United States sanctions: Difference between revisions

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Browse history interactively
← Previous editNext edit →
Content deleted Content added
VisualWikitext
→‎Perceptions: - rename titles to be more neutral; remove two sections that didn't really make sense in meaning but read like there was an agenda, probably contributed to why the maintenance tag was there
Line 258: Line 258:
*{{flag|Russia}}
*{{flag|Russia}}


==Effect of U.S. sanctions==
==Perceptions ==
{{essay|section|date=November 2022}}
{{essay|section|date=November 2022}}


Line 266: Line 266:


According to [[Daniel T. Griswold]], sanctions failed to change the behavior of sanctioned countries but they have barred American companies from economic opportunities and harmed the poorest people in the countries under sanctions.<ref name="Griswold">{{cite web |last1=Griswold |first1=Daniel |title=Going Alone on Economic Sanctions Hurts U.S. More than Foes |url=http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10888 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110923164257/http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10888 |archive-date=2011-09-23 |website=CATO Institute}}</ref> Secondary sanctions,{{efn|Secondary US sanctions prohibit any trading in US dollars and prevent trade with a country, individuals or organizations under the US sanctions regime.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=118|ref=Abd}}}} according to [[Rawi Abdelal]], often separate the US and Europe because they reflect US interference in the affairs and interests of the [[European Union]] (EU).{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=118|ref=Abd}} Abdelal said since [[Presidency of Donald Trump|Donald Trump]] became President of the United States, sanctions have been seen as an expression of Washington's preferences and whims, and as a tool for US economic warfare that has angered historical allies such as the EU.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=133|ref=Abd}}
According to [[Daniel T. Griswold]], sanctions failed to change the behavior of sanctioned countries but they have barred American companies from economic opportunities and harmed the poorest people in the countries under sanctions.<ref name="Griswold">{{cite web |last1=Griswold |first1=Daniel |title=Going Alone on Economic Sanctions Hurts U.S. More than Foes |url=http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10888 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110923164257/http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10888 |archive-date=2011-09-23 |website=CATO Institute}}</ref> Secondary sanctions,{{efn|Secondary US sanctions prohibit any trading in US dollars and prevent trade with a country, individuals or organizations under the US sanctions regime.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=118|ref=Abd}}}} according to [[Rawi Abdelal]], often separate the US and Europe because they reflect US interference in the affairs and interests of the [[European Union]] (EU).{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=118|ref=Abd}} Abdelal said since [[Presidency of Donald Trump|Donald Trump]] became President of the United States, sanctions have been seen as an expression of Washington's preferences and whims, and as a tool for US economic warfare that has angered historical allies such as the EU.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=133|ref=Abd}}

===Criticisms of efficacy===
⚫
===Efficacy===
The increase in the use of economic leverage as a US foreign policy tool has prompted a debate about its usefulness and effectiveness.{{sfn|Lenway|1988|p=397}} According to Rawi Abdelal, sanctions have become the dominant tool of statecraft of the US and other Western countries in the post-Cold War era. Abdelal stated; "sanctions are useful when diplomacy is not sufficient but force is too costly".{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=114|ref=Abd}} British diplomat [[Jeremy Greenstock]] said sanctions are popular because "there is nothing else [to do] between words and military action if you want to bring pressure upon a government".<ref name="greenstock">{{cite news|last= Marcus |first= Jonathan|url= https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10742109|title= Analysis: Do economic sanctions work?|work= BBC News|date=26 July 2010|access-date= 2015-03-30}}</ref> Former CIA Deputy Director [[David S. Cohen (attorney)|David Cohen]] wrote: "The logic of coercive sanctions does not hold, however, when the objective of sanctions is regime change. Put simply, because the cost of relinquishing power will always exceed the benefit of sanctions relief, a targeted state cannot conceivably accede to a demand for regime change."<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= |isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=274 |oclc=1345216431}}</ref>
The increase in the use of economic leverage as a US foreign policy tool has prompted a debate about its usefulness and effectiveness.{{sfn|Lenway|1988|p=397}} According to Rawi Abdelal, sanctions have become the dominant tool of statecraft of the US and other Western countries in the post-Cold War era. Abdelal stated; "sanctions are useful when diplomacy is not sufficient but force is too costly".{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=114|ref=Abd}} British diplomat [[Jeremy Greenstock]] said sanctions are popular because "there is nothing else [to do] between words and military action if you want to bring pressure upon a government".<ref name="greenstock">{{cite news|last= Marcus |first= Jonathan|url= https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10742109|title= Analysis: Do economic sanctions work?|work= BBC News|date=26 July 2010|access-date= 2015-03-30}}</ref> Former CIA Deputy Director [[David S. Cohen (attorney)|David Cohen]] wrote: "The logic of coercive sanctions does not hold, however, when the objective of sanctions is regime change. Put simply, because the cost of relinquishing power will always exceed the benefit of sanctions relief, a targeted state cannot conceivably accede to a demand for regime change."<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= |isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=274 |oclc=1345216431}}</ref>


Line 273: Line 274:
Political scientist [[Lisa Martin (political scientist)|Lisa Martin]] criticized a [[game theory]] view of sanctions, stating proponents of sanctions characterize success so broadly—applying it to a range of outcomes from "renegotiation" to "influencing global public opinion—the terminology of "winning" and "losing" overextends those concepts.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= |isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=8 |oclc=1345216431}}</ref>
Political scientist [[Lisa Martin (political scientist)|Lisa Martin]] criticized a [[game theory]] view of sanctions, stating proponents of sanctions characterize success so broadly—applying it to a range of outcomes from "renegotiation" to "influencing global public opinion—the terminology of "winning" and "losing" overextends those concepts.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= |isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=8 |oclc=1345216431}}</ref>


=== Humanitarian criticisms ===
=== Humanitarian concerns ===
[[Daniel T. Griswold]] of the [[Cato Institute]] criticizes sanctions from a conservative Christian perspective, writing sanctions limit the possibilities of a sanctioned country's people to exercise political liberties and practice market freedom.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= |isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=10 |oclc=1345216431}}</ref>
[[Daniel T. Griswold]] of the [[Cato Institute]] criticizes sanctions from a conservative Christian perspective, writing sanctions limit the possibilities of a sanctioned country's people to exercise political liberties and practice market freedom.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= |isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=10 |oclc=1345216431}}</ref>
In 1997, the [[American Association for World Health]] stated the [[US embargo against Cuba]] contributed to malnutrition, poor water access, and lack of access to medicine and other medical supplies; it concluded "a humanitarian catastrophe has been averted only because the Cuban government has maintained a high level of budgetary support for a health care system designed to deliver primary and preventative medicine to all its citizens".<ref name=":6">{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= |isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=144 |oclc=1345216431}}</ref>
In 1997, the [[American Association for World Health]] stated the [[US embargo against Cuba]] contributed to malnutrition, poor water access, and lack of access to medicine and other medical supplies; it concluded "a humanitarian catastrophe has been averted only because the Cuban government has maintained a high level of budgetary support for a health care system designed to deliver primary and preventative medicine to all its citizens".<ref name=":6">{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= |isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=144 |oclc=1345216431}}</ref>
Line 281: Line 282:
According to journalist Elijah J Magnier in [[Middle East Eye]], the West—led by America and Europe—had not sent any immediate aid to Syria after the [[2023 Turkey–Syria earthquake]]. According to Magnier, some mainstream media incorrectly stated President [[Bashar al-Assad]] was preventing humanitarian aid from reach the Turkish-occupied northwestern provinces of Syria and border crossings. According to one Western diplomat; "the goal is to get the Syrian people to blame their president for western countries’ refusal to provide aid".<ref>{{cite news |last1=Magnier |first1=Elijah J |title=Turkey-Syria earthquake: Aid gap reveals western double standards |url=https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/turkey-syria-earthquake-aid-gap-western-double-standards-reveals |journal=Middle East Eye |date=February 10, 2023}}</ref>
According to journalist Elijah J Magnier in [[Middle East Eye]], the West—led by America and Europe—had not sent any immediate aid to Syria after the [[2023 Turkey–Syria earthquake]]. According to Magnier, some mainstream media incorrectly stated President [[Bashar al-Assad]] was preventing humanitarian aid from reach the Turkish-occupied northwestern provinces of Syria and border crossings. According to one Western diplomat; "the goal is to get the Syrian people to blame their president for western countries’ refusal to provide aid".<ref>{{cite news |last1=Magnier |first1=Elijah J |title=Turkey-Syria earthquake: Aid gap reveals western double standards |url=https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/turkey-syria-earthquake-aid-gap-western-double-standards-reveals |journal=Middle East Eye |date=February 10, 2023}}</ref>


===U.S. economic uncoupling===
===Isolation of the United States and its markets===
According to Abdelal, US sanctions on its own internal economy cost almost nothing but overuse of them could be costly in the long term. Abdelal said the biggest threat is the US's gradual isolation and the continuing decline of US influence in the context of an emerging, multi-polar world with differing financial and economic powers.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=134|ref=Abd}} Abdelal also said the US and Europe largely agree on the substance of sanctions but disagree on their implementation. The main issue is secondary US sanctions—also known as extraterritorial sanctions—{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=117|ref=Abd}}which prohibit any trading in US dollars and prevent trade with a country, individuals and organizations under the US sanctions regime.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=118|ref=Abd}} Primary sanctions restrict US companies, institutions, and citizens from doing business with the country or entities under sanctions.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=117|ref=Abd}} According to Abdelal, secondary sanctions often separate the US and Europe because they reflect US interference in the EU's affairs and interests. Increasing use of secondary sanctions increases their perception in the EU as a violation of national and EU sovereignty, and an unacceptable interference in the EU's independent decision-making.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=118|ref=Abd}} Secondary sanctions imposed on Iran and Russia are central to these tensions,{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=114|ref=Abd}} and have become the primary tool for signaling and implementing secession from US and European political goals.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=117|ref=Abd}}
According to Abdelal, US sanctions on its own internal economy cost almost nothing but overuse of them could be costly in the long term. Abdelal said the biggest threat is the US's gradual isolation and the continuing decline of US influence in the context of an emerging, multi-polar world with differing financial and economic powers.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=134|ref=Abd}} Abdelal also said the US and Europe largely agree on the substance of sanctions but disagree on their implementation. The main issue is secondary US sanctions—also known as extraterritorial sanctions—{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=117|ref=Abd}}which prohibit any trading in US dollars and prevent trade with a country, individuals and organizations under the US sanctions regime.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=118|ref=Abd}} Primary sanctions restrict US companies, institutions, and citizens from doing business with the country or entities under sanctions.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=117|ref=Abd}} According to Abdelal, secondary sanctions often separate the US and Europe because they reflect US interference in the EU's affairs and interests. Increasing use of secondary sanctions increases their perception in the EU as a violation of national and EU sovereignty, and an unacceptable interference in the EU's independent decision-making.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=118|ref=Abd}} Secondary sanctions imposed on Iran and Russia are central to these tensions,{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=114|ref=Abd}} and have become the primary tool for signaling and implementing secession from US and European political goals.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=117|ref=Abd}}


Line 290: Line 291:


Historian [[Renate Bridenthal]] wrote; "the most looming blowback to US sanctions policy is the growing set of challenges to dollar hegemony". Bridenthal cited the use of local currencies to trade with sanctioned countries, and attempts by Russia and China to increase the gold backing of their respective currencies.<ref name="Blowback to US Sanctions Policy 2021 pp. 323–332">{{cite book | author=Renate Bridenthal|title=Sanctions as War | chapter=Blowback to US Sanctions Policy | publisher=BRILL | date=9 December 2021 | doi=10.1163/9789004501201_020 | pages=323–332|isbn=9789004501201 |s2cid=245394028 }}</ref>
Historian [[Renate Bridenthal]] wrote; "the most looming blowback to US sanctions policy is the growing set of challenges to dollar hegemony". Bridenthal cited the use of local currencies to trade with sanctioned countries, and attempts by Russia and China to increase the gold backing of their respective currencies.<ref name="Blowback to US Sanctions Policy 2021 pp. 323–332">{{cite book | author=Renate Bridenthal|title=Sanctions as War | chapter=Blowback to US Sanctions Policy | publisher=BRILL | date=9 December 2021 | doi=10.1163/9789004501201_020 | pages=323–332|isbn=9789004501201 |s2cid=245394028 }}</ref>

===Sanctions as measures against opposition===

[[Farrokh Habibzadeh]] of the Iranian [[Petroleum Industry Health Organization]] wrote a letter to ''[[The Lancet]]'' comparing the strategy of sanctions to [[Siege|besieging]] in ancient times, when armies that could not conquer a city that was surrounded by defensive walls would besiege the city to prevent access by residents to necessary supplies.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Habibzadeh |first1=Farrokh |title=Economic sanction: a weapon of mass destruction |journal=[[The Lancet]] |date=2018 |volume=392 |issue=10150 |pages=816–817 |doi=10.1016/S0140-6736(18)31944-5 |pmid=30139528 |s2cid=52074513 |doi-access=free }}</ref> According to Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot (2008), [[regime change]] is the most-frequent foreign policy objective of economic sanctions, accounting for around 39% of cases of their imposition.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Hufbauer|first1=Gary Clyde|last2=Schott|first2=Jeffrey J.|last3=Elliott|first3=Kimberly Ann|last4=Oegg|first4=Barbara|title=Economic Sanctions Reconsidered|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=crSxDQAAQBAJ|edition=3|location=Washington, DC|publisher=Columbia University Press|date=2008|page=67|isbn=9780881324822|access-date=2018-05-10|quote=By far, regime change is the most frequent foreign policy objective of economic sanctions, accounting for 80 out of the 204 observations.}}</ref>

⚫
====Cuba====
{{Main articles|United States embargo against Cuba}}
There have been 29 consecutive nearly unanimous [[United Nations General Assembly]] resolutions demanding the US end its embargo of Cuba.<ref>{{cite news |title=UN General Assembly calls for US to end Cuba embargo for 29th consecutive year |url=https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/06/1094612 |access-date=14 January 2022 |work=UN News |date=23 June 2021 |language=en}}</ref> When the US imposed its embargo in 1961, Cuba did most of its commerce with the US. Griswold said since then, the sanctions had no effect on [[Presidency of Fidel Castro|Fidel Castro's government]], which used sanctions to justify the failure of policies and to attract international compassion. Griswold said although the sanctions formerly had international backing, as of 2000, no other country supported them. [[Pope John Paul II]] stated during his visit to Cuba embargoes "are always deplorable because they harm the needy".<ref name="Griswold" />

====Iran====
{{Main articles|United States sanctions against Iran}}
In May 2018, the US government announced its withdrawal from the [[Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]] (JCPOA) and launched a [[maximum pressure campaign]] against Iran, which resulted in public protests, and reproach from European political and business elites.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|pp=114-115|ref=Abd}} Excessive use of US financial sanctions has worried companies, and prompted many EU member states and institutions to limit the exposure of their economies to the US-based [[clearing system]] that creates extreme vulnerability for countries other than the US.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=130|ref=Abd}} The Trump administration reintroduced sanctions against Iran with an [[executive order]], going against the wishes of many politicians.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=131|ref=Abd}} In March 2023, Treasury Secretary [[Janet Yellen]] announced the US was looking for ways to strengthen its sanctions against Iran.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/yellen-irans-actions-not-impacted-by-sanctions-extent-us-would-like-2023-03-23/|title=Yellen: Iran's actions not impacted by sanctions to the extent US would like|last1=Lawder|first1=David|last2=Singh|first2=Kanishka|date=23 March 2023|work=Reuters}}</ref>

====Iraq====
{{Main articles|Sanctions against Iraq}}
In 1990, the Iraqi Army [[Iraqi invasion of Kuwait|invaded and occupied Kuwait]]; the invasion was met with international condemnation and brought immediate [[sanctions against Iraq]].<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Peters |first1=John E |last2=Deshong |first2=Howard |title=Out of Area or Out of Reach? European Military Support for Operations in Southwest Asia |url=https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR629.pdf |year=1995 |publisher=[[RAND Corporation]] |isbn=978-0-8330-2329-2}}</ref> The effects of sanctions on the population of Iraq have been disputed. The figure of 500,000 child deaths was widely cited for a long period but in 2017, research showed the figure was the result of survey data manipulated by the Saddam Hussein government. Three surveys conducted since 2003 all found the child mortality rate between 1995 and 2000 was approximately 40 per 1,000, meaning there was no major rise in child mortality in Iraq after sanctions were implemented.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Dyson|first1=Tim|last2=Cetorelli|first2=Valeria|title=Changing views on child mortality and economic sanctions in Iraq: a history of lies, damned lies and statistics|journal=[[The BMJ|BMJ Global Health]]|language=en|volume=2|issue=2|date=2017-07-24|pages=e000311|doi=10.1136/bmjgh-2017-000311|pmid=29225933|issn=2059-7908|pmc=5717930}}</ref>

===Economic engagement as an alternative===

According to [[Denis Halliday]], sanctions in Iraq forced people to depend on the Iraqi government for survival and further reduced the likelihood of a constructive solution. He commented:<blockquote>We have saved [the regime] and missed opportunities for change&nbsp;... if the Iraqis had their economy, had their lives back, and had their way of life restored, they would take care of the form of governance that they want, that they believe is suitable to their country.{{sfn|Chomsky|2003|p=93}}</blockquote>


== Implementing agencies ==
== Implementing agencies ==

Revision as of 06:44, 24 January 2024

Countries sanctioned in some form by the United States (as of 2023)

United States sanctions are financial and trade restrictions imposed against individuals, entities, and jurisdictions that violate U.S. foreign policy or national security goals. Financial sanctions are primarily administered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), while export controls are primarily administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).

Restrictions against sanctions target vary in severity depending on the justification behind the sanction, and the legal authorities behind the sanctions action. Comprehensive sanctions are currently in place targeting Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Syria, and certain conflict regions of Ukraine, which heavily restrict nearly all trade and financial transactions between U.S. persons and those regions. Targeted sanctions specifically target certain individuals or entities that engage in activities that are contrary to U.S. foreign policy or national security goals, rather than an entire country. The U.S. also implements "secondary sanctions", which risk a sanctions designation against a non-U.S. person who transacts with sanctioned parties in violation of U.S. sanctions law, even if no U.S.-nexus existed for the transaction.[1]

The United States has imposed two-thirds of the world's sanctions since the 1990s.[2] Numerous American unilateral sanctions against various countries around the world have been criticized by different commentators.[3]

History

After the failure of the Embargo Act of 1807, the federal government of the United States took little interest in imposing embargoes and economic sanctions against foreign countries until the 20th century. United States trade policy was entirely a matter of economic policy. After World War I, interest revived. President Woodrow Wilson promoted such sanctions as a method for the League of Nations to enforce peace.[4] However, he failed to bring the United States into the League and the US did not join the 1935 League sanctions against Italy.[5]

Trends in whether the United States has unilaterally or multilaterally imposed sanctions have changed over time.[6] During the Cold War, the United States led unilateral sanctions against Cuba, China, and North Korea.[6] Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, United States sanctions became increasingly multilateral.[6] During the 1990s, the United States imposed sanctions against countries it viewed as rogue states (such as Zimbabwe, Yugoslavia, and Iraq) in conjunction with multilateral institutions such as the United Nations or the World Trade Organization.[6] According to communications studies academic Stuart Davis and political scientist Immanuel Ness, in the 2000s, and with increasing frequency in the 2010s, the United States acted less multilaterally as it imposed sanctions against perceived geopolitical competitors (such as Russia or China) or countries that, according to Davis and Ness, were the site of "proxy conflicts" (such as Yemen and Syria).[6]

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet and some members of the United States Congress asked the United States to suspend its sanctions regimes as way to help alleviate the pandemic's impact on the people of sanctioned countries.[7] Members of Congress who argued for the suspension of sanctions included Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and Ilhan Omar.[8]

Types of sanctions imposed by the United States

  • bans on arms-related exports,[9]
  • controls over dual-use technology exports,
  • restrictions on economic assistance
  • financial restrictions such as:
    • authority to prohibit U.S. citizens from engaging in financial transactions with the individuals, entities, or governments on the list, except by license from the U.S. government
    • requiring the United States to oppose loans by the World Bank and other international financial institutions,
    • diplomatic immunity waived, to allow families of terrorism victims to file for civil damages in U.S. courts,
    • tax credits for companies and individuals denied, for income earned in listed countries,
    • duty-free goods exemption suspended for imports from those countries, and
    • prohibition of U.S. Defense Department contracts above $100,000 with companies controlled by countries on the list.[10]
  • visa restrictions that prevent certain individuals from entering the U.S.

Targeted parties

See also: Office of Foreign Assets Control § Sanctions programs

The U.S. does not maintain a specific list of countries that U.S. persons cannot do business with because its sanctions program varies in scope depending on the sanctions program. Although some sanctions programs are broad and target entire jurisdictions ("comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions"), most are "targeted" sanctions and focus on specific entities, individuals, or economic sectors.[11] Depending on the nature of the restriction, U.S. sanctions are announced and implemented by different executive departments, typically the Treasury Department (OFAC)[12] or the Commerce Department (BIS),[13] and sometimes in conjunction with the State, Defense, or Energy departments.[14]

Comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions

Comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions are subject to the most restrictive sanctions measures. Most transactions between a U.S. person and any person or entity "ordinarily resident" in a comprehensively sanctioned jurisdiction is restricted.[15] In addition to the general sanctions listed below, transactions involving entities or individuals from these countries on OFAC's SDN List or BIS' Entity List are also restricted.

Jurisdiction/Region Summary of certain restrictions
 Cuba Treasury:[16]
  • Prohibition from doing business or investing in Cuba without a license

Commerce:[17]

  • License required for the export or reexport of all items on the Export Administration Regulations except food, medicine, medical devices, items necessary to ensure safe civil aviation, items necessary for environmental protection, items to improve telecommunication services, and items destined to the Cuban government to benefit the Cuban people

State:

See also: United States embargo against Cuba

 Iran Treasury:[19]

Commerce:

State:

  • Designation as a State Sponsors of Terrorism

See also: United States sanctions against Iran

 North Korea Treasury:[22]

Commerce:[23]

State:[22]

  • General prohibition on travel to North Korea
  • Designation as a State Sponsors of Terrorism

See also: U.S. sanctions against North Korea

 Russia Treasury:[24]

Commerce:[25]

  • License required for the export or reexport of all items on the Export Administration Regulations
  • License required for the export or reexport of certain foreign-produced items made with U.S. inputs
 Syria Treasury:[26]
  • Prohibition on the direct or indirect exportation of services to Syria
  • Prohibition on the importation of petroleum products from Syria, or dealing in transactions related to Syrian petroleum
  • Prohibition of new investment in Syria

Commerce:[27]

State:

  • Designation as a State Sponsors of Terrorism

See also: International sanctions against Syria

 Ukraine (Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea only) Treasury:[28]
  • Prohibition on new investment in Donetsk, Luhansk, or Crimea
  • Prohibition on the importation and exportation of any goods, services, or technology to/from Donetsk, Luhansk, or Crimea

Commerce:[29]

  • License required for the export or reexport of all items on the Export Administration Regulations except food, medicine, or software necessary to enable the exchange of personal communications over the Internet

Targeted sanctions

In jurisdictions not subject to comprehensive sanctions measures, only transactions related to specific parties are prohibited.[15] Jurisdictions that face targeted sanctions may continue to do business with the United States, with restrictions only placed on specific categories of individuals or entities, and anyone worldwide who materially supports or provides financial, logistical, or technological support for them.

According to OFAC, there are approximately 12,000 names on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN) list,[12] which is the most restrictive category of targeted U.S. sanctions, targeting U.S.-designated terrorists, officials and beneficiaries of certain authoritarian regimes, and international criminals (e.g. drug traffickers) by blocking their U.S. assets and restricting U.S. persons from engaging in any transactions with them.[30]

The following jurisdictions have been designated a specific sanctions program used by OFAC to determine SDN designations targeting individuals or entities in that jurisdiction or engaging in sanctioned activities related to the jurisdiction:[31]

Jurisdiction/Region Summary of certain restrictions
 Belarus Persons the US government believes to be undermining Belarus' democratic processes or institutions, committing political repression activities, and/or misusing public assets and public authority[32]
 Central African Republic Persons the US government believes is responsible, complicit, or have engaged in actions that threaten peace, security, or stability of the Central African Republic, including actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions, threaten the political transition process, target civilians, or UN and other peacekeeping operations through the commission of acts of violence, use of children in armed groups, or obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance[33]
 Democratic Republic of the Congo Persons the US government believes is a political or military leader of an armed group operating in the DRC that impedes the peace, security, or stability of the DRC, including actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions, threaten the political transition process, target civilians, or UN and other peacekeeping operations through the commission of acts of violence, use of children in armed groups, or obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance[34]
 Ethiopia Persons the US government believes is responsible for or complicit in actions that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Ethiopia, including expanding the crisis in northern Ethiopia or obstructing the peace process, or engaging in actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions, including corruption or serious human rights abuses, to obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance, target civilians through violence, or committing attacks against UN or African Union personnel.
Entities the US government believes is a military or security force operating in northern Ethiopia after November 1, 2020, or has engaged in activities that have contributed to the crisis in northern Ethiopia[35]
 Hong Kong Persons the US government believes is responsible for developing, adopting, or implementing the Hong Kong national security law, or be responsible or complicit in actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions in Hong Kong, or threaten the peace, security, stability, or autonomy of Hong Kong, including censorship, extrajudicial rendition, arbitrary detention, or torture of any person in Hong Kong[36]
 Iraq Persons the US government believes has committed acts of violence that threaten the peace or stability of Iraq or the government of Iraq, undermine efforts to promote economic reconstruction and political reform in Iraq, or obstruct the provision of humanitarian assistance[37]
 Lebanon Persons the US government believes has taken action to undermine Lebanon's democratic processes or institutions, contributed to the breakdown of the rule of law in Lebanon, support the assertion of Syrian control or influence in Lebanon, or infringing or undermining Lebanese sovereignty[38]
 Libya Persons the US government believes is responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Libya, obstruct, undermine, delay, or impede the political transition process, misappropriate state assets, or threaten state financial institutions, or planning, directing, or committing attacks on Libyan state facilities or civilian facilities, or illegally exploit and export Libyan natural resources[39]
 Myanmar Persons the US government believes operates in the defense or other critical sectors of the Burmese economy, or are responsible for actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions or threaten the peace, security, or stability of Myanmar, or limit the exercise of freedom of expression or assembly, or arbitrary detention or torture, or is a leader of the military or security forces of Myanmar, or the government of Myanmar after February 2, 2021[40]
 Nicaragua Persons the US government believes is responsible for serious human rights abuses, actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions or threaten the peace, security, or stability of Nicaragua, or engaged in corrupt transactions related to the misappropriation of public assets[41]
 Somalia Persons the US government believes has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia including threatening the peace process, misappropriating public assets, or engaging in acts of piracy, or obstructed the delivery of humanitarian assistance, engaged in acts of violence targeting civilians, recruited children in armed conflict, or imported or exported charcoal from Somalia[42]
 South Sudan Persons the US government believes has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of South Sudan, including actions that threaten the peace process, expanding the conflict in South Sudan, committing human rights abuses and violence against civilians, or attacks against UN or other international peacekeeping operations[43]
 Sudan Persons the US government believes has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Sudan, including undermining the peace process and the democratic process or institutions of Sudan, or engage in censorship, corruption, misappropriation of state assets, serious human rights abuses, acts of violence against civilians, or obstruction of or attacks against UN peacekeeping missions[44]
 Venezuela The Government of Venezuela,[45] those operating in the Venezuelan gold sector, or persons the US government believes is engaging in corrupt government programs,[46] engaged in actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions, commit significant acts of violence, or restrict the freedom of expression or peaceful assembly[47]
Western Balkans Persons under open indictment by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, or has committed actions that threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of any area in the Western Balkans, including actions that undermine the democratic processes or institutions in the Western Balkans, obstructed the peace process, engaged in serious human rights abuses, or are responsible for the misappropriation of public assets for personal gain[48]
 Yemen Persons the US government believes has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen, including obstructing the peaceful transition of power or the political process[49]
 Zimbabwe Persons the US government believes has engaged in actions to undermine Zimbabwe's democratic processes or institutions, engaged in human rights abuses or public corruption, as well as senior officials of the Government of Zimbabwe, or is a state-owned institution[50]

Human rights abuses/corruption

Building off the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, named after Sergei Magnitsky who died in Russian custody after uncovering corruption, the U.S. can enact sanctions against any individual or entity worldwide who engages in severe human rights abuses and corruption that degrade the rule of law, perpetuate violent conflicts, and facilitate the activities of dangerous persons.[51] The following list include some jurisdictions that are frequently targeted by U.S. sanctions related to human rights abuses but are not specifically targeted under a country-specific sanctions program:

Jurisdiction/Region Summary of targeted individuals/entities
 Afghanistan Persons associated with the Taliban involved in the suppression of women's and girl's access to education, and the beating of protestors and unlawful detention of journalists.[51]
Former Afghani officials and their companies engaged in corrupt activities and siphoning resources from the former Afghani Armed Forces[52]
 Cambodia Targeting government officials engaged in corruption[53]
 China Persons whom the US government believes are committing Genocide against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang[54][51] and Chinese government officials whom the US government believes are committing human rights abuses in Hong Kong[55]
 Eritrea Certain persons the US government believes are involved in the Ethiopian war, such as armed forces and government officials.[56]
 Lebanon Persons the US government believes undermine the sovereignty of Lebanon or its democratic processes and institutions[57]
 Myanmar Officials associated with ethnic cleansing related to the ongoing Rohingya crisis[58] and those associated with ethnic militias including the United Wa State Army[59]: 66–67 
 North Korea Targeting government officials associated with state-sponsored human rights abuses and censorship[60]
 Nicaragua Persons associated with contributing to the repression of the 2018–2020 Nicaraguan protests.[61]
 Russia Persons associated with abuses against human rights activists and whistleblowers such as Sergei Magnitsky[62]
 South Sudan Persons the US government alleges have contributed to the conflict in South Sudan or committed human rights abuses[63]
 Zimbabwe Persons the US government believes undermine democratic processes or institutions in Zimbabwe[64]

Terrorism

Some of the jurisdictions whose resident individuals or entities are frequently targeted for sanctions under counter-terrorism authorities include:

Jurisdiction/Region Summary of targeted individuals/entities
 Gaza Targeting persons and organizations tied to Hamas-affiliated groups[65]
 Lebanon Targeting Hizballah-linked facilitators and financiers[66]
 Iran Targeting Iranian support for terrorist organizations including Hamas,[67] Hizballah,[66] and Houthis[68]
 Yemen Persons who the US government claims threaten peace, security, or stability in Yemen[68]

Drug trafficking/transnational criminal organizations

Some of the jurisdictions whose resident individuals or entities are frequently targeted for sanctions under anti-drug trafficking or transnational criminal organizations-related authorities include:

Jurisdiction/Region Summary of targeted individuals/entities
 Italy Targeting the organizational structure and prominent leaders of the Camorra[69]
 Japan Targeting the organizational structure and prominent members of the Yakuza, such as the Yamaguchi-gumi[70] and Inagawa-kai[69]
 Laos Targeting the organizational structure and prominent members of Zhao Wei's criminal enterprise engaging in drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, bribery, and wildlife trafficking, much of which is facilitated through the Kings Romans Casino in Laos.[71]
 Mexico Targeting the organizational structure and prominent members of drug cartels, including the Sinaloa Cartel,[72] Los Zetas,[69] and Beltrán-Leyva Organization,[73] as well as human smuggling rings.[74]
 Russia Targeting the organizational structure and prominent members of the Brothers' Circle[69]

Jurisdictions subject to military/arms related export controls

Department of State Arms Embargo

The U.S. government maintains a policy of denial for any exports of defense articles or defense services to the following countries:[75][76]

  1. ^ Certain Chinese defense companies are also subject to Treasury Department restrictions on U.S. inbound investments[77]

Department of Commerce Military End Use/User Rule

The U.S. government also enforces stricter restrictions on a more expansive definition of defense items, including the export of any U.S.-origin item that "supports or contributes" to the operation, installation, maintenance, repair, overhaul, refurbishing, development, or production of military items to specified countries. The same countries are also subject to additional license requirements in place for certain exports to the targeted countries' "military end users", defined as their national armed services, national police, national intelligence services, and anyone whose activities "support or contribute to military end uses."[78]

Russia/Belarus MEU FDP Rule

Russia and Belarus are subject to the same restrictions as the military end use/user rule, with a more expansive coverage that includes foreign-produced items that are produced using U.S.-origin software or technology, manufactured by plants or major components that are products of the U.S.[80]

Effect of U.S. sanctions

Since 1990, the use of sanctions by the United States has significantly increased, and since 1998, the US has established economic sanctions on more than 20 countries.[3]

A series of studies led by economist Gary Hafbauer has found destabilization of the sanctioned country is the frequent goal of US sanctions programs.[81] Destabilization occurs when people in the sanctioned country lose confidence in their government's ability to operate the country and viable alternatives for them to consider exist.[81]

According to Daniel T. Griswold, sanctions failed to change the behavior of sanctioned countries but they have barred American companies from economic opportunities and harmed the poorest people in the countries under sanctions.[82] Secondary sanctions,[a] according to Rawi Abdelal, often separate the US and Europe because they reflect US interference in the affairs and interests of the European Union (EU).[83] Abdelal said since Donald Trump became President of the United States, sanctions have been seen as an expression of Washington's preferences and whims, and as a tool for US economic warfare that has angered historical allies such as the EU.[84]

Efficacy

The increase in the use of economic leverage as a US foreign policy tool has prompted a debate about its usefulness and effectiveness.[85] According to Rawi Abdelal, sanctions have become the dominant tool of statecraft of the US and other Western countries in the post-Cold War era. Abdelal stated; "sanctions are useful when diplomacy is not sufficient but force is too costly".[86] British diplomat Jeremy Greenstock said sanctions are popular because "there is nothing else [to do] between words and military action if you want to bring pressure upon a government".[87] Former CIA Deputy Director David Cohen wrote: "The logic of coercive sanctions does not hold, however, when the objective of sanctions is regime change. Put simply, because the cost of relinquishing power will always exceed the benefit of sanctions relief, a targeted state cannot conceivably accede to a demand for regime change."[88]

Most international relations scholarship concludes sanctions almost never lead to overthrow of sanctioned countries' governments or compliance by those governments.[89] More often, the outcome of economic sanctions is the entrenchment in power of state elites in the sanctioned country.[89] In a study of US sanctions from 1981 to 2000, political scientist Dursan Peksen found sanctions have been counterproductive, failing to improve human rights and instead leading to a further decrese in sanctioned countries' "respect for physical integrity rights, including freedom from disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture, and political imprisonment".[90] Economists Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot state while policymakers often have high expectations of the efficacy of sanctions, there is at most a weak correlation between economic deprivation and the political inclination to change.[91] Griswold wrote sanctions are a foreign policy failure, having failed to change the political behavior of sanctioned countries; they have also barred American companies from economic opportunities and harmed the poorest people in the sanctioned countries.[82] A study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics said sanctions have achieved their goals in fewer than 20% of cases. According to Griswold, as an example, the US Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 could not stop Pakistan and India from testing nuclear weapons.[82]

Political scientist Lisa Martin criticized a game theory view of sanctions, stating proponents of sanctions characterize success so broadly—applying it to a range of outcomes from "renegotiation" to "influencing global public opinion—the terminology of "winning" and "losing" overextends those concepts.[92]

Humanitarian concerns

Daniel T. Griswold of the Cato Institute criticizes sanctions from a conservative Christian perspective, writing sanctions limit the possibilities of a sanctioned country's people to exercise political liberties and practice market freedom.[93] In 1997, the American Association for World Health stated the US embargo against Cuba contributed to malnutrition, poor water access, and lack of access to medicine and other medical supplies; it concluded "a humanitarian catastrophe has been averted only because the Cuban government has maintained a high level of budgetary support for a health care system designed to deliver primary and preventative medicine to all its citizens".[94]

Economist Helen Yaffe estimates United States sanctions against Venezuela have caused the deaths of 100,000 people due to the difficulty of importing medicine and health care equipment.[94]

According to journalist Elijah J Magnier in Middle East Eye, the West—led by America and Europe—had not sent any immediate aid to Syria after the 2023 Turkey–Syria earthquake. According to Magnier, some mainstream media incorrectly stated President Bashar al-Assad was preventing humanitarian aid from reach the Turkish-occupied northwestern provinces of Syria and border crossings. According to one Western diplomat; "the goal is to get the Syrian people to blame their president for western countries’ refusal to provide aid".[95]

U.S. economic uncoupling

According to Abdelal, US sanctions on its own internal economy cost almost nothing but overuse of them could be costly in the long term. Abdelal said the biggest threat is the US's gradual isolation and the continuing decline of US influence in the context of an emerging, multi-polar world with differing financial and economic powers.[96] Abdelal also said the US and Europe largely agree on the substance of sanctions but disagree on their implementation. The main issue is secondary US sanctions—also known as extraterritorial sanctions—[97]which prohibit any trading in US dollars and prevent trade with a country, individuals and organizations under the US sanctions regime.[83] Primary sanctions restrict US companies, institutions, and citizens from doing business with the country or entities under sanctions.[97] According to Abdelal, secondary sanctions often separate the US and Europe because they reflect US interference in the EU's affairs and interests. Increasing use of secondary sanctions increases their perception in the EU as a violation of national and EU sovereignty, and an unacceptable interference in the EU's independent decision-making.[83] Secondary sanctions imposed on Iran and Russia are central to these tensions,[86] and have become the primary tool for signaling and implementing secession from US and European political goals.[97]

In 2019, the United States Department of State reported it received complaints from American telecommunications providers and television companies the sanctions against Cuba caused difficulties in incorporating the country into their grid coverage.[98]

De-dollarization efforts

Retired business-studies academic Tim Beal views the US's imposition of financial sanctions as a factor increasing dedollarization efforts because of responses like the Russian-developed System for Transfers of Financial Messages (SPFS), the China-supported Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), and the European Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) that followed the US's withdrawal of from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran.[99]

Historian Renate Bridenthal wrote; "the most looming blowback to US sanctions policy is the growing set of challenges to dollar hegemony". Bridenthal cited the use of local currencies to trade with sanctioned countries, and attempts by Russia and China to increase the gold backing of their respective currencies.[100]

Implementing agencies

Authorizing laws

Several laws delegate embargo power to the President:

Several laws specifically prohibit trade with certain countries:

Footnotes

  1. ^ Secondary US sanctions prohibit any trading in US dollars and prevent trade with a country, individuals or organizations under the US sanctions regime.[83]

See also

References

Citations

  1. ^ "Overview of US Sanctions". Retrieved January 23, 2024.
  2. ^ Manu Karuka (December 9, 2021). "Hunger Politics: Sanctions as Siege Warfare". Sanctions as War. BRILL. pp. 51–62. doi:10.1163/9789004501201_004. ISBN 9789004501201. S2CID 245408284.
  3. ^ a b Gordon, Joy (March 4, 1999). "Sanctions as Siege Warfare". The Nation.
  4. ^ "Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Economic Sanctions". PIIE. March 2, 2016. Retrieved August 25, 2020.
  5. ^ Strang, G. Bruce (2008). ""The Worst of all Worlds:" Oil Sanctions and Italy's Invasion of Abyssinia, 1935–1936". Diplomacy & Statecraft. 19 (2): 210–235. doi:10.1080/09592290802096257. S2CID 154614365. Retrieved August 13, 2020.
  6. ^ a b c d e Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy. 2023. p. 16. ISBN 978-1-64259-812-4. OCLC 1345216431.
  7. ^ Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy. 2023. p. 11. ISBN 978-1-64259-812-4. OCLC 1345216431.
  8. ^ "Bernie Sanders and AOC call on US to lift Iran sanctions as nation reels from coronavirus". The Independent. April 1, 2020. Retrieved January 23, 2023.
  9. ^ Haidar, J.I., 2017."Sanctions and Exports Deflection: Evidence from Iran," Economic Policy (Oxford University Press), April 2017, Vol. 32(90), pp. 319-355.
  10. ^ "Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism". Country Reports on Terrorism 2009. United States Department of State. August 5, 2010. Retrieved March 11, 2017.
  11. ^ "Where is OFAC's Country List? What countries do I need to worry about in terms of U.S. sanctions?". OFAC. Retrieved January 22, 2024.
  12. ^ a b "OFAC Homepage". Retrieved January 22, 2024.
  13. ^ "Sanctioned Destinations". Retrieved January 22, 2024.
  14. ^ "Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation". Retrieved January 22, 2024.
  15. ^ a b "OFAC Sanctioned Countries". Princeton Research. Retrieved January 22, 2024.
  16. ^ "Is Cuba open for U.S. business and investment?". Retrieved January 22, 2022.
  17. ^ "Cuba Sanctions". Retrieved January 22, 2022.
  18. ^ "State Sponsors of Terrorism". Retrieved January 22, 2022.
  19. ^ "Iran sanctions overview" (PDF). July 1, 2019.
  20. ^ "Treasury Sanctions Key Actors in Iran's Oil Sector for Supporting Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force". October 26, 2020.
  21. ^ "Iran sanctions". Retrieved January 22, 2024.
  22. ^ a b "North Korea Sanctions". Retrieved January 22, 2024.
  23. ^ {{citeweb|url=https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/country-guidance/sanctioned-destinations/north-korea%7Ctitle=North Korea - BIS|access-date=2024-01-22]}
  24. ^ "Sanctions Summary – Russia Invasion of Ukraine". March 28, 2022.
  25. ^ "Resources on Export Controls Implemented in Response to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine". November 6, 2023.
  26. ^ "Syria sanctions program". August 2, 2013.
  27. ^ "Iran sanctions". Retrieved January 22, 2024.
  28. ^ "Ukraine-/Russia-related Sanctions". Retrieved January 22, 2024.
  29. ^ "Temporarily occupied Crimea region of Ukraine and covered regions of Ukraine". Retrieved January 22, 2024.
  30. ^ Knights, Michael (December 6, 2019). "Punishing Iran's Triggermen in Iraq: Opening Moves in a Long Campaign". The Washington Institute.
  31. ^ "Program Tag Definitions for OFAC Sanctions Lists". Retrieved January 23, 2023.
  32. ^ "Executive Order 13405". June 20, 2006.
  33. ^ "Part 533 - Central African Republic Sanctions Regulations". September 29, 2022.
  34. ^ "Part 547 - Democratic Republic of the Congo Sanctions REgulations". May 28, 2009.
  35. ^ "Executive Order 14046". November 17, 2021.
  36. ^ "Executive Order 13936". July 14, 2020.
  37. ^ "Executive Order 13438". July 19, 2007.
  38. ^ "Part 549 - Lebanon Sanctions Regulations". July 30, 2010.
  39. ^ "Executive Order 13726". April 19, 2016.
  40. ^ "Executive Order 14014". February 10, 2021.
  41. ^ "Executive Order 13851". November 27, 2018.
  42. ^ "Part 551 - Somalia Sanctions Regulations".
  43. ^ "Executive Order 13664". April 3, 2014.
  44. ^ "Executive Order 14098". May 4, 2023.
  45. ^ "Executive Order 13884". August 5, 2019.
  46. ^ "Executive Order 13850". November 1, 2018.
  47. ^ "Executive Order 13692". March 8, 2015.
  48. ^ "Part 588 - Western Balkans Stabilization Regulations".
  49. ^ "Part 552 - Yemen Sanctions Regulations". October 29, 2020.
  50. ^ "Part 541 - Zimbabwe Sanctions". July 29, 2004.
  51. ^ a b c "Treasury Designates Perpetrators of Human Rights Abuse and Commemorates the 75th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights". December 8, 2023.
  52. ^ "Treasury Targets Transnational Corruption". December 11, 2023.
  53. ^ "Treasury Targets Corrupt Military Officials in Cambodia". U.S. Department of the Treasury. June 27, 2023. Retrieved July 27, 2023.
  54. ^ "Treasury Sanctions Chinese Government Officials in Connection with Serious Human Rights Abuse in Xinjiang". March 22, 2021.
  55. ^ "U.S. sanctions Chinese officials over Hong Kong democracy crackdown". July 16, 2021.
  56. ^ "US sanctions Eritrean military over role in Tigray conflict".
  57. ^ "Treasury Targets Two Politically Connected Brothers in Lebanon for Profiting from Public Corruption". April 4, 2023.
  58. ^ "US sanctions Myanmar military over Rohingya ethnic cleansing". ABC News. August 17, 2018. Retrieved October 5, 2018.
  59. ^ Ong, Andrew (2023). Stalemate: Autonomy and Insurgency on the China-Myanmar Border. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-1-5017-7071-5. JSTOR 10.7591/j.ctv2t8b78b.
  60. ^ "Treasury Sanctions North Korean Officials and Entities in Response to the Regime's Serious Human Rights Abuses and Censorship". December 10, 2018.
  61. ^ Koran, Laura (July 5, 2018). "US slaps new sanctions on Nicaragua over violence, corruption". CNN. Retrieved October 5, 2018.
  62. ^ "Treasury Sanctions Russians Connected to Gross Human Rights Violations and Corrupt Leader of Belarus". March 15, 2022.
  63. ^ "Treasury Sanctions Two South Sudanese Officials Responsible for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence". June 20, 2023.
  64. ^ "Treasury Sanctions Two Individuals for Human Rights Abuse in Zimbabwe". March 11, 2020.
  65. ^ "U.S., UK, and Australia Target Additional Hamas Financial Networks and Facilitators of Virtual Currency Transfers". January 22, 2024.
  66. ^ a b "Treasury Sanctions Hizballah Financiers in Lebanon". January 18, 2022.
  67. ^ "United States and United Kingdom Take Coordinated Action Against Hamas Leaders and Financiers". November 14, 2023.
  68. ^ a b "Treasury Targets Network Financing Houthi Attacks on International Shipping". December 28, 2023.
  69. ^ a b c d "Treasury Targets Leading Figures of Transnational Criminal Organizations". January 23, 2013.
  70. ^ "Treasury Sanctions Individuals and Companies Associated with Japan's Major Organized Crime Syndicate, the Yakuza". October 2, 2018.
  71. ^ "Treasury Sanctions the Zhao Wei Transnational Criminal Organization". January 30, 2018.
  72. ^ "Treasury Sanctions Sinaloa Cartel Network Flush with Illicit Fentanyl on Southwest Border". November 7, 2023.
  73. ^ "Secretary Yellen Announces Treasury Sanctions Against New Generation of Violent Drug Trafficking Beltrán Leyva Organization". December 6, 2023.
  74. ^ "Treasury Sanctions Mexico-based Transnational Human Smuggling Organization". June 16, 2023.
  75. ^ "Export Control Countries of Concern". Retrieved January 23, 2024.
  76. ^ "§ 126.1 Prohibited exports, imports, and sales to or from certain countries". January 22, 2024.
  77. ^ "US Government Issues Executive Order Amending Ban on US Persons Purchasing Securities of Certain Chinese Companies". June 10, 2021.
  78. ^ "BIS Issues FAQs Relating to the Military End Use/User Rules". July 1, 2020.
  79. ^ "US Government Tightens Export Controls for Cambodia". December 13, 2021.
  80. ^ "U.S. Department of Commerce & Bureau of Industry and Security Russia and Belarus Rule Fact Sheet". Retrieved January 23, 2024.
  81. ^ a b Hafbauer, Gary (2023). Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy. p. 31. ISBN 978-1-64259-812-4. OCLC 1345216431.
  82. ^ a b c Griswold, Daniel. "Going Alone on Economic Sanctions Hurts U.S. More than Foes". CATO Institute. Archived from the original on September 23, 2011.
  83. ^ a b c d Abdelal 2020, p. 118.
  84. ^ Abdelal 2020, p. 133.
  85. ^ Lenway 1988, p. 397.
  86. ^ a b Abdelal 2020, p. 114.
  87. ^ Marcus, Jonathan (July 26, 2010). "Analysis: Do economic sanctions work?". BBC News. Retrieved March 30, 2015.
  88. ^ Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy. 2023. p. 274. ISBN 978-1-64259-812-4. OCLC 1345216431.
  89. ^ a b Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy. 2023. p. 96. ISBN 978-1-64259-812-4. OCLC 1345216431.
  90. ^ Peksen, Dursun (2009). "Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights". Journal of Peace Research. 46 (1): 59–77. doi:10.1177/0022343308098404. ISSN 0022-3433. S2CID 110505923.
  91. ^ Hufbauer, Gary Clyde; Schott, Jeffrey J.; Elliott, Kimberly Ann; Oegg, Barbara (2007). Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Peterson Institute. p. 162. ISBN 9780881325362.
  92. ^ Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy. 2023. p. 8. ISBN 978-1-64259-812-4. OCLC 1345216431.
  93. ^ Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy. 2023. p. 10. ISBN 978-1-64259-812-4. OCLC 1345216431.
  94. ^ a b Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy. 2023. p. 144. ISBN 978-1-64259-812-4. OCLC 1345216431.
  95. ^ Magnier, Elijah J (February 10, 2023). "Turkey-Syria earthquake: Aid gap reveals western double standards". Middle East Eye.
  96. ^ Abdelal 2020, p. 134.
  97. ^ a b c Abdelal 2020, p. 117.
  98. ^ Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy. 2023. p. 70. ISBN 978-1-64259-812-4. OCLC 1345216431.
  99. ^ Tim Beal (December 9, 2021). "Sanctions as Instrument of Coercion: Characteristics, Limitations, and Consequences". Sanctions as War. BRILL. pp. 27–50. doi:10.1163/9789004501201_003. ISBN 9789004501201. S2CID 245402040.
  100. ^ Renate Bridenthal (December 9, 2021). "Blowback to US Sanctions Policy". Sanctions as War. BRILL. pp. 323–332. doi:10.1163/9789004501201_020. ISBN 9789004501201. S2CID 245394028.
  101. ^ a b c d e Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Policy. 2023. p. 131. ISBN 978-1-64259-812-4. OCLC 1345216431.

Sources

Further reading

Library resources about
United States sanctions
  • Hufbauer, Gary C. Economic sanctions and American diplomacy (Council on Foreign Relations, 1998) online.
  • Hufbauer, Gary C., Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberley Ann Elliott. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy (Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 1990)
  • Mulder, Nicholas. The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War (2022) also see online review

External links

Wikiquote has quotations related to United States sanctions.
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=United_States_sanctions&oldid=1198482629"