French entry into World War I

France entered World War I on August 3, 1914, when Germany declared war. France played only a small part in the diplomatic crisis of July 1914--its top leaders were out of the country for July 15 to July 29, when most of the critical decision were made. However it was a major military and diplomatic player before and after the July crisis, and every power paid close attention to its role.

Diplomatic background

France competed with Italy, and to a greater extent with Britain regarding control of Africa. There was constant friction between Britain and France over demarcation lines between their frontiers (see the Fashoda Incident). The foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé was aware that France could not progress if she was in conflict with Germany in Europe and Britain in Africa and so recalled Captain Marchand's expeditionary force from Fashoda despite popular protests. This paved the way for Britain joining France in World War I.

By the mid-1880s the Bismarckian system of alliances was in disarray. William II had refused to renew the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia and Bismarck, in hope of making the Tsar more amenable to his wished had forbidden German banks to loan money to Russia. French bankers quickly took the Germans position and helped speed the process of Russian industrialisation. The Russians had borrowed around five hundred million francs by 1888.

The advantage of a Franco-Russian alliance was clear to all Frenchmen - it promised a two-front war if France was to go to war against Germany again. Formal visits were exchanged between the two powers in 1890 and 1891 were the Russian Tsar saluted the French anthem, le Marseillaise. The Franco-Russian alliance was announced in 1894. This diplomatic coup was followed by a secret agreement with Italy. Allowing the Italians a free hand in Tripoli, Italy promised she would remain non-belligerent against France in any future war. Meanwhile, as Britain became increasingly anxious over the German naval buildup and industrial rivalry, agreement with France became increasingly attractive.

Edward VII's visit to Paris in 1903 stilled anti-British feeling in France and prepared the way for the signing of the Entente Cordiale. Initially however, a colonial agreement against the Kaiser's aggressive foreign policy deepened rather than destroyed the bond between the two countries. The Moroccan Crises of 1905 and 1911 encouraged both countries to embark on a series of secret military negotiations in the case of war with Germany. However, British Foreign Minister Edward Grey realize the risk that small conflicts between Paris and Berlin could escalate out of control. Working with little supervision from the British prime minister or Cabinet, Grey deliberately played a mediating role trying to calm both sides And there by maintain a peaceful balance of power. He refused to make permanent commitments to France. He approved military staff talks with France in 1905, thereby Suggesting, but not promising, that of four broke out prison would favour France over Germany. In 1911, when there was a second Franco-German clash over Morocco, Grey tried to moderate the French while supporting Germany in its demand for compensation. There was little risk that Britain would have conflicts with anyone leading to war. The Navy Remain dominant in world affairs, and was fully supported. The British Army was small, and designed primarily to handle a colonial presence. Grey insisted that world peace was In the best interests of Britain and the British Empire.

When the war began in 1914 France could only win if Britain joined with France and Russia to stop Germany. There was no binding treaty between Britain and France, and no moral commitment on the British part to go to war on France's behalf. However the British guaranteed Belgium's neutrality, And, more important, and had a strong policy of no allowing any one power to dominate Europe. When Germany invaded Belgium, The two conditions were violated and Britain declared war.

Mounting international tensions and the arms race ensured the need for the increase of conscription levels from two to three years. Socialists led by Jean Jaurés deeply believe that war was a capitalist plot and could never be beneficial to the workingman. They worked hard to defeat the conscription proposal, Often in cooperation with middle-class pacifists and women's groups, but were outvoted.

Attitudes toward Germany

The critical issue for France was its relationship with Germany. Paris had relatively little involvement in the Balkan crisis that launched the war, paying little attention to Serbia, Austria, or the Ottoman Empire. However a series of unpleasant diplomatic confrontations with Germany soured relationships. The defeat in 1870-71 rankled, especially the loss of Alsace and Lorraine. While the issue of Alsace-Lorraine faded in importance after 1880, but the rapid growth in the population and economy of Germany left France increasingly far behind. It was obvious that Germany could field more soldiers, and build more heavy weapons. In the 1890s relationships remained good as Germany supported France during its difficulties with Britain over African colonies. Any lingering harmony collapsed in 1905, when Germany took an aggressively hostile position to French claims to Morocco. There was talk of war and France strengthened its ties with Britain and Russia. Even critics of French imperialism, such as Georges Clemenceau, had become impatient with Berlin. Raymond Poincaré’s speeches as Prime Minister in 1912, and then as President in 1913-14 were similarly were firm and drew widespread support across the political spectrum. Only the socialists were holdouts, warning that war was a capitalist ploy and should be avoided by the working-class. In July 1914, socialist leader Jean Jaurès obtained a vote against war from the French Socialist Party Congress. 1,690 delegates supported a general strike against the war (so long as the German socialists followed suit), with 1,174 opposed. However Jaures was assassinated on 31 July, and the socialist parties in both France and Germany – as well as most other countries – strongly supported their national war effort in the first year.

See also

• France–Germany relations
• France–United Kingdom relations
• History of French foreign relations
• International relations of the Great Powers (1814–1919)

Notes

A French propaganda poster from 1917 portrays Prussia as an octopus stretching out its tentacles vying for control. It is captioned with an 18th-century quote: "Even in 1788, Mirabeau was saying that War is the National Industry of Prussia."

Further reading

Main articles: Bibliography of World War I and Causes of World War I

• Albrecht-Carrié, René. A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna (1958), 736pp; basic survey
• Bell, P.M.H. France and Britain, 1900-1940: Entente and Estrangement (1996)
• Brandenburg, Erich. (1927) From Bismarck to the World War: A History of German Foreign Policy 1870–1914 (1927) online.
• Brogan, D.W. The development of modern France (1870-1939) (1949) pp 432-62.online free
• Bury, J.P.T. "Diplomatic History 1900–1912, in C. L. Mowat, ed. The New Cambridge Modern History: Vol. XII: The Shifting Balance of World Forces 1898-1945 (2nd ed. 1968) online pp 112-139.
• Carroll, E. Malcolm, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs 1870-1914 (1931). online
• Clark, Christopher. The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (2013) excerpt
  • Sleepwalkers lecture by Clark. online
• Evans, R. J. W.; von Strandmann, Hartmut Pogge, eds. (1988). The Coming of the First World War. Clarendon Press. ISBN 978-0-19-150059-6. essays by scholars from both sides
• Fay, Sidney Bradshaw (1928). The origins of the world war. Vol. Volume 1. Macmillan. {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help)
  • Fay, Sidney Bradshaw (1929). The origins of the world war. Vol. Volume 2. Macmillan. {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help)
• Gooch, G.P. Franco-German Relations 1871-1914 (1923)
• Hensel, Paul R. "The Evolution of the Franco-German Rivalry" in William R. Thompson, ed. Great power rivalries (1999) pp 86–124 online
• Hutton, Patrick H. et al. Historical Dictionary of the Third French Republic, 1870-1940 (2 vol 1986) online edition vol 1; online edition vol 2
• Joll, James; Martel, Gordon (2013). The Origins of the First World War (3rd ed.). Taylor & Francis. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1= (help)
• Keiger, John F. V. (1983). France and the origins of the First World War. Macmillan. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1= (help)
• Keiger, J.F.V. France and the World since 1870 (2001)
• Kennan, George Frost. The fateful alliance: France, Russia, and the coming of the First World War (1984) online free to borrow
• Kennedy, Paul M., ed. (2014) [1979]. The War Plans of the Great Powers: 1880-1914. Routledge.
• McDonough, Frank. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars (1997) textbook, 125pp excerpt
• MacMillan, Margaret (2013). The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914. Random House. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1= (help); major scholarly overview
• Mayeur, Jean-Marie, and Madeleine Rebérioux. The Third Republic from its Origins to the Great War, 1871-1914 (The Cambridge History of Modern France) (1988) excerpt
• Neiberg, Michael S. Dance of the Furies: Europe and the Outbreak of World War I (2011), on public opinion
• Nere, J. The Foreign Policy of France from 1914 to 1945 (2001)
• Otte, T. G. July Crisis: The World's Descent into War, Summer 1914 (Cambridge UP, 2014). online review
• Pratt, Edwin A. The rise of rail-power in war and conquest, 1833-1914 (1915) online
• Ralston, David R. The Army of the Republic. The Place of the Military in the Political Evolution of France 1871-1914 (1967).
• Rich, Norman. Great Power Diplomacy: 1814-1914 (1991), comprehensive survey
• Seager, Frederic H. "The Alsace-Lorraine Question in France, 1871–1914." in Charles K. Warner, ed., From the Ancien Regime to the Popular Front (1969): 111-126.
• Sedgwick, Alexander. The Third French Republic, 1870-1914 (1968) online edition
• Seton-Watson, R.W. Britain in Europe: 1789-1914 (1937) detailed survey or foreign policy with much on France
• Schuman, Frederick L. War and diplomacy in the French Republic; an inquiry into political motivations and the control of foreign policy (1931) online
• Stowell, Ellery Cory. The Diplomacy of the War of 1914 (1915) 728 pages online free
• Stuart, Graham H. French foreign policy from Fashoda to Serajevo (1898-1914) (1921) 365pp online
• Taylor, A.J.P. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918 (1954) online free
• Tucker, Spencer C., ed. (2013) [1996]. The European Powers in the First World War: An Encyclopedia. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-50694-0.
• Williamson Jr., Samuel R. "German Perceptions of the Triple Entente after 1911: Their Mounting Apprehensions Reconsidered" Foreign Policy Analysis 7.2 (2011): 205-214.

Historiography

• Hewitson, Mark. "Germany and France before the First World War: a reassessment of Wilhelmine foreign policy." English Historical Review 115.462 (2000): 570-606; argues Germany had a growing sense of military superiority. online
• Horne, John, ed. A Companion to World War I (2012) 38 topics essays by scholars
• Kramer, Alan. "Recent Historiography of the First World War – Part I", Journal of Modern European History (Feb. 2014) 12#1 pp 5–27; "Recent Historiography of the First World War (Part II)", (May 2014) 12#2 pp 155–174.
• Loez, André, and Nicolas Mariot. "Le centenaire de la Grande Guerre: premier tour d'horizon historiographique." Revue française de science politique (2014) 64#3 512-518. online
• Mombauer, Annika. "Guilt or Responsibility? The Hundred-Year Debate on the Origins of World War I." Central European History 48.4 (2015): 541-564.
• Mulligan, William. "The Trial Continues: New Directions in the Study of the Origins of the First World War." English Historical Review (2014) 129#538 pp: 639–666.
• Winter, Jay. and Antoine Prost eds. The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present (2005)