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This page is about the psychological process. For other uses, see Crossfire8228/sandbox (disambiguation).

Introspection (or internal perception) is the self-examination of one's conscious thoughts and feelings. In psychology, the process of introspection relies exclusively on the purposeful and rational self-observation of one's mental state; however, introspection is sometimes referenced in a spiritual context as the examination of one's soul. Introspection is closely related to the philosophical concept of human self-reflection, and is contrasted with extrospection.

Philosophical Origins

Plato is thought to have referenced introspection when he asked, "…why should we not calmly and patiently review our own thoughts, and thoroughly examine and see what these appearances in us really are?"

History of Introspection in Psychology

Wundt

Wilhelm Wundt, the father of modern psychology, was the first to adopt introspection as a tool for use in the context of experimental psychology research. Wundt was influenced by notable physiologists, such as Gustav Fechner, who used introspection as a means to study human sensory organs. Building upon this preexisting use of introspection in physiology, Wundt imposed exacting control over the use of introspection in his experimental laboratory at the University of Leipzig. By requiring this stringent control, it became possible for other scientists to replicate Wundt's experiments elsewhere, and this advent would prove essential in the development of psychology as a modern, peer-reviewed scientific discipline.

Titchener

Edward Titchener was an early pioneer in experimental psychology and student of Wilhelm Wundt. After earning his doctorate under the tutelage of Wundt at the University of Leipzig, Titchener made his way to Cornell University where he established his own laboratory and research. At the time of Titchener's arrival at Cornell, psychology was still a fledgling discipline, especially in the United States. This being the case, Titchener was a key figure in bringing Wundt's ideas to America; however, in this capacity, Titchener was also responsible for misrepresenting some of Wundt's ideas to the American psychological establishment. This misrepresentation was especially evident in Titchener's conception of introspection. Titchener taught that introspection only served a purpose in the qualitative analysis of consciousness into its various parts. This viewpoint stood in stark relief against Wundt's notion of introspection as a means to quantitatively measure the whole of conscious experience. In other words, Titchener was exclusively interested in the individual components that comprised conscious experience, while Wundt, seeing little purpose in the analysis of individual components, focused on the the synthesis of these constituent parts as a whole. Ultimately, Titchener's ideas would form the basis of the short-lived psychological theory of structuralism.

Further Developments in Psychology

Behaviorism claimed that introspection was unreliable and that the subject matter of scientific psychology should be strictly operationalized in an objective and measurable way. This then led psychology to focus on measurable behavior rather than consciousness or sensation. Cognitive psychology accepts the use of the scientific method, but often rejects introspection as a valid method of investigation for this reason, especially concerning the causes of behavior and choice. Herbert Simon and Allen Newell identified the 'think aloud protocol', in which investigators view a subject engaged in a task, and who speaks his thoughts aloud, thus allowing study of his thought process without forcing the subject to comment on his thinking.

On the other hand, introspection can be considered a valid tool for the development of scientific hypotheses and theoretical models, in particular in cognitive sciences and engineering. In practice, functional (goal-oriented) computational modeling and computer simulation design of meta-reasoning and metacognition are closely connected with the introspective experiences of researchers and engineers.

Introspection was used by German physiologist Wilhelm Wundt in the experimental psychology laboratory he had founded in Leipzig in 1879. Wundt believed that by using introspection in his experiments he would gather information into how the subjects' minds were working, thus he wanted to examine the mind into its basic elements. Wundt did not invent this way of looking into an individual's mind through their experiences; rather, it can date to Socrates. Wundt's distinctive contribution was to take this method into the experimental arena and thus into the newly formed field of psychology.

Inaccessible mental processes and confabulation

Main article: Introspection illusion

Psychological research on cognition and attribution has asked people to report on their mental processes, for instance to say why they made a particular choice or how they arrived at a judgment. In some situations, these reports are clearly confabulated. For example, people justify choices they have not in fact made. Such results undermine the idea that those verbal reports are based on direct introspective access to mental content. Instead, judgements about one's own mind seem to be inferences from overt behavior, similar to judgements made about another person. However, it is hard to assess whether these results only apply to unusual experimental situations, or if they reveal something about everyday introspection. The theory of the adaptive unconscious suggests that a very large proportion of mental processes, even "high-level" processes like goal-setting and decision-making, are inaccessible to introspection.

Even when their introspections are uninformative, people still give confident descriptions of their mental processes, being "unaware of their unawareness". This phenomenon has been termed the introspection illusion and has been used to explain some cognitive biases and belief in some paranormal phenomena. When making judgements about themselves, subjects treat their own introspections as reliable, whereas they judge other people based on their behavior. This can lead to illusions of superiority. For example, people generally see themselves as less conformist than others, and this seems to be because they do not introspect any urge to conform. Another reliable finding is that people generally see themselves as less biased than everyone else, because they are not likely to introspect any biased thought processes. These introspections are misleading, however, because biases work sub-consciously. One experiment tried to give their subjects access to others' introspections. They made audio recordings of subjects who had been told to say whatever came into their heads as they answered a question about their own bias. Although subjects persuaded themselves they were unlikely to be biased, their introspective reports did not sway the assessments of observers. When subjects were explicitly told to avoid relying on introspection, their assessments of their own bias became more realistic.

The position of many contemplatives is that while introspection does have its limitation in identifying thoughts, it can be used to accurately identify states of consciousness. Thus, humanistic and transpersonal psychology, as well as existential-phenomenology, find great value in introspection despite the role of introspective illusion. (Add citation for Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception)

Spiritual Usage

Eastern spirituality

In Eastern Christianity, some of the concepts critical to addressing the needs of man such as sober introspection, called nepsis, are specific to watchfulness of the human heart and address the conflicts of the human nous, heart or mind. Also noetic understanding can not be circumvented nor satisfied by rationalizing or discursive thought (i.e. systemization).

Jainism Spirituality

As per Jainism , each and every basic jain layman has to practice Pratikraman . Pratikraman (literally Sanskrit "introspection"), is a process of repentance of sins (prayaschit) during which Jains repent for their wrongdoings during their daily life, and remind themselves to refrain from doing so again. Devout Jains often do Pratikraman at least twice a day.

In fiction

Introspections (also referred to as internal dialogue, interior monologue, self-talk) is the fiction-writing mode used to convey a character's thoughts. As explained by Renni Browne and Dave King, "One of the great gifts of literature is that it allows for the expression of unexpressed thoughts…" (Browne and King 2004, p. 117)

According to Nancy Kress, a character's thoughts can greatly enhance a story: deepening characterization, increasing tension, and widening the scope of a story. (Kress 2003, p. 38) As outlined by Jack M. Bickham, thought plays a critical role in both scene and sequel. (Bickham 1993, pp. 12–22, 50–58)

See also

• Pratikramana
• Introversion
• Phenomenology
• Phenomenology (psychology)
• Psychonautics
• Psychophysics
• Rumination (psychology)
• Self-awareness
• Self-consciousness
• Style (fiction)
• Mode (literature)
• Conceptual proliferation

References

• Schultz, D. P. & Schultz, S. E. (2004). A history of modern psychology (8th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.
• Bickham, Jack M. (1993). Scene & Structure. Writer's Digest Books. ISBN 0-89879-551-6.
• Browne & King (2004). Self-Editing for Fiction Writers: How to Edit Yourself into Print. New York: Harper Resource. ISBN 0-06-054569-0
• Gillespie, A. (2006). Descartes’ demon: A dialogical analysis of ‘Meditations on First Philosophy.’[1] Theory & Psychology, 16, 761-781.
• Gillespie, A. (2007). The social basis of self-reflection [2]. In Jaan Valsiner and Alberto Rosa (Eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Socio-Cultural Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Kress, Nancy (August 2003), Writer's Digest.

Further reading

• Boring, Edwin G. (1953). "A history of introspection" (PDF). Psychological Bulletin. 50 (3): 169–189. doi:10.1037/h0090793. PMID 13056096. Retrieved 2009-07-17.
• Gillespie, Alex (2006). "Descartes' demon: A dialogical analysis of 'Meditations on First Philosophy". Theory & Psychology. 16 (6): 761–781. doi:10.1177/0959354306070527.
• Gillespie, Alex (2007). Valsiner, Jaan & Rosa, Alberto (ed.). The social basis of self-reflection. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 678–691.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)
• Jack, Anthony & Roepstorff, Andreas, ed. (2003). Trusting the subject?: The use of introspective evidence in cognitive science. Imprint Academic. ISBN 9780907845560.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)
• Wilson, Timothy (2002). Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious. Cambridge: Belknap Press. ISBN 0-674-00936-3.
• Wilson, Timothy D. Wilson (1992). "Attitudes as Temporary Constructions". In Leonard L. Martin, Abraham Tesser (ed.). The Construction of social judgments. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. ISBN 9780805811490. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)

External links

• Eric Schwitzgebel. "Introspection". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• Introspection in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Category:Cognition Category:Sources of knowledge Category:Observation Category:Philosophy of science Category:Self Category:Consciousness Category:Philosophy of psychology