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{{further information|Timeline of British diplomatic history|History of the United Kingdom}}


This article covers '''British foreign relations''' since the 1790s. The British from the 1750s to the 1910s an economic base comprising industry, finance, and trade that largely dominated the globe. Foreign policy based on free trade (after 1840) kept the economy flourishing. The overseas Empire recovered after the loss of America in 1776 and reached its zenith about 1920, and foreign policy made sure it was never seriously threatened.
British foreign relations were largely inherited from the [[Kingdom of England]]'s place in the world prior to the unification of Great Britain into a single United Kingdom. British foreign policy initially focused on achieving a [[Balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]] within Europe, with no one country achieving dominance over the affairs of the continent. This was a major reason behind the British wars against Napoleon, and the UK's involvement in the First and Second World Wars. The chief enemy of the British, from the [[Hundred Years' War]] until the defeat of Napoleon (1337-1815) was [[History of France|France]], a larger country with a more powerful army. The British were generally [[British military history|successful in their many wars]], with the notable exception of the [[American War of Independence]] (1775–1783), when Britain, without any major allies, was defeated by the colonials who had the support of France, the Netherlands and Spain. A favoured diplomatic strategy was subsidising the armies of continental allies, such as [[Prussia]], thereby turning London's enormous financial power to military advantage. Britain relied heavily on its [[History of the Royal Navy|Royal Navy]] for security, seeking to keep it the most powerful fleet afloat with a full complement of bases across the globe. British dominance of the seas was vital to the formation of the British Empire, which was achieved through the maintenance of a Navy larger than the next two largest Navies combined for the majority of the 19th and early 20th centuries, prior to the entry of the United States into the Second World War. The British controlled the oceans. so powerful was the Royal Navy, that there were no fleet battles was never challenged by another power between the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, and the start of the First World War in 1914. although all of the other major Powers fought with their neighbors, the British army had only one relatively limited war (the Crimean war against Russia in 1854-56). The Army mostly handled garrison duty, and did have to deal with localized insurrections and colonial conflicts in Asia and Africa.

After expending enormous energy on the defeat of France and Napoleon (1793-1915), British policy focused on achieving a conservative [[Balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]] within Europe, with no one country achieving dominance over the affairs of the continent. This had been the basic reason behind the British wars against Napoleon, and the British commitment in the First and Second World Wars. The chief enemy down to 1815 was [[History of France|France]], with its much larger population base and its powerful army. The British were generally [[British military history|successful in their many wars]], with the notable exception of the [[American War of Independence]] (1775–1783), when Britain, without any major allies, was defeated by the colonials who had the support of France and the Netherlands, and France had support from Spain.

A favoured diplomatic strategy was subsidising the armies of continental allies, such as [[Prussia]], thereby turning London's enormous financial power to military advantage. Britain relied heavily on its [[History of the Royal Navy|Royal Navy]] for security, seeking to keep it the most powerful fleet afloat with a full complement of bases across the globe. British dominance of the seas was vital to the formation of the British Empire, which was achieved through the maintenance of a Navy larger than the next two largest Navies combined for the majority of the 19th and early 20th centuries, prior to the entry of the United States into the Second World War. The British controlled the oceans. so powerful was the Royal Navy, it needed to do little actual fighting from 1812 to 1914. Although all of the other major Powers fought with their neighbors, the British army had only one relatively limited war (the Crimean war against Russia in 1854-56). The Army mostly handled garrison duty, and did have to deal with localized insurrections and colonial conflicts in Asia and Africa.


==1814-1914==
==1814-1914==

Revision as of 04:24, 17 August 2016

the History of the foreign relations of the United Kingdom covers British foreign policy since about 1600. For the current situation since 2000 see Foreign relations of the United Kingdom.

This section is moved from Foreign relations of the United Kingdom.

This article covers British foreign relations since the 1790s. The British from the 1750s to the 1910s an economic base comprising industry, finance, and trade that largely dominated the globe. Foreign policy based on free trade (after 1840) kept the economy flourishing. The overseas Empire recovered after the loss of America in 1776 and reached its zenith about 1920, and foreign policy made sure it was never seriously threatened.

After expending enormous energy on the defeat of France and Napoleon (1793-1915), British policy focused on achieving a conservative balance of power within Europe, with no one country achieving dominance over the affairs of the continent. This had been the basic reason behind the British wars against Napoleon, and the British commitment in the First and Second World Wars. The chief enemy down to 1815 was France, with its much larger population base and its powerful army. The British were generally successful in their many wars, with the notable exception of the American War of Independence (1775–1783), when Britain, without any major allies, was defeated by the colonials who had the support of France and the Netherlands, and France had support from Spain.

A favoured diplomatic strategy was subsidising the armies of continental allies, such as Prussia, thereby turning London's enormous financial power to military advantage. Britain relied heavily on its Royal Navy for security, seeking to keep it the most powerful fleet afloat with a full complement of bases across the globe. British dominance of the seas was vital to the formation of the British Empire, which was achieved through the maintenance of a Navy larger than the next two largest Navies combined for the majority of the 19th and early 20th centuries, prior to the entry of the United States into the Second World War. The British controlled the oceans. so powerful was the Royal Navy, it needed to do little actual fighting from 1812 to 1914. Although all of the other major Powers fought with their neighbors, the British army had only one relatively limited war (the Crimean war against Russia in 1854-56). The Army mostly handled garrison duty, and did have to deal with localized insurrections and colonial conflicts in Asia and Africa.

1814-1914

The main function of the British defense system, especially the Royal Navy, was defense of the overseas [[British Empire (in addition to defense of the homeland).[1] The army, usually in cooperation with local forces, suppressed internal revolts, losing only the American War of Independence (1775–83).[2] Armitage says it became an element of the British creed that:

Protestantism, oceanic commerce and mastery of the seas provided bastions to protect the freedom of inhabitants of the British Empire. That freedom found its institutional expression in Parliament, the law, property, and rights, all of which were exported throughout the British Atlantic world. Such freedom also allowed the British, uniquely, to combine the classically incompatible ideals of liberty and empire.[3]

Britain, with its global empire, powerful Navy, leading industrial base, and unmatched financial and trade networks, dominated diplomacy in Europe and the world in the largely peaceful century 1814-1914. Four men stand out for their leadership in foreign policy: Lord Palmerston, Benjamin Disraeli, William Gladstone and Lord Salisbury. Military action was much less important than diplomacy. British military interventions in 1815–50 included opening up markets in Latin America (as in Argentina),[4] opening the China market,[5] responding to humanitarians by sending the Royal Navy to shut down the slave trade,[6] and building a balance of power in Europe, as in Spain and Belgium.[7]

Personalities

Palmerston

Lord Palmerston, as a Whig and then a Liberal, was the dominant leader in foreign policy for most of the period from 1830 until his death in 1865. As foreign secretary from 1846 to 1851 and subsequently as prime minister, Palmerston sought to maintain the balance of power in Europe, sometimes opposing France and at other times aligning with France to do so.[8][9] Thus he was aligned with France in the Crimean War against Russia, fought and won with the limited goal of protecting the Ottoman Empire. Some of his aggressive actions, now sometimes termed liberal interventionist, were highly controversial at the time, and remain so today. For example, he used military force to achieve his main goal of opening China to trade, although his critics focused on his support for the opium trade.[10] In all his actions Palmerston brought to bear a great deal of patriotic vigour and energy. This made him very popular among the ordinary people of Britain, but his passion, propensity to act through personal animosity, and imperious language made him seem dangerous and destabilising in the eyes of the Queen and his more conservative colleagues in government.[11][12][13] He was an innovative administrator who devised ways to enhance his control of his department and build up his reputation. He controlled all communication within the Foreign Office and to other officials. He leaked secrets to the press, published selected documents, and released letters to give himself more control.[14]

Disraeli

Benjamin Disraeli, the Conservative leader for much of the late 19th century, built up the British Empire and played a major role in European diplomacy. Disraeli's second term (1874-1880) was dominated by the Eastern Question—the slow decay of the Ottoman Empire and the desire of other European powers, such as Russia, to gain at its expense. Disraeli arranged for the British to purchase a major interest in the Suez Canal Company (in Ottoman-controlled Egypt). In 1878, faced with Russian victories against the Ottomans, he worked at the Congress of Berlin to obtain peace in the Balkans at terms favourable to Britain and unfavourable to Russia, its longstanding enemy. This diplomatic victory over Russia established Disraeli as one of Europe's leading statesmen. World events thereafter moved against the Conservatives. Controversial wars in Afghanistan and South Africa undermined Disraeli's public support.[15]

Gladstone

William Ewart Gladstone (Prime Minister 1868-74, 1880–86, 1892–94), the Liberal leader, was much less inclined to imperialism and sought peace as the highest foreign policy goal. However, historians have been sharply critical of Gladstone's foreign-policy during his second ministry. Hayes says it, "provides one of the most intriguing and perplexing tales of mobile and incompetence in foreign affairs, unsurpassed in modern political history until the days of Grey and, later, Neville Chamberlain."[16] Gladstone opposed himself to the "colonial lobby" which pushed the scramble for Africa. His term saw the end of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, First Boer War and the war against the Mahdi in Sudan, as well as the Anglo-Egyptian War, which resulted in the occupation of Egypt.[17]

Salisbury

Historians largely agree that Lord Salisbury as foreign minister (1878–80, 1885–86, 1887–92, and 1895-1900) and prime minister (1886–92, 1895-1902)was a strong and effective leader in foreign affairs.[18] He had a superb grasp of the issues, and proved:

a patient, pragmatic practitioner, with a keen understanding of Britain's historic interests....He oversaw the partition of Africa, the emergence of Germany and the United States as imperial powers, and the transfer of British attention from the Dardanelles to Suez without provoking a serious confrontation of the great powers.[19]

Free trade imperialism

The Great London Exhibition of 1851 clearly demonstrated Britain's dominance in engineering and industry; it lasted until the rise of the United States and Germany in the 1890s.[20] Using the imperial tools of free trade and financial investment,[21] it exerted major influence on many countries outside Europe, especially in Latin America and Asia. Thus Britain had both a formal Empire based on British rule and an informal one based on the British pound.[22]

Relations with the United States

Relations with the United States were often strained, and even verged on war when Britain almost supported the Confederacy in the early part of the American Civil War. British leaders were constantly annoyed from the 1840s to the 1860s by what they saw as Washington's pandering to the democratic mob, as in Oregon boundary dispute in 1844-46. However British middle class public opinion sensed a common "Special Relationship" between the two peoples based on language, migration, evangelical Protestantism, liberal traditions, and extensive trade. This constituency rejected war, forcing London to appease the Americans. During the Trent affair of late 1861, London drew the line and Washington retreated.[23]

During the Civil War, Britain supplied warships and blockade runners to the Confederacy, but had a large scale trade with the United States and many British men volunteered to fight for the North. Northern food supplies were n]much more essential to Britain than Souther cotton.[24] After the war, the US demanded reparations (called the Alabama Claims) for the damages caused by the warships. After arbitration the British paid the U.S. $15.5 million in 1872 and peaceful relations resumed.[25]

Relations with the Ottoman Empire

As the 19th century progressed the Ottoman Empire grew weaker and Britain increasingly became its protector, even fighting the Crimean War in the 1850s to help it out against Russia. Three British leaders played major roles. Lord Palmerston in the 1830-65 era considered the Ottoman Empire an essential component in the balance of power, was the most favourable toward Constantinople. William E. Gladstone in the 1870s sought to build a Concert of Europe that would support the survival of the empire. In the 1880s and 1890s Lord Salisbury contemplated an orderly dismemberment of it, in such a way as to reduce rivalry between the greater powers.[26]

1900-1914

After 1900 Britain ended its policy of "splendid isolation" by developing friendly relations with the United States and European allies - most notably France and Russia, in an alliance which fought the First World War. The "Special Relationship" with the U.S. was forged more definitely during the 1940s, and has endured to this day - playing a pivotal role in the Cold War and the War on Terror.

First World War

Britain had suffered little devastation during the war and Prime Minister David Lloyd George supported reparations to a lesser extent than the French. Britain began to look on a restored Germany as an important trading partner and worried about the effect of reparations on the British economy.[27][28]

Interwar years 1919-39

Britain had suffered little devastation during the war and Prime Minister David Lloyd George supported reparations to a lesser extent than the French did at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. It reluctantly supported the hard Treaty of Versailles. . Britain began to look on a restored Germany as an important trading partner and worried about the effect of reparations on the British economy.[29][30]

Vivid memories of the horrors and deaths of the World War made Britain and its leaders strongly inclined to pacifism in the interwar era.[31]

1920s

Politically the coalition government of Prime Minister David Lloyd George depended primarily on Conservative Party support. He increasingly antagonized his supporters with foreign policy miscues regarding the Middle East. Lloyd George led a coialition dominated by the more conservative Tory political party even though her belonged to the bitterly divided Liberal Party. The Chanak Crisis of 1922 brought Britain to the brink of war with Turkey, but the Dominions were opposed and the British military was hesitant, so peace was preserved, but Lloyd George lost control of the coalition and was replaced as Prime Minister by Bonar Law.[32]

Britain maintained close relationships with France and the United States; however the U.S. refused to renegotiate its wartime loans. In the 1920s Britain rejected isolationism and sought world peace through naval arms limitation treaties,[33] and peace with Germany through the Locarno treaties of 1925. A main goal was to restore Germany to a peaceful, prosperous state. The Dominions (Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand) achieved virtual independence in foreign policy in 1931, though each depended heavily upon British naval protection. After 1931 trade policy favoured the Commonwealth with tariffs against the U.S. and others.

The success at Locarno in handling the German question impelled Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain, working with France and Italy, to find a master solution to the diplomatic problems of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. It proved impossible to overcome mutual antagonisms, because Chamberlain's program was flawed by his misperceptions and fallacious judgments.[34]

1930s

The challenge came from dictators, first Benito Mussolini of Italy from 1923, then from 1933 Adolf Hitler of a much more powerful Nazi Germany. Britain and France led the policy of non-interference in the Spanish Civil War (1936–39). The League of Nations proved disappointing to its supporters; it was unable to resolve any of the threats posed by the dictators. British policy was to "appease" them in the hopes they would be satiated. League-authorized sanctions against Italy for its invasion of Ethiopia had support in Britain but proved a failure and were dropped in 1936.[35]

Germany was the difficult case. By 1930 British leaders and intellectuals largely agreed that all major powers shared the blame for war in 1914, and not Germany alone as the Treaty of Versailles specified. Therefore they believed the punitive harshness of the Treaty of Versailles was unwarranted, and this view, adopted by politicians and the public, was largely responsible for supporting appeasement policies down to 1938. That is, German rejections of treaty provisions seemed justified.[36]

Coming of Second World War

By late 1938 it was clear that war was looming, and that Germany had the world's most powerful military. The British military leaders warned that Germany would win a war, and Britain needed another year or two to catch up in terms of aviation and air defense. The final act of appeasement came when Britain and France sacrificed Czechoslovakia to Hitler's demands at the Munich Agreement of 1938.[37] Instead of satiation Hitler seized all of Czechoslovakia and menaced Poland.At last in 1939 Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain dropped appeasement and stood firm in promising to defend Poland. Hitler however cut a deal with Joseph Stalin to divide Eastern Europe; when Germany did invade Poland in September 1939, Britain and France declared war; the British Commonwealth followed London's lead.[38]

Second World War

Since 1945

The British built up a very large worldwide British Empire, which peaked in size in 1922, after more than half a century of unchallenged global supremacy. The cumulative costs of fighting two world wars, however, placed a heavy burden upon the UK economy, and after 1945 the British Empire gradually began to disintegrate, with many territories granted independence. By the mid-to-late 1950s, the UK's status as a superpower had been largely diminished by the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union. Many former colonial territories joined the "Commonwealth of Nations," an organisation of fully independent nations now with equal status to the UK.[39] Britain finally turned its attention to the continent, joining the European Union.[40]

After 1945 Britain systematically reduced its overseas commitments. Practically all the colonies became independent. Britain reduced its involvements in the Middle east, with the humiliating Suez Crisis of 1956 marking the end of its status as a superpower. However Britain did forge close military ties with the United States, France, and traditional foes such as Germany, in the NATO military alliance. After years of debate (and rebuffs), Britain joined the Common Market in 1973; it is now the European Union.[41] However it did not merge financially, and kept the pound separate from the Euro, which kept it partly isolated from the EU financial crisis of 2011.[42] As of 23 June 2016, the UK has voted to leave the EU.[43][44]

The UK is currently establishing air and naval facilities in the Persian Gulf, located in the UAE and Bahrain.[45][46][47] A presence in Oman is also being considered.[48]

See also

Timeline

Notes

  1. ^ John Darwin, Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain (2012) chapters 5, 10
  2. ^ Darwin, Unfinished Empre ch 8
  3. ^ David Armitage (2000). The Ideological Origins of the British Empire. p. 8.
  4. ^ David McLean, War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire: Britain and the Republics of La Plata, 1836–1853 (1995)
  5. ^ Glenn Melancon, Britain's China Policy and the Opium Crisis: Balancing Drugs, Violence and National Honour, 1833-1840 (2003).
  6. ^ Chaim D. Kaufmann and Robert A. Pape. "Explaining costly international moral action: Britain's sixty-year campaign against the Atlantic slave trade." International Organization 53#4 (1999): 631-668.
  7. ^ John MacMillan, "Historicising intervention: strategy and synchronicity in British intervention 1815-50." Review of International Studies 39.5 (2013): 1091+ online.
  8. ^ Roman Golicz, "Napoleon III, Lord Palmerston and the Entente Cordiale." History Today 50#12 (2000): 10-17 online.
  9. ^ David Brown, "Palmerston and Anglo–French Relations, 1846–1865." Diplomacy and Statecraft 17.4 (2006): 675-692
  10. ^ Glenn Melancon (2003). Britain's China Policy and the Opium Crisis: Balancing Drugs, Violence and National Honour, 1833–1840. Ashgate.
  11. ^ Jasper Ridley, Lord Palmerston (1971)
  12. ^ Dick Leonard, Dick, "Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston—Master Diplomat or Playground Bully?." in Dick Leonard, ed., Nineteenth-Century British Premiers (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008). pp 245-265.
  13. ^ David Brown, Palmerston & the Politics of Foreign Policy 1846-55 (2002).
  14. ^ John K. Derden, "The British Foreign Office and Policy Formation: The 1840's," Proceedings & Papers of the Georgia Association of Historians (1981) pp 64-79.
  15. ^ Martin Swartz, The Politics of British Foreign Policy in the Era of Disraeli and Gladstone (1985).
  16. ^ Paul Hayes, Modern British Foreign Policy: The Twentieth Century: 1880–1939 (1978) p 1
  17. ^ Martin Swartz, The Politics of British Foreign Policy in the Era of Disraeli and Gladstone (1985).
  18. ^ Keith M. Wilson, ed., British foreign secretaries and foreign policy: from Crimean War to First World War (1987).
  19. ^ Nancy W. Ellenberger, "Salisbury" in David Loades, ed. Reader's Guide to British History (2003) 2:1154
  20. ^ Jeffrey A. Auerbach, The Great Exhibition of 1851: a nation on display (1999).
  21. ^ Bernard Semmel, The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism (Cambridge University Press, 1970) ch 1
  22. ^ David McLean, "Finance and "Informal Empire" before the First World War," Economic History Review (1976) 29#2 pp 291–305 in JSTOR.
  23. ^ George L. Bernstein, "Special Relationship and Appeasement: Liberal policy towards America in the age of Palmerston." Historical Journal 41#3 (1998): 725-750.
  24. ^ Howard Jones, Blue & Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations (2010).
  25. ^ Adrian Cook, The Alabama Claims: American Politics and Anglo-American Relations, 1865-1872 (1975).
  26. ^ David Steele, "Three British Prime Ministers and the Survival of the Ottoman Empire, 1855–1902." Middle Eastern Studies 50.1 (2014): 43-60.
  27. ^ Antony Lentin, Lloyd George and the lost peace: from Versailles to Hitler, 1919-1940 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).
  28. ^ ] Margaret Macmillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (2001).
  29. ^ ] Margaret Macmillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (2001).
  30. ^ Antony Lentin, Lloyd George and the lost peace: from Versailles to Hitler, 1919-1940 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).
  31. ^ Michael Pugh, Liberal internationalism: the interwar movement for peace in Britain (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
  32. ^ Michael Laird, "Wars Averted: Chanak 1922, Burma 1945–47, Berlin 1948," Journal of Strategic Studies (1996) 19#3 pp 343-364.
  33. ^ B. J. C. McKercher, "The politics of naval arms limitation in Britain in the 1920s." Diplomacy and Statecraft 4#3 (1993): 35-59.
  34. ^ Dragan Bakić, "‘Must Will Peace’: The British Brokering of ‘Central European’and ‘Balkan Locarno’, 1925–9." Journal of Contemporary History 48.1 (2013): 24-56.
  35. ^ James C. Robertson, "The Origins of British Opposition to Mussolini over Ethiopia." Journal of British Studies 9#1 (1969): 122-142.
  36. ^ Catherine Ann Cline, "British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles." Albion 20#1 (1988): 43-58.
  37. ^ David Faber, Munich, 1938: Appeasement and World War II (2010)
  38. ^ Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938–39 (1990)
  39. ^ Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (2001)
  40. ^ Stephen Wall, A Stranger in Europe: Britain and the EU from Thatcher to Blair (2008)
  41. ^ Andrew Marr, A History of Modern Britain (2009)
  42. ^ Stephen Wall, A Stranger in Europe: Britain and the EU from Thatcher to Blair (Oxford University Press, 2008)
  43. ^ Andrew Gamble, "Better Off Out? Britain and Europe." The Political Quarterly (2012) 83#3: 468-477.
  44. ^ Nathaniel Copsey and Tim Haughton, "Farewell Britannia? 'Issue Capture' and the Politics of David Cameron's 2013 EU Referendum Pledge." JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies (2014) 52-S1: 74-89.
  45. ^ "East of Suez, West from Helmand: British Expeditionary Force and the next SDSR" (PDF). Oxford Research Group. December 2014. Retrieved 22 May 2015.
  46. ^ "A Return to East of Suez? UK Military Deployment to the Gulf". Royal United Services Institute. April 2013. Retrieved 1 July 2015.
  47. ^ "The New East of Suez Question: Damage Limitation after Failure Over Syria". Royal United Services Institute. 19 September 2013. Retrieved 1 July 2015.
  48. ^ "Defence Secretary visits Oman". Ministry of Defence. 1 October 2015. Retrieved 28 October 2015.

Further reading

  • Bartlett, C. J. Defence and Diplomacy: Britain and the Great Powers, 1815-1914 (1993) 160pp
  • Black, Jeremy et al. The Makers of British Foreign Policy, From Pitt to Thatcher (Palgrave, Basingstoke and New York, 2002)
  • Black, Jeremy. America or Europe? British Foreign Policy, 1739-63 (1998) online edition
  • Black, Jeremy, ed. Knights Errant and True Englishmen: British Foreign Policy, 1660-1800 (2003) online edition
  • Black, Jeremy. Natural and Necessary Enemies: Anglo-French Relations in the Eighteenth Century (1986).
  • Bourne, Kenneth. The foreign policy of Victorian England, 1830-1902 (Oxford UP, 1970.) pp 195–504 are 147 "Selected documents"
  • Chassaigne, Phillipe, and Michael Dockrill, eds. Anglo-French Relations 1898-1998: From Fashoda to Jospin (2002)
  • Clark, Christopher. The sleepwalkers: how Europe went to war in 1914 (2012)
  • Dickinson, H. T., ed. Britain and the French Revolution, 1789-1815 (1989)
  • Horn, D. B Great Britain and Europe in the eighteenth century (1967) 411pp; detailed coverage country by country
  • Jones, J. R. Britain and the World, 1649-1815 (1980).
  • Lowe, C.J. The reluctant imperialists: British foreign policy, 1878-1902. Vol. 1. 1967); vol 2: The reluctant imperialists: The Documents (1967). (American edition 1969, two volumes in one).
  • Lowe, C.J. and M.L. Dockrill. The Mirage of Power: Volume 1: British Foreign Policy, 1902-14. (1972); The Mirage of Power: Volume 2: British Foreign Policy, 1914-1922. (1972). vol 3 (1972) includes 190 documents.
  • MacMillan, Margaret. The War that Ended Peace: The Road to 1914 (2013).
  • Mahajan, Sneh. British foreign policy 1874-1914: The role of India (Routledge, 2003)
  • Mulligan, William, and Brendan Simms, eds. The Primacy of Foreign Policy in British History, 1660-2000(Palgrave Macmillan; 2011) 345 pages
  • Neville, Peter. Historical Dictionary of British Foreign Policy (Scarecrow Press, 2013).
  • Otte, T.G., The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865-1914 (Cambridge University Press, 2011)
  • Schroeder, Paul W. "Old Wine in Old Bottles: Recent Contributions to British Foreign Policy and European International Politics, 1789–1848." Journal of British Studies 26#1 (1987): 1-25.
  • Seton-Watson, R. W. Britain in Europe, 1789-1914. (1938) excerpt
  • Taylor, A.J.P. Struggle for Mastery of Europe: 1848-1918 (1954)
  • Ward, A.W. and G.P. Gooch, eds. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919 (3 vol, 1921–23), old classic
  • Webster, Charles. The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830-1841: Britain, the Liberal Movement, and the Eastern Question - Vol. 2 (1951) online edition vol 2
  • Wiener, Martin J. "The Idea of "Colonial Legacy" and the Historiography of Empire." Journal of The Historical Society 13#1 (2013): 1-32.
  • Winks, Robin, ed. Historiography (1999) vol. 5 in William Roger Louis, eds. The Oxford History of the British Empire online
  • Winks, Robin W. The Historiography of the British Empire-Commonwealth: Trends, Interpretations and Resources (1966); this book is by a different set of authors from the previous 1999 entry online

Since 1919

  • Bartlett, C. J. British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (1989)
  • Campbell, John. Margaret Thatcher; Volume Two: The Iron Lady (Pimlico, 2003)
  • Chassaigne, Phillipe, and Michael Dockrill, eds. Anglo-French Relations 1898-1998: From Fashoda to Jospin (2002)
  • Dilks, David. Retreat from Power: 1906-39 v. 1: Studies in Britain's Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century (1981); Retreat from Power: After 1939 v. 2 (1981)
  • Dimbleby, David, and David Reynolds. An Ocean Apart: The Relationship Between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century (1988)
  • Feis, Herbert. Churchill Roosevelt Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought: A Diplomatic History of World War II (1957), by a senior official of the U.S. State Department
  • Hughes, Geraint. Harold Wilson's Cold War: The Labour Government and East-West Politics, 1964-1970 (2009)
  • MacMillan, Margaret. Paris 1919: six months that changed the world (2007).
  • McNeill, William Hardy. America, Britain, & Russia: their co-operation and conflict, 1941–1946 (1953), 820pp; comprehensive overview
  • Medlicott, W. N. British foreign policy since Versailles, 1919-1963 (1968).
  • Moore, Charles (2013). Margaret Thatcher: From Grantham to the Falklands.
    • Moore, Charles. (2016) Margaret Thatcher: At Her Zenith: In London, Washington and Moscow.
  • Reynolds, David. Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century (2nd ed. 2000) excerpt and text search, major survey of British foreign policy
  • Reynolds, David. From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s (2006) excerpt and text search
  • Sharp, Alan, and Glyn Stone, eds.. Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and Cooperation (2000) excerpt and text search
  • Vickers, Rhiannon. The Evolution of Labour's Foreign Policy, 1900-51 (2003) online edition
  • Watry, David M. Diplomacy at the Brink: Eisenhower, Churchill, and Eden in the Cold War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2014.
  • Woodward, Llewellyn. British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (1962); summary of his 5-volume highly detailed history
  • Young, John W. ed. The Labour governments 1964-1970 volume 2: International policy (2008).

Primary sources

  • Bourne, Kenneth. The foreign policy of Victorian England, 1830-1902 (Oxford UP, 1970.) pp 195–504 are 147 "Selected documents"
  • Jones, Edgar Rees, ed. Selected speeches on British foreign policy, 1738-1914 (1914). online free
  • Lowe, C.J. The reluctant imperialists: vol 2: The Documents (1967), 140 documents 1878-1902. (American edition 1969 vol 1 and 2 bound together).
  • Lowe, C.J. and M.L. Dockrill, eds. The Mirage of Power: Volume 3: The Documents British Foreign Policy, 1902-22. (1972), 191 documents.
  • Medlicott, W. N. ed. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 (HMSO, 1946), primary sources
  • Temperley, Harold, and Lillian M. Penson, eds. Foundations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902); Or, Documents, Old and New (1938), 612pp online
  • Wiener, Joel H. ed. Great Britain: Foreign Policy and the Span of Empire, 1689–1971: A Documentary History (4 vol 1972) vol 1 online; vol 2 online; vol 3; vol 4 4 vol. 3400 pages