Harley Copp: Difference between revisions
No edit summary |
|||
| Line 5: | Line 5: | ||
==Input== |
==Input== |
||
===Input1=== |
===Input1=== |
||
Chapter 12. Whistle Blowing |
|||
The Ford Pinto Case |
|||
In the late 1960s American automobiles were losing market share to smaller Japanese imports. Lee Iacocca, then CEO of the Ford Motor Company, wanted a 1971 model to meet the competition. He reportedly ordered that Ford produce a car for 1971 that weighed less than 2,000 pounds and that would be priced at less than $2,000. That meant that the car had to be designed and produced in 25 months rather than the usual 43 months for a new car line. The resulting car was the Pinto.[1] Because of the accelerated production schedule, the Pinto was not tested for rear-end impact until after it was produced. There was no National Highway Traffic Safety Administration rear-end impact standard at the time. Ford engineers knew that testing for rear-end impact is a standard safety procedure. The car was tested after production, and it failed the test, meaning that it fell below the state of the art for cars of that size. The design of the car placed the fuel tank such that if the car was hit from the rear at a speed above 20 miles per hour, it would be punctured by a bolt from the bumper and could possibly burst into flame. Ford did a study and determined that if a baffle (estimated at costing between $6.65 and $11) were placed between the bumper and the gas tank, the Pinto would be comparable to other cars of its class with respect to the danger of fire from rear-end impact. A company cost-benefit analysis that weighed the cost of adding the baffle against the estimated cost of suits resulting from "excess" accidental deaths and injuries indicated that it would cost the company less not to insert the baffle than to insert it. For whatever reason, the company did not change the design from 1971 to 1978. Nor did the company offer its customers the option of purchasing the baffle. |
|||
[Page 299] |
|||
Between 1976 and 1977 alone, Pintos suffered thirteen fiery rear-end collisions, which was more than double the number for comparable-size cars. As it turned out, suits brought against Ford and the amount it had to pay (estimated at more than $50 million) far exceeded what it saved ($20.9 million) by not correcting the defect—not to mention the cost of bad publicity. |
|||
Nonetheless, despite reports of fires in the Pinto, the car sold well through 1978, when it was finally recalled to have the baffle inserted. When the State of Oregon, because of safety concerns, sold its fleet of Pintos at public auction, the cars went for as much as $1,800 each. Obviously, buyers discounted the danger, weighing it against the cost of what was considered adequate transportation at a good price. |
|||
Ford's actions with respect to the Pinto have been widely criticized. Harley Copp, a former Ford executive and engineer, was critical of the Pinto from the start. He left the company and voiced his criticism, which was taken up by Ralph Nader and others.[2] |
|||
Of course, the Ford engineers were not instructed to make an unsafe car, nor did Ford management set out to do so. That the Pinto was arguably below the state of the art may have been a result of the accelerated production schedule. That the defect was not corrected after the initial production year was the result of a business decision. |
|||
Was anyone at Ford at fault? Did anyone at Ford have an obligation to make known to the public the facts that Ford knew but did not make public? If so, who? Why? |
|||
[1] For sources and more details on the Pinto, see Richard T. De George, "Ethical Responsibilities of Engineers in Large Organizations: The Pinto Case," Business and Professional Ethics Journal, 1, no. 1 (1981), pp. 1–14; Lee P. Strobel, Reckless Homicide? Ford's Pinto Trial (South Bend, Ind.: And Books, 1980); and Mark Dowie, "Pinto Madness," Mother Jones, September/October 1977, pp. 24–28. |
|||
[2] Among the many articles that have appeared, one of the earliest and most incendiary was Mark Dowie, "Pinto Madness," Mother Jones (2), 1977, pp. 18–32. For a defense of Ford and an explanation of the decisions made, see Matthew T. Lee and M. David Ermann, "Pinto 'Madness' as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis," Social Problems 46 (1), 1999, pp. 30–47. |
|||
Blowing the Whistle |
|||
We have seen that corporations have a moral obligation not to harm. This obligation falls on the corporation as such, and internally it falls primarily on those who manage the corporation. Yet other members of the corporation—for instance, engineers and assembly-line workers—are not morally allowed to take part in any immoral activity. Hence, they may not morally take part in any activity that they know will cause harm, including producing products that they know will cause harm. Do they further have a moral obligation to prevent harm, if they are able to do so? |
|||
[Page 300] |
|||
As a general rule, people have a moral obligation to prevent serious harm to others if they are able to do so and can do so with little cost to themselves. As the cost increases, the obligation decreases. If we can save another's life only at the expense of our own life, we are not morally obliged to do so, and giving up our life for another is usually considered an act of heroic virtue. What is the obligation as an employee to prevent his or her company from harming others? The question is a complicated one and leads us to a consideration of what has become known as whistle blowing.[3] |
|||
[3] Some general works dealing with whistle blowing are Myron Peretz Glazer, Penina Migdal Glazer, The Whistleblowers: Exposing Corruption in Government and Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1989); C. Fred Alford, Whistleblowers: Broken Lives and Organizational Power (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001); Roberta Ann Johnson, Whistleblowing: When It Works—And Why (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003); Gerald Vinten (ed.), Whistleblowing: Subversion or Corporate Citizenship? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Marcia P. Miceli and Janet P. Near, Blowing the Whistle: The Organizational and Legal Implications for Companies and Employees (New York: Lexington Books, 1992). Ancorr Web: Anti-Corruption Ring Online has a useful bibliography on whistle blowing at http://www1.oecd.org/daf/nocorruptionweb/Corruption/prev_whistle.htm#references.<ref>http://www.safarix.com/0130991635/ch12</ref> |
|||
===Input2=== |
|||
Last year, Trial magazine, a publication of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, featured an article entitled "Important Civil Trials of the Millennium." The article presented a select group of ten cases from the past millennium, which it cited as milestones in the development of the civil justice system. Included in them was Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. (1981). |
Last year, Trial magazine, a publication of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, featured an article entitled "Important Civil Trials of the Millennium." The article presented a select group of ten cases from the past millennium, which it cited as milestones in the development of the civil justice system. Included in them was Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. (1981). |
||
Revision as of 21:12, 29 April 2007
Harley Copp
In fall 1952, Ford set-up the revived Lincoln Continental as a seperate division to produce the Continental Mark II. John Reinhart was chief stylist; Gordon Buehrig was the chief body engineer assisted by Robert McGuffey Thomas; and Copp was chief engineer.[1]
Input
Input1
Chapter 12. Whistle Blowing The Ford Pinto Case In the late 1960s American automobiles were losing market share to smaller Japanese imports. Lee Iacocca, then CEO of the Ford Motor Company, wanted a 1971 model to meet the competition. He reportedly ordered that Ford produce a car for 1971 that weighed less than 2,000 pounds and that would be priced at less than $2,000. That meant that the car had to be designed and produced in 25 months rather than the usual 43 months for a new car line. The resulting car was the Pinto.[1] Because of the accelerated production schedule, the Pinto was not tested for rear-end impact until after it was produced. There was no National Highway Traffic Safety Administration rear-end impact standard at the time. Ford engineers knew that testing for rear-end impact is a standard safety procedure. The car was tested after production, and it failed the test, meaning that it fell below the state of the art for cars of that size. The design of the car placed the fuel tank such that if the car was hit from the rear at a speed above 20 miles per hour, it would be punctured by a bolt from the bumper and could possibly burst into flame. Ford did a study and determined that if a baffle (estimated at costing between $6.65 and $11) were placed between the bumper and the gas tank, the Pinto would be comparable to other cars of its class with respect to the danger of fire from rear-end impact. A company cost-benefit analysis that weighed the cost of adding the baffle against the estimated cost of suits resulting from "excess" accidental deaths and injuries indicated that it would cost the company less not to insert the baffle than to insert it. For whatever reason, the company did not change the design from 1971 to 1978. Nor did the company offer its customers the option of purchasing the baffle.
[Page 299] Between 1976 and 1977 alone, Pintos suffered thirteen fiery rear-end collisions, which was more than double the number for comparable-size cars. As it turned out, suits brought against Ford and the amount it had to pay (estimated at more than $50 million) far exceeded what it saved ($20.9 million) by not correcting the defect—not to mention the cost of bad publicity.
Nonetheless, despite reports of fires in the Pinto, the car sold well through 1978, when it was finally recalled to have the baffle inserted. When the State of Oregon, because of safety concerns, sold its fleet of Pintos at public auction, the cars went for as much as $1,800 each. Obviously, buyers discounted the danger, weighing it against the cost of what was considered adequate transportation at a good price.
Ford's actions with respect to the Pinto have been widely criticized. Harley Copp, a former Ford executive and engineer, was critical of the Pinto from the start. He left the company and voiced his criticism, which was taken up by Ralph Nader and others.[2]
Of course, the Ford engineers were not instructed to make an unsafe car, nor did Ford management set out to do so. That the Pinto was arguably below the state of the art may have been a result of the accelerated production schedule. That the defect was not corrected after the initial production year was the result of a business decision.
Was anyone at Ford at fault? Did anyone at Ford have an obligation to make known to the public the facts that Ford knew but did not make public? If so, who? Why?
[1] For sources and more details on the Pinto, see Richard T. De George, "Ethical Responsibilities of Engineers in Large Organizations: The Pinto Case," Business and Professional Ethics Journal, 1, no. 1 (1981), pp. 1–14; Lee P. Strobel, Reckless Homicide? Ford's Pinto Trial (South Bend, Ind.: And Books, 1980); and Mark Dowie, "Pinto Madness," Mother Jones, September/October 1977, pp. 24–28.
[2] Among the many articles that have appeared, one of the earliest and most incendiary was Mark Dowie, "Pinto Madness," Mother Jones (2), 1977, pp. 18–32. For a defense of Ford and an explanation of the decisions made, see Matthew T. Lee and M. David Ermann, "Pinto 'Madness' as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis," Social Problems 46 (1), 1999, pp. 30–47.
Blowing the Whistle We have seen that corporations have a moral obligation not to harm. This obligation falls on the corporation as such, and internally it falls primarily on those who manage the corporation. Yet other members of the corporation—for instance, engineers and assembly-line workers—are not morally allowed to take part in any immoral activity. Hence, they may not morally take part in any activity that they know will cause harm, including producing products that they know will cause harm. Do they further have a moral obligation to prevent harm, if they are able to do so?
[Page 300] As a general rule, people have a moral obligation to prevent serious harm to others if they are able to do so and can do so with little cost to themselves. As the cost increases, the obligation decreases. If we can save another's life only at the expense of our own life, we are not morally obliged to do so, and giving up our life for another is usually considered an act of heroic virtue. What is the obligation as an employee to prevent his or her company from harming others? The question is a complicated one and leads us to a consideration of what has become known as whistle blowing.[3]
[3] Some general works dealing with whistle blowing are Myron Peretz Glazer, Penina Migdal Glazer, The Whistleblowers: Exposing Corruption in Government and Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1989); C. Fred Alford, Whistleblowers: Broken Lives and Organizational Power (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001); Roberta Ann Johnson, Whistleblowing: When It Works—And Why (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003); Gerald Vinten (ed.), Whistleblowing: Subversion or Corporate Citizenship? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Marcia P. Miceli and Janet P. Near, Blowing the Whistle: The Organizational and Legal Implications for Companies and Employees (New York: Lexington Books, 1992). Ancorr Web: Anti-Corruption Ring Online has a useful bibliography on whistle blowing at http://www1.oecd.org/daf/nocorruptionweb/Corruption/prev_whistle.htm#references.[2]
Input2
Last year, Trial magazine, a publication of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, featured an article entitled "Important Civil Trials of the Millennium." The article presented a select group of ten cases from the past millennium, which it cited as milestones in the development of the civil justice system. Included in them was Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. (1981).
In May of 1972, a new Ford Pinto hatchback unexpectedly stalled on Interstate15, erupting into flames when it was rear ended by another car. Mrs. Lilly Gray, the driver of the Pinto, suffered fatal burns and 13-year-old Richard Grimshaw suffered severe and permanently disfiguring burns over 90% of his body. Grimshaw and the heirs to Mrs. Gray sued Ford Motor Company, alleging that design defects in the Pinto made the car's fuel system extremely vulnerable to compromise or rupture in a rear-end collision, and that the passengers would be seriously injured or killed as a result of post-collision fires fed by escaping gasoline.
Richard Grimshaw was represented by bar members and local attorneys, Mark P. Robinson, Jr. and the late Arthur Hews. Byron Rabin of Rose, Klein & Marias represented the heirs of Mrs. Gray. What appeared at first to be an ordinary product liability case, began with little fanfare or attention in the media. However, the six-month trial was filled with startling revelations about the inner-workings and thought processes within one of the world's largest companies, and how the bottom line can sometimes be placed ahead of safety and human life.
One of the principal witnesses called by the Plaintiffs was Harley Copp, a former Ford engineering executive, who was fired just before Robinson was scheduled to take his deposition. Acting on a tip from a Ford employee moonlighting as a Detroit cab driver, Copp was tracked down and testified that he was forced to take an early retirement because he spoke out on matters of safety. Mr. Copp further testified that the highest level of Ford's management made the decision to go forward with the production of the Pinto, knowing that the fuel tank was vulnerable to puncture and rupture at low impact speeds.
According to OCBA member Mark Robinson, "Several documents introduced into evidence at trial showed that despite management's knowledge that the Pinto's fuel system could be made safe at a cost of $4 to $8 per car, Ford decided to defer corrective measures to save money and enhance profits. One key document which came to light as a result of the Grimshaw case was the infamous "Grush-Saunby" memo, a Ford interoffice memorandum from the early '70s, discussing the costs versus the benefits of meeting proposed federal motor vehicle safety standards."
Although Judge Leonard Goldstein did not allow the memo into evidence, he did permit Mr. Copp to testify that Ford "had put a value of $200,000 on a human life, and that even though inexpensive alternative design 'fixes' were available for use in the Pinto, management based its design decision on the cost savings which would inure from delaying or omitting corrective measures."
The jury's verdict was front-page news nationwide: $128 million. Up until that time the largest verdict in America was approximately $20 million in a personal injury action involving punitive damages against an airplane manufacturer. The Fourth District Court of Appeal had this to say in a concise yet profound comment on corporate irresponsibility: "Through the results of the crash tests Ford knew that the Pinto's fuel tank and rear structure would expose consumers to serious injury or death in a 20 to 30 mile-per-hour collision. There was evidence that Ford could have corrected the hazardous design defects at minimal cost but decided to defer balancing human lives and limbs against corporate profits. Ford's institutional mentality was shown to be one of callous indifference to public safety. There was substantial evidence that Ford's conduct constituted 'conscious disregard' of the probability of injury to members of the consuming public." Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal.App.3d 757,813 (1981).
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration pressured Ford into recalling the Pinto and conducting modifications. The Pinto verdict was a wake-up call for not only Ford Motor Company, but for manufacturers and businesses all over the world. The specter of substantial punitive damages awards for reckless business decisions, which endanger the public, caused businesses to reassess their responsibility to the public. No longer could large corporations put profits over safety. The shock wave set off by the Grimshaw verdict in Orange County still reverberates today. Much like the phrase, "we don't want another Vietnam" is often heard in political decision-making, the phrase "we don't want another Pinto" has found its way into the corporate lexicon.[3]
Input2
2. Junk Car Museum > Bad Cars > Ford Pinto > Ford Pinto Legal Case www.junkcarmuseum.4t.com/badcarbios/fordpinto/lega - [Cached] Published on: 12/18/2003 Last Visited: 9/2/2005
[*777] Harley Copp, a former Ford engineer and executive in charge of the crash testing program, testified that the highest level of Ford's management made the decision to go forward with the production of the Pinto, knowing that the gas tank was vulnerable to puncture and rupture at low rear impact speeds creating a significant risk of death or injury from fire and knowing that "fixes" were feasible at nominal cost. ... Mr. Kennedy, who succeeded Mr. Copp as the engineer in charge of Ford's crash testing program, admitted that the test results had been forwarded up the chain of command to his superiors. ... Finally, Mr. Copp testified to conversations in late 1968 or early 1969 with the chief assistant research engineer in charge of cost-weight evaluation of the Pinto, and to a later conversation with the chief chassis engineer who was then in charge of crash testing the early prototype. ... The Testimony of Harley Copp
Mr. Harley Copp, a former Ford engineering executive, was plaintiffs' principal witness on the subject of defects in the design, placement, and protection of the Pinto's gas tank and on Ford management's [*780] decision to place the car on the market with knowledge of the defects. ... Plaintiffs' counsel met Mr. Copp for the first time on January 18, 1977, and learned of his potential availability [**24] as a witness. ... That the first contact between plaintiffs' attorneys and Mr. Copp occurred on January 18, 1977, was confirmed by Mr. Copp's testimony [*783] [**25] and was and is unchallenged by Ford. ... There was indication that Ford's counsel knew as early as June 1977 that Mr. Copp might be a witness for plaintiffs. [***366] That Ford's oral motion was for the disclosure of any former "disgruntled" Ford employee who might be called as plaintiffs' witness and that Ford's motion was made only after and in apparent response to one made by plaintiffs for the disclosure of a possible Ford witness suggest that Ford knew the identity of the witness. n6 ... Turning to Ford's motions to depose Mr. Copp before he continued with his direct testimony, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's rulings. The right to conduct discovery "within 30 days before trial" is within the sound discretion of the trial court and in exercising its discretion the court is required to take into consideration the necessity and reasons for such discovery, the diligence or lack of diligence of the party seeking such discovery and his reasons for not having completed [*785] his discovery prior to 30 days before trial, whether permitting such discovery will prevent the case from going to trial on the [**30] day set or otherwise interfere with the trial calendar or result in prejudice to any party, and any other matter relevant to the request. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 222; 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. ... The court ruled that evidence of the circumstances under which Mr. Copp left Ford was admissible because it bore upon his credibility and was necessary to enable the jury to understand and evaluate his testimony. ... Ford maintains that the evidence was inadmissible on direct examination because the [**31] witness' credibility had not yet been challenged and that Ford was prejudiced by the erroneous ruling because it was compelled to cross-examine Mr. Copp concerning the reasons for his termination, in turn enabling plaintiffs to introduce prejudicial rehabilitation testimony not otherwise admissible. ... Ford's argument that firing Mr. Copp in 1976 for speaking out on safety does not reasonably tend to show that Ford disregarded safety in designing the Pinto some five years earlier lacks merit. ... Ford complains that since Mr. Copp was permitted to testify to the circumstances surrounding his termination, Ford was compelled to cross-examine him to show that the reason for his dismissal was unexplained absences from work and unsatisfactory [**36] work performance; that if the court had not permitted Mr. Copp to give his version of the reason for termination, Ford would have had little or no reason to examine him about his retirement and plaintiffs would not have been able to adduce rehabilitation testimony highly prejudicial to Ford. ... Ford complains that since Mr. Copp was permitted to testify to the circumstances surrounding his termination, Ford was compelled to cross-examine him to show that the reason for his dismissal was unexplained absences from work and unsatisfactory [**36] work performance; that if the court had not permitted Mr. Copp to give his version of the reason for termination, Ford would have had little or no reason to examine him about his retirement and plaintiffs would not have been able to adduce rehabilitation testimony highly prejudicial to Ford. ... The record discloses that Mr. Copp testified only briefly concerning the circumstances of his early retirement from Ford but that on cross-examination [*788] Ford engaged in extensive questioning to show that the reason for his termination was not his safety views but unsatisfactory work and absenteeism. ... Ford argues that but for the court's erroneous initial ruling and its consequent cross-examination on the reason for Mr. Copp's retirement, the damaging [**37] rehabilitation evidence would not have come in. Since we find no error in the court's initial ruling and since Ford has not advanced any independent reason why the rehabilitating evidence should have been excluded, Ford's complaint concerning the prejudicial nature of that evidence must be rejected. ... 537, 552 P.2d 97].) Mr. Copp was not permitted to testify concerning [**40] the details of the hearsay matters on which he relied in forming his opinion. ... In addition, most of the matters to which Mr. Copp referred were within his personal knowledge and experience. When Mr. Copp was permitted to testify to the matters on which he based his opinion that the bladder within a tank was feasible, the judge gave the jury a proper limiting instruction at Ford's request. ... Finally, in no instance was Mr. Copp permitted to read the reports or documents to which he referred or relate their contents in specific detail. In light of these circumstances, we conclude that the court did not commit reversible error in the cited instances where the expert was permitted to testify to the matters he considered in forming his opinions. ... Mr. Copp testified, however, that the information in the study could be applied equally to the Pinto. ... The [***373] matter first came up during redirect-examination of Mr. Copp. ... Mr. Copp's testimony concerning the emission control matter tended to rebut Ford's evidence that Mr. Copp was fired for absenteeism and unsatisfactory performance. ... The court denied the motion, noting that the reference to the document prepared by Mr. Copp but which had not been received in evidence was innocuous and that the reference to deaths as well as injuries was proper under the evidence. ... It refers to Mr. Hews' statement that Mr. Copp testified that Ford engaged in cost-benefit analyses and that there was "plenty of documentation for it." ... Ford argues that the documentation referred to by Mr. Copp -- the "Grush-Saunby Report" -- was excluded from evidence so that the statement was improper. ... Furthermore, Mr. Copp was permitted to testify that Ford did in fact engage in cost-benefit analyses which balanced life and limb against corporate savings and profits. ... Ford contends those two individuals did not occupy managerial positions because Mr. Copp testified that they admitted awareness of the defects but told him they were powerless to change the rear-end design of the Pinto. [4]
3. Free-CliffNotes.com - Crime www.free-cliffnotes.com/data/ea/lfm98.shtml - [Cached] Published on: 10/28/2003 Last Visited: 11/5/2003
Harley Copp, a former Ford engineer and executive in charge of the crash testing program, testified that the highest level of Ford's management made the decision to go forward with the production of the Pinto, knowing that the gas tank was vulnerable to puncture at low rear impact speeds creating a significant risk of death or injury from fire and knowing that fixes were feasible at nominal cost. He testified that management's decision was based on the cost savings, which would inure from omitting the fixes.[5]