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==Crimean War==
==Crimean War==
{{Main|Crimean War}}
{{Main|Crimean War}}
The [[Crimean War]] 1853 to 1856 was one of the few large wars fought 1815-1914.<ref>R. W. Seton-Watson, ''Britain in Europe 1789-1914, a Survey of Foreign Policy'' (1937) pp. 301-60.</ref> The [[Russian Empire]] lost to an alliance made up of Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire and the [[Kingdom of Sardinia|part of Italy]].<ref>Orlando Figes, ''The Crimean War: A History'' (2011).</ref> The immediate causes of the war were minor. The longer-term causes involved the [[decline of the Ottoman Empire]] and Russia's misunderstanding of the British position. Tsar Nicholas I visited London in person and consulted with Foreign Secretary [[George Hamilton-Gordon, 4th Earl of Aberdeen|Lord Aberdeen]] regarding What would happen if the Ottoman Empire collapsed and had to be split up. The Tsar completely misread the British position as one of supporting Russian aggression. In fact, London stood with Paris in opposition to any breakup of the Ottoman Empire, and especially against any Russian aggrandizement. When Aberdeen became Prime Minister in 1852, the tsar mistakenly assumed he had British approval for aggressive moves against Turkey. He was astonished when the British declared war. Aberdeen had opposed the war, but public opinion demanded war and he was forced out.<ref>Seton-Watson, ''Britain in Europe 1789-1914,'' 319-327.</ref> The new prime minister was [[Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston|Lord Palmerston]] who strongly opposed Russia. The fighting was largely limited to actions in the Crimean Peninsula and the Black Sea. Both sides badly mishandled operations; the world was aghast at the extremely high death rates due to disease. In the end, the British-French coalition prevailed and Russia lost control of the Black Sea-- although it managed to recover that in 1871. <ref>Nicholas Riasanovsky, ''Nicholas I and official nationality in Russia 1825-1855'' (1969) pp 250-52, 263-66.</ref><ref>Robert Pearce, "The results of the Crimean War." ''History Review'' 70 (2011): 27-33.</ref><ref>Figes, ''The Crimean War, 68-70, 116-22, 145-147. </ref>
The [[Crimean War]] 1853 to 1856 was one of the few large wars fought 1815-1914.<ref>R. W. Seton-Watson, ''Britain in Europe 1789-1914, a Survey of Foreign Policy'' (1937) pp. 301-60.</ref> The [[Russian Empire]] lost to an alliance made up of Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire and the [[Kingdom of Sardinia|part of Italy]].<ref>Orlando Figes, ''The Crimean War: A History'' (2011).</ref> The immediate causes of the war were minor. The longer-term causes involved the [[decline of the Ottoman Empire]] and Russia's misunderstanding of the British position. Tsar Nicholas I visited London in person and consulted with Foreign Secretary [[George Hamilton-Gordon, 4th Earl of Aberdeen|Lord Aberdeen]] regarding What would happen if the Ottoman Empire collapsed and had to be split up. The Tsar completely misread the British position as one of supporting Russian aggression. In fact, London stood with Paris in opposition to any breakup of the Ottoman Empire, and especially against any Russian aggrandizement. When Aberdeen became Prime Minister in 1852, the tsar mistakenly assumed he had British approval for aggressive moves against Turkey. He was astonished when the British declared war. Aberdeen had opposed the war, but public opinion demanded war and he was forced out.<ref>Seton-Watson, ''Britain in Europe 1789-1914,'' 319-327.</ref> The new prime minister was [[Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston|Lord Palmerston]] who strongly opposed Russia. He defined the popular imagination which saw the war against Russia is a commitment to British principles, notably the defense of liberty, civilization, free trade; and championing the underdog. The fighting was largely limited to actions in the Crimean Peninsula and the Black Sea. Both sides badly mishandled operations; the world was aghast at the extremely high death rates due to disease. In the end, the British-French coalition prevailed and Russia lost control of the Black Sea-- although it managed to recover that in 1871. <ref>Nicholas Riasanovsky, ''Nicholas I and official nationality in Russia 1825-1855'' (1969) pp 250-52, 263-66.</ref><ref>Robert Pearce, "The results of the Crimean War." ''History Review'' 70 (2011): 27-33.</ref><ref>Figes, ''The Crimean War, 68-70, 116-22, 145-150. </ref>


Pompous aristocracy was a loser in the war, the winners were the ideals of middle-class efficiency, progress, and peaceful reconciliation. The war's great hero was [[Florence Nightingale]], the nurse who brought scientific management and expertise to the bewildering sufferings of the tens of thousands of sick and dying British soldiers. <ref>Figes, ''The Crimean War, 469-71. </ref> according to historian [[R. B. McCallum]] the Crimean war:
Pompous aristocracy was a loser in the war, the winners were the ideals of middle-class efficiency, progress, and peaceful reconciliation. The war's great hero was [[Florence Nightingale]], the nurse who brought scientific management and expertise to the bewildering sufferings of the tens of thousands of sick and dying British soldiers. <ref>Figes, ''The Crimean War, 469-71. </ref> according to historian [[R. B. McCallum]] the Crimean war:

Revision as of 08:05, 25 March 2020

British foreign policy in the Middle East involved multiple considerations. These included maintaining access to India, blocking Russian or French threats to that access, protecting the Suez Canal, guaranteeing an oil supply after 1900 from Middle Eastern fields, supporting the declining Ottoman Empire against Russian threats, protecting Egypt and other possessions in the Middle East, and protecting Britain's major role in the Mediterranean. The timeframe of major concern stretches from the 1770s when Russia took control of the Crimean Peninsula and became a major player in the Black Sea, down to the Suez fiasco of 1956 when Britain tried and failed to block Egyptian takeover of the Suez Canal. The policies are an integral part of the History of the foreign relations of the United Kingdom.

Napoleon's threat

Napoleon, the leader of the French wars against Britain from the late 1790s until 1815, used the French fleet to convey a large invasion army to Egypt, a major remote province of the Ottoman Empire. British commercial interests represented by the Levant Company had a successful base in Egypt, and indeed the company handled all Egypt's diplomacy. The British responded and sank the French fleet at the Battle of the Nile in 1798, thereby trapping Napoleon's army.[1] Napoleon escaped. The Army he left behind was defeated by the British and the survivors returned to France in 1801. Britain absorbed the Levant company into the Foreign Office by 1825.[2][3]

Greek independence: 1821–1833

Main article: Greek War of Independence
Allied victory over Ottomans at Navarino enables Greek independence (1827)

Europe was generally peaceful; the Greek's long war of independence was the major military conflict in the 1820s.[4] Serbia had gained its autonomy from Constantinople in 1815. Thed Greek rebellion came next starting in 1821, with a rebellion indirectly sponsored by Russia. The Greeks had strong intellectual and business communities which employed propaganda echoing the French Revolution that appealed to the romanticism of Western Europe. Despite harsh Ottoman reprisals they kept their rebellion alive. Sympathizers like British poet Lord Byron played a major role in shaping British opinion to strongly favor the Greeks, especially among Philosophical Radicals, the Whigs, and the Evangelicals.[5] However the top British foreign policy makers George Canning (1770–1827) and Viscount Castlereagh (1769–1822) were much more cautious. They agreed that the Ottoman Empire was "barbarous" but they decided it was a necessary evil. British policy down to 1914 was to preserve the Ottoman Empire, especially against hostile pressures from Russia. However, when Ottoman behavior was outrageously oppressive against Christians, London demanded reforms and concessions.[6][7][8]

The context of the three Great Powers' intervention was Russia's long-running expansion at the expense of the decaying Ottoman Empire. However Russia's ambitions in the region were seen as a major geostrategic threat by the other European powers. Austria feared the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire would destabilize its southern borders. Russia gave strong emotional support for the fellow Orthodox Christian Greeks. The British were motivated by strong public support for the Greeks. The government in London paid special attention to the powerful role of the Royal Navy throughout the entire Mediterranean region. Fearing unilateral Russian action in support of the Greeks, Britain and France bound Russia by treaty to a joint intervention which aimed to secure Greek autonomy whilst preserving Ottoman territorial integrity as a check on Russia.[9]

The Powers agreed, by the Treaty of London (1827), to force the Ottoman government to grant the Greeks autonomy within the empire and despatched naval squadrons to Greece to enforce their policy.[10] The decisive Allied naval victory at the Battle of Navarino broke the military power of the Ottomans and their Egyptian allies. Victory saved the fledgling Greek Republic from collapse. But it required two more military interventions, by Russia in the form of the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–29 and by a French expeditionary force to the Peloponnese to force the withdrawal of Ottoman forces from central and southern Greece and to finally secure Greek independence.[11] Greek nationalists proclaimed a new "Great Idea" whereby the little nation of 800,000 would expand to include all the millions of Greek Orthodox believers in the region now under Ottoman control, with Constantinople to be reclaimed as its capital. This idea was the antithesis of the British goal of maintaining the Ottoman Empire, and London systematically opposed the Greeks until the Great Idea finally collapsed in 1922 when Turkey drove the Greeks out of Anatolia.[12]

Crimean War

Main article: Crimean War

The Crimean War 1853 to 1856 was one of the few large wars fought 1815-1914.[13] The Russian Empire lost to an alliance made up of Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire and the part of Italy.[14] The immediate causes of the war were minor. The longer-term causes involved the decline of the Ottoman Empire and Russia's misunderstanding of the British position. Tsar Nicholas I visited London in person and consulted with Foreign Secretary Lord Aberdeen regarding What would happen if the Ottoman Empire collapsed and had to be split up. The Tsar completely misread the British position as one of supporting Russian aggression. In fact, London stood with Paris in opposition to any breakup of the Ottoman Empire, and especially against any Russian aggrandizement. When Aberdeen became Prime Minister in 1852, the tsar mistakenly assumed he had British approval for aggressive moves against Turkey. He was astonished when the British declared war. Aberdeen had opposed the war, but public opinion demanded war and he was forced out.[15] The new prime minister was Lord Palmerston who strongly opposed Russia. He defined the popular imagination which saw the war against Russia is a commitment to British principles, notably the defense of liberty, civilization, free trade; and championing the underdog. The fighting was largely limited to actions in the Crimean Peninsula and the Black Sea. Both sides badly mishandled operations; the world was aghast at the extremely high death rates due to disease. In the end, the British-French coalition prevailed and Russia lost control of the Black Sea-- although it managed to recover that in 1871. [16][17][18]

Pompous aristocracy was a loser in the war, the winners were the ideals of middle-class efficiency, progress, and peaceful reconciliation. The war's great hero was Florence Nightingale, the nurse who brought scientific management and expertise to the bewildering sufferings of the tens of thousands of sick and dying British soldiers. [19] according to historian R. B. McCallum the Crimean war:

remained as a classic example, a perfect demonstration-peace, of how governments may plunge into war, how strong ambassadors may mislead weak prime ministers, how the public may be worked up into a facile fury, and how the achievements of the war may crumble to nothing. The Bright-Cobden criticism of the war was remembered and to a large extent accepted. Isolation from European entanglements seemed more than ever desirable. [20]

145.

Persian Gulf

British interest in the Persian Gulf region
Further information: Oman § British de facto colonisation, and Anglo-Persian Oil Company

In 1650, British diplomats signed a treaty with the Sultan at Oman declaring that the bond between the two nations should be "unshook to the end of time."[21] British policy was to expand its presence in the Persian Gulf region, with a strong base in Oman. Two London-based companies were used, first the Levant Company and later the East India Company. The shock of Napoleon's 1798 expedition to Egypt led London to significantly strengthen its ties in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, pushing out the French and Dutch rivals, and upgrading the East India Company operations to diplomatic status. The East India Company also expanded relations with other sultanates in the region, and expanded operations into southern Persia. There was something of a standoff with Russian interests, which were active in northern Persia.[22] The commercial agreements allowed for British control of mineral resources, but the first oil was discovered in the region in Persia in 1908. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company activated the concession and quickly became the Royal Navy's main source of fuel for the new diesel engines that were replacing coal-burning steam engines. The company merged into BP (British Petroleum). The main advantage of oil was that a worship could easily carry fuel for long voyages without having to make repeated stops at coaling stations.[23][24][25]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Piers Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt, 1801: The End of Napoleon's Conquest (1995).
  2. ^ M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question: 1774-1923, (1966) pp 24-33.
  3. ^ J.A.R. Marriott, The Eastern Question (1940) pp 165-83.
  4. ^ Macfie, pp 14-19; Anderson, pp 53-87.
  5. ^ Robert Zegger, "Greek Independence and the London committee," History Today (1970) 20#4 pp 236-245.
  6. ^ Kenneth Bourne, The foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902 (1970) p. 19.
  7. ^ Rich. Great Power Diplomacy: 1814–1914 (1992) pp. 44–57.
  8. ^ Allan Cunningham, "The philhellenes, Canning and Greek independence." Middle Eastern Studies 14.2 (1978): 151-181.
  9. ^ Henry Kissinger. A world restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the problems of peace, 1812–22 (1957) pp. 295–311.
  10. ^ Paul Hayes, Modern British Foreign Policy: The nineteenth century, 1814–80 (1975) pp. 155–73.
  11. ^ Douglas Dakin, Greek Struggle for Independence: 1821–1833 (U of California Press, 1973).
  12. ^ Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, The establishment of the Balkan national states, 1804-1920 (1977) pp 76-83.
  13. ^ R. W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe 1789-1914, a Survey of Foreign Policy (1937) pp. 301-60.
  14. ^ Orlando Figes, The Crimean War: A History (2011).
  15. ^ Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe 1789-1914, 319-327.
  16. ^ Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and official nationality in Russia 1825-1855 (1969) pp 250-52, 263-66.
  17. ^ Robert Pearce, "The results of the Crimean War." History Review 70 (2011): 27-33.
  18. ^ Figes, The Crimean War, 68-70, 116-22, 145-150.
  19. ^ Figes, The Crimean War, 469-71.
  20. ^ Elie Halevy and R.B. McCallum, Victorian years: 1841-1895 (1951) p 426.
  21. ^ Robert John Alston and Stuart Laing, Unshook Till the End of Time: A History of Relations Between Britain & Oman 1650 - 1970 (2017).
  22. ^ John M. MacKenzie, “The Sultanate of Oman,” ‘’History Today’’ (1984) 34#9 pp 34-39
  23. ^ J.C. Hurewitz, " Britain and the Middle East up to 1914,” in Reeva S. Simon et al., eds., ‘’Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East’’ (1996) 1: 399-410
  24. ^ Anthony Sampson, Seven sisters: The great oil companies and the world they shaped (1975) pp 52-70.
  25. ^ Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The epic quest for oil, money and power (1991) pp 135-64.

Further reading

  • Anderson, M.S. The Eastern question, 1774-1923: A study in international relations (Macmillan, 1966), the major scholarly study.
  • Barr, James. "A Line in the Sand: British-French Rivalry in the Middle East 1915–1948." Asian Affairs 43.2 (2012): 237–252.
  • Brenchley, Frank. Britain and the Middle East: Economic History, 1945-87 (1991).
  • Bullard, Reader. Britain and the Middle East from Earliest Times to 1963 (3rd ed. 1963)
  • Cleveland, William L., and Martin Bunton. A History Of The Modern Middle East (6th ed. 2018 4th ed. online
  • Corbett, Julian Stafford. England in the Mediterranean; a study of the rise and influence of British power within the Straits, 1603-1713 (1904) online
  • D'Angelo, Michela. "In the 'English' Mediterranean (1511–1815)." Journal of Mediterranean Studies 12.2 (2002): 271-285.
  • Dietz, Peter. The British in the Mediterranean (Potomac Books Inc, 1994).
  • Fieldhouse, D. K. Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958 (Oxford UP, 2006)
  • Harrison, Robert. Britain in the Middle East: 1619-1971 (2016) short scholarly narrative excerpt
  • Hattendorf, John B., ed. Naval Strategy and Power in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future (Routledge, 2013).
  • Holland, Robert. "Cyprus and Malta: two colonial experiences." Journal of Mediterranean Studies 23.1 (2014): 9-20.
  • Holland, Robert. Blue-water empire: the British in the Mediterranean since 1800 (Penguin UK, 2012). excerpt
  • Louis, William Roger. The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism (1984)
  • Mahajan, Sneh. British Foreign Policy 1874-1914: The Role of India (2002).
  • Marriott, J. A. R. The Eastern Question An Historical Study In European Diplomacy (1940), Older comprehensive study; more up-to-date is Anderson (1966) Online
  • Millman, Richard. Britain and the Eastern Question, 1875–1878 (1979)
  • Monroe, Elizabeth. Britain's moment in the Middle East, 1914-1956 (1964) online
  • Pack, S.W.C Sea Power in the Mediterranean – has a complete list of fleet commanders
  • Schumacher, Leslie Rogne. "A 'Lasting Solution': the Eastern Question and British Imperialism, 1875-1878." (2012). online; Detailed bibliography
  • Seton-Watson, R. W. Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Eastern question; a study in diplomacy and party politics (1972) Online
  • Seton-Watson, R. W. Britain in Europe 1789-1914, a Survey of Foreign Policy (1937) Online
  • Smith, Simon C. Ending Empire in the Middle East: Britain, the United States and Post-war Decolonization, 1945-1973 (2012).
  • Smith, Simon C. Britain's Revival and Fall in the Gulf: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States, 1950-71 (2004)
  • Syrett, David. "A Study of Peacetime Operations: The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, 1752–5." The Mariner's Mirror 90.1 (2004): 42-50.
  • Thomas, Martin, and Richard Toye. "Arguing about intervention: a comparison of British and French rhetoric surrounding the 1882 and 1956 invasions of Egypt." Historical Journal 58.4 (2015): 1081-1113 online.
  • Tuchman, Barbara W. Bible and Sword: England and Palestine from the Bronze Age to Balfour (1982), popular history of Britain in the Middle East; online
  • Uyar, Mesut, and Edward J. Erickson. A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk (ABC-CLIO, 2009).
  • Venn, Fiona. "The wartime ‘special relationship’? From oil war to Anglo-American Oil Agreement, 1939–1945." Journal of Transatlantic Studies 10.2 (2012): 119-133.
  • Williams, Kenneth. Britain And The Mediterranean (1940) online free
  • Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (1991)

Historiography

  • Ansari, K. Humayun. "The Muslim world in British historical imaginations:‘re-thinking Orientalism’?." Orientalism Revisited (Routledge, 2012) pp. 29-58.
  • Macfie, A.L. The Eastern Question 1774-1923 (2nd ed. Routledge, 2014).
  • Tusan, Michelle. “Britain and the Middle East: New Historical Perspectives on the Eastern Question.” History Compass 8#3 (2010): 212–222.

Primary sources

  • Anderson, M.S. ed. The great powers and the Near East, 1774-1923 (Edward Arnold, 1970).
  • Bourne, Kenneth, ed. The Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902 (1970); 147 primary documents, plus 194 page introduction_
  • Hurewitz, J. C. ed. The Middle East and North Africa in world politics: A documentary record vol 1: European expansion: 1535-1914 (1975); vol 2: A Documentary Record 1914-1956 (1956)vol 2 online
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