User:Shannontimmins/sandbox

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Article evaluation[edit]

The article I evaluated was the article on State capture. I found this article to be severely lacking. Technically, everything included in the article is relevant to the article topic, however the level of detail in the South African example greatly exceed the rest of the article. The subsections discussing Latin America and Bulgaria are only one very general sentence each, while the subsection about South Africa is very detailed with specific examples. The section on Bulgaria doesn’t even really mention state capture. The article would benefit from more general information and fewer details of one specific example, but the majority of edits to this article appear to have been made on the South Africa section. Very few major edits have been made to the definition section or the other examples. The article does appear to be neutral, though there is some inherent negativity in the way state capture is presented. Despite this, all examples were presented fairly and no false claims were made; the article does not appear to be heavily biased towards any position, and this is one of the high points of this article.

Many facts in this article are not cited at all. Of the facts that are cited, several references would not be considered reliable. Some of the citation links led to blogs or news stories from unknown websites, rather than a reliable, peer-edited paper. No bias was ever noted in the article. Upon randomly checking some of the citation links I found that most of the links that were checked did work, although some led to a page where one could buy the book being referenced, rather than the actual article. There was one link that was checked that didn’t lead anywhere. For the most part, the source supported the claims being made.

No information appears to be out of date.

There is essentially no conversation going on behind the scenes. The last (and only) update to the Talk page is a rewritten version of the Definition section, and a suggestion of possible examples to be used. This comment was posted in February 2016, and there appear to be no further updates to the Talk page since then.

The article is rated Stub-class, Mid-importance. It is of interest to WikiProjects Economics, Business, Finance, Politics and Crime.

There were a few differences between this information being presented in this article and the information we have discussed in class. In this article, lobbying is described as a form of state capture, however in class we talked about them as two seperate things. The article also talks about the difference between corruption and state capture, while in class we talked about state capture as a form of corruption.

Article proposals[edit]

State capture[edit]

After evaluating this article above, it is clear that this article could use some work. It is rated as stub-class and of mid-importance, and is missing a lot of information. It requires more reliable sources, a clearer definition and an expansion of the examples listed. Since there isn't a lot of activity in the Talk page, it appears this article is not in the process of being updated.

Cronyism[edit]

This article is very short and needs expansion. The Talk page is controversial, without a lot of useful contributions. This article is rated start-class and high-/mid-importance on two WikiProjects. There are no examples listed in this article, and almost a third of the article is unverified etymology.

Sources for article[edit]

Confronting the challenge of state capture in transition economies: Finance and Development. Hellman, Joel;Kaufmann, Daniel (MyCourses) DONE

http://www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Fazekas-Toth_State_capture_PP_2014Nov.pdf

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1016/j.polsoc.2009.11.003 - Example: State Capture in Mexico

http://f3magazine.unicri.it/?p=402- might not be a credible source - unclear if this is published with UNICRI or just uses their logo


http://www.saccps.org/pdf/5-1/5-1_DRMartin_DrSolomon_2.pdf - more info about South African state capture

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/hellman.htm - from the IMF DONE

https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-2444 from the World Bank - DONE

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/1740479-1149112210081/2604389-1149274062067/2613434-1149276254021/quinghua_paper_hellman.pdf - strategies for fighting state capture DONEhttps://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/State_capture_an_overview_2014.pdf - from TI DONE

https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/illicit-political-finance-and-state-capture.pdf - referenced in TI article

Final draft of improved article[edit]

State capture is a type of systemic political corruption in which private interests significantly influence a state's decision-making processes to their own advantage[1]. The private actors who use their influence in this way are called "captors" or "captor firms".[2][3]

The term 'state capture' was first used by the World Bank in 2000 to describe circumstances in central Asian countries making the transition from Soviet communism where small, powerful groups were using their economic influence to make political decisions.[4]

Instances of state capture often involve private actors known as oligarchs, who are owners of large firms that hold sufficient power to influence politics.[5] The act of oligarchs using their influence to affect policy formation in their favour is the most traditional definition of state capture.[3]

Allegations of state capture have caused an ongoing controversy in South Africa beginning in 2016[6]. Smaller-scale accusations have been made in Germany, South Korea, and many other countries.[1]

While there is no universally used method to measure state capture, the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) includes some questions about state capture, and is often cited as a measure of countries' level of state capture.[1]

Defining state capture[edit]

The classical definition of state capture refers to the way formal procedures (such as laws and regulations) and government bureaucracy are manipulated by private individuals and firms so as to influence state policies and laws in their favour.[7]

In some ways state capture is similar to regulatory capture, but it differs in its wider span of influenced agencies. Furthermore, unlike regulatory capture, the private influence is much more discreet.[8] State capture is characterized by its lack of transparency, which is what sets it apart from other forms of political influence.[8]

While it is a form of corruption, state capture differs from traditional forms of political corruption since it is a case of firms using their influence to better their profits, rather than government officials taking advantage of their positions.[2] In this type of corruption, the focus is on changing the way regulations are formed, rather than working around the regulations, as most acts of corruption are intended to do.[3]

State capture happens frequently in transition states because their lack of political financing makes them more likely to accept donations from private donors. Transition states often have weaker social organization and are less able to regulate firms' influence.[2] State capture is frequently more prevalent in states that have more concentrated political power, which is another common characteristic of transition states.[9]

Forms of state capture[edit]

There are many different methods of state capture. It can be done at the local level, or at the state level.[10] These methods include, though are not limited to, vote buying, illegal contributions to campaigns, illegal lobbying and bribery. Though not always the case, often state capture involves personal or familial connections. [1]

There are four main documented types of state capture. These types are:

  • Legislative capture: refers to private actors buying Parliamentary votes or Presidential decrees.
  • Central Bank capture: refers to the mishandling of funds by the Central Bank to benefit private interests.
  • Legal capture: refers to the buying of legal outcomes or court decisions.
  • Non-transparent political financing: refers to undisclosed donations to political campaigns or parties by private interests who are in the position to benefit from the recipient of the donation.[7]

Prevention of state capture[edit]

Like many other forms of corruption, state capture is difficult to combat. In countries with high levels of state capture, the payoffs of engaging in state capture are very high, especially in the short term. Thus it is an ongoing cycle, with high levels of state capture encouraging even higher levels of state capture in the future.[9] However, increased regulations have been shown to reduce the monetary benefits of engaging in state capture, so there is some proof that prevention strategies have at least a marginal positive impact.[9]

Transparency International recommends improving transparency in political financing to reduce the prevalancy of state capture. This can be done by increasing the amount of public funding available for campaigns, by reducing the costs of campaigns, and by restricting the amount that private donors can donate[1]. Transparency International also recommends the instigation of "asset and interest declaration requirements", in other words, an annual announcement of any conflicts of interest.[1] Improving transparency in the policymaking process would also help to limit the opportunities for state capture. Publicizing the reasoning behind the decisions of politicians would cast a light on any illegal influence.[2]

Recommendations have also been made to mobilize the "losers" in the capture economy.[3] Since the main players in a capture economy are large business owners and political officials, there is little incentive for either group to push for stronger regulations that can prevent state capture. As the social cost to firms not engaging in state capture is high, there is a strong incentive for the firms who are unable to participate to push for change in regulations.[3] By mobilizing these groups, change in regulations can be brought about.

Notable examples of state capture[edit]

Germany[edit]

In 2013, major BMW shareholders donated large amounts to the campaigns of several German politicians, including Chancellor Angela Merkel, amounting to €690,000.[11]

Shortly after these donations were made, the German government voted against new the CO2 restrictions proposed by the European Union (EU) which would have had a significant negative economic impact on BMW.[1] The records of the donations made by the BMW shareholders were not made public until after the EU deal had been stalled by Germany.[12]

South Korea[edit]

In South Korea, chaebol have historically had a great deal of influence in government policy-making. Chaebol are large family-owned conglomerates that are a major part of South Korea's economy.[1]

Chaebol have strong political power, and have traditionally played a large role in deciding South Korean elections.[13] They have been bailed out by the South Korean government multiple times, and many pro-Chaebol regulations have been put in place.[1]

South Africa[edit]

Main article: Gupta family

In 2016, there were allegations of an overly close and potentially corrupt relationship between the wealthy Gupta family and the South African president Jacob Zuma, his family and leading members of the African National Congress(ANC).[14] South African Opposition parties have made claims of state capture following allegations that the Guptas, said to be close to President Jacob Zuma, his family and other ANC leaders. They had manipulated themselves into a position where they could offer Cabinet positions and influence the running of government.[15] These allegations were made in light of revelations by former ANC MP Vytjie Mentor and Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas that they had been offered Cabinet positions by the Guptas at the family's home in Saxonwold, Johannesburg.[16]

The Guptas' alleged state capture was investigated by Public Protector Thuli Madonsela.[6]

On 11 September 2017, the former Finance Minister, Pravin Gordhan, estimated the cost of state capture at 250 billion Rand, in a presentation at the University of Cape Town Graduate School of Business.[17]

On 13 November 2017, South African President Jacob Zuma, in an exclusive interview with ANN7, defended the state capture allegations by calling the term a fancy word used by the media houses for propaganda proliferation. He further justified that a real state capture would include the seizure of the 3 arms of Constitution - Legislative, Executive & Judiciary, which has never been the case in South Africa.[18]

  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i "State Capture: An Overview" (PDF).
  2. ^ a b c d "Strategies to Combat State Capture and Adminstrative Corruption in Transition Economies" (PDF).
  3. ^ a b c d e Hellman, Joel; Kaufmann, Daniel (September 2001). "Confronting the Challenge of State Capture in Transition Economies; Finance and Development". Finance & Development. 38: 31–35.
  4. ^ 1950-, Crabtree, John (15 May 2017). Peru : elite power and political capture. Durand, Francisco. London. ISBN 978-1783609031. OCLC 945390726. {{cite book}}: |last= has numeric name (help)CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  5. ^ Chernenko, Demid (2018-01-11). "Capital structure and oligarch ownership". Economic Change and Restructuring. 52 (4): 383–411. doi:10.1007/s10644-018-9226-9. ISSN 1573-9414. S2CID 56232563.
  6. ^ a b Madonsela, Adv Thuli N (14 October 2016). State of Capture (PDF) (Report).
  7. ^ a b Hellman, Joel, Jones, Geraint, Kaufmann, Daniel, and Schankern, Mark (2000). Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2312. Available at http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website00818/WEB/PDF/MEASURE.PDF
  8. ^ a b Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate. World Bank Publications. 2000-01-01. ISBN 9780821348024.
  9. ^ a b c Hellman, Joel; Jones, Geraint; Kaufmann, Daniel (2000). Seize the State, Seize the Day: An empirical analysis of State Capture and Corruption in Transition. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTABCDEWASHINGTON2000/Resources/hellman.pdf
  10. ^ Bardhan, Pranab, K.; Mookherjee, Dilip (2000). "Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels". American Economic Review. 90 (2): 135–139. doi:10.1257/aer.90.2.135.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  11. ^ "Merkel's Patrons: Donation from BMW Owners Raises Eyebrows". Spiegel Online. 2013-10-15. Retrieved 2018-04-25.
  12. ^ "The German Automotive Industry vs. the Environment - Project for Democratic Union (PDU)". Project for Democratic Union (PDU). 2013-10-17. Retrieved 2018-04-25.
  13. ^ Lee, Phil-Sang (2000). "Economic Crisis and Chaebol Reform in Korea". APEC Study Center. Discussion Paper Series, Columbia Business School.
  14. ^ "Who are the Guptas?". BBC News. 2018-02-14. Retrieved 2018-04-25.
  15. ^ "Parliament must deal with 'state capture' - DA". News24. Retrieved 2018-04-25.
  16. ^ "Zuma defends relationship with Guptas - report". News24. Retrieved 2018-04-25.
  17. ^ reporter, Citizen. "R250bn lost to state capture in the last three years, says Gordhan". The Citizen. Retrieved 2018-04-25.
  18. ^ Africa News Network 7 TV (2017-11-13), #StraightTalk: ANN7 exclusive interview with Pres Jacob Zuma, retrieved 2017-11-21