Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles

Norman Davis, one of the two authors of Article 231.

John Foster Dulles, one of the two authors of Article 231.

Article 231, commonly known as the "Guilt Clause" or the "War Guilt Clause", is the first article in Part VIII, "Reparations" of the Treaty of Versailles. Apart from "Article 231", there is no title for this article in the treaty itself. The names "Guilt Clause" and "War Guilt Clause" were assigned in later commentaries.

Text of the article

The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

Significance

The article, in which Germany accepted the responsibility for the damages they had caused by World War I, served as a legal basis for the following articles, which obliged Germany to pay reparations. Similar clauses, with slight modification to the wording, were present in the peace treaties signed by the other members of the Central Powers.

The article was written by US diplomats Norman Davis and John Foster Dulles who by writing Article 231 had created what President Woodrow Wilson's biographer Arthur Walworth called a "psychological sop".

The British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George commented that:

The English public like the French public, thinks the Germans must above all acknowledge their obligation to compensate us for all the consequences of their aggression. When this is done we come to the question of Germany's capacity to pay; we all think she will be unable to pay more than this document requires of her.

At the time, the various Allied delegations naively regarded Article 231 as not a problematic clause given that the intention was to limit German liability with regard to reparations, and were most surprised at the violent reaction it generated with the Germans when the German delegation read the peace terms in June 1919. Historian Margaret MacMillan comments that the German public's interpretation of Article 231 as unequivocally ascribing the fault for the war to Germany and her allies, says Macmillan, "came to be the object of particular loathing in Germany and the cause of uneasy consciences among the Allies." She notes that the Allies never expected such a hostile reaction, for "No one thought there would be any difficulty over the clauses themselves." Historian Sally Marks comments that neither the Austrian or Hungarian governments viewed the similar clauses, in their respective peace treaties, "as a declaration of war guilt" and rather it was "German politicians and propagandists" who misinterpreted the treaty and convinced "many who had not read the treaties" that the article implied war guilt by "endlessly" protesting it as a way of gaining international sympathy.

By blaming only Germany and its allies for causing the war, Article 231 has been cited as one of the causes that led to the rise of Nazism in Germany. Yale historian Hajo Holborn says that the Treaty of Versailles was "viewed by practically all Germans as a deep humiliation."

Reparations issue

Marks points out that the next article, Article 232 of the Versailles treaty, limits German responsibility to pay only for civilian damages, and that when a conference was called in London in 1921 to determine how much Germany should pay, the Allies calculated on the basis of what Germany could pay, not on their needs. She further notes that the reparation figure was "organized in three series of bonds, labeled A, B, and C. Of these, the C Bonds, which contained the bulk of the German obligation, were deliberately designed to be chimerical" and "their primary function was to mislead public opinion in the receiver countries into believing that the 132-billion mark figure was being maintained." Historian P.M.H. Bell reinforces this position and further notes that two thirds of the reparation figure was contained within C Bond category which "amounted to indefinite postponement" of that sum. Marks continues "thus the A and B Bonds, which were genuine, represented the actual Allied assessment of German capacity to pay". The A Bonds amounted to 12 billion gold marks and the B bonds a further 38 billion marks, which equated to around 12.5 billion dollars "an amount smaller than what Germany had recently offered to pay" In all Germany paid approximately 20 billion marks "during the entire history of reparations, which historian Stephen Shucker notes was "a unilateral transfer equal to a startling 5.3 percent of German national income for 1919-31."

See also

• World War I reparations

Bibliography

References

• Keylor, William (1998), "Versailles and International Diplomacy", in Boemeke, Manfred F; Feldman, Gerald D; Glaser, Elizabeth (eds.), The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years, Cambridge University Press, pp. 469–505, ISBN 978-0-521-62888-4, 688 pp.
• MacMillan, Margaret; Holbrooke, Richard (2003), Paris 1919: six months that changed the world, Random House, ISBN 978-0-375-76052-5, 570 pp.
• Marks, Sally (1978), "The Myths of Reparations", Central European History, 11 (3), Cambridge University Press on behalf of Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association: 231–55, doi:10.1017/S0008938900018707, ISSN 1569-1616, JSTOR 4545835 {{citation}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Invalid |ref=harv (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)