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==The "GE Three"==
==The "GE Three"==
On February 2, 1976, [[Gregory Minor|Gregory C. Minor]], Richard B. Hubbard, and Dale G. Bridenbaugh (known as the [[GE Three]]) "blew the whistle" on safety problems at [[nuclear power plant]]s, and their action has been called "an exemplary instance of [[whistleblowing]]".<ref name=nuke>[http://ethics.iit.edu/career/ Whistleblower on Nuclear Plant Safety]</ref>

The three engineers gained the attention of journalists and their disclosures about the threats of nuclear power had a significant impact. They timed their statements to coincide with their resignations from responsible positions in [[General Electric]]'s nuclear energy division, and later established themselves as consultants on the nuclear power industry for state governments, federal agencies, and overseas governments. The consulting firm they formed, MHB Technical Associates, was technical advisor for the movie, "[[The China Syndrome]]." The three engineers participated in Congressional hearings which their disclosures precipitated.<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,918045,00.html The San Jose Three]</ref><ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,879643,00.html The Struggle over Nuclear Power]</ref>
The three engineers gained the attention of journalists and their disclosures about the threats of nuclear power had a significant impact. They timed their statements to coincide with their resignations from responsible positions in [[General Electric]]'s nuclear energy division, and later established themselves as consultants on the nuclear power industry for state governments, federal agencies, and overseas governments. The consulting firm they formed, MHB Technical Associates, was technical advisor for the movie, "[[The China Syndrome]]." The three engineers participated in Congressional hearings which their disclosures precipitated.<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,918045,00.html The San Jose Three]</ref><ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,879643,00.html The Struggle over Nuclear Power]</ref>

A book chapter which discusses the whistleblowing, written by Vivian Weil, was published in 1983 as "The Browns Ferry Case" in ''Engineering Professionalism and Ethics'', edited by James H. Schaub and Karl Pavlovic, and published by [[John Wiley & Sons]].<ref name=nuke/>


==Arnold Gundersen==
==Arnold Gundersen==

Revision as of 09:22, 1 July 2012

There have been a number of nuclear power whistleblowers, often nuclear engineers, who have identified safety concerns at nuclear power plants in the United States. In some cases the whistleblowers gained the attention of journalists and their disclosures about the possible threats of nuclear power had a significant impact. Some nuclear power plant workers may have to decide whether to blow the whistle on their employer's nuclear safety practices or to be silent out of fear of losing their jobs.

The "GE Three"

On February 2, 1976, Gregory C. Minor, Richard B. Hubbard, and Dale G. Bridenbaugh (known as the GE Three) "blew the whistle" on safety problems at nuclear power plants, and their action has been called "an exemplary instance of whistleblowing".[1]

The three engineers gained the attention of journalists and their disclosures about the threats of nuclear power had a significant impact. They timed their statements to coincide with their resignations from responsible positions in General Electric's nuclear energy division, and later established themselves as consultants on the nuclear power industry for state governments, federal agencies, and overseas governments. The consulting firm they formed, MHB Technical Associates, was technical advisor for the movie, "The China Syndrome." The three engineers participated in Congressional hearings which their disclosures precipitated.[2][3]

A book chapter which discusses the whistleblowing, written by Vivian Weil, was published in 1983 as "The Browns Ferry Case" in Engineering Professionalism and Ethics, edited by James H. Schaub and Karl Pavlovic, and published by John Wiley & Sons.[1]

Arnold Gundersen

In 1990 Arnold Gundersen discovered radioactive material in an accounting safe at Nuclear Energy Services in Danbury, the consulting firm where he held a $120,000-a-year job as senior vice president.[4] Three weeks after he notified the company president of what he believed to be radiation safety violations, Gundersen was fired. According to the New York Times, for three years, Gundersen "was awakened by harassing phone calls in the middle of the night" and he "became concerned about his family's safety". Gundersen believes he was blacklisted, harassed and fired for doing what he thought was right.[4]

The New York Times reports that Gundersen's case is not uncommon, especially in the nuclear industry. Even though nuclear workers are encouraged to report potential safety hazards, those who do risk demotion and dismissal. Instead of correcting the problems, whistleblowers say, industry management and government agencies attack them as the cause of the problem. Driven out of their jobs and shunned by neighbors and co-workers, whistleblowers often turn to each other for support.[4]

David Lochbaum

In the early 1990s, nuclear engineer David Lochbaum and a colleague identified a safety problem in a plant where they were working, but were ignored when they raised the issue with the plant manager, the utility and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). After bringing their concerns to Congress, the problem was corrected not just at the original nuclear plant but at plants across the country.[5]

George Galatis

George Galatis was a senior nuclear engineer and whistleblower who reported safety problems at the Millstone 1 Nuclear Power Plant, relating to reactor refueling procedures, in 1996.[6][7] The unsafe procedures meant that spent fuel rod pools at Unit 1 had the potential to boil, possibly releasing radioactive steam throughout the plant.[8] Galatis eventually took his concerns to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to find that they had "known about the unsafe procedures for years". As a result of going to the NRC, Galatis experienced "subtle forms of harassment, retaliation, and intimidation".[7]

Setsuo Fujiwara

Setsuo Fujiwara, who used to design reactors, said he clashed with supervisors over an inspection audit he conducted in March 2009 at the Tomari nuclear plant in Japan. Fujiwara refused to approve a routine test by the plant's operator, Hokkaido Electric Power, saying the test was flawed. A week later, he was summoned by his supervisor, who ordered him to correct his written report to indicate that the test had been done properly. After Fujiwara refused, his employment contract was not renewed. "They told me my job was just to approve reactors, not to raise doubts about them", said Fujiwara, 62, who is now suing the nuclear safety organization to get rehired. In a written response to questions from The New York Times, the agency said it could not comment while the court case was under way.[9]

Recent trends

A major expansion of nuclear power could lead to "pressure to build and operate nuclear plants faster and cheaper".[10] Lessons from history tell us that these pressures will most likely lead to a "schedule over safety" culture at some plants, and nuclear workers may be pressured to "cut corners and overlook safety problems in the interest of getting and keeping plants online and profits flowing to shareholders".[10][11]

Nuclear power plant workers may have to decide whether and how vigorously to blow the whistle on their employer's nuclear safety practices or to be silent out of fear of losing their jobs. It has been argued that these workers, who have a legal duty to report nuclear safety concerns, need to be aware of their legal rights and that nuclear power plants adhere to zero-tolerance policies that prohibit harassment and intimidation made unlawful by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974.[10][11]

Workers at the San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant fear retaliation and possible job loss if they report a safety concern, according to a 2010 survey of workers conducted by a Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspector.[12]

See also

References

  1. ^ a b Whistleblower on Nuclear Plant Safety
  2. ^ The San Jose Three
  3. ^ The Struggle over Nuclear Power
  4. ^ a b c Julie Miller (February 12, 1995). "Paying The Price For Blowing The Whistle". The New York Times.
  5. ^ Kyle Rabin (06.30.2011). "Our Hero: David Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned Scientists". Ecocentric. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  6. ^ Eric Pooley. Nuclear Warriors Time Magazine, March 4, 1996.
  7. ^ a b William H. Shaw. Business Ethics 2004, pp. 267-268.
  8. ^ Adam Bowles. A Cry in the Nuclear Wilderness Christianity Today, October 2, 2000.
  9. ^ "Warnings on Fukushima ignored, insiders say; They attribute failure to cozy ties between government and industry". Power Engineering. 03/11/2012. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  10. ^ a b c Nicole J. Williams and Debra Katz (May 18, 2009). "Protect nuclear whistleblowers". The National Law Journal.
  11. ^ a b David J. Marshall (2007). "Nuclear Whistleblower Law". Katz, Marshall, and Banks.
  12. ^ Staff at California Nuclear Plant Fear Retaliation The Business Journal, 19 February 2010.

External links