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Philosophy[edit]

Artificial intelligence, by claiming to be able to recreate the capabilities of the human mind, is both a challenge and an inspiration for philosophy. Are there limits to how intelligent machines can be? Is there an essential difference between human intelligence and artificial intelligence? Can a machine have a mind and consciousness? A few of the most influential answers to these questions are given below.^[1]

Turing's "polite convention":

We need not decide if a machine can "think"; we need only decide if a machine can act as intelligently as a human being. This approach to the philosophical problems associated with artificial intelligence forms the basis of the Turing test.^[2]

The Dartmouth proposal:

"Every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it." This conjecture was printed in the proposal for the Dartmouth Conference of 1956, and represents the position of most working AI researchers.^[3]

Newell and Simon's physical symbol system hypothesis:

"A physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means of general intelligent action." Newell and Simon argue that intelligences consist of formal operations on symbols.^[4] Hubert Dreyfus argued that, on the contrary, human expertise depends on unconscious instinct rather than conscious symbol manipulation and on having a "feel" for the situation rather than explicit symbolic knowledge. (See Dreyfus' critique of AI.)^[5]^[6]

Gödel's incompleteness theorem:

A formal system (such as a computer program) cannot prove all true statements.^[7] Roger Penrose is among those who claim that Gödel's theorem limits what machines can do. (See The Emperor's New Mind.)^[8]

Searle's strong AI hypothesis:

"The appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs and outputs would thereby have a mind in exactly the same sense human beings have minds."^[9] John Searle counters this assertion with his Chinese room argument, which asks us to look inside the computer and try to find where the "mind" might be.^[10]

The artificial brain argument:

The brain can be simulated. Hans Moravec, Ray Kurzweil and others have argued that it is technologically feasible to copy the brain directly into hardware and software, and that such a simulation will be essentially identical to the original.^[11]

^ Cite error: The named reference Philosophy of AI was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ Cite error: The named reference Turing test was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ Cite error: The named reference Dartmouth proposal was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ Cite error: The named reference Physical symbol system hypothesis was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ Dreyfus criticized the necessary condition of the physical symbol system hypothesis, which he called the "psychological assumption": "The mind can be viewed as a device operating on bits of information according to formal rules". (Dreyfus 1992, p. 156)
^ Cite error: The named reference Dreyfus' critique was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ This is a paraphrase of the relevant implication of Gödel's theorems.
^ Cite error: The named reference The mathematical objection was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ Cite error: The named reference Searle's strong AI was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ Cite error: The named reference Chinese room was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ Cite error: The named reference Brain simulation was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[Philosophy_of_AI-1] Cite error: The named reference Philosophy of AI was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[Turing_test-2] Cite error: The named reference Turing test was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[Dartmouth_proposal-3] Cite error: The named reference Dartmouth proposal was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[Physical_symbol_system_hypothesis-4] Cite error: The named reference Physical symbol system hypothesis was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[5] Dreyfus criticized the necessary condition of the physical symbol system hypothesis, which he called the "psychological assumption": "The mind can be viewed as a device operating on bits of information according to formal rules". (Dreyfus 1992, p. 156)

[Dreyfus'_critique-6] Cite error: The named reference Dreyfus' critique was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[7] This is a paraphrase of the relevant implication of Gödel's theorems.

[The_mathematical_objection-8] Cite error: The named reference The mathematical objection was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[Searle's_strong_AI-9] Cite error: The named reference Searle's strong AI was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[Chinese_room-10] Cite error: The named reference Chinese room was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[Brain_simulation-11] Cite error: The named reference Brain simulation was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

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