertical lines" or after the "equals" sign? Also, I tried it on the first reference, but since the urls are long, it doesn't look real short. No worries, I'll give it a try on my sandbox when I'm done and then switch it to Paul's. Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 20:45, 18 October 2019 (UTC)
  • Hello E-960 (talk), Sorry for the delay. I shortened the references to the horizontal-type format you suggested. To be perfectly honest, I'm not sure it helps much, but see if it is better for you or others. Personally, I think it is more confusing, but maybe scaning up/down is easier for me than for most others scanning side-to-side. See my sandbox at User:Bigeez/sandbox.
  • I was trying to copy/paste to Paul's (sandbox), but now I cannot find the collaboration/resistance susbsection. No worries, it's on mine (User:Bigeez/sandbox).
  • Before I post it, is it possible for you to offer any constructive comments? Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 05:15, 2 November 2019 (UTC)
Hello @E-960: I changed-up the references and placed them horizontally, as you suggested: SEE my User:Bigeez/sandbox. I still need to whittle it down; previously, it was placed after the "Course of the war." But, now it is in the "Impact" section. SEE Paul's sandbox. Are there perhaps any suggestions or anything you might find unnecessary before I post it on the WWII talk page? In the end, @Paul Siebert: and @Nick-D: will strike-through what they think is superfluous as final arbiters, anyway. Many thanks. Cheers, Eli Bigeez (talk) 21:04, 19 November 2019 (UTC)
Sounds good and many thanks. --E-960 (talk) 09:26, 21 November 2019 (UTC)

Document: German Instrument of Surrender, 8 May 1945

Should we put in this document of the german surrender?

German Instrument of Surrender, 8 May 1945 - Berlin-Karlshorst

— Preceding unsigned comment added by Neptuul (talkcontribs) 15:02, 11 November 2019 (UTC) - ok --Neptuul (talk) 15:24, 11 November 2019 (UTC)

done under Axis collapse, Allied victory (1944–45) --Neptuul (talk) 23:48, 30 November 2019 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 4 December 2019

"Mass-bombing" appears twice, but the other "mass" phrases ("mass killing" and "mass executions") aren't hyphenated. Please replace "mass-bombing" with "mass bombing". 208.95.51.53 (talk) 17:22, 4 December 2019 (UTC)

 DoneDeacon Vorbis (carbon • videos) 18:04, 4 December 2019 (UTC)

German Instrument of Surrender, 8 May 1945

German Instrument of Surrender, 8 May 1945 - Berlin-Karlshorst

- the document was delete by User:E-960 with the note "article already has an image of the captured Reichstag, that should be sufficient to illustrate the point". I think, this are different points, the document marks the final of the war. - --Neptuul (talk) 06:29, 4 December 2019 (UTC)

No it doesn't - the war finished in September 1945 when Japan surrendered. Photos of documents are about the most boring way possible to depict things. Nick-D (talk) 09:03, 4 December 2019 (UTC)
I agree, but not for all types of documents --Neptuul (talk) 19:36, 5 December 2019 (UTC)
The image of this document is poor, and the subject pretty obscure. Sorry, but it would add nothing to the article. --A D Monroe III(talk) 03:00, 6 December 2019 (UTC)

Casualties

The "pie chart" in the category "Casualties" of the World War II article, seems to say that 58% of the civilians of all Allied nations died in the War. This can't possibly be true. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Alfresco77 (talkcontribs) 14:16, 16 December 2019 (UTC)

It doesn't say that, it says that of all the deaths of the war 58% were Allied civilians. That is not the same thing. Britmax (talk) 14:26, 16 December 2019 (UTC)

Add Rhineland to 3.5?

There's a good article here on the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936. Perhaps it deserves a mention and a link early in section 3.5 on the pre-war events in Europe?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Remilitarization_of_the_Rhineland


-- J.S. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2600:1700:F540:5560:DD3F:FAA7:7B9B:15DC (talk) 00:46, 18 December 2019 (UTC)

Death of leaders

It is standard practice on articles on wars and battles to indicate whether or not a particular leader on either side died. This was recently added to the article using the {{KIA}} template, however it was subsequently removed as "trivia." Obviously this isn't "trivia" since the template exists to be used in the first place. See {{Infobox military conflict}}. I'm restoring the previous edits indicating leaders on either side who died. I can't begin to imagine any good reason to withhold the use of these templates. The only issues I see are that Franklin Delano Roosevelt was not in fact KIA (so I've not used the template in his case), and I'm not entirely sure that the {{KIA}} tag applies to Adolf Hitler (though it would be misleading and inconsistent to indicate that Benito Mussolini was executed without also indicating that Hitler died). If there are more accurate alternatives, I'm not aware of them. Global Cerebral Ischemia (talk) 15:01, 8 December 2019 (UTC)

As noted, none of the leaders died "in action". They may have died within the timeframe of the article's subject, but that's far less significant that being directly killed in the subject's combat, which is all that {{KIA}} is for. We might find ways to indicate the varying degrees by which these deaths are less directly caused by the subject, but how would this improve the article? I don't see any need for these to be included in the infobox, which must be limited only to most important subject-defining facts. In this sense, it could indeed be described as trivia. --A D Monroe III(talk) 22:32, 8 December 2019 (UTC)
See Talk:World_War_II/Archive_52#Killed_in_action?! for a brief discussion on why it's inappropriate to list as KIA those who did not die in combat at the hands of enemy combatants. Are there more comprehensive discussions in the archives? Dhtwiki (talk) 01:17, 9 December 2019 (UTC)
This has been discussed a few times, and the consensus on each occasion has not been to use these templates for the reasons noted above (the same applies to also marking FDR has having died during the war). I've reverted the edit in which this was added. These templates aren't actually frequently used in military conflict infoboxes. Nick-D (talk) 09:34, 9 December 2019 (UTC)
The use of this template means that it could apply to virtually anyone who died when there happened to be a war on, even if they were 99 and terminally ill. So, for me, the problem is that the template is just not relevant, and this use widens it so far as to make it meaningless. So, no. Britmax (talk) 09:52, 9 December 2019 (UTC)
Absolutely none of these objections apply to the use of {{Executed}} for Benito Mussolini. I acknowledged at the outset that I was unsure if {{KIA}} applies to Hitler or not. I am, however, quite sure that {{Executed}} applies to Mussolini. "This template is used to indicate commanders who were either captured or surrendered, and were subsequently executed." Can someone explain why this isn't the case? Global Cerebral Ischemia (talk) 20:07, 9 December 2019 (UTC)
So, we are down to discussing just one tag/icon: {{Executed}} for Mussolini.
One presented argument against still applies to this: it's not significant enough to warrant inclusion in an infobox. The fact that the little skull could be applied to him is not an argument that it improves the article in any way.
A new argument against is that the little skull icon does not equate to "executed" for the majority of readers; it's the opposite of helpful information. --A D Monroe III(talk) 22:17, 9 December 2019 (UTC)
I'm not sure I understand; the template exists to be used in articles about wars and battles, its usage is unambiguously appropriate in this case, and this is the largest war in human history...and we're not going to use it because it's "not helpful information"? Why doesn't the same argument apply to any other article where it's used? To say that "the little skull" is not significant and isn't helpful information is to say that {{Executed}} shouldn't exist...but that argument has already been decided, and {{Executed}} is used in countless articles. Why shouldn't it be used here? Global Cerebral Ischemia (talk) 22:23, 9 December 2019 (UTC)
We are not discussing other articles here; different articles are different, as they must be. Whataboutism isn't a logical argument.
The icon is inherently ambiguous here. A skull and crossbones is more likely to imply "poison" or "pirate" rather than "executed" to many readers. Execution isn't commonly associated with WWII.
Again, the infobox cannot be a place for any and all possible information. It's restricted to unambiguous critical information that helps define the subject. This, however -- as ambiguous, non-critical, and does not help define the subject -- fails on all three counts. --A D Monroe III(talk) 22:40, 9 December 2019 (UTC)
Please, I'm engaging with you in good faith. Your arguments apply to the use of the *template per se* not this specific article. The template is intended for use in {{Infobox military conflict}} for any article where it applies (citing standard practice for {{Infobox military conflict}} is *not* "whataboutism"), and it clearly applies here since Mussolini was executed. If there's an argument why it *shouldn't* be used here in this specific article, I'm not seeing it. Global Cerebral Ischemia (talk) 22:57, 9 December 2019 (UTC)
Non standard icons that have no meaning to our readers. At first I thought the dagger denoted a across for him being Catholic or something. Don't see how it helps and in fact will most likely confuse readers.--Moxy 🍁 23:02, 9 December 2019 (UTC)
Just because a template exists, doesn't mean it should be used. The "execution" icon is of dubious utility. (Hohum @) 23:54, 9 December 2019 (UTC)
It is quite relevant that Hitler and Mussolini died at the end of the war, as a consequence of the war. They were not killed in action, but if the war had never happened, their deaths would have been very different. I would say the fact that they died defines the war almost as much as the fact that Nazi Germany and the Italian Empire collapsed defines the war - particularly in the case of Germany, Hitler is practically synonymous with Nazism; it's easy to imagine an alternate timeline where Hitler survived, which would have led to a rebirth of Nazism. In terms of ambiguity, that's the strongest objection I see to including the information. I will note that it is commonly understood that a cross represents death- in western countries, graves are very commonly cross-shaped. I will also note that while the usage of the icons on other pages does not immediately justify usage of the icons, but it does mean that readers are familiar with seeing these icons, and are familiar with their meaning. The icon is used at Operation Barbarossa, Battle of Okinawa, Second Battle of El Alamein, among others - Ramzuiv (talk) 06:09, 10 December 2019 (UTC)
As seen above the symbol of the Dagger is seen as a religious symbol by many...all outlined at Template talk:KIA....clearly not a universal symbol.--Moxy 🍁 06:26, 10 December 2019 (UTC)
Considering that the design of the template is keeping it from being used, and after many years, there seems to be no sign of it changing, might I make a suggestion? It seems to me that an alternative KIA template would be justified in being created, which would have an acceptable design (for example, simply saying KIA, or another alternative proposed in the talk there). Regardless of whether this particular page deserves using the template (which I feel it does), if there are long-standing objections to the current template that people refuse to let change, there is a problem that needs to be solved. - Ramzuiv (talk) 07:01, 10 December 2019 (UTC)
As seen in link above... Template:KIA2.--Moxy 🍁 07:08, 10 December 2019 (UTC)
The use of any little graphics in this context is a bad idea. The deaths of Hitler and Mussolini had no impact at all on the war, so this is nothing but trivia (Ian Keershaw and Richard J. Evans both state that most Germans were totally indifferent to Hitler's death and the war was totally lost, and Mussolini had been an irrelevance since 1943 and the war was also totally lost in Italy anyway). These graphics are not widely used in infoboxes, and would do nothing but clutter the admirably clear current infobox. Nick-D (talk) 07:17, 10 December 2019 (UTC)
I agree.--Jack Upland (talk) 22:48, 21 December 2019 (UTC)

Shouldn't there be an image of atomic bombing?

Considering that this war had the only combat usage of atomic bombs, and how their influence strongly shaped the following Cold War, I think having image of atomic bombing of Hiroshima or Nagasaki would be appropriate in this article. Maybe at spot where we have Japanese surrender ceremony image at the moment?--Staberinde (talk) 17:17, 5 December 2019 (UTC)

As previously discussed, there is very little mention of the atomic bombings in this article.--Jack Upland (talk) 19:19, 5 December 2019 (UTC)
I don't see how this really relates to my suggestion, it is general article about the whole war, so quite obviously individual events get only briefly discussed. Also usage of nukes is mentioned in the very first paragraph of the article.--Staberinde (talk) 11:28, 7 December 2019 (UTC)
FWIW, I fully support this. An image of one of the atomic bombings is an absolute no-brainer, and I'm surprised it hasn't been done sooner. Global Cerebral Ischemia (talk) 22:39, 21 December 2019 (UTC)
I'm not opposed to it; I was just saying it has previously been discussed.--Jack Upland (talk) 22:46, 21 December 2019 (UTC)
I also could not understand why the atomic bombing picture was replaced with the photo of some very formal procedure. If course, Staberinde's edit is an improvement.--Paul Siebert (talk) 07:24, 22 December 2019 (UTC)
The image of the blast is ok, however if the image is ultimately changed and stays the size should be upright not to make it bigger than the other images and thus stand out more. --E-960 (talk) 18:28, 30 December 2019 (UTC)