Talk:Teleology/Archive 1

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Chaos theory and its notion of an attractor IS NOT teleologic[edit]

In the introduction it is claimed that chaos theory and its notion of an attractor is an example of teleology being applied in modern science, together with a reference to "the Encyclopedia of artificial intelligence". I can see how some scientists in the field of Artificial Intelligence could have used chaos theory in a teleological way. However, this is an extremely specific application of chaos theory. To claim that chaos theory and (strange) attractors are teleological is simply very very wrong. Chaos theory is a mathematical field of study and it makes absolutely no claims whatsoever on "why things are the way they are". As any field in mathematics, you have a bunch of assumptions, you define things and through logic you then make all sorts of conclusions. Naturally, not every mathematician or scientist using mathematics is a non-teleogical person and thus some might then end up trying to apply there thing in a teleological way. One example of a mathematical finding that has been widely (mis)-used in teleological way is the "Golden ratio". Yet, there is no mathematical field that can only be applied teleological way. One of the most well-known things about Chaotic systems, is the sensitivity to initial conditions. In general (or at least to my knowledge in ecology) it is NOT claimed that systems are structured in a certain way because this allows them to show chaotic behavior. Maybe some 'teleological' scientist in the field of artificial intelligence claim that brains are organized in a certain way with the purpose of showing a chaotic unpredictable (because of sensitivity to initial conditions) behavior. More teleological even, they might claim chaotic systems are mathematically possible, because it allows our brains to show unpredictability and complex behavior. However, such a view does not exist in other scientific fields using chaos theory. Instead, chaos theory is simply used as a handy way to get a better understanding of natural systems; as a lot of natural systems appear not to be stable and chaos theory is very useful in describing those unstable systems. Just as people might say: "There is air so we can breath", they might say: "There are chaotic systems with (strange) attractors so our brain can show complex behavior". However neither air nor chaos theory and (strange) attractors are in any way teleological, it is merely the way people use it that might be teleological. Furthermore, attractors are way more general thing than chaos theory. The notion specific to chaos is that of 'strange attractors' not attractors in general. This is another sign to me that the editors of this part were no experts on the subject. I will remove this example by next week, unless someone comes up with a better suggestion. :Laurensjean (talk) 21:51, 12 September 2015 (UTC)[reply]

https://books.google.pl/books?id=n0Hg2ipZeBkC&pg=PT119&lpg=PT119&dq=attractors+modern+dress+teleology&source=bl&ots=JCh3X-LdG8&sig=ACfU3U0ux5vPeISFMhykyfaYsQNuJmiV1Q&hl=pl&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjlz4Pv-oHgAhVFbFAKHeSACBUQ6AEwCHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=attractors%20modern%20dress%20teleology&f=false here we have a source the editors od the source are experts for sure

2A00:F41:5849:2EE2:0:3D:6E4F:4701 (talk) 18:03, 22 January 2019 (UTC)[reply]

I would say everything from there on in the intro should be removed. Thomas Nagel is not a biologist. The side debate about using teleology to teach is a different subject, and very debateable obviously, but anyway not something to shove in here.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 19:14, 23 January 2019 (UTC)[reply]

Does really need a Rewrite[edit]

I want to take up the points about Hegel and dialectical materialism:

How is Marxism considered to be at odds with Darwinism? In some Fascistic sense maybe? Marxism is supposed to be about an economic-social science; Darwin about biological science. Marxist teleology is as much political stance as it is analytic, if it even is analytic at all. In fact Marx's precise invocation of Hegel was in order to expunge the latter's idealist teleology and his focus on 'identity' (hence Marx's book 'the Poverty of Philosophy), and then to take synthetic (dialectical) method and apply it to material history. This current article is not only incomplete and limited in its discussion of teleology, but misleading about other topics as well. There is a debate to be had about Marxism and teleology, but this has not been written here. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 62.24.251.240 (talk) 10:09, 6 December 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Be bold! :-D Xavexgoem (talk) 11:33, 6 December 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Needs Complete Rewrite[edit]

The author has learned to use some buzzwords correctly, but has no sense of what final cause and teleology are about. If, as Aristotle says on the subject, "what comes before is for the sake of what comes after," then perhaps this confusing article will be a stepping stone towards a more nuanced approach which would address, among other things (in no logical order): randomness; the problems of knowing the future; the distinctions (developmentally) between living and non-living things; the exclusive prominence of efficient causality in naturalism (especially in theory of biology, and as contradicted by:); the teleological or normative aspects of the idea of law (social or natural); the teleological nature of the theory of evolution (the end being the development of the unit of evolution); and therefore, the absolute inability to describe nature without using teleological language. janaka 14:46, 4 August 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Markbassett (talk) 03:58, 10 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]
FIRST, FIX JUST THE TOP: I will suggest an approach of starting with (a) initially edit just the top basic description part, and including (b)getting closer to the concept, where I think the article has really missed that this is a fundamental approach to viewing things, one that is widely applied, in the sense of what's it good for or what use is it, and gotten fixated on theistic teleology and missed other forms of application.
SECOND, WORK THE WRITING: in particular I note parts such as statement re material naturalism or Aristotle are repeated, and think it better to have it just in the proper area.
THIRD, HANDLE YOUR TOPICS. I confess it's beyond my skil, I am limited to about the level of pointing out scientific teleology includes evolutionary consideration of what's it good for for an adaptation.
FOURTH, HOW ABOUT MORE THOUGHTS: If no one else tackles it, I will take a shot at a first paragraph more of the form seen in dictionary or encyclopedia. Thinking along the line of (Teleology is considering something in terms of its final ends or design. Originally stated by Aristotle in terms that everything material can only move or change for some intrinsic or extrinsic end, for example an acorn becomes an oak by intrinsic nature, while a stone becomes rounded due to external waterflow. The concept has been used very widely and loosely and had its meaning change considerably over the years. While it is in common practice of viewing something in terms of what it does or is good for, the term "Teleology" itself is best known by Teleological arguments for the existence of God. ) But if anyone has some desired content or ideas for this, please add them to the talk. Please RSVP any thoughts
Markbassett (talk) 03:58, 10 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]
The criticisms of the article appear justified but too harsh. The breadth of coverage is good but it lacks clarity. The first paragraph suggested here by Markbassett is much better. I'd suggest a minor change to "Originally stated by Aristotle in terms that everything material can only move or change for some intrinsic or extrinsic end. For example an acorn becomes an oak (intrinsic end), while a stone in a river becomes rounded (extrinsic: abrasion)." but that's just fiddling.

--174.7.56.10 (talk) 15:37, 19 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]

I've another alternative of starting with definition from http://www.1911encyclopedia.org/Teleology (Encyclopedia Britanica past period of copyright) and wonder if there's a preference. TELEOLOGY (Gr. TE¦or, end), in philosophy and theology, strictly that branch of study which considers "final causes" as real principles of explanation, i.e. which explains things as existing solely as pre-requisites of the results which they produce. I'm liking it being older and the Britannica authority, but want to snip at the definition leaving for later the where it went into most commonly refers to there being an overall plan or at least tending towards an end, or evolution being scientific teleology, or that usage is loose and the meaning has changed over time.

Markbassett (talk) 19:57, 14 August 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Confusing[edit]

Hey, I Hope I don't cause offence by putting up the "cleanup-confusing" tag in, but after reading this article, I still don't know what teleology actually is/means/is the study of (while the opener obviously defines it, it doesn't really give much context for understand what it ACTUALLY means). Indeed, I found more clear definitions/context from reading the talk page, e.g. "Rather, teleology is about meaning or purpose being behind a PROCESS. Thus, a philosopher like Pierre Teilhard de Chardin who argues that consciousness and God drive evolution, is making a teleological argument." I have no education in philosophy so I don't feel confident to try and edit this myself, but there are too many examples of the application of teleology, things pointing out how teleology differs from other philosophical thought processes and sub-divisions of teleology. I still don't really get what it is! Bilz0r 09:05, 10 June 2007 (UTC)[reply]


It is flawed to use the word sight to debate final cause in the example of eye and sight (chickens and eggs). It confuses the definition of final cause. Final cause is the '...ness' of something.

What is it that makes a table a table what is tableness - what makes a pen a pen - what is pen-ness? Many say "pens write - and that's pen-ness" - "just like eye-ness is sight, eyes see".

Pens do not write and eyes do not see, pens dribble ink in a controlled fashion when brought into contact with a surface that they were designed to or coincidently can dribble on - and thus in combinatioon with other forms they can do something called write - the pens final cause (pen-ness) is to work with other causes to write - which in turn has it's own formal cause - communication. We would't say pens communicate.

Eyes do not see - eyes detect light - better eyes detect light better and focus it better / faster / clearer etc. Eyes in combination with brains 'see'. Primitive eyes in combination with primitive brains sense and induce reaction without thought - is that sight? Eye-ness is not sight. Final Cause of a thing is not end-cause it is a composite of other other forms of causein a heirarchy of abstractions.

Apply the suffix 'ness' to things and you begin to understand final cause.

62.25.109.196 11:33, 1 February 2007 (UTC)[reply]


I removed my contribution on "American philosophy" because of possible copyright issues. It's part of a larger piece on teleology in American philosophy, and I have become aware that it may be protected by copyright.Rats 03:35, 3 November 2006 (UTC)[reply]

These two sentences conflict:

Teleology, on the other hand, holds both that man sees because he has eyes and has eyes so that he can see.
As Aristotle wrote in support of teleology, "Nature adapts the organ to the function, and not the function to the organ" (so organ is the eyes; seeing is the function)

Well, at least I think they do. I don't understand the article at all anyway and I have an exam on epistemology in a few hours. Anyone up for a Simple English translation? 218.102.218.7


I've added a section which those socialised in the analytic tradition in philosophy tend to overlook: that there is also a specifically 'middle european' angle to the teleology debate - namely Kant, Hegel and the 'dialectical' tradition. It's a big debate, mine is a short addition, but it does at least emphasise this one point: the notion of the 'present as history'. (Brianshapiro raised this point a while back - perhaps this is a start.) best, ifs-ffm


Dear Wiki - Thanks for moving closer to the center on this term. It is can be quiet alarming to see words being high jacked or whose meanings are diminished by the 'world view' filter of a few --- and then passed on to others as definitive…. Although (in my opinion) there are some tinges of post modernism I do applaued you in your efforts...



Can someone help me with this... I wanted to include some very recent, interesting comments by one of the more note worthy philosophers of modern time… Antony Flew is the David Hume of our day….And he recently (December 2004) stated, "What I think the DNA material has done is show that intelligence must have been involved in getting these extraordinarily diverse elements together," he said. "The enormous complexity by which the results were achieved look to me like the work of intelligence."….. I mean this stuff is hot off the press, and Flew is note worthy….

Wiki-P has noted some philosophers who are not in the middle of the teleology debate today... I hope Wiki-P is "cool" as they want us to believe…. If you're going to have links to these other philosophers, include Flew and let the chips fall where they may, vice framing definition of teleology in a 'preferred' world view….

Don't filter knowledge through your singular world view - to the exclusion of the conclusion of the observations of some of the best minds known within the last 50 years… fear

HELP


I'm removing this, because I find it particularly troublesome:

It was one of the merits of Darwin's theory of evolution that it eliminated teleology from the account - it was no longer necessary to suppose that giraffes grew long necks in order to reach high branches (or that God had designed them with that intention).

I think something like this would be a better formulation:

Darwin's theory allows us to make claims like "giraffes grew long necks in order to reach high branches" without a guilty conscience; we know that what this claim "really" means is something like "over the course of their evolution, the giraffes with shorter necks tended to die out, recursively increasing the percentage of giraffes with long necks. This is why giraffes have long necks." Thus the teleological talk is "just shorthand" for this more verbose claim.

I don't like this formulation either, because I think it does violence to human psychology. (I may explain this later.) But I think it may be an improvement.

--Ryguasu

"Thus the teleological talk is "just shorthand" for this more verbose claim." In private, among consenting evolutionists, this sort of shorthand may be OK. However, when used in an article that will be read by non-experts, it invites people to believe it is meant literally. One of the merits of natural selection is that it eliminates teleology. Rjm at sleepers (talk) 07:58, 7 July 2013 (UTC)[reply]

teleological Casus Belli[edit]

If we applied pseudo giraffe teleological explanation to horses, shouldn't they already have developed 8' legs in order to jump over 10' fences? Could nuke bombs have been developed to curb overpopulation? Could preemptive war ben devised for similat noble purposes?

For the horses, not already; they've only had a few generations since we've been making them jump over fences...and besides, they don't tend not to reproduce if they're good jumpers. On the other hand, we've seen this with the strains of bacteria resistant to penicillin. I'm not exactly sure what you're saying in the second part, but it seems that you're also ignoring the Darwinian constraint of reproduction; however, if it seems that humans who go to war more often have populated the Earth now, that may be due to natural selection against overpopulation (though I doubt it). --Geoffrey 23:03, 7 Oct 2004 (UTC)
I think the Aristotle phrasing is kind of a wierd reverse in terms of the ends make the means, but would always be a view for something that is and not these hypotheticals. Markbassett (talk) 04:16, 10 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]

The articles for teleology and teleological argument are confused as to what "teleology" means, or at least what it has meant in the philosophical sense. Stating that God creates life spontaneously is not "teleological". Rather, teleology is about meaning or purpose being behind a PROCESS. Thus, a philosopher like Pierre Teilhard de Chardin who argues that consciousness and God drive evolution, is making a teleological argument. Other philosophers and thinkers who have made "teleological arguments" are Aristotle, who phrases it in terms of "final cause", Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who talks about reality driving towards perfection in the Absolute, and Karl Marx, who offers a historicist teleology which describes a final state of human history that we're being driven to. I believe certain religions like Zoroastrianism have teleologies that talk about a process in nature driven towards a meaningful goal. Use of the concept "teleology" in any other way, is either new to me, or misunformed. Please, someone correct these articles! Brianshapiro

I am so delighted to find Wonderful Wikipedia
Ray K

I appreciate your comments, although i'm not sure how they should be integrated into the article. feel free to edit as you will! i attempted to differentiate between the two uses for the word in the intro -- both your definition of a purpose behind the process (as less commonly used) and the position that there is such a purpose (as more commonly used). for an example of the latter, consider this link. please! stick around! you obviously know what you're talking about and i'd greatly appreciate your help!Ungtss 16:38, 19 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Of the hundreds of Wikipedia articles (thousands?) that I've read, this aricle is the best single answer to the question "what are the shortcomings and limitations of Wikipedia?" Any authority this article might otherwise have is obliterated by its lack of organization and clarity. Teleology is an elementary subject in philosphy (it must be, because I was asked to define the term on my very first test for Intro to Philosophy), so despite the ramblings presented here, there's gotta be some simpler, more cohesive way to define the term. I'm testifying here in the hopes that the "experts" who read this will bear in mind the true purpose of Wikipedia-- mostly, this is a first source, a quick reference for amateurs who need to know something on the fly, or at most, a first step into deeper research. So please, if people consistently tell you that your writing is obtuse or unclear, leave Wikipedia authorship to someone else.

Hi! I don't know if anyone is still editing this page but one question I had was about the claim: "Teleological philosophy stresses essence before existence, form before being"--it is not clear to me that teleological theories necessarily assume essence before existence--Aristotle, maybe. Also, the second claim "form before being" is confused; for the Greeks form was pure being (as an immaterial unity) but it is also true that material objects had being, but it was a lesser or inferior way of being because of its determinate nature. The question was the degree of being a particular substance had.

Great to see the discussion!

Numberthreefourfive (talk) 06:13, 11 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Metaphysical naturalism isn't the opposite of teleology[edit]

Metaphysical naturalism and teleology are mutually exclusive, but aren't opposites. For example, a person can reject teleology by believing that there's no design or purpose in nature, but can also reject metaphysical naturalism by believing in "supernatural" things, like mind/body dualism. For example, I believe that the mind is metaphysically distinct from the brain and can even survive death. However, I also believe that the mind emerges "naturally" from the brain, instead of being designed by God or having some purpose. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.216.37.31 (talk) 02:53, 6 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]

One cannot believe in both meta physical naturalism and teleology. They may not be opposites but they are definitively not compatible. You cannot believe in both, or you will be inconsistent to your own world views. For instance in the example you have given of you your own beliefs, you have stated that you believe in "super natural" things, like the mind. You go on to say that you believe the mind emerges "naturally" from the brain. Something cannot be both natural and super natural at the same time. I do not doubt your believe, but I suggest that your world view is not consistent and is in fact contradictory, and therefore is not a great example to use. I like the idea of a eternal or everlasting brain existing without god to explain it, but, logically one cannot say that something supernatural emerges out of the natural. Wophi (talk) 13:39, 22 August 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Physics[edit]

I've removed the following for now:

In recent decades a form of teleological reasoning has reappeared in certain quarters of physics and cosmology, under the heading of anthropic principle, a term Brandon Carter coined in 1973. One of the problems the anthropic principle tries to address is this: why has the universe, which began in a very simple state (Big Bang), since grown ever more complex to the extent that it is even more hospitable to human life than is necessary for mere survival but even allows advanced human civilization?

Far from being a revival of teleology, Brandon Carter's anthropic principle is a very elegant sidestep of the Copernican Principle. To quote from Carter himself, certain observational aspects of apparently exotic behavior could in principle have been predicted by conventional theory (without resort to exotic theories), "However, these predictions do require the use of what may be termed the anthropic principle to the effect that what we can expect to observe must be retricted by the conditions necessary for our presence as observers (Although our situation is not necessarily central, it is inevitably privileged to some extent)." ("Large number coincidences and the anthropic principle in cosmology", Brandon Carter, presented 1973 at the IAU Symposium at Krakow).

No teleology there at all. --Anticipation of a New Lover's Arrival, The 22:18, 17 June 2008 (UTC)[reply]

"Carter has protested that such teleological readings "are quite different from, and even contradictory with, what I intended"." - the Anthropic principle page states. You were right to take it out. I lately restyled the page, but left the data more or less as found. You (or someone) have also taken issue with the teleology v naturalism contrast. Perhaps the citations need checking...Redheylin (talk) 23:07, 18 June 2008 (UTC)[reply]

"Teleology and science"[edit]

The Teleology and science section needs major work. As it is, you could probably replace the whole thing with "Some people think telology may have a place in science - here are some books to read about it in" without losing any information. Wardog (talk) 10:30, 12 November 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Plagiarism and Inadequate disclaimers[edit]

My revisions of this article were prompted by reading a handful of student papers who all plagiarized this site - and all made the very same errors that the article makes. As a consequence, my students came away with an understanding of the topic that was at best impoverished and at worst completely wrong. As many of the discussions imply, this article is in desperate need of revision on the basis of a careful study of the history of teleology and its role in contemporary thought. I had attempted to put a disclaimer in at the start of the article, but it was quickly erased by some "monitor". I have subsequently revised the introduction to give the reader a sense of the different ways that teleology can be used (something effaced in the original article). The original article equated teleology with only one (Christian) version of the theory, and it gave no sense of the broader conceptual framework in which teleological theories are understood. Overall, this article highlights everything that is wrong with Wikipedia. A good scholarly discussion of a complex theoretical subject cannot be a single, monolithic article that attempts to "converge" on the truth. It effaces the complexity and instructive disagreements that are a healthy part of academia. Daphne-3 (talk) 19:15, 16 November 2008 (UTC)Daphne-3[reply]

Useful edits summarily rejected[edit]

While writing the last post, my corrections to the teleology article were deleted; the article reverted back to its impoverished form. It seems the only way to provide a better version is to post it in here (which no one really reads). See below. The main issue that I attempted to correct, which was summarily rejected, was that not all forms of teleology involve "purpose" or "design" (in the sense that requires an Intelligent Designer) and that some teleological theories do not even claim that their final causes are not ontological but only heuristic devices. That was subsequently rejected as an edit despite the fact of the matter.

This is just one more example of the major problems with this mode of conveying scholarship. If someone does not like your version, regardless of the truth, it will be deleted in favour of his. (It's a good thing Darwin didn't try to publish his theory of evolution by natural selection on Wikipedia!)

"Teleology (as the Greek telos suggests) is the study of ends. Some teleological theories hold that ends are part of the causal structure of the world or some part of the world (e.g. living things), while others hold that final causes are useful "heuristic" devices. On the latter view, ends are not really operative in the world; rather, by thinking of things as if they were designed for an end we can better discover the true (efficient) causes of things. Not all teleology implies "purpose" or "design" (in the sense that requires an Intelligent Designer), for example Aristotle believed that ends are present in nature (that natural processes occur "for the sake of" an end) but famously denied that this requires an intelligent planner (see Physics 2.8, 199a20-35, 199b27-9). Moreover, not all teleology implies a global teleological view of the universe where every part is adjusted to some overall purpose. For example, Aristotle (in contrast to Plato) held that bile lacks a function: this is supposed to show that we should not look for ends in all things alike (Parts of Animals 677a12-18). This should be borne in mind in what follows. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Daphne-3 (talkcontribs) 19:20, 16 November 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Daphne-3 (talk) 21:08, 16 November 2008 (UTC)Daphne-3[reply]

In a subsequent exchange, the person "monitoring" this page explained that he deleted my edits because they were based on "personal opinion" and were not "good for Wikipedia". I question the whole process involved. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Daphne-3 (talkcontribs) 23:45, 16 November 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Neo-Aristotelian[edit]

Should a neo-Aristotelian account (see Veatch's Rational Man) be taken into account here as a modern view of teleology? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 149.68.16.92 (talk) 07:03, 11 December 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Philosophy of science[edit]

Is this section really needed??????? 59.96.217.51 (talk) 11:20, 25 February 2009 (UTC)[reply]

There is an inherent purpose or final cause for all that exists[edit]

What if you claim, as science does, that the inherent purpose and final cause for all energy existing is entropic and ends in heat death of the universe? Sanitycult (talk) 06:16, 24 July 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Teleological ontology[edit]

It might be a good thing if we could start gathering relevant references on the topic of teleological ontology, which is a branch of philosophy which tends to combine both teleology and ontology. ADM (talk) 13:08, 17 December 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Four causes article: is modern science teleological or does it at least attempt the opposite?[edit]

There is discussion at Four causes relevant to this article. It is being claimed that "Most modern theories of evolution are unabashedly teleological", and it is being argued that the article should remove references to modern science not being teleological and say the opposite. Comments please.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 09:07, 13 March 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Sorry; not sure about the mode of discussion here--first time posting on a Wikipedia talk page. Between reading higher priority texts for school, I'm very slowly reading Richard Dawkins's The Selfish Gene, which is filled with such text as this:

I shall make use of the metaphor of the architect's plans, freely mixing the language of the metaphor with the language of the real thing. ... This metaphor will take us quite a long way. When it finally breaks down, I shall introduce other metaphors [also teleological]. Incidentally, there is of course no 'architect'. The DNA instructions have been assembled by natural selection. -- Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 30th Anniversary Edition, p22

I searched through several chapters trying to find that line "there is of course no 'architect'" or something similar. I think that science literature written for other scientists (in the form of actual papers) couldn't afford to use such clumsy and potentially misleading metaphors, since it would be very difficult to have such a paper taken seriously by reviewers. Still, a lot of literature written for the layperson on the topic of evolution is written with a teleological bent, since that seems to make the seemingly self-organizing nature of evolution easier for the nontechnical to understand. Writers such as Dawkins should be more careful, or at least give more than two sentences to explaining this common misunderstanding of the mechanics of evolution.

Incidentally, why is the modern ideological fad of Intelligent Design not mentioned in this article? It seems closely linked. --tsbertalan (talk) 03:38, 2 Feb 2011 (UTC)

Yes, I guess Intelligent Design attempts, or claims to attempt, to reinstate teleological science. I guess if someone has time, good sources, and perhaps most difficult of all, an idea about how to mention this without diverting the whole article into being about intelligent design, then it would probably fit someone as a short mention. I fear that to treat it properly without creating a lot of side discussion may be difficult partly because the sourcing might be controversial. By this I mean that while Intelligent Design as a religious political movement is easy to source and discuss, many sources claim it is best understood only as a political movement, and that its science and philosophy are a front so that the movement can claim to be scientific. --Andrew Lancaster (talk) 15:51, 2 February 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Earliest use of the word was incorrect[edit]

The previous version of this wiki page claimed the word appeared in http://books.google.com/books?id=awg_AAAAcAAJ&ots=-87UsEHG1l&dq=Philosophia%20rationalis%2C%20sive%20logica&pg=PP5#v=onepage&q&f=false . This work is in Latin so can't really be claimed to be a source for a word in English. The word that appears in the index of the book is teleologia but I have to admit I couldn't find it in the main text in any case. The earliest known English usage is in http://books.google.com/books?id=rYxYAAAAMAAJ&dq=Elements%20of%20the%20critical%20philosophy&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false . See page 113 for example. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 137.222.105.134 (talk) 15:04, 3 June 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Intrinsic finality - Given. This is fucking bullshit.[edit]

"Just as physical masses obey universal gravitational tendencies, which did not evolve, but are simply a cosmic "given,"This is fucking bullshit, if it's intrinsic it's not given, especially in the mind of the young gullible idiot who thinks that HE HIMSELF will live forever, tired of this Marxist crap, fucking die already -- 92.86.134.203

That... didn't actually make any sense. Can you restate your query in a more coherent manner? Evercat (talk) 14:28, 21 June 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Fixed the definitions, though I note that I have more commonly heard them referred to as "vertical" and "horizontal teleologies," respectively.--Heyitspeter (talk) 21:03, 21 June 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Teleology and Ethics[edit]

Hi, I would like to add to this article by setting teleological ethics apart from deontological ethics in a short and compact manner. This is my proposal:

Teleological ethics is defined by the thought that behavior is subservient to that which is the 'good' to a man, men, or humanity for example. This in the sense that this 'good' is understood as a 'goal', but contains no morality (in the narrow sense)t[1]. Because of this, behavior is called 'good' if the consequence of that behavior adds towards achieving these 'goals'. Herewith it is contradictory (at least in ethics) to deontological ethics, which focuses on the manner of behavior (or intention) at the same time.
Teleological ethics knows several forms, among which are Aristotelianism, Utilitarianism (also known as consequentionalism)and hedonism. The logic of teleological and deontological ethics is examined in detail in Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
External Links
References
  1. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p240

I am hoping for some constructive criticism. --Faust (talk) 13:33, 26 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]

With all due respect, but I really don't think it would be a good idea to add this to the article text, mainly because your proposal is very unclear. A few comments:
Teleological ethics is defined by the thought that behavior [any behavior, or just ethical behavior?] is subservient to that which is the 'good' [the good?] to a man [only a man, not a woman?], men [only men, not women?], or humanity for example [why for example?; is this just one of many possible definitions?]. This in the sense that this 'good' is understood as a 'goal' [why the quotation marks?], but contains no morality (in the narrow sense) [does the source you provide really claim this explicitly that the teleological good 'contains' no morality?; peculiar wording btw]. Because of this [because of what exactly?], behavior is called 'good' if the consequence of that behavior adds towards achieving these 'goals' [why the consequence of that behavior rather than the behavior itself? the way I see it, achieving those goals is the consequence of the behavior you are talking about]. Herewith it is contradictory (at least in ethics) [where else?] to deontological ethics, which focuses on the manner of behavior (or intention) at the same time [you seem to suggest that manner of behavior is more or less synonymous with intention, which I think is wrong]. Zaspino (talk) 17:52, 27 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]


Okay, There are not many valid points in this remark, the rest is 'fucking bullshit', as the author luckily calls it himself. Regardless I have adapted the above in a way that I think will be more comprehensible to Zaspino.

Teleological ethics is defined by the thought that behavior is subservient to that which is the 'good' to a man, men, or humanity[1] for example. This in the sense that this 'good' is understood as a 'goal'. Because of this, behavior is called 'good' if the consequence of that behavior adds towards achieving these 'goals'[2]. The reason for this is that the principle of action (maxim) is not meant to be a (duty to a) universal law[3] and therefore has no morals (in the narrow sense)[4].Herewith it is contradictory (at least in ethics) to deontological ethics, which focuses on the manner of behavior (or intention) at the same time[5].
Teleological ethics knows several forms, among which are Aristotelianism, Utilitarianism (also known as consequentionalism)and hedonism[6]. The logic of teleological and deontological ethics is examined in detail in Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
External Links
References
  1. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p375
  2. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p360
  3. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p294
  4. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p240
  5. ^ The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, P172 and P173
  6. ^ The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, P172 and P173

I think this deals with everything, except for the quotation marks. Quotation marks are used when a word is being used in manner which is not normal to the word. Such as an explanation of that word. Hence they are well placed here both with 'good' (which is the topic of investigation of ethics as a whole) and with 'goal', since this takes the special meaning of cause: endcause. In normal life this is usually meant as aim and not as endcause.

If there are any serious constructive remarks, please let me know. --Faust (talk) 07:39, 2 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

NOTE: not all references show up here. They will on the project page. --Faust (talk) 07:41, 2 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]


Faust, for the most part you fail to address my criticism. And please try to keep it civil. Calling my remarks "fucking bullshit" is totally uncalled for. And I most certainly didn't use those words myself to describe my remarks. Zaspino (talk) 09:24, 2 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Your edit was called: this is complete bullshit, so I returned the favor. It is you who should keep it civil. Apart from that I have addressed ALL your points. The ones I didn't mention I made a reference of. So, if there are no constructive criticisms, I will place piece. --Faust (talk) 13:09, 2 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

NOTE: I do remember editing the wrong pieces at first. I didn't think it important enough to revert again. One can check the history regardless, so I didn't see much point. I would like to clearly state that I had no intention to make things appear other than they are. I would also like to say that I expect you to assume good intentions Zaspino. --Faust (talk) 13:37, 2 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Zaspino's edit was not called "this is complete bullshit". In this edit Zaspino repaired an error in the heading 'Teleology and Ethics', and his edit summary was appropriately called "don't know what happened, but fixed". In the edit history not only the edit summary is listed, but also the heading under which the edit belongs. When you fix an heading, the previous heading is listed in the edit history (in this case: 'Intrinsic finality - Given. This is fucking bullshit'), together with the edit summary itself. I think Faust's proposal is not a good and balanced piece on teleological ethics. It is one-sided and seen from a Kantian and moral absolutist point of view. Theobald Tiger (talk) 14:11, 2 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Theobald, you are interrupting a discussion that might prove a learning experience to Zaspino. On top of that you are also giving false information, please stay out of this.
1) In this comparisson it is clearly visible what he named his last edit. Since this heading was not called that his edit should not have had that name. Regardless of the reason, his edit was named thusly.
2) The edit I am making sets out teleology against deontology. Since Kants is the leading deontological system (according to the oxford dictionary of philosophy), it is only natural that a definition reflects his ideas (at least a bit). The definitions concerning teleological ethics are referenced and that should be enough to show its objectivity. Apart from that moral absolutism is not what is stated here. The idea is that a certain act in a certain situation can AT THE SAME TIME be willed to be a universal law, A big difference. Moral absolutism requires a rule base. Deontology has none. Anyway, that is one of the disambiguations I want to make to the teleology and deontology pages. I will add 'simultaniously' to my piece regardless.
So, proven wrong twice. It is very surprising to see you here by the way. Especially since you do not use this account normally. --Faust (talk) 14:47, 2 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Faust, Everyone is allowed to contribute to discussions on talk pages. Your indignation has prevented you from reading what I wrote. I explained to you that the heading under which an edit belongs is presented, without any interference of the editor, in the edit history. Zaspino is not responsible for headings that previous editors have created (my guess would be that he/she considers that heading in shockingly bad taste). Your reaction to my criticism of your proposal is off the mark. Theobald Tiger (talk) 15:17, 2 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Theobald, you are twice wrong again (and proven so. I never said what caused the header's name, nor did I forbid you to edit here. Herewith I would like to notify you that I will no longer address your remarks if I had properly addressed them before. I left a message on your talk page addressing this situation. Kindly respond there since it disrupts normal activity here. --Faust (talk) 15:29, 2 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Faust, since you seem intent on clinging to your mischievous interpretation of the facts, here is what really happened. While adding some text to this talk page, I accidentally and thus unwillingly changed the heading == Telelogy and Ethics == to Italic text== Teleology and Ethics == (here). As Theobald Tiger explained to you, this caused the previous heading, called "Intrinsic finality - Given. This is fucking bullshit", to automatically show up in my edit summary. It is incredibly disingenuous on your part to claim and keep claiming, despite Theobald's and my explanation, that I consciously called my edit "fucking bullshit". And you were way out of line in using those very same words to describe my edit. Zaspino (talk) 16:03, 2 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Faust, On my talk page you asked me not to edit here. That is the reason I said that I was allowed to do so. I will continue to do so. Because all Zaspino's criticisms that I have come across thus far are sound and stated in a clear and unambiguous way, I would politely suggest that this argument could be a learning experience to you as well. Theobald Tiger (talk) 17:55, 2 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Theobald, I am asking you not to transfer problems from the nl.wiki to the en.wiki. Please do not twist the facts around again. Since Zaspino has stated no valid arguments and I have responded to all his arguments by giving more references. will now await to see if there will be any more arguments and if not I will place my piece. --Faust (talk) 07:50, 3 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Faust, I urge you not to incorporate your text proposal in the article, since two users (Theobald Tiger and I) object to it. Please try to properly address our complaints instead of resorting to innuendos. You should at least quote the different philosophy handbook sections you refer to, so I can see in what way they constitute an answer to my specific questions and support the text you propose. Zaspino (talk) 09:10, 3 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Oh, come on. I am not going to type out 6 references. I have cited the truth, I have made proper references to it and most of these references can be found online. Please, if there is something that you think is incorrect, say so. I have refuted all of your previous remarks, so come out with a new one. --Faust (talk) 17:17, 3 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Faust, if those references can indeed be found online, it should be quite easy for you to copy and paste them. (By the way, as my questions mostly concern your particular choice of words, how are a couple of references going to answer them?)
Apart from that I would appreciate it if you'd apologize for calling my remarks "fucking bullshit" and for stubbornly sticking to your wrong assessment that I first used those same words. That would be the civil and moral (pun intended) thing to do and I think you owe me that much. Zaspino (talk) 20:29, 3 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Zaspino, you did call it 'fucking bullshit', as I have proven You can just follow the link. Other than that, we are retracing our steps. I have given sources for my opinion and you haven't. I have answered all your (unfounded) objections and refuted them. If you do not believe my sources, please, go get some sources of your own. This will be the last time that we will retrace our steps. So, which particular wording did you object to? --Faust (talk) 10:09, 4 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Faust, Your ability either to read what your fellow wikipedians have written or to understand it seems to be limited to the point that communication is nearly impossible. ZASPINO DID NOT USE THE WORDS "FUCKING BULLSHIT".
  1. I wrote on this talk page: "Zaspino's edit was not called "this is complete bullshit". In this edit Zaspino repaired an error in the heading 'Teleology and Ethics', and his edit summary was appropriately called "don't know what happened, but fixed". In the edit history not only the edit summary is listed, but also the heading under which the edit belongs. When you fix an heading, the previous heading is listed in the edit history (in this case: 'Intrinsic finality - Given. This is fucking bullshit'), together with the edit summary itself."
  2. And again: "Your indignation has prevented you from reading what I wrote. I explained to you that the heading under which an edit belongs is presented, without any interference of the editor, in the edit history. Zaspino is not responsible for headings that previous editors have created (my guess would be that he/she considers that heading in shockingly bad taste)."
  3. Zaspino wrote: "Faust, since you seem intent on clinging to your mischievous interpretation of the facts, here is what really happened. While adding some text to this talk page, I accidentally and thus unwillingly changed the heading == Telelogy and Ethics == to Italic text== Teleology and Ethics == (here). As Theobald Tiger explained to you, this caused the previous heading, called "Intrinsic finality - Given. This is fucking bullshit", to automatically show up in my edit summary. It is incredibly disingenuous on your part to claim and keep claiming, despite Theobald's and my explanation, that I consciously called my edit "fucking bullshit". And you were way out of line in using those very same words to describe my edit."
  4. The next day Zaspino has kindly asked you the following: "I would appreciate it if you'd apologize for calling my remarks "fucking bullshit" and for stubbornly sticking to your wrong assessment that I first used those same words. That would be the civil and moral (pun intended) thing to do and I think you owe me that much."
  5. TheDJ wrote on your talk page: "You should probably apologize to Zaspino, for calling his comments "Fucking bullshit", which clearly was an error in your assessment of the talk page history, something that Theobold correctly and helpfully pointed out to you, before you told him not to participate."
So, are you going to apologize or not? Theobald Tiger (talk) 15:22, 4 September 2010 (UTC) (One more quotation added - 19:34, 4 September 2010 (UTC))[reply]


Look, do you two really think I am going to fall for this? You and I both know the 'Zaspino' user knows all inns and outs of the wikipedia. If that user would have replied to the header under which the remakr was placed here there would have been no such remark. I do not believe that this was an accident. So, no, I will not apologise. 'Zaspino' should. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Faust (talkcontribs) 19:44, 6 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Faust, I do not know what is meant by "would have replied to the header under which the remakr was placed here", but anyway, when someone corrects a heading (not a remark under a heading) the previous heading automatically shows up in the edit history. You seem to have an inveterate habit to overlook the obvious. Theobald Tiger (talk) 07:48, 7 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Review[edit]

I have read this proposed addition, and one of my concerns of this addition is one of undue weight. The theory seems marginal at first glance to me (total outsider of the field here). Using references to works other than dictionaries and other reference works, like papers and other scientific analysis or some books might help me (The term is "just defined" vs. the term is "in use in discussions"). I had a lot of trouble understanding the text. Too much "because, therefore, herewith" at the start of the lines is part of the reason for that I think. The bracketed text is also a bit much and making the text harder to understand. —TheDJ (talkcontribs) 10:49, 4 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Okay, thanks for the feedback. Perhaps I am that. Some words are crucial to statements, the ones you mentioned are not. Would you be willing to rewrite my piece in a more comprehensible language?

Note: I think that the discussion was hard for you to follow, not the text itself. The words you mention are not in there. Is that correct?
--Faust (talk) 10:59, 4 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
I reviewed the second version that you proposed, which contains those words. Also Wikipedia:PRIMARY#Primary.2C_secondary_and_tertiary_sources as to why using dictionaries and other tertiary sources are good as 'supporting' sources, but why we usually prefer secondary sources in Wikipedia. —TheDJ (talkcontribs) 13:24, 4 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Faust, I do not think that TheDJ's troubles to understand the text are completely due to TheDJ's difficulties to grasp what the discussion was about. The proposal itself is flawed, has defects, as Zaspino already has pointed out. Besides, none of the references you have added in the text is available online. The pages 375 (1), 360 (2), 294 (3), 240 (4) of the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy are not available online, and the same is true for The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, p.172 and 173 (5 and 6). Could you please quote the sections you refer to? Theobald Tiger (talk) 20:02, 4 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

You and I both know you have a membership of said dictionary of philosophy Theobald. Further more: You are retracing our steps again and clearly not referring to the changes I made. Why are you always ignoring what is plain to see, apart from painting a false picture? @TheDj: Are you sure you found this piece, since none of the term you mentioned are in there?

Teleological ethics is defined by the thought that behavior is subservient to that which is the 'good' to a man, men, or humanity[1] for example. This in the sense that this 'good' is understood as a 'goal'. Because of this, behavior is called 'good' if the consequence of that behavior adds towards achieving these 'goals'[2]. The reason for this is that the principle of action (maxim) is not meant to be a (duty to a) universal law[3] and therefore has no morals (in the narrow sense)[4].Herewith it is contradictory (at least in ethics) to deontological ethics, which focuses on the manner of behavior (or intention) at the same time[5].
Teleological ethics knows several forms, among which are Aristotelianism, Utilitarianism (also known as consequentionalism)and hedonism[6]. The logic of teleological and deontological ethics is examined in detail in Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
External Links
References
  1. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p375
  2. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p360
  3. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p294
  4. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p240
  5. ^ The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, P172 and P173
  6. ^ The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, P172 and P173

—Preceding unsigned comment added by Faust (talkcontribs) 19:44, 6 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Faust, Again, you have overlooked the obvious:
Teleological ethics is defined by the thought that behavior is subservient to that which is the 'good' to a man, men, or humanity for example. This in the sense that this 'good' is understood as a 'goal'. Because of this, behavior is called 'good' if the consequence of that behavior adds towards achieving these 'goals'. The reason for this is that the principle of action (maxim) is not meant to be a (duty to a) universal law and therefore has no morals (in the narrow sense). Herewith it is contradictory (at least in ethics) to deontological ethics, which focuses on the manner of behavior (or intention) at the same time.
I have used boldface to emphasize the words 'because', 'therefore' and 'herewith' (mentioned by TheDJ). I do not have a copy of the ODPh and I neither have access to the online edition. But of course I found the ODPh using Google Books. The pages you refer to are not available there. Theobald Tiger (talk) 07:48, 7 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Maybe I copied the wrong version. Easily remedied though:
Teleological ethics is defined by the thought that behavior is subservient to that which is the 'good' to a man, men, or humanity[1] for example. This in the sense that this 'good' is understood as a 'goal'. This is why behavior is called 'good' if the consequence of that behavior adds towards achieving these 'goals'[2]. The reason for this is that the principle of action (maxim) is not meant to be a (duty to a) universal law[3] and, as such, has no morals (in the narrow sense)[4].This is why it is opposite (at least in ethics) to deontological ethics, which focuses on the manner of behavior (or intention) at the same time[5].
Teleological ethics knows several forms, among which are Aristotelianism, Utilitarianism (also known as consequentionalism)and hedonism[6]. The logic of teleological and deontological ethics is examined in detail in Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
So, changed the choice of words. About the online source I do believe that you said so on nl.wiki. However, A reference I am willing to type out, not all of them. I am of a mind that if you want to edit articles you should do your own research...at school, or by reading and not just block edits because you feel like it, even though good and credible sources have been given. --Faust (talk) 08:19, 7 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Faust, You did not "copy the wrong version" - the version you have posted above appears for the first time on this talk page. As far as I can see, changing "the choice of words" does not make any difference. If a blue car has defects, it's no use painting it yellow. Theobald Tiger (talk) 12:18, 7 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
The latest versin was new, the before last was a copy. That is what I meant. I think I ad eliminated the terms that were referred to in a previous version, but I may be mistaken.
Anyway, if both of you are so upset about my formulation, why don't you help out by reformulating? I do not see the problem you see. --Faust (talk) 15:24, 7 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Faust, I think you are mistaken on the true nature of criticism. Several editors have criticized your proposals. The objective of criticism is either elimination (if it's too bad) or improvement of a proposal. To see which outcome is appropriate, in both cases you should respond properly to the points your critics make. You have not done so. In his first comment Zaspino has criticized your proposal mainly because he/she considered your proposal very unclear. You responded by adding references, without giving the slightest explanation as to why, without giving the quotations we asked for, and by offending him. How could we help you to improve your text if the text is not clear? What's more, you have, as Zaspino said elsewhere, a tendency to present your Kantian take on the matter as the neutral approach. I am so far not at all convinced that a paragaraph of this tendency is appropriate in the article. Theobald Tiger (talk) 18:24, 7 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Theobald, why are you lying? I have nowhere posited Kant's idea as neutral. I have placed teleology against deontology here. That was the entire point of the section. It is quite clear to everybody who does not have a POV, as far as I know. The supposed unclearity were, in my opinion, requests for an elaboration. This seems very strange to do here to me, which is why the hyperlinks are in there. I have, however placed references because an uninformed critique can inform oneself by following the references. It also proves the unbiased nature of the short piece. Apart from that I do not think I have offended anybody, apart from stating what that person does. If that is insulting, than please behave differently...morally for instance.
Now, if you really do think that the piece is unclear, than I invite you to rewrite it so that it will be clearer. To me it is crystal clear, you see. --Faust (talk) 08:34, 8 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Andrew Lancaster discussion[edit]

I just decided to put this article on my watchlist. I had not seen this discussion before. Faust, may I ask you to state your late proposal after the discussion above?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 12:24, 11 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Hi Andrew, not much has changed to be honest. I think adding this part would be an improvement because it shows (at least in an ethical sense) that there are more than one epistemologies. I will work on quantum mechanics later, bvut to me ethis is more important. Anyway, this is being blocked by somebody who simply does not know his way around philosophy, but by whom I feel harassed. He has got it in his mind that everything I say here is related to Kant in some way or another. While I do enjoy Kant and I think that not following Kant puts science back about 200 years it is not what I am doing. I am simply adding content that I think is valuable. In this case so that people being raised with 'goals' that there are other ways. I will not type out 12 sources you see. Anyway, I would appreciate an idea on how to deal with this. The latest version was:
Teleological ethics is defined by the thought that behavior is subservient to that which is the 'good' to a man, men, or humanity[7] for example. This in the sense that this 'good' is understood as a 'goal'. This is why behavior is called 'good' if the consequence of that behavior adds towards achieving these 'goals'[8]. The reason for this is that the principle of action (maxim) is not meant to be a (duty to a) universal law[9] and, as such, has no morals (in the narrow sense)[10].This is why it is opposite (at least in ethics) to deontological ethics, which focuses on the manner of behavior (or intention) at the same time[11].
So this is your proposed paragraph? It is complex and if you don't mind I'll play with it below. Let's see what we come up with in order to at least get it in a form that we all see in the same way.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 17:28, 13 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Teleological ethics knows several forms, among which are Aristotelianism, Utilitarianism (also known as consequentionalism)and hedonism[12]. The logic of teleological and deontological ethics is examined in detail in Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Faust (talkcontribs) 16:32, 13 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Does that dictionary really call Utilitarianism and hedonism a form of teleological ethics? I believe that is incorrect.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 17:28, 13 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Below my running through your proposed paragraph:-

Thought is an odd choice of word here. A thought can be a passing flight of fantasy. I think better might be "understanding of reality"; "proposal"; "philosophical theory"; "ethical account" etc?
  • that behavior is subservient to that which is the 'good'
Again I know what you mean but odd wording: "behavior is best aimed at"?
  • to a man, men, or humanity[13] for example.
Good intentions there I guess but doesn't humanity cover it?
  • This in the sense that this 'good' is understood as a 'goal'. This is why behavior is called 'good' if the consequence of that behavior adds towards achieving these 'goals'[14]. The reason for this is that the principle of action (maxim) is not meant to be a (duty to a) universal law[15] and, as such, has no morals (in the narrow sense)[16].This is why it is opposite (at least in ethics) to deontological ethics, which focuses on the manner of behavior (or intention) at the same time[17].
I need help here. In a complicated definition paragraph like this it can be very heavy going for readers if you repeatedly refer back to "this". "This" is obviously something back near the beginning but what?

Can you tell me if the follow version (which is not a proposal I am making or agreeing with, just a test at re-wording to see if I understand) would mean the same thing...

A teleological ethics is any ethical system that proposes that behavior should be directed towards what is 'good' - either what is good for people, or "good" in some more general sense[18] In such ethics, what is 'good' is understood as a 'goal', and in some extreme versions of teleological ethics what is a goal is even equated with what is good.[19] Such teleological systems can be contrasted with those which understand that human action should be guided by universal laws which exist apart from humanity[20] which are sometimes held to be a necessary conditions for an ethics to be considered as a morality in the narrow sense[21]. In other words, teleological ethics are the opposite of deontological ethics, which focus on the manner of behavior (or intention) and not just what goals are being aimed at.[22].

I have to say that what I can follow does not seem correct to me. But at least let's first confirm if I've understood.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 17:28, 13 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

You are restating what I have been going through before. I personally have never seen any other mention of aristotelianism, hedonism and utalitairianism than as teleology since they all have a rulebase with goals. It surprises me that the only source for this is an online standford dictionary and that everybody I meet seems to think this is correct. My advise would be to try to use creditable sources. I do not have the impression that you know your way around ethics. Especially since teleological ethics are based on the notion that an end-cause (a.k.a. goal) is 'the good'. That is why what you are saying above is incorrect on two accounts (sources are given above):
1) It is not in an extreme version of teleology, but in all versions of teleology that the goal is equated with that good.
2) The example of the good to a person, persons or mankind is a very good one since it stipulates the very essence of teleology: the subjectivity which promotes a POV and, for a person is aristotelianism, for persons or humanity is consequentionalism and hedonism is a bit special in the sense that it motivates positive emotions as 'the good'.
Another point by which I know that you do not know your way around is that you mysteriously remove the examination of the maxim from your definition of deontology. The entire core of deontology is that an act is moral when the subjective principle of action (maxim) can simultaneously be willed to be a universal law (intent). Only to examine the rule (intent) is to make that rule into a goal and therefore into teleology. This is why virtue ethics is teleology. Here is a creditable source:
"Deontology asserts that there are several distinct duties. Certain kinds of act are intrinsically wrong. The rightness or wrongness of any particular act is thus not (or not wholly) determined by the goodness or badness of its consequences. <<etc>>" (P172, Deontological Ethics)
I am grateful with your attempt to mediate, but if you do not know your way around, please do not judge. You will only create a whole lot of static, like many before you. --Faust (talk) 20:54, 13 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Thinking this over I remember that all ancient Greek (ethical) theories always focus on the benefit to the individual (so that goes for hedonism as well). The 'amor fati' thought is substantial in this. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Faust (talkcontribs) 21:08, 13 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Faust FWIW I do know "something" about this subject, but of course it is difficult for us to judge each other's knowledge over the internet and so a better method of practical discussion is to judge what we actually say, not try to guess things about each other as people too much, and as you point out, actually being able to source things might help. Anyway though, maybe these first remarks help explain what I am thinking so far...
  • Teleology means "an account with ends" and is a term which normally refers not to ethics especially but to theories of causality more generally, amongst things which are not human.
  • All human behavior has ends and all ethical theories discuss ends. Humans aim at goals. So it is not normally useful to use the word teleology in those contexts, because all ethics is effectively teleological.
  • Teleology is more commonly a word for theories of causality that assert that their are aims outside of the aims of individual humans - for example, to take a very simplistic case, if we say that animals were created with the intention of being eaten by humans.
  • It is not true that Greek ethical theories focus only on the benefit of the individual. The first works called Ethics were those of Aristotle and he certainly did not take such an approach.
  • You make some points about my attempt to reword you which require me to comment that your English is not very easy to read, both in the paragraph I was trying to re-write and also in your explanation. That is going to make discussion difficult so please take your time when writing. Novel word usage such as "is substantial in this" is effectively impossible to parse because it could mean just about anything. The same with "the subjectivity which promotes a POV and, for a person is aristotelianism, for persons or humanity is consequentionalism and hedonism is a bit special in the sense that it motivates positive emotions as 'the good'." Quite apart from whether your intentions when writing are correct, such a sentence makes it hard to judge what you mean to begin with.
  • I have real doubts that the sources you cite are being interpreted correctly by you. But in any case with your writing style it is actually hard to tell what you mean. Either way, can you give some exact quotations? That could help discussion.
  • (After typing this I looked at what others have written and noticed similar comments.)--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 08:00, 14 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
I agree with most comments made by Andrew Lancaster (AL). I have a few additional comments:
  1. By now Faust has told nearly everyone with whom he happens to have an argument that he or she does not know enough about the subject to fully participate. This is a nasty habit. Since AL has made considerable efforts to understand Faust's proposals and explications in the first place and has done further suggestions for improvement in the second place, I think AL's efforts deserve to be appreciated.
  2. Discussing abstract concepts can be useful only if the participants try to be precise in their use of terminology. AL has expressed doubts whether certain philosophical positions ('utilitarianism' and 'hedonism') should be categorized as teleology. I think those doubts are justified. Almost every 'Weltanschauung', worldview, conception of life has a vision of what is a desirable state of affairs ("the good"), but the mere fact that this is true does not make automatically such a worldview a form of teleology.
  3. Taxonomists of ethical theories usually distinguish (among other things) between teleological theories and deontological theories. An ethical theory is called teleological if, within that ethical theory, the consequences of an act have a considerable impact on the moral judgement of this act. The 'Weltanschauung' or worldview that has called into being a specific ethical theory may or may not have a vision of what is a desirable state of affairs, but the mere presence or absence of such a vision does not alter the taxonomy of the ethical theory that originated within that worldview. A hedonist may aim at some (future) state of affairs in which 'the net pleasure is maximized', but it remains possible for him or her to develop either a deontological or a teleological ethical theory within the hedonistic worldview. If I am well-informed, the ethics of some (or most) hedonistic utilitarians is often called teleological.
Theobald Tiger (talk) 13:02, 14 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Well it could indeed be that people sometimes called utilitarianism teleological. I am more familiar lately with classical and early modern ethics. I guess my point would be that we need to be careful to "disambiguate" this word. Obviously for example, calling Aristotle's metaphysics teleological means something very different from calling Bentham's utilitarianism teleological (if that is what they do).
And just on Aristotle, in case it is helpful, his word for the goal of human living is eudaimonia but that is initially just defined tautologically in order to start discussion and work out what it might be. He eventually defines it more precisely as a certain way of being in action which is natural to humankind. The aim is to do that as well as possible. So although he does refer to this as a target and a good, it is not hedonism or utilitarianism. Indeed he explicitly says that even though people aim at something most of them also misunderstand what it is. And Aristotle specifically says that pleasure will come with the right type of life, but not as part of the activity, but rather pleasure is a separate activity which occurs as an added bonus. --Andrew Lancaster (talk) 13:38, 14 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

I will briefly respond to Andrew here and specifically not to Theobald, since he has declared not to be interested in the objective content of an encyclopedia if that includes my thoughts. I need to run so it will be short Andrew. Be careful of your POV (that all ethics is teleology). Teleology is clearly set out against non-causality in all fields. The reason for this is that causality only has bearing on the workings in the mind. So, what you are talking about is what I am talking about in the sense that some 'duties' can be grasped as 'goals' if improperly wielded. A duty is only that which connects a certain maxim to the will to make it a universal law simultaneously. This leaves the rulebase completely empty, thus being something else (non-causal). A detail of interest might be the term teleology: the logos of telos. This means the reasoning of an endcause; towards that endcause.

NOTE: I think you are a friend of Theobald or otherwise recruited by him. This means I am not going to give you much room for strange behavior. The reasons for this are that you are making the same strange mistakes he is (which point to a clear lacking of knowledge in this field of expertise). Apart from that I notice that my language is easily readable for people who are able to understand that non-causality takes an ontological grasp. Since this is the entire content of my entry it might be a little difficult for you to interpret, but still important to be included. Please, understand that deontology has two layers and teleology only one, which necessitates the syntax I am using.
I will be out for the next few days, so please do not run amok along with all the strange mumbo jumbo I have seen placed here. --Faust (talk) 13:58, 14 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Faust, I'm not going to reply to the ad hominem stuff. It just makes the discussion longer and more complicated.
Concerning what you call my POV about the meaning of the word teleology, please read my reply to Theobald. I said that that it might have several meanings, but that if this is the case the we at least need to disambiguate.
Concerning difficult wording, you'll need to make an effort. Please define any unusual terms, be careful of relying on long strings of unclearly defined pronouns, and use normal English grammar. There's no other way to communicate here than by typing, and no other way to get you material accepted than by consensus. If people interested in editing this subject have trouble reading it, there is a problem.
Would you be willing to try re-writing your proposal?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 14:09, 14 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Editors here may want to look at Deontological ethics.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 19:41, 14 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

teleo reactive computer programs?[edit]

Bdongol has contacted me on my talk page because I have removed attempts to include a sub-section on teleo-reactive programs. I request Bdongol to explain the connection here on this article talk page, between teleo-reactive computer programs and teleology. Just to start with the obvious, these are different words, concerning entirely different areas of discussion. I see no connection apart from the Greek prefix? Should we also include a sub-section on every word beginning with the letters teleo?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 16:14, 9 February 2011 (UTC)[reply]


Unlike other action selection paradigms, teleo-reactive programs execute in a teleological manner (hence the name). In particular, teleo-reactive programs are structured so that the "goal" or "end-result" is execution of the first action in the sequence. Statements "X in order to achieve Y" are inherently present, namely actions that appear later in the sequence must be completed "in order to" enable execution of the earlier statements. The word reactive is needed because such programs are also able to react dynamically to changes in its environment - which I agree does not have much to do with teleology. Bdongol (talk) 01:09, 10 February 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for posting here. Let´s work out what to do. Obviously not everything which has an end or goal or aim can be in this article. Having an end or goal is common, but teleology does not just mean having an end or goal. Also, as I mentioned above, just because the Greek word for end is used to build the word also does not make it teleological. I think the critical point for whether it this subject is related to teleology is neither etymology nor having goals or ends, but whether teleo-reactive programs are routinely referred to as teleological in reliable, notable and relevant sources. Can you say whether it is?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 09:48, 10 February 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, there are plenty of sources. [1]
Sorry to be devil's advocate, but that google scholar search shows only a very small number of articles using the terms teleological and teleo-reactive in the same article. It looks like just an odd wording choice by a few authors? I hope other editors will comment though.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 13:15, 15 February 2011 (UTC)[reply]
That would be because only a few sources are needed to establish the relationship between the two terms. The research on teleo-reactive programs focuses on their applications, not on teleology itself --- there is no need keep bringing up "teleology" in every article on teleo-reactive programs. Furthermore, teleo-reactive programs are a relatively new concept and have only just become an active research area in recent years. Bdongol (talk) 01:13, 17 February 2011 (UTC)[reply]
I agree. In general, one could think of software in terms of teleology, but it's never formally described that way. Developers and analysts (even academics) commonly use metaphor in non-rigorous descriptions... That would seem to be the case here and if it's notable, it's not in this article.—Machine Elf 1735 (talk) 16:05, 15 February 2011 (UTC)[reply]
I disagree with this statement. In general, software is thought of in terms of inputs and outputs or if you like, pre- and post-conditions. A teleological action choice (or teleological planning) is unique to teleo-reactive programs. Bdongol (talk) 01:13, 17 February 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Yes but (a) this is not what teleology means normally, and (b) you've not really shown a source which tells us that there is a notable special computer meaning that strongly connects teleo-reactive programmes with teleology. The word teleology is normally not used to describe human goals, and in this case the computer is a human tool so it has human goals. This is simply because it is not interesting to point out that humans (and their tools) are aimed at goals. This article can not be about every type of aiming at goals. Teleology is a special word, I think, which is normally used when it is being claimed that their are non human goals in nature itself. The word might sometimes be used for rhetorical effect in contexts relating to human-set goals, of course, but the article can't be about all those cases I think? Why would we not have a section on the teleology of screw-drivers for example? They achieve an end.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 07:19, 17 February 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Teleology is sometimes used to describe human goals, as in the sense used in "teleological ethics". --Pfhorrest (talk) 20:29, 17 February 2011 (UTC)[reply]
That's true indeed, which is why I asked if there is a notable history of computer programs being named that way. I do realize there are exceptions, and I do agree that no matter how near my logic is, if reliable sources start doing something we have to find a way to follow no matter how awkward those crazy reliable guys can be. So what do you think about this particular case?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 09:05, 18 February 2011 (UTC)[reply]
I'm not fussed either way anymore especially because there seem to be wider issues with the teleology and science section in general. In my view, the way teleo-reactive programs are used in computer science makes them teleological, i.e., "the design and purpose analogous to that found in human actions are inherent also in teleo-reactive programs". It's true that TR programs have been built to achieve human goals, but this does not need to be the case, i.e., the semantics (of a TR program) simply state that the program will try to achieve its goal (human or otherwise) in a teleological manner. It's also true that we've designed them to be teleological, but the philosophical implications of this is beyond me. Perhaps there should be an article on TR-programs that links to teleology, rather than the other way round. Thanks for an interesting discussion. Bdongol (talk) 23:43, 21 February 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Well Bdongol, unless the output precedes input, then it works exactly like every program. From the name, I imagine it dynamically adapts to changing goals but, at least for Aristotle, something's final cause never changes; it's just a static generic form. I'm sure the software does something very different and much more impressive (even if can't foresee the future).—Machine Elf 1735 (talk) 18:03, 17 February 2011 (UTC)[reply]
"unless the output precedes input" - So you're saying we are capable of solving the Halting problem? The goals are not dynamically changing - there is only one goal (final cause). The dynamic part comes from the fact that the program is able to react to a changing environment. Bdongol (talk) 23:43, 21 February 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Prophetic software would probably do the trick but no, just a small joke. Very small. But surely there's a whole class of algorithms that iteratively reduce the difference between some established goal and monitored values? If you can't find an article, you should probably start one.—Machine Elf 1735 (talk) 05:44, 22 February 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Science[edit]

Errm <struggles to be polite> who put all the teleology-and-modern-science stuff in? William M. Connolley (talk) 22:48, 21 February 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Looking at recent edits I would say that I agree with the short un-sourced paragraph you have put in now instead, which says modern science takes a pretty negative attitude to teleology. There might be exceptional cases worth mentioning, but I think we'd want good clear sourcing and explanation about this. I see a source has been called for your new sentence also though. I think one can be found.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 08:51, 22 February 2011 (UTC)[reply]
I've hacked it a bit more. There is a lot of dodgy stuff in the bio section. Eg biologist philosopher Francisco Ayala has argued that all statements about processes can be trivially translated into teleological statements, and vice versa, but that teleological statements are more explanatory and cannot be disposed of makes no sense: it asserts that all teleo can trivially be translated into non-teleo, and then that teleo can't be disposed of. This needs to be corrected or removed. I also wonder re WP:UNDUE William M. Connolley (talk) 10:15, 22 February 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Yes the Ayala stuff keeps coming back on articles about these subjects. I think you'll find stuff on the archives of this article. He seems reasonably well known, so not quite fringe, but also not standard mainstream obviously. I guess in the end we'll need to cover the "best of" claims that teleology is still in modern science, because the claim is out there. But it is a bit problematic in that some of these neo-teleological claims tend to twist the meaning of teleology so much that it becomes virtually meaningless. See the discussion above about teleo-reactive computer programming. In my mind, teleology means "final causes" in nature, goals in nature equivalent to those that humans have except actually causing things to work in a directed way. And denying that science should assume these is generally seen as one of the defining attributes of modern science?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 10:59, 22 February 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks. Re defining of modern science: yes I think that is fair. That means stuff like the cybernetics is a bit problematic: computer programs obvious *do* have a purpose, because they were built to have one. Nonetheless they don't really belong where they are in the article. Obviously, most human artifacts have a "purpose", like a knife or anything, else why would you build them? But that really has nothing to do with modern science: the cybernetics is there because it seems modern-sciencey, but it seems to me not to belong any more than knife-making does William M. Connolley (talk) 12:44, 22 February 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Final and efficient causes[edit]

Interesting material can be found in Adaptation#Function and teleonomy.

Biology and cybernetics are full of feedback, homeostasis, regulation, feedback control... If anything, they are 'efficient causes'. They are not teleological in the sense of final causes, and Wiener went out of his way not to use teleological language in the title of his book. Macdonald-ross (talk) 12:57, 31 March 2011 (UTC)[reply]

About necessity of teleological concepts (but without metaphysics) in biology[edit]

I think in the article can be interesting the use of papers about the necessity of unreplaceable teleological terms and concepts in life sciences, but without any appeal to supernatural or metaphysics entities. I suggest the following Ernst Mayr's text "The multiple meanings of teleological":

http://faculty.washington.edu/lynnhank/Mayr3.pdf

"In spite of the long-standing misgivings of physical scientists, philosophers, and logicians, many biologists have continued to insist not only that such teleological statements are objective and free of metaphysical content, but also that they express something important which is lost when teleological language is eliminated from such statements."

It's interesting also that Mayr reports that Aristotle is often misinterpreted in the past as an anti-scientific cosmic teleologist but this interpretation is recently shown as inaccurate:

"Aristotle has been traditionally misinterpreted as a cosmic teleologist. Modern students of Aristotle are in agreement that he was not (Gotthelf 1976; Nussbaum 1978; Sorabji 1980; Balrne 1981). As already understood by Delbruck (1971), Aristotle's concept of the eidos, in the context of ontogenetic development, is in some respects remarkably similar to the modern concept of the genetic program. What the standard histories of philosophy write about Aristotle's teleology is unfortunately largely wrong, and must be ignored. I myself misinterpreted Aristotle before I became acquainted with the modern literature."

I suggest also the following volume:

http://books.google.it/books/about/Purposiveness.html?id=Ased-Na1uy4C&redir_esc=y

"Since the rise of modern thought and natural science, teleological discourses have been banished as explanatory tools in natural investigations. The various contributions to this volume set out whether, and in which form, it is possible to talk of purposes in nature, without resorting to an account requesting some intentional agent. The legitimacy of such a notion as that of internal teleology is addressed, together with the issue of what the term "internal"properly denotes. It is meant to be an alternative both to the position of those who assume that teleology in biology requires a dimension transcending nature itself and find in teleological language an argument for the intelligent designer, and to the stance of those who aim to eliminate teleology from scientific inquiry altogether."

Bye.

80.117.30.221 (talk) 14:25, 29 April 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Misapplications?[edit]

Is it fair to say, *when it's misapplied*, that teleology is nothing but post hoc ergo propter hoc? I don't pretend to understand the ways teleology may be correctly applied; it just seems to me that common mistakes about it are sometimes made to sound more complex or more interesting than they really are. Maybe I'm missing the point. TooManyFingers (talk) 19:22, 15 May 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Verb missing in the VERY FIRST SENTENCE![edit]

As if this abstract subject weren't difficult enough to understand, the very first sentence of this article is incomprehensible:

"A teleology is any philosophical account which that final causes exist in nature..."

Huh??? Captain Quirk (talk) 16:18, 8 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Fixed. --Faust (talk) 17:47, 8 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks. Typo.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 12:14, 11 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
  1. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p375
  2. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p360
  3. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p294
  4. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p240
  5. ^ The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, P172 and P173
  6. ^ The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, P172 and P173
  7. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p375
  8. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p360
  9. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p294
  10. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p240
  11. ^ The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, P172 and P173
  12. ^ The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, P172 and P173
  13. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p375
  14. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p360
  15. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p294
  16. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p240
  17. ^ The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, P172 and P173
  18. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p375
  19. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p360
  20. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p294
  21. ^ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2008, p240
  22. ^ The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, P172 and P173