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The General Assembly Committee on Schools, commonly known as the Sibley Commission, was a committee created by the state government of Georgia in 1960 in order to gage the opinion of the state's population regarding school integration.

CURRENTLY ON ROCHE 1998, p. 121

VERY LONG.[1]

Background[edit]

Racial segregation in public schools[edit]

White American protestors against school integration at the Arkansas State Capitol in Little Rock, Arkansas, 1959

In 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States issued their landmark decision in the court case Brown v. Board of Education that racial segregation in public schools is unconstitutional.[2][3] In response, conservative state politicians in the Southern United States adopted a policy of massive resistance where they passed a number of legislative acts designed to delay or outright stop attempts to integrate public schools.[3][4] In Georgia, where historian Alton Hornsby Jr. described the state's general assembly as "overwhelmingly segregationist",[5] legislators had previously approved a constitutional amendment in 1953 that would have cut state funding to any public institution that voluntarily integrated and converted those school districts from public systems to private schools,[6][note 1] and in 1956, the state government passed additional legislation further outlining the transfer of public school property to private entities in the event of mandatory integration.[3][8] Much of this legislation had been passed under the administration of Governor Marvin Griffin, who was succeeded by Ernest Vandiver in 1959.[2] As part of his campaign, Vandiver promised to uphold the laws signed by Griffin that would have defunded integrated public institutions,[2] often saying "no, not one" with regards to admitting African American students into white-only institutions.[9][10][11]

Legal action against segregation in Georgia[edit]

Because of the ambiguous wording in the Brown case, individual school districts did not have to integrate until they were mandated to do so by a court order.[8][note 2] However, following the Little Rock Crisis in 1957, federal courts began to issue more decisions on school segregation cases that hastened integration.[13] On January 11, 1958, 28 parents in Atlanta, selected by the local chapter of the NAACP filed a lawsuit (Calhoun v. Latimer) against the Atlanta Board of Education alleging that the board was enforcing racial segregation in Atlanta Public Schools in violation of the ruling in Brown.[14][15] On June 5, 1959, presiding Federal Judge Frank Arthur Hooper ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and, later that month, he ordered the board to submit a desegregation plan by the following year.[15][16][note 3] In November 1959, the board submitted a plan that would have seen a limited integration of four of Atlanta's whites-only schools over several years, with one grade being desegregated per year.[18] Despite having a very limited scope and not specifying an exact start date, Hooper approved the plan, which he felt satisfied the requirements set forth in Brown.[19] The board's plan, however, meant that, without a change to existing legislation, Atlanta's public schools would either have to violate federal laws or violate state laws concerning integration, with the latter resulting in the defunding and closing of the school system.[20] Because of this, Hooper postponed the plan's implementation until January 1960, when the Georgia General Assembly was scheduled to begin its legislative session, in order to give the state government time to change their laws barring any publicly funded integrated schools.[21]

Creation of a blue-ribbon committee[edit]

Griffin Bell (pictured c. 1977) served as Governor Ernest Vandiver's chief of staff and formulated the idea for the Sibley Commission.[22][23]

Following Hooper's 1959 order that Atlanta's schools must desegregate, Governor Vandiver organized a five-member group of lawyers, headed by his Chief of Staff Griffin Bell,[22] to act as his advisory panel on the issue of school segregation.[23] The group traveled to other states in the Southern United States, such as Alabama and Virginia, to observe how they were handling similar court orders to integrate their public schools, though in Bell's opinion, "Nobody had any idea what to do".[23] Upon returning to Georgia, Bell drafted a plan to create a commission, composed of leaders from parent–teacher associations, union representatives, and members of the state's business and educational communities,[24][25] that would travel throughout the state to gage the residents' opinions on school segregation and integration.[23][note 4] Additionally, the committee's hearings would allow members of the public to air their grievances and would remove some of the pressure from elected officials,[23][29][6] with Vandiver hoping that the hearings would spur citizens to demand a referendum on the issue.[30][note 5] Later commentators also state that a major goal of the committee was to convince the people of Georgia to back down on their hardline stances regarding segregation.[note 6] While the idea of a blue-ribbon committee to address desegregation was not unique to Georgia (precedence existed in the Gray Commission (1955) and Perrow Commission (1959) in Virginia and the Pearsall Committee (1955) in North Carolina),[32][33][note 7] the Georgian commission would differ in that it would hold statewide hearings and take testimonies from both African Americans and white Americans.[28]

While some of Vandiver's other advisors were against the idea, the governor personally supported it.[23] Additionally, the idea was supported by the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce President Ivan Allen Jr.[20] In choosing a leader for this committee, Vandiver chose John A. Sibley for the role.[23][6] Sibley was a well-known local businessman and lawyer who had served as the chief counsel for The Coca-Cola Company, the president of the University of Georgia's alumni association,[20][6] and the chairman of the Trust Company of Georgia.[35][24] Sibley had previously worked for the law firm of King & Spalding,[23] where Bell was the current managing partner,[9] and Bell had personally recommended him for the position.[23] In part, Sibley was selected by the governor and his advisors because of his opposition to school integration,[6] and in correspondences between Sibley and Representative Carl Vinson, he expressed support for racial segregation in schools, which he justified in part with a concern over miscegenation.[36][37][38] While Sibley was initially reluctant to take the position, he was swayed following a personal meeting with Vandiver where he was told he would have a role in selecting the other members of the commission.[27]

State representative George Busbee (pictured 1975) introduced legislation for the committee's creation.[6][27]

To create the committee, Vandiver called upon Representative George Busbee to introduce legislation for its creation to the Georgia House of Representatives.[6][27] Busbee was selected because he was from a small town and unaffiliated with leadership in the General Assembly, which Vandiver and his advisors believed would lend the commission an air of independence from the the establishment.[30] In late 1959, Vandiver visited Busbee's hometown of Albany and gave a copy of the bill to establish the committee to local Democratic Party leader and segregationist James H. Gray Sr., who passed the bill to Busbee and swore him to secrecy concerning the governor's involvement.[30] Busbee was initially hesitant to introduce the bill, which he thought would be political suicide.[30] The committee was officially created by the state government in February 1960 with the title "General Assembly Committee on Schools", though it was commonly known as the Sibley Commission after its head.[39][3][40]

Members[edit]

The commission included the following 19 individuals, all white men,[27][41] who represented both chambers of the state legislature and many business and civic groups across the state.[42]

Member Occupation
John Sibley President of the University of Georgia Alumni Association
John Duncan President of the Georgia Farm Bureau Federation
John W. Greer Jr. Member of the Georgia State Senate
Claude Purcell Georgia State Superintendent of Schools
Homer Rankin President of the Georgia Press Association
Zade Kenimer Chairman of the Georgia Education Cabinet
Charles Cowan
  • President of the Georgia Municipal Association
  • Mayor of Cartersville
John Dent President of the Georgia Chamber of Commerce
J. W. Keyton Member of the Georgia County Commissioners Association
Samuel Boykin President of the Superior Court Judges Association
Robert O. Arnold
Harmon White Caldwell
Eulond Clary Member of the Georgia State Senate
Wallace L. Jernigan Member of the Georgia State Senate
Howell Hollis Member of the Georgia House of Representatives
Render Hill Member of the Georgia House of Representatives
Robert Battle Hall Member of the Georgia House of Representatives
George B. Brooks Member of the Georgia House of Representatives
Walstein Parker Member of the Georgia House of Representatives

Additionally, the committee hired two personal secretaries and employed the services of Freeman Leverett, an attorney of constitutional law.[43]

Initial meetings[edit]

First meeting[edit]

The commission held its first meeting on February 17, 1960, at the Georgia State Capitol (pictured 2014) in Atlanta.[44]

On February 17, the committee held its first meeting and elected its officers, with Sibley as the chairman (and, unofficially, spokesperson),[45][43] Duncan as the vice chairman, and Greer as the secretary.[46] During this meeting, Sibley denounced the Brown decision as "devoid of legal reasoning", but accepted it as the rule of law and stressed the commission's goal in determining how Atlanta's schools would be desegregated.[47] Ten meetings to be held in March 1960,[6] one in each of Georgia's congressional districts,[3][48] were also announced.[47] An effort was made to select venues, such as courthouses and school gymnasiums, that were in a central location in each district.[49] The committee also agreed to allow representatives from civic groups, school boards, and other public organizations to have precedence at the hearings and encouraged groups that were sending testifiers to poll their members and discuss the matter prior to the hearings so as to encourage good discourse.[50] Individuals who were not speaking for a larger group would be allowed to testify as time permitted.[50] While this first meeting was held at the Georgia State Capitol, the commission decided to hold future meetings at the Trust Company of Georgia's headquarters due to the presence of many reporters and journalists at the government building.[45][43]

The "local option" proposal[edit]

The next day, the committee's legal subcommittee, consisting of Boykin, Brooks, Hollis, Kenimer, and Sibley, met with Bell and Leverett to create the framework for the hearings, with the group deciding on two possible options to present to the people of Georgia: either continue with massive resistance at the expense of the state's public education system or allow for some limited integration while largely maintaining a segregated society.[51] Ultimately, Sibley framed this second option as part of a "local option" proposal where local municipalities could determine for themselves how they would address the issue of school integration.[47] In the hearings, Sibley would purposefully frame the discussions to favor the local option plan instead of the existing policy of massive resistance,[6][49] and he would assure skeptics of the proposal that, unless legal action was brought against a specific school or school district, then the existing system of segregation would continue unimpeded.[52] To support his belief, he highlighted recent events in Norfolk, Virginia, which had recently backtracked on plans to operate segregated private schools and had instead reopened their public schools as integrated institutions.[53] As part of the local option proposal, a small number of African American students could be selected for enrollment in previously whites-only institutions at the expense of their parents.[54] Regarding the proposal's legality, it was considered an acceptable choice per the wording of Hooper's rulings.[6]

Public hearings[edit]

Sibley and Greer developed the overall schedule for the hearings, which would run from March 3 through March 24.[55] Additionally, Sibley drafted a speech wherein he expressed his disagreement with the Brown ruling, but stressed that it stood as the law of the land and highlighted the importance of the hearings in determining whether the state would continue with massive resistance or change state laws.[56][55] The speech was roughly 30 minutes long and was read aloud at the start of each hearing.[56][57]

- SCHEDULE OF ALL OF THE HEARINGS, INCLUDING CITIES AND DISTRICT LOCATIONS.[55]

- ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE HEARINGS.[58]



First hearing (Americus)[edit]

Future president of the United States Jimmy Carter (pictured 1971) attended the commission's first hearing in Americus.[59][60]

On March 3, the commission held its first hearing at the Sumter County Courthouse in Americus,[29][47][61] which was in Georgia's 3rd congressional district.[56] Speaking later of the meeting, Sibley stated that he and Greer chose Americus as the location for the first meeting due to its large African American population and the hostility of the white American population there, arguing that if the committee could successfully hold a meeting there without a riot, then the rest of the state would be easier.[29][47] Americus was located in the Black Belt region of Georgia, where most counties had an African American population of at least 45 percent.[62] Of the twenty counties in the district, all but 6 had a student body population that was at least half African American.[63] The hearing in Americus was segregated, with black participants seated in a separate area of the courthouse.[56][64] Twelve members of the city's police department kept the peace at the hearings.[63]

The hearing began at 10 a.m. with Sibley's speech.[56] The first person to speak before the commission was Charles F. Crisp, a banker and member of a local political family,[note 8] who stated that he favored full closure of all public schools in the state rather than to allow Atlanta to follow through with its token integration plan.[65] This set the tone for much of the rest of this hearing, as indicated by the testimony from a Columbus, Georgia-based radio station that had found in a poll of 1,200 people that 1,192 were in favor of complete segregation, even if it meant public school closures.[66] Both Jimmy Carter, who was a member of the Sumter County Board of Education, and his wife Rosalynn attended the Americus meeting, but neither spoke for unclear reasons.[note 9]

In total, 66 people testified at Americus, with 52 preferring school closures to integration and five in favor of the local option.[67][68] The 52 represented community groups with a combined membership of 12,500, while the five represented a combined total of 23 people.[67][68] Additionally, of the nine African Americans who testified, all but one favored maintaining the current system of segregation.[67][68][note 10] The NAACP later issued a statement that these witnesses had been under pressure from white school board members in the district to take these pro-segregation stances, which were widely promoted by segregationists in South Georgia such as former governor Griffin.[67][68] Sibley himself was surprised by the overwhelming support that massive resistance had among the white people in the district.[67][70]

Second hearing (Washington)[edit]

The committee's second hearing was held at the Wilkes County Courthouse (pictured 1969) in Washington.[71]

The commission held its second hearing on March 7 in Washington, part of Georgia's 10th congressional district.[71] Approximately 500 people attended the meeting at the Wilkes County Courthouse.[72] Based on the results of the Americus hearing, Sibley and the committee tried to get more civic groups involved in the hearings, and as a result, the Washington hearings were much less one-sided than the first hearing had been.[72] As an example, the first witness, Mayor Edward Pope of Washington, spoke in favor of the existing laws, while the second witness, a representative from the Washington Women's Club, was in favor of the local option.[73] During the hearings, many groups representing educators and students, industry groups, church groups, and the League of Women Voters spoke in favor of the local option.[74] Concerning the University of Georgia, which was located in the district, one group presented a petition in favor of the local option that had signatures from 838 students, while a poll of 279 professors showed that 252 favored the local option.[75] However, massive resistance was by far the more popular option expressed by groups representing the district's rural population, including farm bureaus and local social organizations.[76]

In total, 99 people testified, with 50 favoring the local option and 34 favoring massive resistance.[77] The remainder either did not express a preference or were African American testifiers who were not asked to state an opinion on the two options.[77] The division of opinion was largely one of rural vs. urban respondents, and, according to historian Jeff Roche, the greater support for the local option in this district compared to the 3rd congressional district can be attributed to the district's lower overall African American population, which was roughly three-quarters that of the 3rd district.[77]

POSSIBLY REMOVE THIS NEXT PART

Testimony from Roy V. Harris[edit]

The afternoon session of the hearing began with testimony from Roy V. Harris of Augusta.[78] Harris was a white supremacist politician who had denounced the commission prior to its creation and vowed a "holy crusade" to preserve segregation in Georgia.[79] At the time of the hearing, he was a member of the Georgia Board of Regents and president of Georgia's state equivalent of a Citizens' Council.[80][note 11] Harris spoke forcefully against the local option and opined that integration in Atlanta's schools would lead to white flight and further integration in all of Georgia's schools.[53] For the remainder of the commission's hearings, Harris was a leading figure in opposition to the local option plan, and as the spokesperson for many county commissioners who had recently met in Augusta, he vowed to uphold existing segregation and accused the commission of spreading "confusion" on the issue.[83]

Third hearing (Cartersville)[edit]

The committee's third hearing was held at the Bartow County Courthouse (pictured 2011) in Cartersville.[77]

The commission's third hearing was held at the Bartow County Courthouse in Cartersville, part of the state's 7th congressional district,[77] on March 10.[55] In spite of a snowstorm that struck much of the district and the broader North Georgia region, the hearing saw about 400 people pack the courthouse.[84] Sibley began the hearing by reading statements from Judge Hooper, who had recently ordered a delay in the implementation of his orders in Calhoun v. Latimer in order to allow the commission to conduct its business, who expressed approval of the committee.[84]

The 7th district saw a much smaller African American population than the previous two districts, which Sibley used to his advantage in promoting the local option plan by pointing out that, under current state laws, mandatory school closures would also affect five counties in the district that were all-white.[85] The local option plan proved much more popular here than in the previous two districts, with largescale support from the district's industry, including its strong textile industry.[77] However, in a break from the stance taken by many of the country's national labor unions, many local unions were opposed to any form of integration, and together with farm organizations, they constituted some of the strongest opposition to the local option plan.[85] Overall however, the overwhelming majority of witnesses (60 of the 80 who testified) spoke in favor of the local option plan.[86] Only five groups spoke in favor of the massive resistance option: an American Legion chapter and a farm bureau from Polk County, a pro-segregationist group from Cobb County, and two labor union organizations.[86]

Fourth hearing (LaGrange)[edit]

The committee's fourth hearing was held at the Troup County Courthouse (pictured 2012) in LaGrange.

The committee's fourth hearing was held in LaGrange, part of Georgia's 4th congressional district,[87] on March 11 and saw roughly 700 people fill the Troup County Courthouse.[88]





- By this hearing, Sibley changed his approach due to overwhelming opposition to the local option by stressing that many local municipalities would probably not face legal actions if they opted to maintain the status quo.[89]

- Change in how Sibley treated black testifiers.[89]

- 17 of 23 witnesses at the morning session in La Grange favored the local option.[90]

- Afternoon session: 47 to 41 split between local option and massive resistance.[90]

Fifth hearing (Douglas)[edit]

- POSSIBLE UNCERTAINTY REGARDING LOCATION???[91]

- Fifth hearing held in Douglas, Georgia, part of the 8th congressional district, in southeast Georgia.[91]

- Info on the district.[91]

- Very rural, OVERWHELMING support for segregation.[91]

- Committee heard 148 witnesses in five hours.[83]

Sixth hearing (Sandersville)[edit]

- SOME hearing held in Sandersville, 8th congressional district.[92]

- Some testifiers at this hearing discussed segregated schools in the context of the unfolding sit-in movement.[92]

- Heated statements by Georgia General Assemblyman Emory C. Gilbert, who butted heads with Sibley.[93]

Seventh hearing (Sylvania)[edit]

- W. W. Law, civil rights activist in Savannah, interrupted a boycott in that city to lead a delegation to speak in Sylvania.[93]

- W. W. Law, in a group of 14 people, spoke before the segregated courthouse in Sylvania, INFO ON THAT.[93]

- Law's statements angered Sibley, led to a heated exchange, INFO ON THAT.[94]

- Law's statements were later followed by some from Hosea Williams, INFO ON THAT.[94]

- Almost all of the NAACP testifiers in Sylvania voiced support for immediate integration, led to gravelling from Sibley and boos from audience.[94]

- Commission also heard from several pro-open school groups, LISTED HERE.[94]

- Chatham County represented the first county delegation to voice overwhelming support for the local option.[94]

Eighth hearing (Moultrie)[edit]

- Hearing in Moultrie held on March 21.[94]

- All fourteen counties represented in this district voiced a majority opinion of closing schools if needed.[94]

- All Democratic General Assemblymen from the district, including George Busbee, voiced opposition to integration, INFO ON THAT.[94]

- Larger cities in the district, such as Albany and Thomasville, were more in favor of integration.[95]

- Quote from Dartt about segregationists having their "final stand" in Moultrie.[95]

- Statement from politician James MacKay, open-school advocate.[95]

Ninth hearing (Atlanta)[edit]

- Hearing held in Atlanta, in the 5th congressional district, at Henry Grady High School on March 23, 1960.[96]

- School was let out for the day.[96]

- Publications in Atlanta favored the local option policy.[96]

- Klansman was initially present at the school entrance, removed by police.[96]

- Police officers, including plainclothes members of the GBI, were dispersed throughout the crowd at the gymnasium to keep order.[97]

- Hearing here attracted over 1,000 people to the gymnasium.[98]

- Reporters from around the nation were present for the Atlanta hearings.[98]

- Sibley called hearing to order at 10 a.m. with joke about gavel.[98]

- First witness was A. C. Latimer, president of the Atlanta school board and defendant in Calhoun v. Latimer, who supported the local option plan and spoke against the private school option as unfeasible.[98]

- March 23, 1960: Several hundreds attended the Atlanta meeting at Henry Grady High School, primarily supported keeping schools open, but also vocally wanted segregation.[99]

- 85 of 114 witnesses, mostly representing groups in Atlanta, reported in favor of the local option plan.[98]

- Local option supporters included the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce and many leaders in the black community.[98]

- Other groups that favored the local option plan.[100]

- Julian Bond attended and spoke at one meeting in Atlanta, representing members of the Atlanta University Center.[101]

- Some pro-segregation individuals spoke, including a Klansman.[100]

- Civil War Confederate veteran descendants divided.[100]

- Lester Maddox spoke against local option plan, cited communists.[100]

- Sibley threatened to move hearing to a classroom due to raucous caused by Maddox's speaking.[100]

- At Atlanta meeting, violence almost broke out, only notable instance of near-violence during any of the hearings.[53]

- Atlanta meeting ended with attorney representing parents in Calhoun v. Latimer reading a statement in favor of integration.[102]


- Additional testimony heard by Sibley on March 31 for those who were not able to speak before time expired.[103]


Tenth hearing (Gainesville)[edit]

- Tenth and final scheduled meeting held in Gainesville, part of the 9th congressional district, on March 24.[103]

- Large majority of witnesses here favored local option plan.[103]

- Support for local option attributed to low African American population in the county.[103]

- Only representatives from Barrow and Jackson Counties (two agricultural areas) opposed the local option plan.[103]

Eleventh hearing (Columbus)[edit]

- Commission decided to hold an additional hearing in Columbus on March 31.[103]

- This was due to lobbying from pro-integration individuals who argued that the lopsided results from the Americus hearing was due to the lack of voice from the 3rd district's most populous and only large city.[103]

- John Duncan presided over this subcommittee hearing, as Sibley was in Atlanta overseeing additional testimony from those who had not spoken at the original Atlanta hearing.[103]

- Columbus hearing showed urban-rural split, info on that.[103]

- Columbus hearing saw the largest gathering of African Americans at any hearing, most spoke in favor of the local option.[104]

Twelfth hearing (Atlanta)[edit]

- Sibley presided over an additional hearing in Atlanta on March 31 for those unable to speak at the initial meeting.[104]

- Sibley's patience had worn thin, ordered those present to avoid speeches and simply state preference for the two options.[40]

- Result of second hearing: 71 supported local option while 49 opposed it.[40]



Following the hearings[edit]

- Sibley Commission's report made state and national headlines.[105][106]

- WSB-TV, Atlanta's NBC affiliate, sent a cameraman to every hearing, sometimes broadcast on NBC's national news, other stations broadcast some hearings.[107][108]

- The committee concluded all of its hearings by the end of March and began formulating its official report, which was due to the state lawmakers as soon as possible.[109]

- Render Hill: Statement about not learning anything from the hearings.[110]

- First two meetings held by the committee were held in secret to ensure privacy.[111]

- MAP OF THE RESULTS BY CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT CAN BE FOUND HERE.[112]

- In total, the Sibley Commission took testimony from over 1,600 witnesses representing 148 of the state's 159 counties.[40]

- Interviewed roughly 1,800 people.[48][20][113][34]

- Results from hearings mirrored demographics in the area, INFO ON THAT.[114][115]

- Results ALSO reflected different attitudes in urban vs. rural areas, INFO ON THAT.[93]

- Meetings showed that almost all white residents wanted public schools instead of private ones, but 55 percent were in favor of closing the schools if segregated.[115]

- Despite Sibley's handling, 60 percent of witnesses favored total segregation.[6]

- School closing vs. local option polling at 55 to 45 percent.[116]

- While the majority of white Georgians supported segregation, their numbers were declining and had done so during he hearings.[117]

- Results of the hearings showed that white residents of the state favored closing schools instead of having integrated public schools by a margin of three to two.[118]

- Committee was divided between a minority of members, some of whom were also General Assembly members, who were opposed to the local option and felt vindicated by the hearings, and a majority of members who favored the local option.[119]

- As a compromise, the committee agreed to submit two separate reports, a majority and minority report.[119]

- The local option plan was approved by the committee in an 11 to 10 vote by its members.[48]

- Local option plan was recommended by the committee, with Sibley and ten others voting in favor of it.[105]

- Sibley and ten other committee members signed the majority report.[116]

- Minority report written by committee vice-chairman Duncan and segregationist Peter Zack Geer.[116]

- Additionally, another committee member, Render Hill, submitted his own statement saying that, due to the close polling between the two options, the state government should consider other methods.[116]






The reports[edit]

- FULL TEXT OF THE MAJORITY AND MINORITY REPORTS CAN BE FOUND HERE.[120]

- April 28, 1960: In spite of the majority support for total segregation, Sibley issued the committee's final report, which recommended accepting Hooper's ruling and outlined several paths to maintaining a large degree of segregation.[6]

- Issued on April 28, 1960.[115][121]

- April 1960: Committee reported in favor of other routes towards segregation aside from threatening to close schools.[122]

- April 28: Sibley read the majority report before a packed chamber of the State Supreme Court.[119]

- INFO FROM THE MAJORITY REPORT, INCLUDING SPECIFIC PHRASES.[119]

- With majority report, Sibley outlined a method in which largescale segregation could be maintained in most districts without legal issues.[119]

- The majority report recommended two constitutional amendments: one would have allowed for white students to receive vouchers for private schools if their school integrated, and the other outlined the local option plan where districts could vote over whether or not to integrate.[123]

- Local option plan would have seen the repeal of the state's massive resistance legislation.[20]

- This was the first time that a state-sponsored organization advocated against massive resistance and viewed desegregation as an inevitability.[116]

- Prior to the hearings, Sibley sent lawyers to other Southern states to investigate methods of resisting desegregation, which shaped part of the commission's final report in the form of a proposed constitutional amendment.[124][125]


- The minority report received very little attention.[114]

- Minority report attacked "communist-inspired organizations" and urged for a constitutional amendment against integrated schools, EXACT PHRASING HERE.[116]


Aftermath[edit]

- QUOTE FROM ACADEMIC ELIZABETH STEVENSON ABOUT SIBLEY AND HIS COMMISSION.[126]



- Vandiver, shocked at the results, opted against calling a special session of the General Assembly and avoided direct commenting on the committee's report.[116]

- May 9, 1960: Judge Hooper denied request by plaintiffs to implement integration for the fall 1960 semester, but instead gave a date for implementation of May 1, 1961.[127]

- After the reports were issued, judge presiding over Aaron v. Cook ordered Atlanta schools to be desegregated by May 1961.[114]

- May 1960: Judge ordered desegregation by the fall semester of 1961.[115]

- May 1960: Hooper allowed the state one year to rescind its segregation legislation.[105]

- Hooper advised the General Assembly to follow through with the committee's majority report and rescind its segregation laws.[127]

- Per Hooper's plans, both 11th and 12th grades would be integrated, with the Atlanta school board having between May 1 through May 15, 1961, to review and approve applications for black students wishing to transfer to whites-only schools.[127]

- Plaintiffs initially were going to appeal the order, but later allowed it to stand after meeting with Hooper.[127]

- Hooper stated that the order would go into effect regardless of any action taken by the state legislature.[127]

- Many civic leaders in Atlanta expressed satisfaction with the hearing and were hopeful that the state government would pass laws allowing them to legally implement their desegregation plans.[127]






- Between April 1960 and January 1961 (when the General Assembly was set to vote on desegregation), Sibley attempted to garner support for his moderated integration proposals.[6]

- Sibley participated in Edward R. Murrow interviews for documentary "Who Speaks for the South?"[117]

- OTHER INFORMATION FROM MURROW AND THE DOCUMENTARY.[117]

- Sibley also worked with Ivan Allen Jr., head of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, to have rural assemblymembers introduce a bill to allow for an open-schools amendment drafted by a constitutional attorney.[128]

- By January 1961, 28 legislators signed on to endorse the proposal.[128]

- Vandiver said that the 1961 legislature would be responsible for acting on the report.[129]

- Many General Assembly members expressed doubt that the 1961 legislature would act on the report, with one member saying that existing laws would probably first be tested.[129]

- Roy Harris remained vocally opposed to the report and the commission, and Frank Twitty, floor leader of the Georgia House of Representatives, basically said that the majority opinion of the legislators would be the law.[129]

- Twitty and Senate President Pro Tempore Carl Sanders said on November 11, 1960, during legislative meeting in Macon, that they would not consider any new legislation until the courts had struck down existing laws.[128]











- January 1961: Before the General Assembly could vote, UGA experienced a desegregation crisis that resulted in the integration of that university, despite the chances of a federal-state showdown.[6]

- UGA issue occurred prior to the legislature acting on the committee's report.[48]

- Court ordered UGA to integrate on January 6, 1961, three days before the legislature was set to convene and debate on the Sibley Commission report.[10]

- Judge William A. Bootle of Macon made the ruling on January 6, the Friday before the legislative session was set to begin.[130]

- Two black students registered at UGA on January 9 and attended classes later that week.[131]

- Governor Vandiver ordered the university closed and defunded, which was later struck down by Judge Bootle.[132]

- Later that week, a riot broke out on UGA's campus in Athens.[133]

- Governor Vandiver ordered units of the Georgia State Patrol to quell the rioting, which was led by a Klansman.[134]

- Hunter and Holmes were suspended.[134]

- Harris later praised the rioters.[134]

- Day after the riot, Judge Bootle struck down the 1956 public school defunding law and ordered Hunter and Holmes reinstated.[135]

- January 16, 1961: Governor Vandiver called an informal meeting at the executive mansion, announced plans to repeal all massive resistance legislation and to keep the university open.[135]

- January 18: Joint session of the General Assembly met in their first-ever night session to vote on repealing massive resistance legislation, INFO ON SPECIFICS and Vandiver's continued commitment to segregation.[136]

- Despite opposition from some arch-segregationists, such as Harris, Vandiver signed bills repealing massive resistance legislation on January 31, 1961.[137]




- January 18, 1961: In light of the UGA desegregation crisis, Governor Vandiver spoke before the General Assembly in support of full adoption of the Sibley Commission's proposals, paving the way for Atlanta's public schools to integrate in August 1961.[6]

- Statement from Frederick Allen on how the Sibley Commission's recommendations may have been ignored by the legislature had the UGA crisis not occurred.[138]

- Info on the UGA crisis, which eventually resulted in the university remaining open.[139]

- Include the final two sentences from the New Georgia Encyclopedia regarding the commission and how it simultaneously avoided violence seen in other southern states, while also allowing local school boards to prolong the integration process.[6]



- Committee's report recommended that each school district should be allowed to determine on their own if they would support defunding their public school systems or keeping them open.[2]

- Committee showed that Atlanta leaders favored keeping the schools open in the event of integration, but the state as a whole, by a small margin, supported closing the schools.[3]

- Committee discovered that a significant minority of individuals in the state supported keeping public schools open regardless of integration.[140]

- Committee's Majority Opinion favored the local option.[3]

Aftermath[edit]

- Given the committee's opinion, the general assembly passed an act outlining the local option strategy and clarifying several provisions to hinder the full scope of integration.[3]

- Committee's recommendations passed overwhelming amidst the UGA desegregation activity.[141]

- LIST OF SPECIFIC LEGISLATION PROPOSED BY GOVERNOR.[141]

- Before the committee's recommendations could be acted on, the University of Georgia desegregated.[2]

- Vandiver refused to defy a court ruling that ordered the university to be integrated, and he urged the general assembly to rescind the defunding law.[2]

- January 6-10, 1961: UGA integrated.[142]

- During UGA desegregation, multiple state politicians publicly voiced their opposition to defunding and closing the university.[142]

- During UGA integration, Vandiver initially gave contradictory statements, but ultimately allowed the university to be funded.[143]

- January 9, 1961: Vandiver stated before opening session of legislature that funds would not be withheld, but said the opposite several days later.[10]

- Soon after UGA integrated, many letters were written to the state government in support of keeping the institution open.[144]

- Ultimately, the government repealed massive resistance laws, as in Tennessee and Virginia, and adopted the plans outlined in the Sibley Commission.[144]

- Last few days of January 1961: State government repealed massive resistance, INFO ON SPECIFICS.[145]




- Several months after UGA, the Atlanta school system integrated.[2]


- The committee's report aided lawmakers in the desegregation process, per the New Georgia Encyclopedia.[146]

- Vandiver recommended following the commission's recommendations, avoided massive resistance in Georgia.[147]

- The committee's report helped persuade white people in the state to maintain open schools.[148]


- Statements from Atlanta Mayor William Hartsfield regarding integration in January 1961[5]

- January 4, 1961: Federal district court approved a "token integration" plan for Atlanta desegregation.[5]


- August 1961: Atlanta public schools desegregated, with nine black students enrolling in the formerly all-white system.[3]

- August 30, 1961: The Atlanta Public Schools integrate.[146][149]

- Atlanta's public school integration drew praise from many national publications and politicians, including President JFK.[149]

- Atlanta's integration was the first public education integration in Georgia beneath the college level, and it occurred without violence.[149]

- 1965: Facing further legal troubles, Atlanta voted to fully desegregate rather than fighting for more incrementalism.[150]

- 1974: George Busbee elected governor of Georgia.[151]


- Alton Hornsby Jr.: "Atlantans succeeded when so many other cities had failed".[152]

- Hornsby: Three reasons for success in Altanta's desegregation.[152]

- The committee's report was one of the first instances of opposition to massive resistance in Georgia.[153][154]

- Quote about how organizing the committee was one of the few successes in Georgia.[155]

- Quote from Roche about how Sibley Commission made abandoning massive resistance preferrable and palatable.[156]

- Sibley Commission came back up during Bell's confirmation hearings for federal office, info on that HERE.[157]

- Sam Nunn: Sibley Commission saved Georgia.[158]

- Bell received honorary degree from Morris Brown College in part because of his work with the Sibley Commission.[158]

- Vandiver later revived the idea of polling people with a 1960 referendum on unpledged presidential electors.[159]


- Bell in 1977 said that the committee was progressive in Georgia for the time.[160]

- Quote from Dartt about the "Old South" and "democracy in action".[161]

- State Representative James E. McKinney, speaking in 1977, defended the committee and stated that the overt racial nature was necessary to get it to pass through the general assembly.[162]

- Joseph L. Rauh Jr.: 1977, Rauh used the Sibley Commission to oppose Bell's nomination, READ THESE PAGES.[163]

- Julian Bond said he viewed the committee as a ploy by Vandiver to prolong segregation.[101]

- Clarence Mitchell Jr. also stated similarly that the committee hurt black people's rights.[164]

- Statement about "hot potato".[165]

- On the other side of the political spectrum, some pro-integration activists in Georgia viewed the creation of the committee as a stalling tactic by the governor as an attempt to postpone desegregation and criticized the composition of the commission.[37]


- Same month as the hearings, sit-ins and other civil rights demonstrations began in cities such as Atlanta and Savannah.[92]

- MIXED RESPONSES FROM POLITICIANS REGARDING THE COMMITTEE'S FIRST STATEMENTS.[43]

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ This constitutional amendment was proposed by Georgia legislators following a 1950 United States Supreme Court decision that outlawed racial segregation in graduate schools and law schools.[7]
  2. ^ In May 1955, as part of a series of hearings following the initial Brown case that is commonly referred to as Brown II, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that states where segregated public schools existed would have to desegregate "with all deliberate speed".[12] According to historian Jeff Roche, with this, the Supreme Court "left the task of interpreting their decision to the lower courts".[12]
  3. ^ Sources vary on when Hooper demanded the school board to submit its integration plan. A 1998 book by historian Jeff Roche states that Hooper gave the board until December 1959,[15] while a 1999 book by historian Thomas V. O'Brien states that the plan was due by January 1960.[17]
  4. ^ While many sources state that the idea for the commission originated with Bell,[26][24][27] historian Jeff Roche stated in a 1998 historical book on the Sibley Commission that George T. Smith, then-speaker of the Georgia House of Representatives, claims to have originated the idea for a commission to address the issue of integration.[28]
  5. ^ Concerning a referendum, historian Jeff Roche wrote in 1998, "The language of the bill [that created the committee] clearly indicates that Vandiver and those in the assembly preferred a popular vote on the school issue. In addition to relieving those in public office from deciding the school question, a vote in the form of a constitutional amendment (to overturn the private school amendment of 1954) would also put off implementing the Calhoun decision until sometime after the next general election in 1962".[31]
  6. ^ In 1977, then-United States Senator Herman Talmadge of Georgia stated that the committee was created "for the purpose of educating the segregationists on the inevitability of public school desegregation".[26] Additionally, in a 1996 book on the history of Atlanta, Frederick Allen stated, "Bell's commission would be a propaganda machine, bent on instructing Georgians about the futility of resisting the law of the land. Its purpose would be to get Vandiver off the hook by persuading voters that he ought to break his promise".[27]
  7. ^ The similarities between the Georgia and Virginia commissions were such that, in 1969, historian Numan V. Bartley called the Sibley Commission "the Georgia equivalent of Virginia's Perrow Commission".[34]
  8. ^ See Charles F. Crisp and Charles R. Crisp.
  9. ^ In a 2008 biography on Carter, historian Deanna L. Michael states that Carter may not have been invited to speak or declined to speak due to disagreements he had with his neighbors regarding school segregation.[59] Journalist Calvin Trillin states that Carter speaking at the meeting may have resulted in political suicide, saying, "Jimmy Carter had an opportunity to testify before the Sibley Commission at Americus that, as a member of the Sumter County Board of Education, he was unwilling to preside over the abandonment of public education in the name of segregation, but if he had he would probably not now be the President of the United States".[60]
  10. ^ For the first two hearings, African Americans who testified were not asked for a preference on either maintaining state laws or changing them in favor of a local option plan, but instead were asked if they were in favor of integrated or segregated schools.This difference in questioning drew criticism from some African American activists, and starting with the third hearing, Sibley would change his questioning to be consistent for white and black testifiers.[69]
  11. ^ Citizens' Councils were pro-segregationist grassroots organizations that were popular in many southern states following the Brown decision.[81] According to historian Jeff Roche, the councils "never caught on in Georgia", and Georgia's council (called the States' Rights Council of Georgia), under Harris's leadership, functioned primarily as an "arm in the state Democratic Party" than as its own organization.[82]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Kruse, Kevin M. (2007) [2005]. White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism. Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century America (First paperback ed.). Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-1-4008-4897-3.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g Henderson 2021.
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h i Hatfield 2020.
  4. ^ Roche 1998, p. xii.
  5. ^ a b c Hornsby 1982, p. 125.
  6. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p Huff 2020.
  7. ^ Roche 1998, pp. 19–20.
  8. ^ a b Roche 1998, p. 33.
  9. ^ a b Allen 1996, p. 86.
  10. ^ a b c Silver & Moeser 1995, p. 106.
  11. ^ Roche 1998, p. 73.
  12. ^ a b Roche 1998, p. 22.
  13. ^ Roche 1998, pp. 38–39.
  14. ^ O'Brien 1999, p. 146.
  15. ^ a b c Roche 1998, p. 47.
  16. ^ O'Brien 1999, pp. 160–161.
  17. ^ O'Brien 1999, p. 161.
  18. ^ Roche 1998, pp. 76–77.
  19. ^ O'Brien 1999, p. 171.
  20. ^ a b c d e Silver & Moeser 1995, p. 105.
  21. ^ Roche 1998, p. 77.
  22. ^ a b Lanier 2016.
  23. ^ a b c d e f g h i Murphy 1999, p. 67.
  24. ^ a b c Dartt 2008, p. 88.
  25. ^ Roche 1998, pp. 83–84.
  26. ^ a b United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary 1977, p. 3.
  27. ^ a b c d e f Allen 1996, p. 87.
  28. ^ a b Roche 1998, p. 82.
  29. ^ a b c Michael 2008, p. 20.
  30. ^ a b c d Roche 1998, p. 83.
  31. ^ Roche 1998, p. 88.
  32. ^ Roche 1998, pp. 22, 76.
  33. ^ Bartley 1969, p. 325.
  34. ^ a b Bartley 1969, p. 334.
  35. ^ Allen 1996, pp. 56–57, 87.
  36. ^ Allen 1996, p. 57.
  37. ^ a b Dartt 2008, p. 90.
  38. ^ Roche 1998, p. 86.
  39. ^ Sokol 2006, p. 123.
  40. ^ a b c d Dartt 2008, p. 113.
  41. ^ Dartt 2008, p. 89.
  42. ^ Roche 1998, pp. 86–87.
  43. ^ a b c d Roche 1998, p. 89.
  44. ^ Roche 1998, p. 87.
  45. ^ a b Dartt 2008, p. 91.
  46. ^ Roche 1998, pp. 87–88.
  47. ^ a b c d e Allen 1996, p. 88.
  48. ^ a b c d Murphy 1999, p. 68.
  49. ^ a b Dartt 2008, p. 92.
  50. ^ a b Roche 1998, p. 90.
  51. ^ Roche 1998, pp. 90–91.
  52. ^ Roche 1998, p. 92.
  53. ^ a b c Allen 1996, p. 89.
  54. ^ Allen 1996, p. 135.
  55. ^ a b c d Roche 1998, p. 94.
  56. ^ a b c d e Dartt 2008, p. 94.
  57. ^ Roche 1998, pp. 94, 100.
  58. ^ Roche 1998, pp. 97–99.
  59. ^ a b Michael 2008, pp. 20–21.
  60. ^ a b Trillin 2017, p. 205.
  61. ^ Roche 1998, p. xi.
  62. ^ Dartt 2008, p. 93.
  63. ^ a b Roche 1998, p. 99.
  64. ^ Roche 1998, p. 100.
  65. ^ Dartt 2008, p. 95.
  66. ^ Dartt 2008, pp. 94–95.
  67. ^ a b c d e Dartt 2008, p. 97.
  68. ^ a b c d Roche 1998, p. 105.
  69. ^ Roche 1998, pp. 117–118.
  70. ^ Roche 1998, p. 106.
  71. ^ a b Roche 1998, pp. 108–109.
  72. ^ a b Roche 1998, p. 109.
  73. ^ Roche 1998, pp. 109–110.
  74. ^ Roche 1998, pp. 110–111, 115.
  75. ^ Roche 1998, pp. 110–111.
  76. ^ Roche 1998, pp. 111–112, 114.
  77. ^ a b c d e f Roche 1998, p. 116.
  78. ^ Roche 1998, pp. 112–113.
  79. ^ Allen 1996, pp. 87–88.
  80. ^ Roche 1998, p. 112.
  81. ^ Roche 1998, pp. 31–32.
  82. ^ Roche 1998, p. 32.
  83. ^ a b Dartt 2008, p. 103.
  84. ^ a b Roche 1998, p. 117.
  85. ^ a b Roche 1998, pp. 116–117.
  86. ^ a b Roche 1998, p. 119.
  87. ^ Dartt 2008, pp. 99–100.
  88. ^ Roche 1998, p. 121.
  89. ^ a b Dartt 2008, p. 99.
  90. ^ a b Dartt 2008, p. 100.
  91. ^ a b c d Dartt 2008, p. 102.
  92. ^ a b c Dartt 2008, p. 105.
  93. ^ a b c d Dartt 2008, p. 106.
  94. ^ a b c d e f g h Dartt 2008, p. 107.
  95. ^ a b c Dartt 2008, p. 108.
  96. ^ a b c d Dartt 2008, p. 109.
  97. ^ Dartt 2008, pp. 109–110.
  98. ^ a b c d e f Dartt 2008, p. 110.
  99. ^ Sokol 2006, pp. 123–124.
  100. ^ a b c d e Dartt 2008, p. 111.
  101. ^ a b United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary 1977, p. 417.
  102. ^ Dartt 2008, pp. 111–112.
  103. ^ a b c d e f g h i Dartt 2008, p. 112.
  104. ^ a b Dartt 2008, pp. 112–113.
  105. ^ a b c Allen 1996, p. 90.
  106. ^ Dartt 2008, p. 101.
  107. ^ Dartt 2008, pp. 98–99.
  108. ^ Roche 1998, pp. 106–107.
  109. ^ Dartt 2008, p. 117.
  110. ^ Roche 1998, p. 107.
  111. ^ Dartt 2008, pp. 117–118.
  112. ^ Dartt 2008, p. 114.
  113. ^ United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary 1977, p. 658.
  114. ^ a b c Michael 2008, p. 21.
  115. ^ a b c d Sokol 2006, p. 124.
  116. ^ a b c d e f g Dartt 2008, p. 119.
  117. ^ a b c Dartt 2008, p. 122.
  118. ^ Allen 1996, pp. 89–90.
  119. ^ a b c d e Dartt 2008, p. 118.
  120. ^ Dartt 2008, pp. 185–204.
  121. ^ United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary 1977, p. 252.
  122. ^ Tuck 2001, p. 102.
  123. ^ Dartt 2008, pp. 118–119.
  124. ^ Dartt 2008, pp. 113, 115.
  125. ^ Roche 1998, p. 91.
  126. ^ Roche 1998, pp. 107–108.
  127. ^ a b c d e f Dartt 2008, p. 120.
  128. ^ a b c Dartt 2008, p. 126.
  129. ^ a b c Dartt 2008, p. 121.
  130. ^ Dartt 2008, p. 129.
  131. ^ Dartt 2008, pp. 131–132.
  132. ^ Dartt 2008, p. 132.
  133. ^ Dartt 2008, pp. 132–134.
  134. ^ a b c Dartt 2008, p. 134.
  135. ^ a b Dartt 2008, p. 135.
  136. ^ Dartt 2008, p. 136.
  137. ^ Dartt 2008, p. 138.
  138. ^ Allen 1996, p. 104.
  139. ^ Murphy 1999, pp. 68–69.
  140. ^ Hornsby 1982, p. 129.
  141. ^ a b Pratt 2005, pp. 108–109.
  142. ^ a b Hornsby 1982, p. 126.
  143. ^ Hornsby 1982, pp. 127–129.
  144. ^ a b Silver & Moeser 1995, p. 107.
  145. ^ Hornsby 2009, pp. 216–217.
  146. ^ a b New Georgia Encyclopedia.
  147. ^ Tuck 2001, p. 109.
  148. ^ Allen 1996, p. 68o.
  149. ^ a b c Hornsby 1982, p. 120.
  150. ^ Allen 1996, p. 144.
  151. ^ Allen 1996, p. 194.
  152. ^ a b Hornsby 1982, p. 121.
  153. ^ Hornsby 1982, p. 133.
  154. ^ Hornsby 2009, p. 217.
  155. ^ Murphy 1999, p. 71.
  156. ^ Roche 1998, p. 69.
  157. ^ Murphy 1999, pp. 178, 186.
  158. ^ a b United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary 1977, p. 5.
  159. ^ Roche 1998, p. 81.
  160. ^ United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary 1977, p. 462.
  161. ^ Dartt 2008, p. 115.
  162. ^ United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary 1977, pp. 340–341.
  163. ^ United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary 1977, pp. 252–258, 271–277.
  164. ^ United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary 1977, pp. 604–605.
  165. ^ Roche 1998, p. 95.

Sources[edit]

Futher reading[edit]















CASE OF BOUNKHAM PHONESAVANH

GEORGIA PLATFORM (New Georgia Encyclopedia article)

STATUE OF HANK AARON, ATLANTA

CATHEDRAL OF CHRIST THE KING (ATLANTA) (existing article needs a large overhaul)

THREE GOVERNORS CONTROVERSY (overhaul article)

ATLANTA NEGRO VOTERS LEAGUE

PERRY MONUMENT, ERIE, PA

MICHAEL KRUSE, political journalist

WASHINGTON AVENUE GREEN

SWEET GUM HEAD / MARTIN PADGETT / BILL SMITH (Atlanta LGBT history topics)

LIST OF GEORGIA HISTORICAL MARKERS (base it off of list of New Hampshire historical markers, but year instead of number)

1914 PRAIRIE CREEK MINE STRIKE, SEBASTIAN COUNTY, ARKANSAS

SHAKESPEARE MEMORIAL, PHILADELPHIA

1919 KNOXVILLE STREETCAR STRIKE (Use "Labor Conflict in Urban Appalachia: The Knoxville Streetcar Strike of 1919" by James A. Burran, Tennessee Historical Quarterly, Spring 1979).

MUSKEGON MUSEUM OF ART

2023 UAW MACK TRUCKS STRIKE

REBELS WITH A CAUSE, urban youth organization led by Eartha Kitt

ROME SIT-INS

SWIFT'S PEANUT PORK FACTORY STRIKE, interracial strike that occurred in post-WWII Moultrie, GA (mentioned in Beyond Atlanta)

ANDERSON PARK, ATLANTA (mentioned in Beyond Atlanta)

JUNE 1943 RACE RIOT AT CAMP STEWART, GEORGIA (reported by the New York Times)

SIBLEY COMMISSION, GEORGIA (mentioned in Beyond Atlanta)

STATUE OF HENRY CLAY, LEXINGTON CEMETERY

BEAR CREEK MAROON NEAR SAVANNAH

1918-1919 SAVANNAH STREETCAR STRIKE

1915 PITTSBURGH STREETCAR STRIKE

1914 MONAGHAN MILL STRIKE

Upload images from THE UPWARD PATH by Mary Helm on Internet Archive

WILLIAM M. REILLY MEMORIAL, PHILADELPHIA

1917 TEXAS GULF COAST OIL STRIKE

THE PILGRIM by John Quincy Adams Ward

JOSEPH GABRIEL STARKE, Australian politician

1933 FUNSTEN NUT STRIKE

1916 MESABI IRON RANGE STRIKE, IWW

WHALEMAN STATUE, NEW BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS

STATUE OF NICHOLAS HERKIMER

HERKIMER MONUMENT

STATUE OF THOMAS LOWRY, MINNEAPOLIS

MINGOE, 1691 RAIDERS

1915 ARIZONA MINERS STRIKE, COPPER MINES, 8,000 MINERS (also possibly known as Clifton-Morenci-Metcalf Strike)

1947 TERRYTOONS STRIKE

1831 SNOW TOWN RIOT, PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND

1898 by Andrew O'Connor

HILLANDALE FARMS FIRE

1970 ASBURY REVIVAL

1891 SAVANNAH DOCK WORKERS STRIKE (Philip S. Foner wrote about this in The Black Worker Vol. III)

PROPOSED WASHINGTON MONUMENT IN NEW YORK CITY (look up Atlas Obscura article)

1938 philly city workers strike plaque at city hall

PRESIDENTIAL STATUES IN RAPID CITY, SOUTH DAKOTA

PRESIDENTS NORTH CAROLINA GAVE THE NATION, monument at the NC State House