User:PenangLion/Anting crisis
| Anting incident | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Cultural Revolution | |||
Wang Hongwen (left), and Chen Pixian (right). | |||
| Date | 8 November – 12 November 1967 (4 days) | ||
| Location | |||
| Caused by | General discontent against the Shanghai Municipal Committee | ||
| Goals | Concession of political powers from the Shanghai Municipal Committee:
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| Resulted in | Demonstration quelled:
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| Parties | |||
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| Lead figures | |||
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| Anting incident | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chinese | 安亭事件 | ||||||
| Literal meaning | "Anting incident" | ||||||
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The Anting incident (Chinese: 安亭事件; pinyin: Āntíng shìjiàn) was a political crisis in Shanghai during the Cultural Revolution between 8 to 12 November 1966. It was initiated by the Headquarters of the Revolutionary Revolt of Shanghai Workers, a Maoist rebel faction led by Wang Hongwen, , against the Shanghai Municipal Committee. The Shanghai Workers' Headquarters, initially declared illegal by the local government, issued several demands which included legalising workers to form their own Maoist rebel groups. After these demands were rejected, thousands of demonstrators planned to travel to Beijing by rail to protest. When the convoy was forcefully halted at Anting, a town at the outskirts of Shanghai, a three-day standoff ensued, which was only dismantled through the intervention of Zhang Chunqiao from the Cultural Revolution Group.
Through a compromise agreement, the legitimacy of the Workers' Headquarters was recognised by the CRG and the Beijing administration, a move disapproved by the Shanghai Municipal Committee. As a result, tensions between the Shanghai bureaucrats and Workers' Headquarters remain, leading to violent struggles between the Workers' Headquarters and pro-government rebel factions, which eventually caused the CRG and the Workers' Headquarters to lead a coup d'etat against the Shanghai Municipal Committee in January 1967.
Background
[edit]"Black files"
[edit]A major political issue in Shanghai during the onset of the Cultural Revolution relates to the "black files" – political dossiers on citizens compiled for years by surveillance organisations in all aspects of life in the city. The "black files" were effective in restraining rebellious actions on any people with Maoist sympathies, as it was feared that these dossiers might be used against them as retribution by local party divisions once the Cultural Revolution concludes or fails. These files sowed resentment among citizens against the Shanghai Municipal Committee.[1]
On 5 October 1966, a directive was issued by the Beijing administration urging the "black files" be burned in public. This directive encouraged student rebels and the Red Guards to demonstrate for their destruction. However, the Shanghai government once again refused to release materials that they deem to be "state secrets". In early November, the Red Guards hosted several night raids on Shanghai party offices to seize the files, which led to violent struggles between rebel masses and party cadres. As a response, another directive was issued by the Beijing administration on 16 November, which demanded for the destruction of the "black files", but also called for the process to be settled by peaceful means.[1]
Class division between workers in Shanghai
[edit]Prior to the Cultural Revolution, there exists several class divisions between industrial workers. The first division was between older and skilled workers, and young apprentice workers. The older workers were benefited with higher wages and better bonuses, and thus were less likely to respond towards the rebellious call of the Cultural Revolution, wishing to continue to preserve the current political systems. The younger workers, however, were unskilled and situated in worse living conditions which made them inclined to rebel under the Maoist call.[1]
A second and far greater division existed between temporary workers (linshi gong) and permanent workers. The amount of temporary workers increased dramatically during the Great Leap Forward, who were drafted from the proletariat and rural peasants.[2] While the move was originally stated for ideological hegemony among all workers, it actually produced a "dual system" whereby the urban workforce expanded without the expense of enlarging social welfare systems like those of the permanent workforce, providing cheap manpower for state enterprises.[3] The temporary workers lived on the barest of subsistence wages, and were given no access of any bonuses and benefits with no guarantees on job security, as opposed to regular workers who were state employees.[4] By the end of 1965, there were 33 million permanent workers and 31 million temporary workers in the economy.[5]
Contract labourers and young regular workers would attempt to exploit the political upheavals from the Cultural Revolution to fight for better workers' rights, a situation that was first centred around Shanghai, China's largest and most industrialised city.[6] They described the inequality as "capitalist exploitation", and demanded for the "iron rice bowl", equal benefits and job security like those given to permanent workers.[7] The decision to enforce stricter rules on hukou registrations in urban regions also created further gaps between the two groups. It also restricted social mobility for the rural populace.[8]
History
[edit]Interference in Shanghai politics by the CRG
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During the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, the party leaders in Shanghai were supportive of the movement.[9] The consensus by the Shanghai leadership at the time was that the Cultural Revolution was aimed to achieve higher work efficiency and to boost the economy. Hence, it was seen that any activities not suited to maintaining industrial production to be inadequate. These conditions can be circumvented if revolutionary activities and production cycles were conducted separately, with ideological leadership groups devoid of interference, especially by the Red Guards, and work hours where revolutionary activities were strictly forbidden.[10]
However, Mao Zedong's radical ideals in the movement, especially his call to "storm the bourgeois headquarters" and "drag out the capitalist powerholders", which transpired after August 1966 in the eleventh plenum of the 8th Central Committee, was unpopular and alarming among the Shanghai leadership, with the exception of Zhang Chunqiao of the Cultural Revolution Group.[9] It became clear that the sudden change of direction in the Cultural Revolution threatened the position of the Shanghai Municipal Committee. The highly radicalised and factionalised rebels began to launch attacks on administrative buildings in the city, challenging the administration of Cao Diqiu, the mayor of Shanghai, and Chen Pixian, the head of the party's East China bureau and Shanghai division.[1] These circumstances allowed Zhang to undergo political change in the city, by unseating the "capitalist powerholders" that were his old superiors who were deeply unpopular in Shanghai.[9]
On 15 September 1966, Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao gave well-propagated speeches at Tiananmen calling for a clear separation of revolutionary politics and industrial and agricultural production. They ordered the Red Guards to not intervene in farms or factories.[10] Cao Diqiu warned the Red Guards on 24 September that attempted ideological liaisons will make maintenance difficult, and even suggested recalling the Beijing Red Guards and end the "great exchange of revolutionary experience".[11] In spite of this, Wang Hongwen, a textile worker and party cadre in the security apparatus of the Shanghai 17th Cotton Mill, organised a group of thirty workers and went to Beijing to complain against the Shanghai party leadership in October 1966. The CRG endorsed the group, and under Zhang's arrangement, Wang was received by Mao and Lin Biao.[12] On 6 November, with the support of the Capital Third Army and the Shanghai Red Guards, several Maoist rebel factions in Shanghai formed an alliance under the Headquarters of the Revolutionary Revolt of Shanghai Workers, which was again led by Wang.[13][4] The group was an effort solely credited towards the workers in Shanghai, receiving no instructions from the Beijing leadership.[4] Zhang lent his support to the group.[12]
Workers' Headquarters present demands
[edit]The creation of the Workers' Headquarters on 6 November 1966 perplexed the Shanghai leadership, even top politicians in Beijing did not take a clear stance towards its formation outright. The Shanghai bureaucracy under Chen Pixian and Cao Diqiu opposed the group and declared it illegal, viewing the group as counterrevolutionary.[14] The majority of the group's membership were apprentice workers and contract labourers.[15] On 8 November, the group issued several demands to the Shanghai leadership, demanding several political concessions from the Shanghai Municipal Committee:
- The Workers' Headquarters was to be legalised;
- The Workers' Headquarters will be provided with finance, press and propaganda equipment;
- All workers will be allowed the means to organise Maoist groups within factories, and;
- Public accounting and transparency within the administration.
As a response to these demands, Cao consulted with Tao Zhu and spent half-a-day contemplating on his decision. Eventually, it was decided that the Shanghai Municipal Committee would reject all demands by invoking the Sixteen Articles and the statements made by Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao on 15 September 1966 which prohibited the existence of the Workers' Headquarters itself. The Shanghai administration produced the stance of the Three Nos, "no participation, no recognisation, and no support".
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2158729?seq=4
https://www.marxists.org/chinese/reference-books/qibenyu/3-16.htm
https://archive.org/details/maoschinaaftera00meis/page/344/mode/2up
https://www.fulcrum.org/concern/monographs/4q77ft49x
https://jiliuwang.net/archives/93941
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.19240.9?seq=3
SMC invoked the Sixteen Articles and Zhou Enlai's document against intra-industry organisations, providing the stance of the "three nos": no participation, no recognisation, and no support. While it was expected that the SMC would cave to the Workers' Headquarters' demands, they refused. Thus, when the Workers' Headquarters organised a conference at the Canidrome on 9 November, they were met with cold-shoulders from the Shanghai bureaucrats.
On 10 November 1966, to achieve their political motives, the Workers' Headquarters decide to send a convoy to Beijing for protest and negotiations. Rebel faction leader Pan Guoping would lead a convoy consisting of a thousand members in an express train to Beijing, while Wang Hongwen would lead another thousand members to Zhengzhou. The trains would stop at Nanjing and Anting. At 12pm, in an attempt to expand the crisis, the Workers' Headquarters would block an express train at Anting station, which caused a 20 to 30-hour disruption on the Beijing–Shanghai railway. These moves were meant to force the Central Committee to act. The incidents at Anting shocked the Beijing leadership.
On 11 November, Han Zheyi, the third general secretary of the East China Bureau of the Central Committee, and deputy mayor Li Gancheng reached Anting to persuade the protesters to back down, which ended the disruption on the rail line. Meanwhile, Chen Boda would issue a telegram, stating: "The action you carried out this time, did not just affect local production, but also affected national transport greatly, [I] hope you return to Shanghai immediately to resolve any problems on the spot." However, this telegram was shunned by the Workers' Headquarters in an unprecedented manner. Following this impasse, the government would send CRG's Zhang Chunqiao to resolve the situation. He would reach the site later that day, and negotiated with the Workers' Headquarters to reach a compromise at Shanghai. Most of the protesters would return to Shanghai on 12 November 1966.
On 13 November, in negotiations between Zhang Chunqiao and the Workers' Headquarters, participating officials from the SMC invoked the "Three Nos" principle and refused to compromise. By afternoon, Zhang would bypass the SMC and represent to the CRG to recognise the Workers' Headquarters' legitimacy, and label the convoy's action to Shanghai as a "revolutionary act". The results of this negotiation was eventually accepted by the SMC and signed by Cao Diqiu, where the contents were printed and distributed throughout Shanghai. Zhang's response towards the crisis was praised by Mao Zedong and the CRG. On 16 November 1966, Mao stated, "[this issue] can be resolved first then evaluated, since there must be a truth before a concept forms." The ban by Zhou Enlai would be removed by the government, resulting in massive congregations by newly created rebel factions and the Red Guards.
Aftermath
[edit]该事件后，多米诺骨牌接连倒下：《解放日报》事件、康平路事件相继发生。这一事件成了全面“炮打”中共上海市委，导致后来轰动全国的所谓夺权的“一月革命”的导火索、转折点。[citation needed]
中共中央华东局及上海市委的领导陈丕显、曹荻秋、魏文伯、常溪萍等先后被打倒、迫害，常溪萍甚至离奇死亡。
Evaluation
[edit]Left-wing intervention in the workers' movement
[edit]References
[edit]Citations
[edit]- ^ a b c d Meisner 1986, p. 343.
- ^ Meisner 1986, p. 343–344.
- ^ Wemheuer 2021, p. 224.
- ^ a b c Meisner 1986, p. 344.
- ^ Wemheuer 2021, p. 236.
- ^ Karl 2010, p. 130.
- ^ Wemheuer 2021, p. 224–225.
- ^ Wemhauer 2021, p. 236–237.
- ^ a b c Chang 1979, p. 23.
- ^ a b Walder 1978, p. 27.
- ^ Walder 1978, p. 27–28.
- ^ a b Chang 1979, p. 23–24.
- ^ Qi 2019.
- ^ Russo 2020, p. 169.
- ^ Walder 1978, p. 28.