The DSM Coordination Center is a center for coordinating all things in support of exposing the truth behind the Administration's handling and presentation of pre-war intelligence, and whether the president was determined to go to war with Iraq prior to assessing and regardless of the facts, intelligence, and legality. The goals of this center are to aggregate information, prepare representatives (fight misinformation and propaganda), coordinate actions, and disseminate news.

Antimisinformation • Information • News • Analysis • Strategy • Action • Coordinate • Counter-narrative

Representatives to contact and prepare[edit]

This is a list of DSM-action supporting people scheduled to be interviewed or otherwise appear on TV or Radio broadcasts. Even if you don't know anything about the appearance, just put a link to were you heard about it. If someone's sent them a link to this page, or otherwise contacted them, please make a note of that under their name.

Blogs with misinformation[edit]

http://www.livejournal.com/community/politicsforum/681905.html?mode=reply
http://stealthebandwagon.blogspot.com/2005/06/downing-street-memo.html
http://whatattitudeproblem.blogs.com/home/2005/06/dems_miss_the_b.html
http://mariestwocents.blogspot.com/2005/06/downing-street-memo-crap.html
http://wizbangblog.com/

Misinformation and responses[edit]

PRIMARY ATTACK[edit]

The UN route: as elaborated in the memo, they tried to create the impression of an ultimatum to Saddam regarding weapons inspections, and the impression of Saddam not cooperating, in order to garner public support for the war and create justification (rationale). this was linked to WMDs. It's all in the memo. Notice this press interview with Bush and Blair in Washington: http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page7600.asp

QUESTION: Thank you, sir.

On Iraq, the so-called Downing Street Memo from July, 2002, says, "Intelligence and facts remain fixed around the policy of removing Saddam through military actions." Is this an accurate reflection of what happened? Could both of you respond?

BLAIR: Well, I can respond to that very easily. No, the facts were not being fixed in any shape or form at all. And let me remind you that that memorandum was written before we then went to the United Nations. Now, no one knows more intimately the discussions that we were conducting as two countries at the time than me. And the fact is, we decided to go to the United Nations and went through that process, which resulted in the November, 2002, United Nations resolution to give a final change to Saddam Hussein to comply with international law. He didn't do so. And that was the reason why we had to take military action. But, all the way through that period of time, we were trying to look for a way of managing to resolve this without conflict. As it happened, we weren't able to do that because, as I think was very clear, there was no way that Saddam Hussein was ever going to change the way that he worked or the way that he acted.

BUSH: Well, you know, I read, kind of, the characterizations of the memo, particularly when they dropped it out in the middle of his race. I'm not sure who they dropped it out is, but I'm not suggesting that you all dropped it out there.

(LAUGHTER)

And somebody said, "Well, you know, we had made up our mind to go to use military force to deal with Saddam." There's nothing farther from the truth. My conversations with the prime minister was how could we do this peacefully, what could we do. And this meeting, evidently it took place in London, happened before we even went to the United Nations -- or I went to the United Nations. And so it's -- look, both of us didn't want to use our military. Nobody wants to commit military into combat. That's the last option. The consequences of committing the military are very difficult. You know, one of the hardest things I do as the President is to try to comfort families who've lost a loved one in combat. It's the last option that the President must have, and it's the last option I know my friend had as well. And so we worked hard to see if we could figure how to do this peacefully, to put a united front up to Saddam Hussein, so the world speaks. And he ignored the world. Remember, 1441 passed the Security Council unanimously. He made the decision. And the world is better off without Saddam Hussein in power.

Relevant parts of the memo, for Bush-Blair defense:

The Foreign Secretary (UK Jack Straw) said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister (Tony Blair) said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work. On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary (UK Jack Straw) thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary (UK Geoffrey Hoon) said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Notice the details that were left out. Most clear line in there: "...the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work." The "detail" that was left out, or rather, lied about, was why they used the "political strategy" that they did: not in pursuance of a peaceful solution, as they contend above, but "to give the military plan the space to work.", in plain and simple terms, to manufacture consent for WAR.

"This has already been investigated" or "This is old information that has already been discredited"[edit]

Nope.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/12/AR2005051201857.html http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,564-1649071,00.html

Me and Mr. Robbins from the NRO[edit]

Here's my email dialogue with a reporter for the National Review Online:

Mr. Robbins,

I recently encountered your article in the National Review Online, "Causing a Commotion" In this column, you wrote: "But if Dearlove meant the former, he should be called upon to substantiate his charge. It can be weighed against the exhaustive investigation by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on prewar intelligence assessments in Iraq. The committee examined this very question, whether the White House had pressured the intelligence community to reach predetermined conclusions supporting the case for war."

Actually, the committee had, in a comprimise, decided to split the investigation into two parts, the first part was to examine just the intelligence department, whereas the second part was to examine the question you speak of, namely, how policymakers handled and presented intelligence that was given to them by the intelligence department. But the committee never took up the second part of the investigation; they never examined this question, irrespective of what any politican says or has written, they simply did not investigate this issue.

I remember it clearly. The investigation was big news, but noone ever heard anything about the second part, it was (predictably) forgotten by the public in the aftermath of the election and the findings of the first part. But recently, the fact that it never occured was reported in the Washington Post: British Intelligence warned of Iraq War

"The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has dropped its previous plan to review how U.S. policymakers used Iraq intelligence, and the President's commission on intelligence did not look into the subject because it was not authorized to do so by its charter, Laurence H. Silberman, the co-chairman, told reporters last month."

-Kevin Baas

Kevin, check out the full report:

http://intelligence.senate.gov/iraqreport2.pdf esp. pp. 272-284.

They did address the question, they had witnesses and everything.

Regards, Jim

Jim, check out these reports:

washington post article, 2003

houston chronicle article, 2002

american prospect article, 2002

They did address the question, they had witnesses and everything.

Regards, Kevin

Well sure, but my contention was that the Senate looked into this and didn't find anything. I think a Senate investigation trumps news reports. At least we can see the way the investigation was conducted, and not have to rely on the sources a reporter happens to find.

Regards, Jim

There are multiple problems here:

First, the first part of the investigation was not even authorized to look into the question at hand.
Second, the Senate clearly did not look into this, for if they did, they would at least have found what the news reporters, who have less powers of investigation, found.
Third, you are using either appeal to authority logical fallacy or letting semantics trump formal operational thinking. The calling of something an "investigation" by no : means affects the process that was undergone.
Fourth, the "investigation into whether the intelligence was just bad" did not even question the CIA agents who went to the reporters with information, so if it did "happen to : find" (stumble outside of its authority) any information regarding this question, it was cursory, at best.
Fifth, in any case, by not even examining the specific circumstances of those specific agents, the report on whether intelligence was bad cannot invalidate or in any way : speak to the veracity of those reports.
Sixth, members of the commitee have alleged that dissenting opinions in the report were stifled and censored.

Now to the specific matter of intelligence, here's something else that the investigation into if the intelligence was bad missed, that it doesn't take a rocket-scientist, or a Senator for that matter, to see:

INTEL: In 1997, the U.N.’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released a report saying there was no indication Iraq ever achieved nuclear capability or had any physical capacity for producing weapons-grade nuclear material in the near future. In February 2001, the CIA delivered a report to the White House that said: “We do not have any direct evidence that Iraq has used the period since Desert Fox to reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction programs.” HOW IT WAS USED: In March 2003, Cheney definitively claimed on Meet the Press that Iraq “has reconstituted nuclear weapons.”

INTEL: In April 2001, the the Energy Department told the White House the aluminum tubes Iraq bought couldn’t be used for nuclear weapons production. In late 2001, the State Department also sent word they were ill-suited for that use. HOW IT WAS USED: On Sept. 8, 2002, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice told CNN the tubes were “only really suited for nuclear weapons programs.” Bush in his 1/03 State of the Union said the tubes which were “suitable for nuclear weapons production.”

INTEL: In the fall of 2002, the CIA told white house officials not to include the uranium-from-Niger assertion in speeches. HOW IT WAS USED: Bush included it in his 2003 State of the Union.

INTEL: A September 2002 DOD intel report found “”no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has – or will – establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities.” HOW IT WAS USED: In October 2002, Bush claimed, without doubt, that Iraq “possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons.”

Average Joe, -Kevin

Those emails were exchanged in the matter of a day. It's been almost a week since my last response, and I have heard nothing back from him. I've learned from experience that, in a debate, silence is the surest sign of victory. I believe that this example demonstrates that one can silence lies by vocalizing truths.

Downingstreetmemo.com[edit]

June 5, 2005 Meet the Press, NBC

Ken Mehlman (Republican National Committee chairman) claims that the "findings" of the Downing Street Memo "have been totally discredited by everyone who's looked at it," including the 9-11 Commission and the Senate.

In fact, neither the 9-11 Commission nor the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence addressed the Bush administration's use of pre-war intelligence.

When Russert raised the issue of the Downing Street Memo's contention that, in the Bush administration's push for war in Iraq, "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy," Mehlman replied: "Tim, that report has been discredited by everyone else who's looked at it since then. Whether it's the 9-11 Commission, whether it's the Senate, whoever's looked at this has said there was no effort to change the intelligence at all." When Russert noted "I don't believe that the authenticity of this report has been discredited," Mehlman reiterated: "I believe that the findings of the report, the fact that the intelligence was somehow fixed, have been totally discredited by everyone who's looked at it."

The Senate Intelligence committee's report examined the creation of the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, which was the intelligence community's most comprehensive and authoritative statement about Iraq. But the committee decided at the outset not to investigate the Bush administration's use of intelligence, including public statements by administration officials, in the first phase of its investigation

Though the committee initially planned to conduct the second phase of its investigation following the 2004 election, Sen. Pat Roberts (R-KS) indicated in March that the committee's investigation into whether the administration misrepresented intelligence judgments in its public statements would be indefinitely postponed, because of administration officials' insistence that "they believed the intelligence, and the intelligence was wrong." "[W]e sort of came to a crossroads, and that is basically on the back burner," Roberts said.

The 9-11 Commission report said even less about the Bush administration's use of intelligence in the run-up to the Iraq war. The 567-page report focuses entirely on issues surrounding the September 11 terrorist attacks, addresses Iraq only in the context of Al Qaeda and September 11, and does not assess the accuracy or honesty of the Bush's public statements about the Iraqi threat.

Other official reports have similarly avoided the question of whether the Bush administration politicized intelligence. The Robb-Silberman commission's report on intelligence regarding weapons of mass destruction noted: "[W]e were not authorized to investigate how policymakers used the intelligence assessments they received from the Intelligence Community." The Duelfer report presented the results of the Iraq Survey Group's hunt for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq following the invasion but did not compare these findings either with Bush's prewar statements to the public or with the prewar assessments of the intelligence community. http://www.downingstreetmemo.com/news.html#factcheck

Tom Paine's analysis[edit]

http://www.tompaine.com/articles/20050606/the_hunting_of_the_president.php

Robbins treats the Downing Street memo as a series of new accusations. This is wrong. The Downing Street Memo is a new source document that is evidence, not accusation. It is evidence that the Bush administration decided to invade Iraq by April 2002. It is evidence that the Bush administration acted on that decision and was using Operations Northern and Southern Watch to hit Iraqi command and control targets to prepare the battlefield in advance of a declaration of war and Congressional authorzation. It is evidence that the Bush administration had decided to "fix the facts" around the policy they could not otherwise justify to the American people.

So, when Robbins says, for example, that the "The charge of intelligence fraud (if it is such a charge) has already been investigated and found baseless," his statement relies on an investigation (the Silberman-Robb Commission) that was not only unable to look at the political use of intelligence, it relies on an investigation that did not have in hand the evidence he is attempting to refute.

What Robbins does not do, however, is provide a refutation that deceiving the American people and Congress is not an impeachable offense. If the evidence in the Downing Street Memo can be further corroborated—which will most likely require more high-level leaks—the Downing Street Memo could be the equivalent of the Watergate break-in.

"Clinton started the policy of regime change"[edit]

Iraq Liberation Act of 1998

Clinton's statement on Iraq

"Thrice removed hearsay"[edit]

Which would make it a more reliable source than you, wouldn't it? Ya, that's what I thought.

In that it's a written document, that's a level of removal, sure, as is a direct statement from someone about something that happened in the past. But the written record from the past is considered more reliable than the oral statement in the present, in an educated mind and in a court of law. In that it was written by an attendee? Like a typist writes the transcript in a court room? The transcript is considered more reliable than the recollections of those present. That's the whole idea behind records: they don't change.

This document is the official record of what was, on July 23rd, 2002, at 10 Downing Street, being relayed from the US through official channels, to top officers of the UK, including the Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Secretary of Defense Geoffrey Hoon, and what they were relaying back to top officers of the US Administration, including then Secretary of State Collin Powell, through official channels.

Senator Kerry calling for impeachment[edit]

This claim is false. On June 1, Senator John Kerry told the the Massachusetts newspaper, the "Standard-Times," that he was amazed at the lack of American media coverage of the Downing Street Memo. By Saturday, Al-Jazeera had reported that Kerry called for Bush's impeachment, the Conservative newssite, Newsmax.com picked up the story, and from there, it traveled through blogs all across the internet. real player

Kerry on impeachment(Windows Media Player) Kerry on impeachment(Realplayer)

Not a smoking gun?[edit]

http://blue-state-red.blogspot.com/2005/06/update-on-downing-street-memo.html
http://pmcarpenter.blogs.com/p_m_carpenters_commentary/2005/06/the_rights_defe.html

Did all foreign intelligence really agree with ours?[edit]

(from http://mariestwocents.blogspot.com/2005/06/downing-street-memo-crap.html):

"all the Intelligence from Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Israel, and several other foreign countries ALL concluded the same based on thier intelligence as well as our own, that Saddam had weapons of Mass Destruction."

According The Sunday Herald's and the BBC's interviews with several British intelligence officials [1]:

The British intelligence source said the best Humint on Saddam was held by the French who had agents in Iraq.

' French intelligence was telling us that there was effectively no real evidence of a WMD programme. That's why France wanted a longer extension on the weapons inspections. The French, the Germans and the Russians all knew there were no weapons there -- and so did Blair and Bush as that's what the French told them directly. Blair ignored what the French told us and instead listened to the Americans.'

Another source -- an official involved in preparing the Iraqi dossier for Blair -- told the BBC: 'Most people in intelligence weren't happy with [the dossier] as it didn't reflect the considered view they were putting forward.' Other sources said they accepted there was a 'small WMD programme' in Iraq, but not one that would either threaten the West or even Saddam's neighbours. Another said they were 'very unhappy' with the dossier, others said they were 'pissed off' and one described the claim that WMDs could be ready in 45 minutes as 'complete and utter bollocks'.

The Sunday Herald was told: 'The spooks were being asked to write this stuff. The dossier had been lying around for about six months. When it came time for publication Downing Street said it wasn't exciting or convincing enough. The message was that it didn't cut the mustard in terms of PR as there wasn't much more in it than a discerning newspaper reader would know.

'The intelligence services were asked if there was anything else that could be added into it. Intelligence told Downing Street that the 45-minute claim hadn't been added in as it only came from one source who was thought to be wrong.'

'The intelligence services were asked to go back and do a rewrite even though Downing Street was told the 45 minute claim was unconvincing.'

Another intelligence source was quoted as telling the BBC that they had been asked to rewrite the dossier as well to make it 'sexier'. The intelligence source said the dossier had been 'transformed' a week before publication. Blair has rejected each and every one of these claims as 'completely absurd'.

And not to mention, sour grapes.

Resolution 1441[edit]

First of all, UN Resolution 1441 did not give the US a "blank check" for war, nor did the resolution make the United States the ultimate arbiter in determining whether or not Iraq was in violation of 1441. In addition, UN Ambassador John Negroponte specifically guaranteed to other member nations that there were no "hidden triggers" or "automaticity" with respect to the use of force. Consequently, the resolution passed.

Remember, the UN Charter specifically prohibits member nations from starting wars, and the US invaded a sovereign nation that never attacked us. They will argue that invasion was justified on the basis of 1441 because Iraq supposedly failed to account for all of its WMDs and was therefore in violation of UN demands. However, the resolution does not give the United States the ultimate say over all other nations in deciding whether or not Iraq was in compliance with the UN. Only the UNSC itself can determine that answer, and only the UNSC can authorize military action, not individual member states!

Contrary to US claims, the UN did not believe Iraq was in noncompliance with 1441, nor did it have sufficient proof that Iraq had failed to disarm. The inspections process was essential to resolving that question, but as we all know, Bush ordered the inspectors out before they could complete their task. The US violated the UN Charter in order to get the war it wanted all along.

The UN route, as the DSM proves, was a gigantic smokescreen. The revisionists citing 1441 can't have it both ways! Bush broke the resolution then, so claiming that same resolution now as justification is an inherent contradiction.

A list of rebuttals[edit]

It's not authentic.[edit]

Counter-Rebuttal: No one questions its authenticity, anymore. The Blair administration calls it "nothing new." [2]

It was the interpretation of Matthew Rycroft[edit]

Counter-Rebuttal: It was a top-secret document, endorsed by the Foreign Policy Advisor, as a summary of their discussions, and written by his aide. And if the aide were making false statements, the Blair administration could've claimed that it was false, and released evidence proving that (such as memos by officials immediately afterwards, claiming that the memo was an incorrect assessment). That has not happened. And it was not an essay, but a summary of their discussions.

Furthermore, if you take a look at the format, it is carefully and concisely organized in the form of a summary or a report, as if it were drafted from notes, rather than just a person writing a political opinion from memory. (Bold added):

Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee, John Scarlett's Assessment:

"John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based."

Chief of MI-6's Assessment:

"C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action."

Chief of Defence Staff's Assessment:

"CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August."

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary's Assessment:

"The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun 'spikes of activity' to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections."

The Foreign Secretary's Assessment:

"The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force."

The Attorney General's Assessment:

"The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change."

The Prime Minister's Assessment:

"The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work."

Various Disputes with the Prime Minister's Assessment:

"On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush."

Conclusions:

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers."

Furthermore, Rycroft is an aide, not an actual advisor or head of any government agency. The head of MI-6, the Attorney General, the Prime Minister, and the other British heads of State had no need for an extensive, top-secret memo about an aide's opinions of their statements, and it is preposterous to insinuate that the Foreign Policy Advisor would ask his aide to do so.

Iraq HAD WMDs![edit]

Counter-Rebuttal: That is arguable, but even so, the memo itself states that the Chief of MI-6 (British Intelligence, remember James Bond?) said that it's unlikely that Iraq was an "imminent threat", but rather, the U.S. was intentionally generating false intelligence to support an unnecessary war. That pre-war intelligence's failure has been reported in the media many times.[3] And furthermore, before the war,

The 911 Commission and other investigations contradict the memo.[edit]

Counter-Rebuttal: Bush refused to allow the 911 Commission to exist for "nearly a year" after it was suggested. Even then, he only agreed to it, provided that he could appoint the head of the comission. So, arguably, the 911 Comission, the only "independent" investigation on intelligence was not independent at all. All other investigations were government-operated and therefore subject to political bias, just as with the pre-war intelligence. [4]

"Fixed", in British English, means "established."[edit]

Counter-Rebuttal: It can be either our definition or Britain's "established." However, take a look at the context of the memo saying, "Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy." The qualifier 'but' implies a contradictory nature. For example, "I am a Liberal, BUT I am against gun control", or "I am ugly, BUT I have a pretty girlfriend." So, within the context of, "Bush wanted to remove Saddam because of WMDs, 'BUT' the intelligence was being fixed", the definition of intentionally adjusting applies and the intelligence was, indeed, being illegally 'fixed.'

Cherry picking your intelligence is not lying.[edit]

Counter-Rebuttal: That is incorrect. Read the law. [5] Quote: 18 USC Sec. 1001 "whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully-- (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both."

To clarify: the intelligence they cherry-picked was known by the CIA to be false, and the CIA told them that.

All politicians lie.[edit]

Counter-Rebuttal: But just like with Nixon, Clinton, and Tom DeLay, if they are caught, they should be put on trial, because lying to Congress is a Federal crime, worthy of impeachment. Lying to Congress to support an unnecessary war could also be interpreted as treason, especially when Bush's trust-fund (for retirement) is vested in oil and the Vice-President used to be on the board of directors of the major oil company, Haliburton, which has recieved major government deals and bonuses in Iraq. [6]

No one believes this memo. It's old news.[edit]

Counter-Rebuttal: The British newspaper, the Times, did a front-page story on it recently, as did the New York Times. 89 Congressmen have demanded that Bush answer the allegations put forth by the memo, led by Congressman John Conyers. [7] CNN is also running a story on it, on Sunday, June 12th at 11:30 A.M.

It's not solid proof that he lied.[edit]

Counter-Rebuttal: But there is enough evidence to support an independent investigation, and that's all we're asking for

Rebuttals from downingstreetmemo.com[edit]

The issue of why we went to war is moot[edit]

We can all agree that a stable Iraq is the most desirable outcome, and indeed the US should do whatever it can to make this a reality. But this is an entirely separate issue from the question of why we went to war and how the case for war was made.

There is ample evidence—in the DSM and elsewhere—that the administration misrepresented the nature and extent of the threat posed by Saddam’s Iraq, that the case for war was built on this misrepresentation, and as a consequence many tens of thousands of people (Americans, Iraqis and others) have lost their lives. Every time someone is killed or injured as a result of the ongoing violence in Iraq, it becomes more—not less—important that we understand why and how we went to war. If we were misled, as it now seems impossible to deny, then the people who misled us must be held accountable for their deception.

Information that is now publicly available, such as the DSM, makes it at least possible that a crime may have been committed by the Bush administration. To say that the issue of why we invaded Iraq is irrelevant because it’s in the past is akin to saying that the specifics of Watergate became irrelevant when Richard Nixon resigned.

The information in the DSM is not “news”[edit]

True, much of the information contained in the DSM has been reported elsewhere, so in that sense it is perhaps not a “smoking gun.” This, however, does not diminish the importance of what the memo reveals. When viewed in context—as we have attempted to do with DowningStreetMemo.com—the DSM paints a damning portrait of an administration artificially pumping up its case for war while at the same time disingenuously asserting its desire to avoid it.

What makes the DSM so vital from a news perspective is:

The source – short of a similar document on the US side, there isn’t a much more credible source than the British Prime Minister and his senior staff.
The timing – the fact that the meeting in question took place in July 2002 illustrates just how early on Bush had made up his mind to “remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of WMD and terrorism.”
The “nutshell” – in a few sentences, the memo summarizes all of the key components of Bush’s deception: that Iraq posed an imminent threat to the United States, that the US was willing to work with the UN on a diplomatic solution, that war was a last resort, but if undertaken that the legal basis for it was sound, and that the aftermath of an invasion, if necessary, would be managed responsibly.

The content of the DSM is undeniably newsworthy. As to why it isn’t being covered adequately here in the US, well that’s a subject for another web site.

Americans knew the case for war was thin from the outset[edit]

Let us assume for the moment that Americans had the benefit of a truly fair and balanced news media from which to gather information and form an opinion on the necessity of war. The DSM makes it clear that there were some things that the public did not know and could not have known (e.g., the National Security Council’s unwillingness to work with the UN). There were other things too that were presented by the administration in such a distorted way as to render them useless to even the most engaged American citizen in forming an opinion on the necessity of war.

The non-existent connection between Saddam and al Qaida, for example, was cited so many times by the administration that at the height of prewar hysteria, well over half of Americans polled believed Iraq was involved in the 9/11 attacks when in fact Iraq had nothing to do with them. (Sadly, many people still believe this.) Similarly, claims about Iraq’s WMD capability featured regular invocations of “mushroom clouds” when there was in fact no evidence on which to base such claims.

What we now know is that the conflation of Saddam, WMD and terrorism was in essence a marketing strategy, a preconceived justification for a preconceived war. As early as July of 2002, the President and his administration had not only decided to invade Iraq in order to depose Saddam, they had also determined how to enlist the support of the American people by playing on their worst fears.

Bush’s reelection came well before the release of the DSM, so it is impossible to know what it’s impact might have been on what was a very close election.

The DSM doesn’t tell us anything we didn’t already know[edit]

For those of us who saw through the Bush administration’s house of cards before the invasion, the DSM doesn’t really offer anything we “didn’t already know.” However, its provenance and its comprehensive yet straightforward representation of the administration’s Iraq policy present the facts in a much more compelling light. It also represents hard evidence of the administration’s willful misrepresentation of its own policies.

The DSM’s importance lies not so much in what it says but who said it. This is not “sour grapes” coming from ousted White House officials with a bone to pick—it is the official record of a meeting held by the US’ staunchest ally. The DSM may not tell us anything we didn’t already know, but it does offer hard evidence that the Bush administration misled the country into war.

The DSM is just one aide’s impressions[edit]

This argument seeks to discredit the document’s accuracy by suggesting that it represents one person’s—presumably erroneous—impression of the meeting. Wrong–these are minutes, and they were circulated after the meeting to all who took part. However, given numerous opportunities to refute or clarify any of the memo’s contents, none of the players has done so. Not the British government, the Prime Minister, or any members of his cabinet. In fact, at a joint appearance, neither British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw nor US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice refuted any aspect of the memo’s legitimacy or accuracy.

Interestingly, White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan has moved from refusing to comment on the memo at all, to calling the memo “flat out wrong” to, most recently, avoiding any direct commentary on its veracity.

The issue of manipulation of intelligence has been settled[edit]

This is, quite simply, false. The President’s commission on intelligence did not address the issue because it was not authorized to do so under its charter. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was originally going to investigate how intelligence was used but, under White House pressure, scaled back its inquiry to deal only with “intelligence failures” in terms of how the information was collected, not how it was used as a basis for war.

What the DSM clearly states is that the head of British Intelligence believed that the Bush Administration was using its intelligence to support a course of action rather than determining a course of action based on the intelligence.

Many other nations, France included, believed Saddam had WMD[edit]

While it’s true that many governments believed Saddam had WMD, there was obviously no agreement about what to do about it. Further, simply believing something to be true does not make it so, and certainly does not form a basis for war.

The administration never had a “smoking gun” to prove Saddam had WMD, and in fact the intelligence supporting the administration’s view was alarmingly thin. As we now know from various reports, US intelligence affirming WMD frequently came from paid informants who, in some cases, were later proven to be fabricators. There was virtually no intelligence coming out of Iraq itself—the country was impenetrable, leaving the US and others with little in the way of credible sources.

That President Bush believed Saddam had WMD is not in dispute. The issue is whether he was justified in taking the nation to war on the basis of his beliefs, absent any hard evidence (like pictures of missiles in Cuba, to take a historical example).

It is also worth noting that while there was widespread agreement (and widespread error) as to Saddam’s chemical weapons capability, the issue of nuclear weapons is a different story. On that score, the US and UK stood nearly alone in their assessment of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities. It was also on this issue that the administration demonstrated its carelessness with intelligence by claiming that Iraq had sought nuclear material from Niger. The fact that the President made this claim in a State of the Union address is all the more troubling, especially given that the same statement was pulled from a speech he gave just a few months earlier.

Regime change was already US policy before we invaded Iraq[edit]

The Iraq Liberation Act expressed the Clinton administration’s support for democratic opposition groups inside Iraq and authorized a variety of mechanisms by which to provide that support. These included military assistance in the form of supplies and training. However, the final section of the act expressly limits the administration to just these forms of military support. From this we can safely assert that the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 provided no policy precedent for invasion, air strikes or any use of American military force.