Talk:Battle of Cuito Cuanavale

Changes

There are quite a few changes and a couple of nomenclature mistakes on the rewrite--ex. Close Air Support for Combat Air Support--and addition of sources. I can add or clean those up in the next two days, just waiting to see if there might be more integration or rewriting. Virgil61 (talk) 10:01, 4 January 2008 (UTC)

What's your view on "close air support" vs "combat air support"? There's no article for the latter, while the former seems a good description for the use here? Socrates2008 (Talk) 10:31, 4 January 2008 (UTC)

I'd use 'close' for the reason you gave, I mistakenly used 'combat', which I think is used far less than the former. In my defense I was an Army guy. Virgil61 (talk) 17:28, 4 January 2008 (UTC)

Pointless Comment Removed

I removed the following from the Aftermath section of the article.

"It must be emphasized that all Cuban military service in Angola was on a voluntary basis and that for a small country such as Cuba the deployment of 50,000 troops would be the equivalent of the US deploying 1.25 million soldiers."

This is an interesting statistic, although of little merit to the article. If anyone objects, please provide a reason for keeping it in the article. It appears that the editor is attempting to disprove the amount of combatants deployed by Cuba. If this is the case, please cite appropriate resources.--SAcit777 (talk) 14:03, 8 January 2008 (UTC)

Paratus

Socrates why is Paratus marked as an 'unreliable' source? It was a military journal like one which most armies produce for internal consumption. An quote by the commander of the SADF in the battle is pertinent to this article, certainly as much as one by Nelson Mandela whose views while tremendously important to this didn't participate nor has a military background. Virgil61 (talk) 15:06, 8 January 2008 (UTC)

Being the official magazine of the SADF, some people won't consider it neutral/reliable with respect to achievements of the SADF. Your point will come across stronger if it's from an independent source. Socrates2008 (Talk) 20:33, 8 January 2008 (UTC)

I disagree. Neutrality is not the same as reliability and you appear to have mistaken the context in which the source is utilised. Paratus is being used not as a reference for objective facts, but as a source for claims made by the SADF and for a quote by a senior SADF officer. In this context the publication was the vehicle in which both pieces of information were first published and, being the official journal of the SADF, it is reasonable to believe with full confidence that it accurately represented the words of the SADF and Col. Ferreira. Thus it is a reliable source and the tag should be removed. — Impi (talk) 21:03, 8 January 2008 (UTC)

OK, I can see where you're coming from, by the words "they claim" in the sentence - that leaves the statement about 3000 soldiers unreferenced though Socrates2008 (Talk) 21:13, 8 January 2008 (UTC)

Finding a source for 3,000 SADF figure should be easy enough, I've seen it referenced about a dozen times in various publications. If no one else does it I'll try and get to it as soon as possible. Virgil61 (talk) 22:42, 8 January 2008 (UTC)

Would a book by Heitmann be acceptable as a reliable source? It seems to me that the biggest difference between factual claims on the part of the MPLA/Cubans and those referring to the SADF is that there exists, in the SANDF Archives in Pretoria, comprehensive documentation of practically everything they did. It would in fact be possible to compile a totally accurate and complete list of SADF members who were there, when they arrived, where they went and when they left. Such a list could identify every single one by name, address, blood type, religious affiliation, next of kin and so on. One could even find out how much food, fuel, ammo and spare parts they used. Unfortunately it would totally destroy one of the favourite myths of the ANC and their friends in Angola and Cuba. Thats the only reason why the current SA government will not release those records. Roger (talk) 18:12, 11 January 2008 (UTC)

Do you think Cubans don't have such records? Once again the white supremacists cannot hold their tongs. Why don't all the AWB types regroup around a new Terreblanche and take your ex-country back? You won't of course, you're armchair cowards, and your "Sleg Blankes" country is no more, probably the Boers too are soon to be history. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 190.48.107.79 (talk) 05:42, 12 January 2008 (UTC)

I'm sure I don't need to tell you that your poor attitude, combined with that epic chip on your shoulder, is hardly endearing you to any of the contributors here. If you have something worthwhile to contribute, we'd be happy to take a look at it and revise the article as necessary. But throwing out ill-judged and ignorant insults just makes you look stupid and, well, racist.

For the record, it's entirely irrelevant whether or not the Cubans kept similar records, since the issue in dispute at the moment is the number of SADF soldiers in the battle, not Cuban. For this the SADF records are the most comprehensive and complete, whilst the Cuban records on the number of SADF soldiers would have been derived from imperfect intelligence estimates based on incomplete information, and are thus unreliable.

Further, the SADF archives are now under the control of a government that would delight in any information that would make the former SADF look bad and thus justify the ANC's account of the battle, yet the records relating to the battle of Cuito Cuanavale remain largely inaccessible. One can only assume that this is because the information in those personnel lists, operational orders and debriefs contradicts rather than confirms the ANC and Cuba's version of events. There's nothing racial about it, it's just politics. — Impi (talk) 16:16, 13 January 2008 (UTC)

Paratus was a generally reliable source. It is certainly more reliable than either the ANC or Cuba.

Its like if cuban goberment have created a lot of dead bodies

The first thing I saw wrong was the amount of casualties during the battle, it is incredible that in 15 years of conflict, the cubans, that lost about 2000 mans in total, have lost more in only a few months of fighting in 1987, during the Cuito Cuanavale battle. Maybe if Cuba was a country more like United States that figure was more believable, its sound like fantasy, like other user said. The point is, how many personal do you think the Cubans have in their armed forces? And keeping in mind that all the troops were volunteers, man to lose more than that... Its like the USAF shooting down 792 mig-15s in the Corean War, they shoot down all the Russian air force.--OverG (talk) 05:35, 5 March 2008 (UTC)

Look again - the official Cuban casualy number is only 14. The casualty number given (900 to 4000) is the combined total for Cubans and FAPLA, the majority of them would inevitably be FAPLA. I have not yet seen any reliable casualty figures for the Cubans alone other than the official number, which does not seem realistic at all. This battle/campaign was the biggest operation of the entire war and Cuban involvement in terms of number of personnel (and materiel) was also the highest, so it is not at all a surprise to me that most of their casualties occured during this event. It is a real pity that casualy statistics for UNITA are not known. Absence of UNITA statistics does make the "score" look more skewed than it actually was. South African casualties were kept low due to very little infantry versus infantry action on their part. The majority of the Cuban/MPLA casualties were inflicted by the South African's very long-range artillery, mainly the G5 howitzer and G6 howitzer, bombarding highly visible registered targets such as river crossings, etc. Roger (talk) 11:51, 12 March 2008 (UTC)

I am agree with you, it is very difficult to settle down the true above all, keeping in mind that the media is controlled and shows only what the most dominants wants. Is also hard to believe many of us because, in some cases, there is no way to prove our posts because of many reasons. For example if I say I am a Cuban or a Sudafrican would you believe me?? I know that its hard to believe that cubans only lost 14 mans in the battle, keeping in mind, like you´d say, that Cuito was the bigger battle of all the war. What I want to say is: The cubans were very carefull in the war, they planed every detail in their actions, the beginnig of the battle was when the Soviets and the FAPLA began a big scale offensive against the UNITA using an old regular war metod, moving away from their bases, hardening the logistics support and moving too far among themselves, making possible to UNITA to pass between them. from the begining the cubans warned about this but they were not heard. The cuban part in the battle was to save it and to prevent the taking of the Cuito city, so it is true that the majority of the casualties were angolans.OverG (talk) 00:19, 16 March 2008 (UTC)

I entered a large section of factual information about the battle on Friday 14 March 2007, and to my surprise it was all deleted by somebody else. That ends my interest in building public domain knowledge about this affair.... I thought that Wikipedia was about trying to write up a genuine history. For those interested, I am able to answer some of the above-asked questions - which I have done in my private memoirs entitled "Shaking Hands with Billy". The data I entered (which was then deleted) was directly from those memoirs. I was a senior intelligence officer working on strategic level operations during this whole period, including the negotiations that ended the South African engagement in Angola. Bottom line is that South Africa never entered the war to capture and hold territory. Intelligence was quite clear about the fact that the USSR was disintegrating and that Cuba was looking for a way to withraw while saving face. Cuito Cuanavale was led by a Russian General and much of the hardware was materiel withdrawn out of Afghanistan (all of this in the sections deleted by who knows who?). "Shaking Hands with Billy" is a limited edition book (only 100 numbered and signed hard copies in circulaton, mostly held by members of my former unit) but some copies have been placed in select research libraries in UK (Oxford University), the USA (George Washington University in DC and the Library of Congress) and in South Africa (Smuts House Library at Wits University, University of Free State and Samuel Pauw Library at University of North-West). Aturton (talk) 07:38, 16 March 2008 (UTC)

To save wish face? cubans wining the battle and the war were saving face? No wonder somebody erased your information here.OverG (talk) 23:31, 11 April 2008 (UTC)

Independence and Reliability of References

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Not one of the references, cited sources, or added literature counts, by Wiki-standards, as acceptable for an encyclopedia article to rely on. The only reliable publishing house in the bunch is Norton, but that book, Crocker's memoirs, falls into the category of participants' memoirs, which Wiki-guidelines explicitly say must be used with caution by editors. The guidelines go on to say that individual scholarly contributions...Crocker of course is not even a scholar...can best be evaluated for reliability by looking for reviews of their work in the reputable mainstream press. If one looks at the Foreign Policy Review of Crocker's memoirs, the reviewer calls it a spin job. Can this article be salvaged? I believe it could be... —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.226.60.29 (talk) 03:25, 2 May 2008 (UTC)

Crocker isn't a scholar? I hate to break this one to you. He was a prof at Georgetown and American U and now teaches at Georgetown again. Ironically for our purposes, he has a PhD from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins. That would be the same school that Piero Gleijeses now teaches. Virgil61 (talk) 12:57, 4 May 2008 (UTC)

this was written before I added a representative sample Literature Section24.226.60.29 (talk) 01:39, 4 May 2008 (UTC)

And one 'scholar' who has been quoted in the article has been a friend of Castro and the Cuban revolution. Wikipedia does not advocate elimination of memoirs or recollections, only asks we proceed with caution. Virgil61 (talk) 04:25, 3 May 2008 (UTC)

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For convenience, some of the relevant excerpts from Wiki-guidelines and policies:

For 'convenience sake' post links. Virgil61 (talk) 04:25, 3 May 2008 (UTC)

On many historical topics there are memoirs and oral histories that specialists consult with caution, for they are filled with stories that people wish to remember — and usually recall without going back to the original documentation. Editors should use them with caution.

This isn't a rule not to use memoirs or oral histories, it is merely a warning to use them with caution. Not the same thing. Virgil61 (talk) 04:25, 3 May 2008 (UTC)

Scholars doing research publish their results in books and journal articles. The books are usually published by university presses or by commercial houses like W.W. Norton and Greenwood which emulate the university press standards. Reputable history books and journal articles always include footnotes and bibliographies giving the sources used in great detail. Most journals contain book reviews by scholars that evaluate the quality of new books, n general, the most reliable sources are peer-reviewed journals and books published in university presses; university-level textbooks; magazines, journals, and books published by respected publishing houses; and mainstream newspapers.

You are of course confused when it comes to historical analysis. "Reputable" history books do include sources such as memoirs and these memoirs are often assigned in undergrad/graduate history courses. In a social science like history some journals, such as the the Radical History Review are completely at odds with other 'reputable' historical journals published by the same university press. Wikipedia (as most encyclopedias) is replete with use of memoirs and other sourcing not under the umbrella of that definition. Why you choose to stop here and issue your edict on sourcing rather than go elsewhere on Wikipedia remains a question. Virgil61 (talk) 12:57, 4 May 2008 (UTC)

Material that has been vetted by the scholarly community is regarded as reliable; this means published in peer-reviewed sources, and reviewed and judged acceptable scholarship by the academic journals. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.226.60.29 (talk) 03:35, 2 May 2008 (UTC)

Wikipedia is clear that none of this precludes inclusion of memoirs, recollections or military journals. See above. Virgil61 (talk) 04:25, 3 May 2008 (UTC)

I am not talking about inclusion. I am talking about relying on. 24.226.60.29 (talk) 01:39, 4 May 2008 (UTC)

I'm talking about including them 'in the article'. History is not an exact science such as mathematics or physics. Scholars vehemently disagree, have axes to grind, points of view, etc., based on political, social and emotional stances. You're talking about 'relying on', I'm talking about including them in an encyclopedic article, noting the source and even the slant if necessary. In a battle such as Cuito, drastic POVs on the aftermath are part and parcel of the story. Virgil61 (talk) 05:43, 4 May 2008 (UTC)

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The reference to Ponomariov (his nem is toataly missprellled) is a) a good quote to have in the article, b) totally violates Wike standards. The original quote must be in Russki, da-nyet? obviously the editor has not seen the original, so this reference has to be directly to the second-hand source, and say, "as quoted in".

ETc. This is going to be difficult to fix24.226.60.29 (talk) 16:47, 12 May 2008 (UTC)

I worked in St Pete's, Moscow and Kiev for a couple of years, now work in the int'l trade field with the RF and Ukraine and know enough Russian. This cyrillic to English translation of a last name is passable enough that I didn't worry about it. Red Army has a site online with archives, I have access to back issues and I have a friend who teaches at St Petersburg St.(edit I should know better) checking won't be that difficult. Nice try. Virgil61 (talk) 17:32, 12 May 2008 (UTC)

Thankyou for your attention to this matter. It is a very useful quote to have and bringing it up to Wiki standards will be great. The Times of London standard (unless I am getting it mixed up with Die Zeit...) is to represent the difference between ye and yo. Remember that the diaresis is not always printed in russian texts, but will be in a biographical encyclopedia. I "feel sure" it's ponomarioff, not ponomarieff. 24.226.60.29 (talk) 17:09, 13 May 2008 (UTC)

A Russian friend claims she is certain it's probably Ponomariev. Virgil61 (talk) 17:41, 13 May 2008 (UTC)

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What is the policy on external links? The external link to Richard All port's website is to a disgraceful treatment of the battle of CC which totally omits all battle actions in 1988. This man is the maintainer of the website and the author of the treatment. Also, he writes this on his homepage: "The first volume of two books written by Gerrit Mes in South Africa in the 1960s in which he developed a new theory that explains the difference between the races of mankinf, not only in terms of IQ, but in regard to their ability to predict or "look into" the future and act accordingly in the present. The Bantu of Africa has a very short future-sense and the White man of Western Europe a medium future-sense. PDF file. " isnt' there some policy against links to crank web pages? and to the treatment, it being his own and totally unverifiable? This website seems to be the universal, global source for the treatment, which is widely disseminated on the web but is copyright by this man. 130.15.101.140 (talk) 18:27, 16 May 2008 (UTC)

Since you're also posting from Kinston, ON (Queens University) are you the same poster as 24.226.60.29 who posts from there as well or not? This is getting confusing. Are you three different posters (you, Sundar1 and 24.226.60.29) or two or one? See WP:SOCKS and WP:MEAT for guidance on sockpuppets and meatpuppets. Virgil61 (talk) 20:29, 16 May 2008 (UTC)

His treatment uses a listed bibliography of references to Crocker, Brigdland, Steenkamp and Heitman--all you needed to have done was to have read it, you'd have seen it. Not crank writers but not pro-Cuban flag wavers. I don't like the inference of his web page's intro to Gerrit Mes' book--it does give pause. On the other hand I don't particularly like Gleijeses and many of the pro-Cuban faction's support of a totalitarian communist regime that jails, tortures and executes opponents. It does encompass meaningful and relevant information--you yourself admitted to its popularity and use--so its inclusion in favor of allowing relevant information outweighs the concern I think. Anyone else? Virgil61 (talk) 20:29, 16 May 2008 (UTC)

wrong Jamba on map

It turns out that there are several Jamba towns or localities in Angola. The one marked on this map is jamba in Huambo province, which is not the one which played a role in this military episode. There are two localities called Jamba in Cuando Cubango province. The one closest to the Namibian border is, I think, the relevant one. Here is a link to a map, not perhaps quite suitable for this article yet, but at least it shows the location of Savimbi's headquarters, Jamba. http://www.traveljournals.net/explore/angola/map/m4009108/jamba.html Perhaps this is an object lesson in how easy it is for anyone to make a mistake by using primary sources24.226.60.29 (talk) 00:49, 4 May 2008 (UTC)

well, I think I have figured out how to fix the map. I moved Jamba to the location that seems to me to be correct, and I included Mavinga for good measure.24.226.60.29 (talk) 05:56, 4 May 2008 (UTC)

The Jamba, Angola article appears to contradict your edit. Do you have a source for the above change please? Cheers Socrates2008 (Talk) 06:49, 4 May 2008 (UTC)

After looking at various articles, I think that that article is mistaken. My sources have to be put together: a), the link I provide above shows where one of the many Jambas is located. b) some of the articles explain that SAvimbi's Jamba was in the extreme southeast of the country, near the border with Namibia, hence I picked the Jamba which seems to fit that description. Also, Gleisejes and others say that the assault on Mavinga was because mavinga was the gateway to Jamba. But the other Jambas don't fit that description. This could be better sourced, I admit, but these are real inconsistencies in the wikipedia articles24.226.60.29 (talk) 13:25, 4 May 2008 (UTC)

Would a quote from the New York Times be an acceptable cite?

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE1DE1638F934A25753C1A96E948260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all See the erratum at the end of the article. Roger (talk) 13:41, 4 May 2008 (UTC)

You're quite correct - I've found a reference that matches the location you've used. Socrates2008 (Talk) 13:54, 4 May 2008 (UTC)

I appreciate the effort two Wiki-editors put into fact-checking, especially since I clearly said "it seems to me" . But now that the fact has been checked, we do not need to source it in the article. This fact has never been seriously disputed (the contradictory wiki-article doesn't count as a "source") so I suggest omitting the reference, which seems to be to the ecology of horned herds, interesting as that is24.226.60.29 (talk) 16:10, 10 May 2008 (UTC)

SADF initial intentions vis a vis Cuito Cuanavale

I do not have access to back issues of the Johannesburg Star, but P. Gleijeses, in his article on the Cuban involvement in this battle, says that By mid-January 1988, South African military sources and Western diplomats were announcing that the fall of Cuito was "imminent." and refers, in a footnote, to See the front-page coverage in The Star (Johannesburg), 21 January 1988, p. 1. If some contributor could find that text, it might be useful for this discussion.96.227.228.107 (talk) 04:37, 5 May 2008 (UTC)

The present article had two repetitions of the SADF (partisan) claim that they *never* intended to take the city. Independent analysts seem to think their initial intention was to take the city, but after a while, they decided it was not worth the cost, so that their intentions changed during the campaign. Neither reference to the SADF claim was sourced. The claim was first made in May, when the battle had wound down considerably. In the aftermath section, i added a NYTimes source for the article's assertion. in the Final Phase section, I deleted the claim since the claim wasn't made until May and the final phase is about Jan-March. Besides, to me it seems like point of view pushing to give so much prominence to this claim. The NYTimes reporter does not give it much credence, just reports that the claim was made in parliament. In the Aftermath section, perhaps we should add an independent source for the counter-claim that UNITA and the SADF did initially intend to take CC and use it as a UNITA base from which to declare a provisional governement. (NYTimes).24.226.60.29 (talk) 19:08, 11 May 2008 (UTC)

Deletion of quotes

I deleted two quotes; the first was a review of a book by another scholar. A quotation of a review of a book doesn't seem to have a place here. The original book on the other hand might be a very decent source for one. A lengthy quotation in French on English Wikipedia is out of place. A translation perhaps? Virgil61 (talk) 05:50, 9 May 2008 (UTC)

I suggest the whole section is deleted as it's currently nothing more than a set of politically-loaded statements that no-one was able to integrate into the article. Socrates2008 (Talk) 12:16, 9 May 2008 (UTC)

I wouldn't necessarily disagree with that. They can always be integrated at a later date. Virgil61 (talk) 13:03, 9 May 2008 (UTC)

I restored it because, at least at present, it is the only source for Cuban troop strengths in the article. It should be translated, and integrated, not deleted, unless a better source can be found. Official Cuban sources of 1500 troops seem too low.130.15.101.140 (talk) 16:19, 9 May 2008 (UTC)

OK, I think it should be translated as soon as possible. My French is good enough to see that it compares Cuito to Verdun and Stalingrad, basically political hyperbole. Additionally it's only a web page as a source. Virgil61 (talk) 16:37, 9 May 2008 (UTC)

I know what you mean. Afrique-Express was (it is now defunct but the new web-publication has preserved its old archived articles) mainstream press, but not scholarly. So, not the *most* reliable source. I would translate it if I did not hope someone else will be inspired to find an even better source. ... maybe I'll translate it soon anyway. Also, the comparison to Stalingrad, although it matches some of the comment in the AFtermath section of this article (people have complained about both the Aftermath section and this quote section, so both will proabably be heavily revised eventually) could well be trimmed out of the quote. Maybe I'll do that too.130.15.101.140 (talk) 21:02, 9 May 2008 (UTC)

Given that it talks of 7000 SA troops I don't see how we can accept it as a source for Cuban troop numbers. Roger (talk) 21:51, 9 May 2008 (UTC)

Are you saying that you would not accept any source that disagrees with the South African official figures? Wiki-standards give us some guidance on which kinds of sources are more reliable than others, and it has to do with objective criteria such as the publisher and peer-review, not whether the author is a leftist or not. in footnote 105 of Rethinking the "Reagan Doctrine" in Angola, Michael McFaul, International Security, vol. 14, No. 3, Winter, 1989-1990, pp. 99-135, MIT press, one has "General Geldenhuys claimed that 3,000 troops were deployed; The Times (London), March 20, 1988. Angolan Foreign Minister Van Dunem estimated that 9,000 South African troops were useed; The Independent, March 19, 1988. The number most frequently cited, however, is 6,000. See Financial Times, May 5, 1988 and January 16, 1988." if 6000 is the number most frequently cited, in the judgement of this scholar, then Lique is not far off in that regard.24.226.60.29 (talk) 04:32, 10 May 2008 (UTC)

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Official Cuban sources give 1500 troops of the FAR at the battle. This neutral source, Liquer, gives 5000.

Official SADF sources give 3500 or 3000 SADF troops at the battle. Most independent sources give 6000, according to McFaul. The deflation factor is about the same...we can't just present the official versions of both sides and leave it at that, after all, can we? I think most encyclopedia writers would pick middle of the road independent analysts for both sides and leave it at that. These sources place about 18000 FAPLA troops at the battle, or less (due to losses at the battle at Mavinga). There also seem to have been 15000 Cuban regulars in Angola far to the rear, guarding supply lines etc, and 40,000 or so on the second front at Calueque? which is not considered part of this battle, when defined tactically narrowly as this article does.24.226.60.29 (talk) 04:42, 10 May 2008 (UTC)

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We need to decide on a figure and source for Cuban and FAPLA troop strengths before we delete this quote. At present, the SADF figures are lower than average, but official. If we use official SADF, we should use official Cuban, which is 1500. And may as well use Crocker's figure for FAPLA, which is 18000 (but according to Crocker, over 4000 of these were lost before the siege of Cuito Cuanavale even began since 4000 were lost in the battle before Mavinga and in the disastrous retreat to Cuito Cuanavale. This would make the combined forces less than 15,500.) Then the 40,000 combined cuban/FAPLA figure is impossible. Anyway, it is unsourced. I am challenging it. I will eventually remove it unless someone sources it. 24.226.60.29 (talk) 00:28, 11 May 2008 (UTC)

All the sources that give numbers way in excess of 3000-3500 for SADF have one fatal flaw. They imply that all of the thousands of SADF records such as movement orders, quartermasters’ records, transport logs, payroll records, war diaries, comms logs, personnel files, sitreps, press releases, etc. were faked. Not merely individually faked but all faked to be totally consistent with each other to indicate a false lower number of troops "in country". (Such a huge conspiracy would make the various JFK Assassination conspiracy theories look like class projects for 3rd grade school kids!) Casualty figures that differ from the official number also imply that a number of SA soldiers simply disappeared without explanation - no repatriated remains, no funerals. The white SA population whose sons, brothers, cousins, were in Angola would never stand for that. Such unexplained losses would have seriously threatened the National Party's hold on power which was already under pressure from both the right as well as the left.

However, there is another quite innocent explanation: The number of ~3000 is the maximum number of SA troops who were in Angola at any given moment during the entire campaign, which consisted of 3 interlinked operations, Moduler, Hooper & Packer. Taken as a whole, over the entire period, the number of SADF troops who were involved might number 6000 or more as units were rotated in and out of Angola. Adding to the "confusion" was the SADF's practice of manning "operational units" with companies/squadrons of troops from various "#"SAI Battalions and other training/conscript units. Some operational units were formed on an ad hoc basis, for example "20 SA Brigade" existed only for the duration of their operation. The designation of the "operational unit" would not change even when its entire personnel would be switched with others from different "source" units. Heitmann criticised this practice in his book "War in Angola - The Final South African Phase"

Just another point - when was the town of Cuito Cuanavale "under siege"?

All the sources I am familiar with report that CC was only shelled sporadically by G5/G6 to disrupt the HQ and to keep the airfield unusable. If the SADF ever intended to "take and hold" CC they would surely have deployed a much larger force. A major town that deep inside enemy territory could never be held by such a small force. In terms of logistics the SAAF had a total long range transport fleet of only 7 C130s and three multi-role Boeing 707s, which at times were strained to the maximum to keep supplies (particularly 155mm ammo and spare barrels) flowing. Personnel availability was also an issue as the "2nd year conscripts all had to be discharged during December and most of the "1st year" conscripts went on leave for Christmas and New Year, leaving the SADF with only a handful of inexperienced "1st year" conscripts and a small number of generally much older "Citizen Force" (Reserve) troops. The "Permanent Force" components of the SA Army were very small and were mostly HQ personnel and instructors. Besides the logistical, and logical impossibility of such an objective, one must remember that the SADF would at that time not do anything so drastic as to ruin the "talks about talks" that were already secretly happening with the Angolans, Cubans, Soviets, SWAPO as well as the ANC. Roger (talk) 12:41, 11 May 2008 (UTC)

according to the NYTimes, official SA military press releases for deaths in the CC campaign add up to 57. No one has ever suggested that they were faked, too. I did not know that the payroll records were declassified: what is your source for this? Your interesting line of reasoning sounds like it is speculation and inference. I have read sources which imply that none of the records you talk about are available to scholars: some people point out that the declassification procedure is onerous, and others say that many top secret military records were destroyed in 1990. One source says that the entire operation was top secret, and that during this period parents were never told the circumstances of the deaths, simply that they were due to accident. This led one commentator to comment that the SADF was the most accident prone army in the world. I don't think we can rely on your line of reasoning. Anyway, in principle, official sources, whether Cuban or SADF, are partisan. A South African veteran remarks on a veteran's blog that losses due to hepatitis were 1000 (this doesn't mean deaths). he also remarks that there were 300 body bags during this campaign (but not all would be KIA). NYTimes reports very heavy shelling of CC during January and February, not sporadic. Editors ought not to rely on speculative lines of inference (also we shouldn't rely on these blogs I mention either) in order to subjectively decide that anything that disagrees with official figures is unreliable.

We have objective criteria for reliability, as laid out in the Wiki-guidelines: published by a independent publisher with an established record for fact-checking and accuracy. So, Paratus and Zebra and Ashanti and Gibraltar and official military press releases do not count as reliable. We need to find a reliable source if possible. If we cannot find one, we should say so.24.226.60.29 (talk) 15:24, 11 May 2008 (UTC)

The spirit of the rule trumps the letter of the rule as does common sense. WP:COMMON and WP:WIARM.

It's been explained to you before. Wikipedia's objective criteria you mention is not as cut and dried as you state. Wikipedia policy allows a broader inclusive version of sources than you infer. WP:VERIFIABILITY states that In general the most reliable sources are peer reviewed journals. In general here also means not exclusive. Online or even 'self published' sources are not prohibited but cautioned on; that's why we have editors. Paratus is a military journal and the SADF CDR's opinions can certainly be mentioned as an important source of information even if not used as definitive.

The scientific field is more exact and more objective, history and political journals much more subjective. If one were to make an analogy to science then diplomatic history scholars can't be relied upon to give a determinative judgment any more than a micro-biologist can be the definitive source when discussing zoology (maybe not an exact analogy). The point is that we've seen generalists or cultural or diplomatic historians here unable to understand the use of artillery to deny an area of operations. They aren't military historians and aren't writing on their area of expertise. That's one reason why Wikipedia has editors. Mindless worship of 'scholars' without acknowledging instances where they have a blatantly obvious ideological ax to grind where they are commenting out of their area of expertise is the stuff of naive pedants and sophomores. Virgil61 (talk) 16:34, 11 May 2008 (UTC)

I have not noticed any employment of caution. Operationally, what does caution in using a source consist of? I suppose it consists of double-checking with independent sources.

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Perhaps we are now ready to delete the entire quote section. Ponomariov and Mandela are already in the aftermath section, and Col Ferreira's information is already sourced to more neutral sources in the body of the paper, so it serves no useful purpose anymore. Also the reference to Paratus magazine is still present in the body of the paper, so nothing will really be lost. Is there a consensus on this? 24.226.60.29 (talk) 00:20, 15 May 2008 (UTC)

Definitely Socrates2008 (Talk) 05:56, 15 May 2008 (UTC)

Secrecy paper

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a link for one of my assertions about a source i once saw somewhere is http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/ptb/wvw/wvw4/baines%20paper.pdf. It is a very interesting papere about the secrecy surrounding the invasion of Angola.24.226.60.29 (talk) 18:40, 11 May 2008 (UTC)

Reinforcements

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Socrates correctly asserts that the *reinforcements* sent by Cuba at this time were 15,000. (some sources say 14000). The reader might still like to know that this brought total cuban regulars in all of Angola (most in the north and in the rear, guarding the railway lines from UNITA guerillas) to 55000. If this is so, then the reader might wonder where the 55000 subtract 15000 went. (it wasn't to cuito cuanavale). Since the active deployment of those 40,000 didn't occur until april, I move the statement about the second front involving Calueque to a better place, the "final phase". I am well aware that the editors of this article have defined the BAttle of CC itself to be: the debacle near Mavinga, the disastrous retreat to CC, and the siege and shelling of CC. A reasonable choice. But the Cuban sources define the battle of CC differently: they include what they call the south-west front. The reader will be, I think, misled unless we say, parenthetically, something about where most of the cuban troops went. I don't think all of the reinforcements went to CC, I think only some of them went there. The official sources place only 1500 cuban troops at CC.(perhaps the rest were on the lineBenguele-Menongue).24.226.60.29 (talk) 02:38, 12 May 2008 (UTC)

The logic here doesn't add up. The Cubans were--and it's been promoted ad nauseum--rushed to CC's immediate area to stop the SADF which they claim were about to overrun the town. A force of 1500 is little over a battalion's worth of troops (far less infantry when you subtract support personnel) isn't going to stop the claimed SADF advance. That's military common sense if nothing else.

A feint to the south with several brigades 1. wouldn't have stopped the claimed overrun of CC & 2. wouldn't have prevented an operational flanking in the rear by the SADF if the Cubans were feinting south. The Cuban advance to Calueque may be their out on this one but it sounds suspiciously like face-saving. Be that as it may, the Cuban move south was excruciatingly slow by any standard of mechanized warfare and there's no major combat occurring on that front on the level of CC, where shockingly few Cubans were stopping the SADF back from capturing CC, which is part and parcel of their claim. Something has to give. Virgil61 (talk) 04:13, 12 May 2008 (UTC)

please avoid emotionally loaded words like ad nauseam. Cubans are very patriotic. I am not proposing to mention these Cuban claims in the article itself because the claims raise too many questions. I am mentioning that 40000 cuban troops of the line were used to open a second front for only two reasons: it is relevant context to the BAttle of cuito itself, and it addresses a natural question the reader would have about what were all those Cuban troops doing if Cuban troop strength at Cuito itself was only 1500 (if we use official sources, as seems to be the consensus) or only 5000 if we believe the French quote. (But if we believe the French quote, we need to increase SADF strenght parallel-ly.) Mentioning such claims would be more appropriate for a book than an encyclopedia article. As for the logic, lets focus on the logic of our article. It looks like we will either wind up saying Angolan side, 1500 + 18000 - 4000 losses = 15500. Rebel side: 11-12K. Or, if we go with middle-of-the-road figures, both sides larger but in the same rough proportions. The article says the result was disputed, and many readers might agree that tactically it was a stand-off or stalemate. It looks logical: the air superiority was good enough for defence, but not to actually take the heights. After a while, the SADF would certainly decide crossing the river would require greater forces and greater casualties than were desirable. This would look logical to the reader, and it also would allow some readers to conclude that both SADF and Cuban tactical objectives were achieved: the SADF might not have really intended to take the airbase, and Cuba's only tactical intention was to hold the city and break the siege of the 3 Angolan brigades at the bridgehead. FAPLA intentions were obviously not achieved. UNITA??? 24.226.60.29 (talk) 15:33, 12 May 2008 (UTC)

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two small points: A) the NYTimes source which McFaulan and many others quote,

does not say the 15000 elite reinforcements ever went to Cuito itself. If the Cubans thought that building a new airstrip near the Namibian border and opening a second front would help the relief of Cuito, and they claim that in their publications, then sending 15000 reinforcements to Angola to help in the relief of cuito is consistent with : a small number going to break the siege of Cuito itself, as they claim, more going to Menongue to guard against recce ops and UNITA sabotage raids, and the bulk going from Namibe (not Benguela) on the coast towards Calueque. (You mention the exruciatingly slow advance. You will be interested to know that that slowness was a major bone of contention between Catro and Ochoa. Catro insisted on a motorised advance. But Ochoa refused because he thought it was too dangerous. According to exile sources, General Ochoa ignored Catro's orders and persuaded all the other generals to ignore them too, and the advance was made on foot, with an airstrip to support the advance being constructed as part of this process.) and B) Turner, an anti-Cuban source, uses the word siege in the long quote. (While we are still discussing the article, it seems that that quotation section is still very useful, no?) Cuban sources say that three FAPLA brigades were cut off at the bridghead and effectively besieged (due to SADF artillery control of the river crossing and destruction of the bridge) and were in serious danger of "annihilation". (November and December). Hence the Cubans had only two objectives: break the siege, and hold the city. The FAPla brigades had lost their armour and artillery and the SADF had air superiority that month, or if not quite superiority, enough. Cuban sources (and SADF too) describe massive ground attacks against this bridgehead.24.226.60.29 (talk) 15:33, 12 May 2008 (UTC)

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i do not yet know how much of the following quote should be worked into the article itself. But it is very relevant to this dicussion, and a small part of it is important for the question of where those 15000 elite troops, including the battle-hardened 50th division, went. They didn't go to cuito cuanavale.

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"a large detachment of fifteen thousand newly arrived cuban recruits with 270 tanks was dispatched in May 1988 directly toward the Namibian border north of Ovamboland, much further to the west than Cuito Cuanavale. The ensuing buildup of a front along 300 kilometers [sic] from the border posed a threat to South Africa...Although not realized [sic] in the world outsidethe fear of this latter possibility was emphasized [sic]

by a senior military commander later interviewed by Jaster (1990:23): "Had the cubans attacked [Namibia] they would have over-run the place. We could not have stopped them." " The Transition to Independence in Namibia, Lionel Cliffe et al., London, 1994.p. 59. The reference to Jaster is The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of South-western Africa. Adelphi Papers 253. London: Brassey's International Institute for Strategic Studies. I have not seen this issue of the Adelphi papers yet. 24.226.60.29 (talk) 17:00, 13 May 2008 (UTC)

Read with a critical eye it boggles the mind to think that the an Army that needed only 1500 (edit replace 1400) troops and aircraft to bolster allies and supposedly stop an enemy advance at CC then--instead of bringing an elite force of 270 tanks and 15,000 troops to neutralize and destroy the major enemy concentration eliminating the threat that they easily stopped--chose instead a feint far, far away from there. Either the Keystone cops were running the show or somewhere there's a disconnect in the info and in the rationale. I don't believe the Cuba commanders were Max Sennett extras and that; "...there's something rotten in the state of Denmark".

A competent commander doesn't usually dismount troops instead of having them mechanized (motorized) unless he's got a reason; terrain, logistics, etc. The evidence seems to point to the fact the Cubans may not have had the necessary resources for an invasion of Namibia and didn't want to major confrontation with the SADF for whatever reason at CC but that Castro had his eye on bluffing at the diplomatic bargaining table rather than the battlefield something Ochoa possibly wasn't privy to. Virgil61 (talk) 17:34, 13 May 2008 (UTC)

don't get 14,000 mixed up with 1,500. (Why do you say 1,400?) The figure of 14,000 is an alternate estimate of reinforcements to all of Angola, not CC itself. The figure of 1,500 is the official figure of cuban troops

at CC. Your calling the southwest front a feint is unjustified by the sources, cuban sources regard it as the *main* counterattack and claim it succeeded in surrounding the 400 SADF troops left at CC to guard the G4 and G5 artillery. If you have a source for saying the 50th division of the FAR went to CC, produce it: I am looking for it but haven't found one yet. If what the cuban sources say is true, it makes much more sense than you suppose: a relatively cautious and costless surrounding flanking movement could well be preferred to a frontal assault on troops with Stingers, the finest howitzers in the world, entrenched on strategic heights...

You completely misunderstood my statement (though I meant 1500 not 1400 at CC). Reread it. Virgil61 (talk) 06:14, 14 May 2008 (UTC)

In general it is not a good idea to disregard one side of the controversy simply because you can elaborate a long string of speculative argumenst against it.

Thanks for the lecture; Again, you misread my statement. In general accepting spoon-fed theories without critical thought isn't a good idea either. Virgil61 (talk) 06:14, 14 May 2008 (UTC)

Other analysts (such as journalists for le Monde and researchers at the London, establishment, Institute of Security Studies) have come up with arguments against the SADF claims, too.

Well Le Monde isn't world renown for its military analysis. Virgil61 (talk) 06:14, 14 May 2008 (UTC)

If we are really going to descend, in this article, into the claims of both sides, our task is merely to present them fairly, not to analyse them. I have already suggested we leave out of this article both the SADF claim and the cuban claim.24.226.60.29 (talk) 02:40, 14 May 2008 (UTC)

You're off base on this (Sundar1?). No one said anything about not presenting them fairly, that's your inference not my position. I've not squabbled about inclusion of both sides but rather the slanted and repeated efforts by the pro-Cuban side to make this a white-wash. Remember this is the talk page not the article, pointing out something walks like a duck and quacks like a duck when someone calls it a moose is fine. I think we're done here. Virgil61 (talk) 06:14, 14 May 2008 (UTC)

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I still can't figure out where the 50th division of the FAR went after disembarking at Namibe. The sources I have looked at are vague and contradictory. It might be a nice touch to include the fact, if it is a fact, that at CC the 50th FAR, Castro's personal division faced Botha's personal division (I forget off hand which it was, but I have it's number somewhere) and that Botha personally visitied the war zone during the battle. Now, what are we to do with the Cuban claim, supported by two independent military analysts (or at least one military analyst and one scholar and one anonymous source) that those 4-500 SADF troops had their retreat cut off for two months and were only saved by the August cease-fire?24.226.60.29 (talk) 12:25, 15 May 2008 (UTC)

Casualties vs. deaths

What about my suggestion that we change the heading in the box from Casualties and losses to deaths? The figures therein are for deaths and do not include hepatitis, desertions, wounds, etc. The article as it stands is extremely misleading in this regard.24.226.60.29 (talk) 19:52, 11 May 2008 (UTC)

USMC paper on SADF

An interesting paper from the 'Small Wars' center of the USMC with an amount of information on the SADF during the Angolan Wars. It's 170-some pages.

http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/Papers/morris.pdf Virgil61 (talk) 07:00, 14 May 2008 (UTC)

¿Why quotes in the footnotes?

I am painfully aware of the repetitions and longuers in these quotations. But this subject is so controversial, I think we serve the readers by including variations on such basic questions as when did the battle start and stop. Notice our article includes operation hooper...Lique confines it to 8 days...other authors say, Jan-march...this is important for the readers to know. I will translate the other french quote provided it doesn't get deleted in another edit war... I include two quotes since someone might reasonably worry that Maier's estimate, published in 1996, is not complete. At least Lique's is up to date.24.226.60.29 (talk) 14:06, 14 May 2008 (UTC)

Even though the Crocker quote is very long, I suggest it is a good idea to retain it at that length since it makes it clear to the reader that our estimate of 18,000 FAPLA troops includes the more than 4,000 lost on the disastrous retreat from Mavinga, so they couldn't have been at the siege of Cuito Cuanavale in January. I think this length is just one of the things we have to put up with, trying to write a balanced history of a subject so recent, so controversial, and still lacking a comprehensive scholarly account.24.226.60.29 (talk) 15:43, 14 May 2008 (UTC)

I just removed it from the "Quotes" section and left Crocker's quote in the footnotes--no need for repetition--though I don't think it needs to be quoted at length there either, a sourcing note is good enough. Virgil61 (talk) 19:51, 14 May 2008 (UTC)

Problems with the numbers, still.

Since I made changes, the controversy flag has gone up, so I have not made any more substantive changes. But the numbers I put up, to replace the unsourced (and mistaken) estimate still have serious problems. Crocker makes clear that FAPLA began with 18,000 and lost more than 4,000 even before the battle of cuito cuanavale even started. I even saw a source which said, 2,000 deaths plus `twice as many' wounded, lost, deserted, etc. 18K-6K leaves 12K for the battle itself. Plus 1,500 cubans. But worse: the estimate of the journalist there (and others) is 10,000 FAPLA plus Cuban. I propose we say combined estimate of 10,000 and 1,500 official cuban, and use Crocker as a source for 18,000 FAPLA and their losses in the mavinga campaign. This means using Maier as a source. Or we may find another source for the number of FAPLA at Cuito. I do not propose we perform the subtraction ourselves and list that, I don't think that's allowed.24.226.60.29 (talk) 21:45, 15 May 2008 (UTC)

The other problem is the discrepancy between 3,500 official SADF and other estimates of 6,000 South AFrican. It occurred to me there is an obvious explanation: S.W.A.T.F. was there, but was neither UNITA nor SADF. WE need to either include it in the SADF or put up another participant. Also, it is possible that the official figures exclude the 32 Battalion (the black battalion) of the SADF. So I hope we can see our way to this: present official SADF (3-4K). Present estimated combined SADF + SWATF(6K). Present est. UNITA (8K). combine all three. (17-18K) It seems to me reasonable, this was, in the early stages, a siege, and normally the besiegers are more nummerous than the besieged. Also, UNITA losses were very light in the ops modular and hooper, but very heavy in the assaults on the bridgehead east of the Cuito river. This requires discussion24.226.60.29 (talk) 21:45, 15 May 2008 (UTC)

I have watched this unfolding discussion on these pages with interest, as I feel that healthy debate over historical events can only help us understand them better. But I have grown concerned over some of the aspects of it, in particular your conduct. First, I think your refusal to sign up and adopt a user-name, even after all this time, is discourteous. It is far, far easier to carry out discussions with a name than it is with a number, and having a permanent user-name with a known history allows for trust to be built between editors. It does require only five minutes of your time. Secondly, I think you have begun to lose track somewhat and have become too lost in trying to incorporate your sources rather than pursuing what's true. Your previous comment is an example: In attempting to reconcile the disparity between the numbers quoted by various sources for SADF forces at Cuito, you blithely assume (entirely incorrectly) that there must have been SWATF forces present as well. Yet this is sheer nonsense; no record official or otherwise makes a mention of such a SWATF presence at Cuito and none of the soldiers present at the battle have said anything similar. Indeed, it is exceedingly unlikely that the SWATF was ever deployed in significant numbers on such long-range expeditionary strikes into Angola, since their role was that of a territorial force intended to free the SADF up from local patrol and garrison duties.

The correct approach to take here is not to assume that the answer 'is somewhere in between', but to analyse the sources and figure out how and why they came to such numbers. For instance, although it was not common knowledge until after the war, SADF units were often composite in nature and under-strength to some extent. An author, more accustomed to the armour-heavy formations of the Northern hemisphere with their massive logistical tails, may have assumed that the units at Cuito were the same. In reality, they were not; they were almost perilously light and at the end of a long and tenuous logistical supply line. Further, few of these authors would have had access to either the official records of the SAAF or the personal insight of the commanders involved. As such, they would be operating on limited information and forced to rely on estimates, usually being educated guesses at best and possibly including UNITA numbers in error. In contrast, the figure of 3000 - 3500 SADF troops is not a claim, it is hard information that has come from the official military records of the SADF, now under the control of a political party and government absolutely opposed to the old SADF and those in it. As far as primary sources for military actions go, it does not get any better than that. In fact, these records should have you questioning the inflated figures of your other sources, which are not based on hard primary information. Indeed, the key issue regarding Cuito and the entirety of SA's involvement in Angola is that it is only the SADF's records which are truly open and available. Both Cuba and Angola are still controlled by the same political groups which controlled them in the 1980s, with the result that they still have an incentive to selectively release information and cover up embarrassing figures or other information. But in South Africa, it is the ANC which is now in control and, as they have made clear, they are entirely on the side of the Cubans and Angolans in this. Any information proving that SADF numbers were higher than those claimed, that losses were astronomical, that the SADF was fearful of defeat and so on would be jumped on with alacrity by those now in charge. Fact is, this one small detail (often overlooked or ignored) makes the SADF's claims and records far more reliable than any other sources around this battle. I don't believe you have quite grasped this distinction.

All in all though, I do think you have a valuable role to play in this article, particularly with regard to the Cuban involvement which I believe remains inadequately represented. But you should be more careful in your use of sources and in your assumptions, particularly when actually changing the article itself. And above all, remember that our goal is not to promote any particular side, but to represent the objective truth as best as is humanly possible, which is our real responsibility as editors. The war has already been fought, there is no need to re-fight it virtually. — Impi (talk) 23:04, 15 May 2008 (UTC)

independent scholarly sources assert that the SWATF was there.24.226.60.29 (talk) 13:56, 16 May 2008 (UTC)

The SADF records are not open and available, Gleijeses was denied access to them when he went to SA. I was mentioning this yesterday to a South African, and she said the ANC would never be in favour of declassifying those records since if they did that, they would also have to declassify the records about their own atrocities (torture and killing of suspected "spies") and they just don't want to do that. Sadly, I believe her....Besides, the records might have beren destroyed by the SADF before the transition. (The documents about the six atomic bombs were destroyed at that timme.)24.226.60.29 (talk) 13:56, 16 May 2008 (UTC)

The job of encyclopedia-article writers is to faithfully represent the different verifiable points of view according to their importance. Your point of view is a minority pov in the reliable sources. The standard of inclusion in Wiki is verifiability, not truth.24.226.60.29 (talk) 13:56, 16 May 2008 (UTC)

You're absolutely correct about verifiability. This article would benefit considerably from more reliable sources and less interpretation by editors such as yourself. For example, your assumption that the destruction of documents about the atomic bombs was an SADF cover up reflects your own personal incorrect interpretation of the compliance that was mandated by the International Atomic Energy Agency when the programme was dismantled. The troop numbers is a futher example: It is not up to the editors here to make deductions about troop strengths at CC based on assumuptions on how many troops were in Angola, especially subtracting x troops from y to conclude z troops at this battle. The ONLY thing you can do here is cite a reliable source that explicitly states the point/number, otherwise your edit is original research. Lastly, Gleijeses is not the ultimate authority on this battle - indeed his material is particularly biased towards one faction and should therefore be carefully balanced by other sources. Socrates2008 (Talk) 03:06, 17 May 2008 (UTC)

I wrote that I thought we were not allowed to do the subtraction. You confirm this, thankyou. Also, I did not use the words cover-up or even suggest it. So please don't "interpret" me. But Crocker explicitly says that the 18,000 FAPLA troops were at Mavinga (or Lomba) and so we cannot really use Crocker as a source for the number of FAPLA troops at CC. We have to find a source that explicitly talks about FAPLA at CC. And what about the SWATF? The S.W.A.T.F was there. We have an official figure for SADF. We have a reliable estimate for UNITA. Who, may I ask, put the combined troop strenght up without checking on SWATF?24.226.60.29 (talk) 05:55, 17 May 2008 (UTC)

What I meant, which is clear from the context the wording was in, was that there was not a significant SWATF presence, least of all one large enough to make up the disparity between 3500 and 6000. In fact, the only SWATF troops present at CC were two motorised infantry companies from 101 Battalion, which are included in the SADF figures. In general, from my experience this is common practice whenever SWATF units were combined with SADF units and under the command of the latter. What I take exception to is your 'fill in the gaps' reasoning, in which you note the disparity and being unwilling to cast doubt on the veracity on some of your sources you simply assume that the disparity means that there were 2500 SWATF troops present who aren't being counted. This is neither logical nor particularly encyclopaedic. Socrates is correct, we do not have the authority to make the kind of deductions you are engaged in now. We are permitted only to cite a reliable source, of which the SADF records (or books using them as their primary reference) appear at the moment to be the most reliable. Contrary to Gleijeses's experience, these records have increasingly been made available and continue to trickle out. Furthermore, your claim about the destruction of records does not make any sense. First of all, the records surrounding SA's nuclear weapons program were never destroyed, a fact the IAEA verified after months of patient investigation. Secondly, there are no indications that any of the important SADF records from Operations Modular, Hooper and Packer were destroyed; what with other authors having gained access to them over the years. On what basis do you make the claim? In sum, your claims about the SWATF are unfounded, your judgement of sources is suspect and you still have not bothered to sign up for a user-name. Unfortunately, that makes it harder than it should be to take you seriously. — Impi (talk) 10:17, 17 May 2008 (UTC)

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At least I make my mistakes on the talk pages, not in the article. ;-) Looking over my notes, I see a source of the highest reliability for troop strengths. Jaster, a politico-military analyst who has taught even at Annapolis, associated with the establishment and "authouritative" blah blah blah, see refferences, gives these figures: (it bears out some of what Impi was saying) p. 19: est. 4K SADF and SWATF, 8K UNITA, 10K FAPLA,

"backed up by several thousand Cuban reinforcements who at first only assumed defensive positions around the town". Next: I did not used to believe the official cuban figure, as cited in Gleijeses, of 1.5K. On these talk pages I even wondered if it was a misprint! But I added a reference to Gen. Geldenhuys of the SADF who estimated a mere one thousand. So I think we can accept the official Cuban figure as certain. Both references, to Geldenhuys and Cuban official figures, are in the article. How about we change the FAPLA figure, using Jaster as a reference, and give Jaster as the reference for the unsourced SADF/UNITA figures? (I still like the Crocker quote a lot and suggest we move it as a reference to something)24.226.60.29 (talk) 15:11, 17 May 2008 (UTC)

date of SADF withdrawal and cease fire

The statement in the article about the Dec. 22 agreement is factually inaccurate. on Aug. 8 SA agreed to withdraw all SADF troops from Angola, in exchange for an immediate cease-fire. Cuba agreed to an immediate cease fire but did not agree to withdraw any of its troops from Angola. All SADF troops had left Angola by Sept.1, as agreed. O'Neill and Munslow, Third World Quarterly, vol. 12 No. 3/4 (1990-1991) "Ending the Cold War in Southern Africa", p. 84. What was agreed to in Dec. 22 was the removal of SADF troops from Namibia in exchange for Cuban withdrawal from Angola. This is an important distinction. Anyway, I suggest putting in the dates of the cease-fire and the date of SADF withdrawal from Angola, and correction of the phrase about the Dec. 22 agreeement.24.226.60.29 (talk) 23:50, 21 May 2008 (UTC)

dates of battle

According to the standard historical dictionary of Angola, there are two different battles, the Battle of Mavinga II, and afterwards, the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. The dates of the ' battle of Cuito Cuanavale are given as Dec1987-March1988. The Cuban army did not really arrive until January of 1988. So I changed the dates to conform with standard usage, for example Reagan referred to the UNITA victors at Mavinga as "the heroes of the Lomba River." (Journalists also give these dates for the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 216.57.20.76 (talk) 22:29, 16 June 2008 (UTC)

Olifants

I am dubious about this addition. of course we need a reliable source. the SADF didn't abandon the Olifants, its policy was to blow them up (if lost in a minefield or something like that) in order that the communications equipment not fall into Cuban hands...this would have compromised their military communications security. (clive holt etc.) Now if a disabled tank is blown up, it is not "abandoned" . Also, losing a few tanks in a minefield is not "being bested" . Only one Olifant that I know of was abandoned and captured by the Cubans. (there is an amusing account of the difficulties they had getting it across the river since it was several tons heavier than their own tanks and exceeded the weight limits of their bridge and their rafts). The Cubans claim to have won a defensive victory because they repulsed these ground attacks: as one veteran says, if the blacks draw, then they win (chess). 65.95.245.19 (talk) 12:27, 2 July 2008 (UTC)

I'm also dubious about this Olifant claim. Can we either have a source or delete it from the article? --67.241.42.162 (talk) 01:41, 18 August 2008 (UTC)

I suspect these are pictures of the abandoned Olifant (and Spanish text): [[1]] and more here [[2]] Farawayman (talk) 21:48, 13 October 2014 (UTC)

More recent picture of one of the tanks for those who don't believe we had to leave them behind - [[3]] - click through the pictures to the last one Conlinp (talk) 08:12, 14 October 2014 (UTC)

Terminology

Artillery never provides "close air support" -- it provides fire support, etc. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 63.226.104.225 (talk) 22:23, 30 September 2008 (UTC)

Cuban claims of SADF materiel losses (Edit war)

The claims that the SADF lost 7 G6 Artillery pieces is obvious nonsense. The SADF sent 3 development prototype G6s into battle directly from the factory. All 3 came back from Angola. They couldn't have lost 7 because the 3 that they had were the only ones in existence at the time. The SAAF also could not have lost 24 jets as they didn't even have that many in the "operational area" in total at the time. The same applies to the claimed tank losses. The official Cuban source dating from 1989 has absolutely zero credibility. Roger (talk) 16:01, 14 October 2008 (UTC)

The date alone of the Cuban source would make it suspect, since few Cuban reports made available for public consumption during that time period had any credibility thanks to the usual propaganda efforts and the limitations of battlefield intelligence. After all, it was only a few years after the end of World War II that both the British and the Germans could finally get a true and accurate picture of the losses they had imposed on their respective enemy air forces.

But the most important flaw in the source's figures is that they have no battlefield wreckage to prove it. When the SADF claimed to have captured an SA-8, it actually had the vehicle in its possession to show to the world's media; but the Angolans and Cubans have never been able to show the wreckage of a single G5 or G6 or more than the 3 Olifant tanks known to have become disabled in the minefields around Tumpo. What's more, 14 SADF fighters lost would have represented the destruction of an entire squadron; yet after the war the SAAF emerged with nearly all its aircraft intact, minus only those they had admitted to losing (such as Arthur Piercy's F1). When compared to the aircraft the SAAF had purchased in the 1960s and 1970s, the construction numbers and serial numbers matched up. There just wasn't room for there to have been 14 fighter aircraft lost in a single engagement. It's just impossible, and it makes the source look stupid.

And the G5 and G6 numbers are just ridiculous. There were only 16 G5s and 3 G6s deployed in the entire theatre, with the latter being pre-production prototypes under evaluation at the School of Artillery before being rushed to the battle area.[4] Amusingly, even Ronnie Kasrils, until recently the Minister of Intelligence under the ANC government, a self-described scholar of the Border War and ardent exponent of the pro-Cuban version of events, stated that there were only 'sixteen G5 and G6 artillery guns' [5] at the battle. So the claim of 24 having been destroyed is nonsensical, since there weren't 24 available to destroy.

Taken together, these cast serious credibility on the source being used by Yurizuki to justify the inclusion of these figures in the infobox, to the extent where allowing the source to be used as though it were reliable and impartial would be utterly against Wikipedia's principles and standards. So I do not support these changes and will continue reverting them if they are re-added to the article. — Impi (talk) 16:44, 14 October 2008 (UTC)

While we're at it - The New York Accords and Namibian independence were a consequence of about 30 years of war and diplomacy. To link them specifically to just this battle alone is patently absurd. Roger (talk) 17:08, 14 October 2008 (UTC)

The SADF losses of men and military material in Cuito Cuanavale and Calueque were enormous. Unofficial SA government sources talked of 715 dead. At least 17 Oliphants tanks were destroyed, mostly in Mig bombings; huge numbers of Unimogs, Casspirs and field artillery were destroyed as well -- or, in some cases, captured intact after they were abandoned by fleeing SADF units. The wrecks are exposed today in Angolan and Cuban museums or at the battle site itself. There is also proof of three SADF fighters shot down. However, I could find no confirmation of G6 being destroyed, so it appears that it was a mistake to include such units among the losses. Follow this link for detailed information:

http://www.urrib2000.narod.ru/EqMiG23a.html

I'm bothered by the numbers given in the infobox for Cuban/Faplan material losses, as they are completely unsourced and look like typical propaganda from the apartheid South African government. The numbers for human losses are suspect as well -- they only make sense if they include the Angolan casualties in Operation Modular, in which case such numbers are, not completely wrong, but very misleading. I recommend removing all mentions to Cuban/Faplan material losses, and checking again the numbers for human losses.

I'm also bothered by claims that the battle, and the Angolan war in general (the whole Cuba/Fapla vs. SADF/Unita clash), had an unclear conclusion -- "results disputed" as they say in the infobox. Apartheid South Africa sent troops to Angola to strengthen their rule over Namibia, defeat the SWATO, and help Unita win their war against MPLA -- so as to have a friendly government in Luanda. Cuba sent troops to Angola to support the MPLA government, defeat the Unita and its South African backers, and help the SWATO in Namibia. After Cuito Cuanavale, South Africa retired from Angola, lost Namibia, and abandoned Unita to their decadence and defeat. Cuba retired its military from Angola with the MPLA government strengthened, the SADF back in their country, and SWATO triumphant in a recognized independent Namibia. Cuba's victory was total. The entry for result of the battle should read: "Decisive Cuban/Faplan victory." Read these articles by SADF veterans for further confirmation of what happened during the battle and its aftermath:

http://www.geocities.com/sadfbook/7sai.htm

http://uk.geocities.com/sadf_history1/dfrench.html

http://www.geocities.com/sadfbook/911text.htm

Also, read this article for extremely interesting information, coming from another SADF veteran, about how desperate the SADF/SAAF situation in the Angolan/Namibian border was right after Cuito Cuanavale, and how close the SA government came to using nuclear bombs on the area -- as they simply lacked the manpower and air power to stop a Cuban attack:

http://www.geocities.com/sadf_scrapbook/sanuc.htm

Oh, and about the Accords: in 1974, South Africa officially declared that SWA (Namibia) would never be independent -- instead, all of its territory would be annexed to South Africa. They didn't budge one inch from this position, ignoring international pressure, until the battle of Cuito Canavale. Immediately after, the government of South Africa accepted a negotiation, and signed in New York the independence of Namibia. It's transparent that their brutal defeats at Cuito Canavale and Calueque (not to mention the imminent threat of a Cuban thrust into Namibian territory) were the determining factor that forced them to let go of their SWA colony. Angolan, Namibian and modern (not apartheid-related) South African sources all agree on the subject.Yurizuki (talk) —Preceding undated comment was added at 18:50, 14 October 2008 (UTC).

You have still not addressed my questions about your source, which has now been shown to be obviously flawed and unreliable. And instead of acknowledging that fact, or abandoning the source, you merely re-added the incorrect numbers with slight adjustments here and there to overcome some inconvenient facts. I'm sorry, but that's not how Wikipedia works. If a source has been proven to be unreliable, as yours has, you simply cannot continue to use it as a source for any factual claim. After all, even your adjusted and supposedly 'corrected' figures are still ridiculous:

* 17 tanks lost - There were only 22 tanks (two Squadrons) in the entire operational theatre, and 19 of those returned to South Africa. Despite all the claims, the only wreckage shown in post-battle photos is that of the three tanks at Tumpo. No other wreckage has been discovered or presented.

* 24 G5s lost - As I wrote above, there were never more than sixteen G5s inside either Angola or Namibia, a fact acknowledged by Ronnie Kasrils who was certainly no friend of the SADF. So what, did they destroy each gun twice over?

* 3 fighter aircraft shot down - An improvement from 14 fighters being shot down, but still not accurate. The only SAAF fighter losses during this period were that of F1AZ 245 (shot down by an SA-9) and F1AZ 223, which crashed on a night sortie unrelated to this battle. That makes one aircraft shot down, not three.

Considering all this, I honestly don't see how you have any grounds to continue adding these numbers to the article. They're obviously wrong.

But to address the rest of what you wrote, the links you posted are essentially irrelevant in this context. We're discussing the outcome of a single battle, not of the entire war (which was fought in a far wider context). And in the context of the SADF's operations surrounding the battle (Ops Modular, Hooper & Packer), it's perfectly reasonable to conclude (as many have) that the SADF actually emerged the victor. Lest we forget, the SADF sent forces into Angola in order to stop a massive FAPLA armoured offensive towards Unita's strongholds in the south. This was wildly successful, to the point which the relatively small SADF force in Angola (no more than 3000 men) was able to repulse the Angolan brigades all the way back to Cuito Cuanavale. So even if we accept that the SADF intended to capture Cuito and did not (a heavily disputed assertion), there's no doubt that the initial objectives of the South African intervention were achieved. The personal accounts by low-ranking SADF soldiers do not make any difference to this conclusion, since by definition those men were exposed to only a tiny portion of the entire battle and saw only a fraction of the larger strategic picture. And it's not true to claim, as you do, that the goal was to install Unita as a friendly government in Luanda, as that idea had been rejected as early as 1975 due to its impracticality. The real aim was far more limited, which was to preserve Unita's strength in southern Angola so that it could act as a buffer zone against SWAPO infiltrations and also prevent the Angolan and Cuban armies from building up significant forces in the south of the country.

It's also untrue to say that South Africa would not budge on the question of Namibia's independence until after this battle. By 1977 the South African government had already agreed in principle to Namibian independence as part of the negotiations around UNSC Resolution 435, which South Africa agreed to implement based on certain pre-conditions, one of which was the absence of Cuban troops in Angola. There was no intention to annex the territory, nor would it have made much sense to do so as the country was more of a economic burden than an asset. By 1985, a second round of elections had produced a Transitional Government composed mostly of ethnic black political parties (but excluding SWAPO), which South Africa hoped would be recognised by the international community as a legitimate government. It was not. Fact is, the South African strategic interest in Namibia was not a desire to annex it, but rather a desire to avoid having it become a Soviet client state possibly containing Cuban armoured forces, which would have been the likely scenario after a SWAPO victory. With the fall of the Soviet Union from 1988 onwards, that ceased to be the threat it once was.

Neither Cuito nor Calueque can be considered 'brutal defeats', nor was the Cuban armoured column in southern Angola that big a threat. A serious surprise, perhaps, and a potent demonstration that the Cubans were far better than their Angolan counterparts, but no more than that. The Cuban force was so badly mauled in the counter-attack by a smaller and lighter SADF force that its potency was greatly reduced. And Calueque was a strategically-ineffectual attack, causing little infrastructural damage and demonstrating nothing more than that Cuban/Angolan aircraft were capable of attacking targets inside of Angola. And please don't try to bring forth that 'MiG-23 broke our hearts' nonsense, as that has been soundly debunked elsewhere. As for the link you provided; despite Duvenage's speculation there's no evidence that preparations were being made to ready the country's nuclear weapons for use in 1988. None of the six that had been built were moved from their vaults near Pretoria, nor were any actually fitted to any SAAF aircraft or other delivery platforms. It's also unrealistic; common sense proscribes that the SA government would first attempt a bulking up of its conventional forces in Angola (of 500 000 trained soldiers, just over 3000 were deployed to Angola. That's less than 1% of the SADF's available soldiers) before choosing to go nuclear, which would have been a move so extreme it would almost certainly have resulted in the forced removal from power of the SA government.

Ultimately though, the fact of the matter is that the massive SADF losses in men and materiel alleged by the sources on which you rely do not have any real basis in fact whatsoever. To this day neither Cuba nor Angola have been able to produce any of the wreckage for the hundreds of vehicles and aircraft they claim to have destroyed over and above those which independent sources acknowledge to have been lost. But more importantly, there's a massive distinction between the SADF and Cuban accounts of the battle, which is that only one of the three countries involved has seen a true change of government. The Castro regime remains in place in Cuba, while Angola is still ruled by the MPLA, but South Africa is now governed by the ANC which has always been a close ally of both Cuba and Angola. The ANC is inherently opposed to the old SADF and continues to claim that the SADF lost at Cuito, but yet despite having full access to all the SADF records from the entire Border War it has not produced a single piece of hard evidence to support the claims of massive SADF losses. The SADF, like all professional militaries, was fastidious about accurate record-keeping and every detail you could ever want about SADF losses and equipment numbers remains locked up in the SADF archives, so the fact that the ANC has yet to bring out those records in order to justify its claims about Cuito Cuanavale can indicate only that the records match the SADF's claims. In contrast, the official Cuban records remain strictly classified, which means that Cuban supporters have to rely on Cuban propaganda and the tiny portions of Cuban military records that the Castro regime permits certain friendly journalists to see because they're not too embarrassing. We'll have to wait until a democratic Cuba before the truth contained in those records can be revealed.

But this has all been discussed before on this page, and I'm not really willing to continue arguing it ad infinitum without anything new being brought to the table. I will continue to revert you if you attempt to add the ridiculous SADF loss numbers to the infobox, as you do not have a credible and reliable source for the numbers and so there's no justification for their presence in the article. — Impi (talk) 14:40, 16 October 2008 (UTC)

Roger, Impi there's not point in arguing facts with idiots. They will drag you down to their level and beat you with experience! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.103.117.117 (talk) 00:04, 8 January 2009 (UTC)

so-called "lessons"

I deleted the obviously unsubstantiated, and tendentious, claim that the battle of Cuito Cuanavale gives, as an important lesson, the the SADF could not be defeated in battle. How does a stalemate, or a defensive victory, "prove" any such thing?

Anyway, i suggest deleting *all* these lessons. Is it really usual to have "lessons' in an encyclopeida article? Wike policy seems to me to suggest we let the reader draw such conclusions. Some of these so-called lessons are not really all that important, although true, like the 16,000 ft. issue. others are unsbustantiated. If the editor who wrote these would kindly provide a source which is relatively consensual that really says "the sadf could not be defeated in battle" that would be different.

It is illogical to infer from "the sadf was not defeated in this battle" that "the sadf could not be defeated in battle", and it is super-controversial to say the sadf was not defeated in this battle. LOok, they had infantry assaults against the Tumpo triangle that were all thrown back. That is a defeat, of a sort. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 200.55.154.139 (talk) 04:27, 3 March 2009 (UTC)

Lessons deleted, since you both seem to say let's do so - and they look like original research. Babakathy (talk) 12:46, 3 March 2009 (UTC)

Reads like SADF propaganda

Order of Battle section can be summarized as "SADF claims: our valiant forces annihilated the enemy time and again", with SADF losses mentioned so low as to be surreal. Furthermore, no engagements that SADF failed to win decisively (again, according to itself) are mentioned, yet its casualties clearly came from somewhere... —Preceding unsigned comment added by Aadieu (talk • contribs) 01:49, 5 October 2009 (UTC)

So which pro-South African jackass wrote this

This article is pathetic. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.22.215.20 (talk) 08:27, 5 December 2009 (UTC)

Both sides claimed victory, but...

All Cuban/MPLA demands where granted: independence of Angola and Namibia, withdraw of all troops. Come on! Can anybody believe this? Please, get the facts right! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 200.55.140.181 (talk) 19:00, 16 December 2009 (UTC)

All South African demands were also met - the Cubans left Angola at the same time. But that is relevant to the war as a whole - not this particular campaign. The SA goal for this campaign was to prevent MPLA/FAPLA from encroaching into UNITA controlled territory and more specifically to stop FAPLA's advance on Jamba. Angola was already independent at the time of this campaign. Get your facts straight! The only goal SA had with respect to the town of Cuito Cuanavale itself was to disrupt the airbase - which they did very successfully using long range artillery, The Angolan/Cuban claim that SA wanted to occupy the town itself is the biggest lie of the whole war. If they really intended to do that they would have brought far more than ~3000 troops. Roger (talk) 09:41, 17 December 2009 (UTC)

The objectives of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale were none of the things you mention. It was undeniably a South African/UNITA victory. The allies achieved their strategic and tactical aims, Cuba/MPLA did not. To blandly state that both sides claimed victory is a nonsense. Mandela is not a reliable source.Royalcourtier (talk) 02:20, 11 December 2014 (UTC)

No Royalcourtier, it was NOT a SADF/UNITA victory. The SADF was ultimately defeated when they besieged the town of Cuito Cuanavale and failed to capture it. This is nothing but Boer revisionist propaganda. As far as Mandela as a source is concerned, when he assumed power in South Africa he had access to the military records of the South African military even before the collapse of Apartheid. The military failure is what brought South Africa to the negotiating table and there has been a disinformation campaign to cover up the actual SADF losses which were far greater than reported. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Yog Sohoth (talk • contribs) 04:12, 17 January 2015 (UTC)

As it happens, you can argue this using emotive language as much as you like. You're wrong. There were many factors which brought South Africa to the negotiating table, military failure in this or any other battle/campaign had nothing to do with it. I'd like to see your sources for a "disinformation campaign" to cover up the losses. The number of SADF losses are public knowledge and well recorded! BoonDock (talk) 08:06, 17 January 2015 (UTC)

As it is, the current records made available by the SANDF are far more transparent than those offered by Cuba and Angola - indeed, it is the latter two who have consistently - and I'm talking as late as 2013 here - refused to release their own records of the battle to historians. Hence, we have no alternative to rely on mostly South African sources, which are far more specific in any case. The problem with Cuban/FAPLA accounts is that they use so much political language (ie lacing factual accounts with constant references to ideology) that it's difficult to separate military fact from say, a lecture on the evils of apartheid. Furthermore, their accounts are hideously vague: for example, claiming to have destroyed twelve SADF "armoured cars" and 10 "tanks" on February 14. The SADF claimed to have destroyed at least 7 "tanks" that day for the loss of 2 vehicles slightly damaged. However, this is backed up not only by the accounts of many individual soldiers, but also by photographic evidence and other extensive documentation. Although it is the Cuban/FAPLA version which is most often repeated in former communist bloc states, it's just an echo - with no proof or individual accounts or other sources to back it up.

Anyroad, that's all I have to say regarding the comment on "Boer disinformation". If you want to get more sources out of Havana and Luanda, you're welcome to go ask them yourself...unfortunately without a Freedom of Information Act like RSA's they're not obligated to provide you with answers and have already refused many world-class scholars on the subject. A dreadful shame.

I don't usually like delving into the whole nitpicky "who won" crap when it comes to Cuito Cuanavale. Both sides (meaning FAPLA and UNITA) took heavy losses. Both sides also defined victory in different ways. FAPLA came out worse when it came to casualties and equipment destroyed. In this case I think it's best to refer those who want concrete answers to Eeben Barlow. Barlow fought on both sides of the Angolan Civil War and had the unique opportunity of commanding alongside FAPLA and the SADF throughout his career. His words of wisdom:

“ It all depends on which side you are speaking to...Cuito lay in the path of the FAPLA/Cuban forces push towards Jamba – the UNITA stronghold in Southern Angola – and the SADF was ordered to stop this drive. They did this well and with very limited forces. But, a very large Cuban flanking manoeuvre far to the West threatened to cut-off the SA forces at Cuito. At that time, the SADF had lost its air superiority due to a lack of aircraft – the arms embargo had done its job. The Cuban push could thus be done under an air superiority umbrella.

Facing the likelihood of being cut-off, the SA forces executed a retrograde operation. So, talk to the Cubans – they say they turned the tide of the war and won. Speak to the SADF – they say they achieved their mission. Speak to ex-FAPLA men who were there – they will tell you they suffered horrific casualties but persevered.

Personally, and bear in mind that I was not there, I think Cuito was a short-sighted political blunder by SA politicians who had lost sight of the strategic objectives of the war and tried to play generals.

The fact is that Cuito got such massive international publicity aimed at creating a perception that the SADF lost there. So, from an operational point-of-view, the SADF won. But from a strategic point of view, the Cubans placed the SADF at a disadvantage they did not exploit.

Cuito did however alter the landscape of the war as all sides were by then war-weary.

”

Eeben Barlow in 2013, speaking here

Thanks, --Katangais (talk) 19:32, 17 January 2015 (UTC)

Well said and thought out, Katangais. But one thing is very clear that despite the dispute over who won the battle, it is clear that the SADF lost the military advantage in Angola and decided to cut their losses and retreat. So even if Cuito Cuanavale was a tactical victory for the SADF, it was clearly a strategic defeat for the SADF and the Reich of South Africa. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.17.246.44 (talk) 00:39, 20 January 2015 (UTC)

Again, not so at all! This article is about a specific battle, not the broader Cold War. In the context of this specific battle, the facts are clear - MPLA+Cuba tried to destroy UNITA so that they could impose a communist dictatorship. SA backed UNITA and tried to protect UNITA from destruction, by confronting MPLA+Cuba at Cuito. SA halted the MPLA+Cuba advance against UNITA, and forced them to abandon the attempt. Job done, SA won. Ultimately UNITA lived on to contest elections post-war, so SA+USA clearly succeeded in that process as well. Two nil. However ultimately-ultimately the MPLA imposed a communist dictatorship anyway, so ultimately-ultimately the communists won that one. However in the very big picture the USSR bled itself to death in the attempt (in Angola and in Vietnam and in Afghanistan etc etc) so ultimately-ultimately-ultimately communism was defeated. Game over. Re Namibia - SA tried to protect Namibia from communist military invasion, and succeeded at that level. SWAPO eventually won elections, although with a non-dictatorial constitution, so they sort-of won but they also sort-of lost. Re apartheid, SA held on to apartheid until the Berlin Wall came down and the USSR gave up, then handed over peacefully to democracy with a non-dictatorial constitution. We see the value of that war every day - the ANC government tries to steal and is blocked by the constitution which they were forced to accept because they were unable to win liberation by military means. So the "whites" have been protected from communist dictatorship, so in part they won, but the "blacks" have a majority in a democratic parliament, so in part they won. It’s a classic compromise situation, and all sides can claim to have won merely by being selective about where the winning post is set - at the battle in Cuito, at the negotiating table at the UN, in the elections in Namibia, in the elections in SA, in the SA Constitutional Court arguing about the right to nationalize? However this article is specifically about the battle at Cuito, so we need to stick to that. And in the battle, SA+UNITA defeated MPLA+Cuba. The fact are clear on this. Wdford (talk) 09:54, 20 January 2015 (UTC)

Bias!

Parts of this article are poisonously biased in favour of the SADF. This article is not objective. It is like a propaganda report for the SADF. Military History and Strategic Studies students will be poisoned by this. Was it written by a South Afeica soldier or general? Take it off!

70.51.81.135 (talk) 17:37, 11 May 2010 (UTC) early drafts of this article seem based on one source, written by a former South Rhodesian now in europe and running a wierd commercial bookshop website. That source has been much copied but its bias is clear, especially if you look at other items reviewed or for sale on the site.

            The dates of the battle are given in a standard academic reference on the history of angola as December 1987 – March 1988[, as in the 

box on top of the article. Other journalists are even more specific about a few weeks around Jan 1988. Yet this source, and the "order of battle" that was posted in this article recently, completely ignore all events after Dec. 1987..... this order of battle should never have been put in the article at all. 70.51.81.135 (talk) 17:37, 11 May 2010 (UTC)

The only bias is in treating Cuban and MPLA propaganda as the equal of official South African records.Royalcourtier (talk) 02:21, 11 December 2014 (UTC)

overhaul

the article was very biased and not well organized. i reduced the whole discussion about the different claims (victory or not) to a minimum because i think the facts speak for themselves.Sundar1 (talk) 11:32, 11 June 2010 (UTC)

unhindered aggression

(Moved here from User talk:Socrates2008#unhindered aggression)
hello socrates2008

if i hadn't known you or or your edits for a while i would think this guy simply has no idea. but this is not the case. you know very well that south africa's aggression went unhindered for years and one just has to read all the articles on its history to confirm that. perhaps you do know the odd occasion, where they were met with some resistance worth mentioning - i don't. when you first removed the word "unhindered" i thought it is not so important but then came to the conclusion, that the whole sentence would not make sense anymore. it is exactly for that reason that cuito (or what happened in those months) has legendary status. its this david-goliath-story. if south africa had been "hindered" before, cuito wouldn't be special, would it?

as to the term "aggression", i could list all the deeds listed in the report instead if it made you any happier. the term aggression simply covers them all.

the same applies to black africa's cheers when south africa finally retreated from angola and namibia. i've read about this many times and the press was full of it. unfortunately i don't remember, whether i was the one who added this statement and presently i can find no direct sources. i'm sure you also know about this. in wikipedia it is generally not necessary to source statements that are not doubted. how can anyone clear-minded doubt this? it would be like doubting the jews not rejoicing after the nazis had been defeated. anyhow, since i couldn't find a source i left it out. a recent other editor had the nerve to call that statement "racist".

It's rather insulting to associate holocaust survivors happiness with the any notion of success by notorious abusers of human rights like Cuba and the FAPLA. Perhaps when the beating, shootings, hunger and humiliation are by communists that it is 'better' then when done by racists? Virgil61 (talk) 19:06, 30 September 2010 (UTC)

all this leads me to the conclusion, that, whenever possible, the purpose of your edits is to dispute statements that put a bad picture on apartheid (and good ones on cuba, for that matter) but not to improve the articles. this is underlined by the fact that many articles dealing with south africa are poorly sourced and extremely one-sided and strangely you do not seem to mind.Sundar1 (talk) 06:41, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

• Firstly, South Africa's activites were not "unhindered". Billions of dollars of Soviet and Cuban weaponry, as well as tenacious opponents like SWAPO, FAPLA, Cuba and the Soviet Union, compounded by international sactions and the deaths of South African soldiers, ensured that this was not a cakewalk. So while the SADF might have been the dominant force for the greater part of the conflict, they were as you well know, certainly not "unhindered". The reference you provided also makes no mention of the SADF being unhindered in Angola. In summary, this terminology fails to meet both WP:NPOV and WP:V.

i fail to see where s.a. was ever hindered in a way worth mentioning. first of all, this statement is referring to all of southern africa, not just angola. none of the obstacles you list (you forgot many others like zanu, anc, frelimo etc.) ever stopped them and they also had free hand in southern angola until cc. so what on earth are you talking about? do you call a few dead s. a. soldiers compared to thousands of dead opponents or that some resistance was encountered an obstacle? also, this statement fully mirrors the numerous s. a. “battle” reports in which there hardly ever is mention of remarkable resistance, if at all.

• I care a great deal about the balance in these articles, which is one of the ways that I contribute towards them. Yes, the South Africans did a bunch of bad things in the name of apartheid, but that does not give anyone carte blanche to stretch or embelish the truth with politicised POV language, especially when there are so many facts readily available.

“a bunch of bad things” is putting it very nicely! this statement exactly shows what kind of balance i oppose and you dislike politisised pov-language but don't seem to mind militarised pov-language. where has the truth been stretched or embellished and where is politicised pov-language in my edits? it’s exactly theses kinds of statements without pointing out the actual mistakes (usually not existing) which lead to the conclusion that you favour apartheid s. a. in your edits.

• "Articles dealing with south africa are poorly sourced and extremely one-sided and strangely you do not seem to mind" - I encourge you to review my edits to articles such as the Cassinga Raid (back to 2007), as well as some of the South African-related articles that I've taken to GA (e.g. Siege of Kimberley). The definition of one-sided is not: anything that does not agree with Sundar1's political viewpoint. If you have strong political views, as you appear to have, you are more likely than not going to find that you disagree with a bunch of other people here at WP - you're going to have to work out how to deal with that.

it says “many articles”, not “articles” dealing with s. a. and they refer to apartheid s. a. which is obvious. so the kimberley article is no example for neutrality when cuba is involved.

the title “battle of cassinga” is already off the mark, because there was no battle. yes, you did positive edits there, yet, you seem totally oblivious to the “attack” section, which is absolutely one-sided. it’s exactly this kind of article i’m referring to.

you seem to know my “political pov” and what are “strong political views”? please enlighten me. the only people i will likely disagree with are ones trying to keep apartheid s. a. out of the light or not to give cuba its due just because it’s communist. so far, there haven’t been too many and i need not work out how to deal with them; indeed, there are so many sources.

• "i've read about this many times and the press was full of it. unfortunately i don't remember, whether i was the one who added this statement and presently i can find no direct sources" - I believe that you are experienced enough an editor to know that this does not meet WP:V, so I don't know why you've bothered to mention this. (c.f. your point about poorly-referenced articles above, as well as the warning at the top of this page about this article being controversial and requiring full references)

what is the statement or argument in this?

• Lastly, your note here is fringing on WP:NPA - I would urge you to stay focused on commenting on article content, not other editors, if you wish to avoid future adventures with administrators.

don’t worry, i will. unfortunately, this is an advice you and many others do not heed yourselves. what about your definition of one-sidedness, assuming “political” viewpoints or “strong political views”? this has little to do with focus on content.

Socrates2008 (Talk) 12:32, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Sundar1 (talk) 13:59, 26 July 2010 (UTC)

a better read

This page is about a battle. There is a lot of talk on this page, but not about te battle. A beter read is this: http://rhodesia.nl/cuito.htm

The Wikipedia page should be more like this. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 77.162.77.117 (talk) 09:09, 18 August 2010 (UTC)

This Article has been drastically changed

Over the next few days I will be reverting the politically biased parts of the article that were injected over the summer to the less political more analytical previous approach. Virgil61 (talk) 18:15, 30 September 2010 (UTC)

I've been busy with work so haven't been able to change the article as soon as I planned. Not off my radar. The aftermath section reads like love-letter to Cuba. Virgil61 (talk) 17:46, 11 December 2010 (UTC)

"Stalemate"

The outcome on Wikia state this battle was a stalemate however there is a section that clearly states in the same paragraph that there is no offical outcome depending on the factors however it does state that based on straight military POV that this was a South Africa / UNITA victory so it should go to them. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.165.115.234 (talk) 23:42, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

I have read in the comment secction, that the Angolan/cubans won at the end. Could someone tell me what was the real outcome of the battle? hope this aricle dont look like the battle of Bir Backeim or the Battle of La drang in wich both sides claim victory.--190.118.9.11 (talk) 17:51, 23 April 2011 (UTC)

Both sides claim "victory" of sorts, but the TRC source describes a stalemate. Greenman (talk) 22:41, 23 April 2011 (UTC)

Cuban/FAPLA/SWAPO achieved all their objectives, Apartheid South Africa did not. Period. The winners are very obvious. I know it hurts dear south africans but the truth is.... you lost! — Preceding unsigned comment added by 190.202.89.162 (talk) 08:51, 28 August 2011 (UTC)

Weapons

Does anyone mind if I added a section on weapons used by the combatants? I've done it before with other areas of conflict. See Winter War[6], Vietnam War[7], 1948 Arab–Israeli War[8], Six Day War[9], Yom Kippur War[10]--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 18:50, 1 September 2011 (UTC)

Be bold. PS: Although you're not following your own pattern by adding this to a battle rather than a war article. Socrates2008 (Talk) 09:35, 2 September 2011 (UTC)

True but this battle lasted for quite a while and had far-reaching implications in the context of Cold War politics.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 12:57, 2 September 2011 (UTC)

I don't believe that the Rooikat participated in the battle though it was added to the weapons chart[11] Can anyone provide a source that establishes the Rooikat's use at Cuito?--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 16:04, 11 October 2011 (UTC)

As per DefenceWeb the Rooikat entered service only once the war was over. I have removed it from the table. Impi (talk) 16:33, 11 October 2011 (UTC)

Excellent. Thank you.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 18:03, 11 October 2011 (UTC)

Content re-ordered and supplemented

I have re-written much of the article, to provide a more coherent flow of the battle, with its various objectives, actions and outcomes, so that it can be better understood in order. I filled in some gaps with additional referenced material, using researched secondary sources rather than newspapers etc. The aftermath section was unduly long, and doesn't really form part of this topic, so I have reduced it accordingly. If its excessively detailed we can trim it down further. Wdford (talk) 09:42, 24 September 2013 (UTC)

I appreciate the efforts, and acknowledge this article is better written than many southern African battle articles, as it at least presents the military history of both sides. However, that both sides presented the battle as victory is relevant - and in fact the Angolan, Cuban and Namibian governments still do present it as such. We cannot treat one side's views as fact and the others as "claims". Babakathy (talk) 11:28, 23 December 2013 (UTC)

If we are to take this operation by operation:

• Saludando Octubre (FAPLA):

• drive UNITA from Mavinga and south-east: failure
• secure the town of Cuito Cuanavale from capture: success

• Moduler (SADF): protect UNITA by stopping FAPLA/Cuban advance: success
• Hooper (SADF): clearing FAPLA/Cuban forces from the east side of the Cuito river: failure
• Packer (SADF): clearing FAPLA/Cuban forces from the east side of the Cuito river: failure

To me this is rather indicative of an inconclusive result and to present it as a SADF victory is misleading. Babakathy (talk) 11:44, 23 December 2013 (UTC)

The FAPLA/Cuban objective was to advance on Mavinga and destroy UNITA. The SADF objective was to stop that advance, and to protect UNITA. The advance was smashed, and was abandoned, as all objective sources agree. The SADF objective was thus achieved in full, and the FAPLA objective not. Although a few FAPLA individuals remained on the east of the river behind their minefields they were unable to advance beyond those minefields, so were out of the battle. The actual town was never attacked, so protecting it from capture is a make-believe victory. To use a football analogy, its like Cuba claiming to have won the third quarter of the match 1-0, and ignoring that the final result was 4-1 against them. A typical communist distortion of the facts, but this is to be expected. Wdford (talk) 12:01, 23 December 2013 (UTC)

I have to disagree on all objective sources agree - we have two sources in the lead. The first is the SADF magazine, which is no more objective than a speech by Fidel Castro or Oliver Tambo. The second source actually says for both sides the myth of victory seemed a crucial precondition for realignment and as a source it doesn't even support the first part of the sentence it is attached to as a citation ( Although the SADF achieved its objectives). It explores the political and psychological effects of the battle as part of an overall analysis of the role of the armed struggle in South Africa - but it does not speak at all to the military aspects of CC. Babakathy (talk) 12:25, 23 December 2013 (UTC)

I didn't put the Paratus source in the lead, and I personally disagree with having citations in the lead at all, as they are supposed to be summaries of the article content. There are numerous sources quoted in the body of the article that address these issues in depth. I would propose that all citations in the lead be removed, and the readers be allowed to study the detail in the body of the article. If we need to cite everything in the lead, it can be done, but it will be messy and I think unproductive. What do you think? Wdford (talk) 12:39, 23 December 2013 (UTC)

Nowhere in the article itself other than the lead do we have conclusions. The objectives section reads well to me, but if that is correct, then perhaps if we are to have any "conclusion" in the lead it should talk to those.

Proposed edit to lead on citations: Sounds fine to me. Babakathy (talk) 12:46, 23 December 2013 (UTC)

Sorry, I'm confused. Are you suggesting we should add a new "Outcomes" section or a "Conclusions" section? If yes, then I agree. Wdford (talk) 13:25, 23 December 2013 (UTC)

Not quite what I meant but actually a better idea ;)

Outcomes I think is a good title for new section, and then we can state what outcomes were factually - which is a lot more productive than arguing about definitions of victory... Babakathy (talk) 07:13, 24 December 2013 (UTC)

Interesting point of view by Namibian author

This personal opinion makes for very interesting reading: here Farawayman (talk) 22:33, 30 May 2014 (UTC)

This "opinion" is in tune with the reliable sources. Is this author perhaps a reliable source in his own right? Wdford (talk) 12:12, 1 June 2014 (UTC)

Self-published. Not an RS. Feketekave (talk) 08:51, 22 October 2014 (UTC)

Bush War: The Road to Cuito Cuanavale

• I am a little surprised to see no mention of "Bush War: The Road to Cuito Cuanavale. Soviet soldiers' accounts of the Angolan War". Appendix A ("Gauging the Losses and the Outcome") contains a detailed (and, I would say after a first look, rather convincing) critique of some of the South African figures used here. Feketekave (talk) 08:51, 22 October 2014 (UTC)

As you seem to be the one who has the book, it's up to you to use it. Editors cannot use sources they do not have. Roger (Dodger67) (talk) 09:48, 22 October 2014 (UTC)

Or the pages visible here can be used [Bush War: The Road to Cuito Cuanavale] BoonDock (talk) 10:47, 22 October 2014 (UTC)

• Actually, I see someone's opinion reflected in the pages that I linked to above. There is no substantial argument that would change, in my opinion, anything that has been debated on this page before about the numbers. The core issue there, as I see it, is that the SADF numbers are the only ones which are verifiable. All the others are pure speculation, including the Cuban and UNITA ones, as the contemporary documentation, the primary source if you will, is not accessible to researchers because either it was never recorded correctly or at all (UNITA), or it is still held as a "state secret" (Cuba), so all the books and articles are all the same, they are rehashing the same arguments based on the same problems with the numbers that we are struggling with here. BoonDock (talk) 06:23, 23 October 2014 (UTC)

Most of the Cuban accounts are repeated in contemporary Soviet (later Russian) and other academic publications in countries formerly aligned with the communist bloc. Historians in these countries, much like historians in RSA, use whatever material is most readily available to them. While I agree that 99.9% of it is complete bloody utter rubbish, that doesn't mean they should be excluded altogether. See T-54/55. The article makes mention of both the SADF claim that only one Ratel was destroyed on February 14 during the Cuito campaign, and the absurd FAPLA/Cuban claim that they destroyed ten Olifants(!) and twelve Ratels the same day. --Katangais (talk) 23:35, 4 November 2014 (UTC)

Protection

• Is it possible to "semi-protect" this article to prevent the hit and run vitriol such as what I have just reverted? BoonDock (talk) 11:16, 14 December 2014 (UTC)

this is a rare moment of world history

South Africa decided to launch an attack and succeeded.

South Africa decided to let unita alone and succeeded.

South Africa decided to abandon the field and succeeded (inflicting heavy casualties on opponents).

South Africa decided to enter negotiations and succeeded.

South Africa decided to accept Angola and SW Africa independence and succeeded.

South Africa decided to end apartheid and give power to mandela and succeeded.

This is one of the rare moment in history where a whole country decided to auto terminate itself (and succeeded ;) ). It is quite impressive. Do you really have sources that implies this suicide ?

RigOLuche (talk) 21:09, 18 January 2015 (UTC)

I'm not sure I understand your question? I agree with most of the declarative statements you made. It WAS a rare moment in history and was lauded as such world wide. So what is your point? BoonDock (talk) 21:14, 18 January 2015 (UTC)

Only the first three statements are related to the specific subject of this article. Roger (Dodger67) (talk) 21:19, 18 January 2015 (UTC)

And yet the last three are often mentioned as being made possible by this, or at least, having a direct causative effect. That aside, I take exception to the implication that South Africa "committed suicide" in any way by peacefully moving to a sharing of power! The "aftermath" of this (series of) battle(s) has been argued to include a hastening of South Africa's movement to the peace table, or conversely that SA hastened the end of the operations in Angola specifically so that the situation at home could be concentrated on. However you look at it, it made political sense to "abandon the field" and "enter negotiations" voluntarily. I'm not sure what is meant by "let unita alone" though? SA supported UNITA through the whole process of peace negotiations and the JMC etc. It was only after the 1994 elections in South Africa that UNITA was truly orphaned. I see that RigOLuche has removed his request for proof of casualties. I wonder why? maybe he's actually read the article or the sources or waded through the "debate" on this page? BoonDock (talk) 22:30, 18 January 2015 (UTC)

my point is that the article pose like SA was successfull all the way through in this affair. Or we all know that this affair lead to the independence of Angola and Namibia, and mid term, to the downfall of the apartheid. As the article shows that SA repeatedly plan and succeed, we can ask ourself if she intended to abandon UNITA, allow Namibia to be independent and apartheid to finish. Do you have sources that implies this strategical suicid then apartheid self destruction ? RigOLuche (talk) 18:38, 19 January 2015 (UTC)