Jump to content

Draft:Social Inequality in the Maoist-Era China

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
  • Comment: On Wikipedia, all stated facts should be supported by a citation to a reliable source. Currently, large portions of this draft are unsourced - please add necessary citations before resubmitting. Thank you. ~Liancetalk 02:53, 11 December 2023 (UTC)

Social Inequality in the Maoist-Era China[edit]

All "China" mentioned in this page refers to the People's Republic of China, unless mentioned otherwise.

"Maoist-era China" or "China" in this page both refers to China from 1949-1976.

The Maoist-era China failed to build a perfectly egalitarian society as propagated by the Chinese Communist Party. Contrary to the regime's propaganda, the Maoist-era People's Republic of China was one of the most unequal socialist economies in the world, as measured by the Gini coefficient, which was largely due to the urban-rural divide. Although the Gini coefficient of urban residents' incomes varied very little, there were significant inequalities between different work units in different cities and industrial sectors, mainly in social welfare such as housing, education, and health care. During the Maoist-era, China had de facto created a new privileged elite class, consisting mainly of party cadres. China also created de facto "class differences" by controlling access to and consumption of specific goods, such as wristwatches, bicycles, sewing machines, and Mao badges.

High Gini Coefficient[edit]

China had the largest Gini coefficient among most of the was relatively higher than other industrialized socialist economies, especially during the 1970s. [1] This made China one of the most unequal socialist economy in terms of distribution of income. The table below shows the Gini coefficient of three different groups of countries/regions during the 1970s. In 1979, China's Gini coefficient was 0.33, while other socialist economies were usually between 0.20 to 0.21. This made China the most unequal socialist economy during the 1970s. However, China's income inequality did not appear to be significant if compared to other capitalist economies. Compared to other Asian countries/regions, China was relatively more equal to India, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, but was significantly worse than Taiwan. However, China was still more equal than most of the Western capitalist industrial countries.

Comparative National Measures of Income Inequality (Gini Coefficient), 1970s[1]
Socialist Gini Asia Gini Industrialized Gini
East Germany 0.20 Taiwan 0.28 China 0.33
Bulgaria 0.21 China 0.33 United Kingdom 0.34
Czechoslovakia 0.21 Pakistan 0.33 Canada 0.39
Yugoslavia 0.21 Sri Lanka 0.33 Sweden 0.39
Poland 0.22 India 0.38 West Germany 0.39
Hungary 0.25 Thailand 0.42 Italy 0.40
Soviet Union 0.27 Indonesia 0.44 United States 0.40
China 0.33 Philippines 0.47 Japan 0.42

Despite the large national Gini coefficient, China was highly egalitarian within urban or rural areas. China's intra-urban Gini coefficient is extremely small, while the large urban-rural gap widened the Gini coefficient at the national level. Maoist-era Chinese cities exhibited almost no signs of conspicuous wealth. For example, in 1981, the Gini coefficient for urban Chinese income was 0.16, which made it the most equal distribution in the world.[2] In rural areas, the polarization between rich and poor was even less pronounced. Instead of earning salaries, rural residents earned "work points" that entitle them to a share of collective grains and cash through their labor. This made families of village leaders often fare worse economically than other families with greater numbers of able-bodied laborers.[3] The reasons for the huge urban-rural divide were mainly: 1. the Soviet model of development, which squeezed agriculture through price scissors; 2. the strict restriction on people's free movement through household registration (hukou).[2]

Rural-Urban Divide[edit]

The extreme inequality between the urban and rural development was one of the most striking features of Maoist-era China. Extreme poverty prevailed in rural China during the Maoist-era.[2] Following the collectivization of agriculture, village land was turned into common property and the rural population was organized and managed in production brigades. They were not considered workers and therefore not paid by the state. Instead, they earned "work points" through their labor, which entitled them to a share of village grain and a small cash disbursement.[3] The production brigades, rather than the state, were responsible for providing social welfare like healthcare, education, and childcare. Therefore, the consumption of the rural population largely depended on the productive capacity of their production brigades.[4] However, the Soviet development model that Mao followed was designed to extract maximum amounts of resources from the villages and suppress the price of grains while setting higher prices for the country's industrialization by exploiting peasants through price scissors.[5] This led to a fragile rural economy and trapped the rural population in chronic poverty. According to surveys conducted in the late 1970s, one-fifth of China's rural population had diets that were below the level of daily calorie consumption for a bare subsistence defined by the Chinese government at the time.[6] According to an official survey conducted in 1978, 30% of the rural population, or 237 million people, were living under the official poverty line defined by the Chinese government.[7] It is worth noticing that the Chinese official standards of daily calorie consumption for subsistence and poverty were both significantly lower than standards set by international agencies.[8] The quality of the average rural diet was also low. The state did not take responsibility for providing food rations to the rural population, and the collective agriculture forced the rural population into grain-centered agriculture, resulting in a steady decline in the consumption of oils, meat, and other proteins.[8] In comparison, the urban population as a whole was better off than the rural population.[9] All urban population was managed by different work units, which were all owned and run by the state. Urban residents could receive wages, rations, and social welfare provided by the government, which were significantly better than what the rural population could receive.[10]

Rural residents could not avoid such huge inequality between urban and rural areas by migrating to the cities. Strict household registration (hukou) and rationing systems almost eliminated all domestic migration in Maoist-era China. Every citizen in China was tied to his/her work unit/production brigade through household registrations.[11] Only those with a hukou could enjoy the benefits provided by a certain region or work unit. Transferring to another unit was extremely difficult as this required the approval of both units and the employee.[11] This means that even if a peasant physically moved into a city, he/she would still not be able to get a job, housing, food rations, or any other social benefits in that city since he/she did not have an urban hukou. Due to the same reason, a peasant was even unable to move from the most impoverished rural regions to more prosperous ones. The hukou system trapped poor farmers where they were and further increased the huge urban-rural divide.

Inequality Among and Within Work Units[edit]

Although disruption of income was generally equal within urban or rural areas, significant inequality among and within different production units can still be found. A distinct hierarchy of work units existed during Maoist-era China. In cities, for example, large enterprises run by central ministries, especially those in priority industries like steel, automobile, and shipbuilding, controlled more resources relative to smaller factories owned by local governments.[9] These privileged work units could provide their members with better housing, education, healthcare, and other types of social welfare that cannot be measured by wages.[9]

Compared to inequalities among different production units, inequalities within each unit were relatively small, yet still important. Members of urban work units were classified as either cadres or workers and had a different scale of wage ranks set by the government. Cadres included political and administrative leaders, management staff, and technical employees. Cadres were considered more important to the state; therefore, their appointment, promotion, transfer, training, and political education were paid special attention to.[9] Most of the cadres, especially those in political and administrative leadership positions, were members of the CCP.[9] The wages and social welfare they received were usually not significantly better than ordinary workers. A 1966 survey of 38 industrial enterprises found that the average monthly base pay for the highest paid leader was RMB 137, a little over twice the average pay for all employees (RMB 63), and less than four times the average lowest pay (RMB 37). Moreover, in many of these enterprises, the highest paid employee was a skilled worker, rather than a leader.[12] However, the political and administrative leaders had bigger political power and could supervise those higher-paid technicists.[13]

Due to the strong egalitarian norms and collective identity, worker participation was high in factory management in Maoist-era China. However, despite the high degree of participation, this system was still paternalistic. The CCP formed mechanisms within work units to promote "democratic management" (“民主管理”) and "mass supervision" (“群众监督”).[14] The CCP established "Factory Management Committees (FMCs)" in state-run enterprises. Apart from all the administrative and Party leaders, these committees usually also included a number of elected workers' representatives.[15] "Staff and Workers Congresses (SWCs)" were also established within factories, and were assigned with power to "supervise" the FMCs and make recommendations to the factory leadership.[15] However, the autonomy of such mechanisms was highly restricted by the CCP in practice.[16] The FMC decisions could be vetoed by the factory director, who was definitely a Party member. The SWCs usually met less often than the regulations suggest, and their recommendations had to be approved by the FMCs before implementation.[15] In fact, since the Party leaders refused to accept autonomous collective activity by workers or even by the labor unions that operated under Party auspices, the possibility of developing truly democratic institutions was curtailed.[16] The influence of ordinary workers was limited in scope and restricted to Party-controlled forums. Real decision-making power was tightly controlled by the Party leaders and workers couldn't challenge their authorities.[17] This de facto made the Party cadres a new privileged class, not by economic capital, but by political capital.

Inequality Caused by Consumerism[edit]

Consumerism and consumption did not vanish during the Maoist-era. Forms of consumer culture was shaped by the country's politcial atmosphere, which emphasized hard work and frugal living.[18] Fetishism, or worship of commodities, continued to exist.[19] Throughout the Maoist-era, uneven distribution of goods continued to enlarge the "three main social difference" (三大差别) that the Party claimed it would try to bridge, which are: urban vs. rural; industrial vs. agriculture; intellectual work vs. manual labor.[20]

Party policies created a large number of consumerist elements in Chinese society and generated new social inequalities. Consumerism in Maoist-era China can be described as "state consumption," which means that the state managed demand in every aspect. The state promoted, defined, and spread consumption of certain goods to eliminate, discredit, or marginalize private preferences for the allocation of resources.[21] For example, the state politicized the production and universal consumption of the "Three Big Things" (“三大件”, wristwatches, bicycles, and sewing machines) as a symbol of the success of socialism and shifted from promoting frugality to encouraging the consumption of the "Three Big Things."[22] However, the state-controlled distribution of these three products reflected clear inequalities. For example, in the 1960s, only people working in specific "important" industries like metallurgical industries, shipbuilding, and the military were allowed to buy wristwatches with a letter of introduction issued by their work units.[23] As wristwatch production increased in the 1970s, it became a widespread symbol of sophisticated identity instead of becoming a massively distributed product.[23] Similarly, consumption of bicycles was also severely controlled by the state through high prices and rationing. For example, a Beijing cyclist named Zhao Shulan recalled that she had an monthly income of RMB 47, while the average price of a bicycle was RMB 159, which was more than three times of her monthly salary. Even after she saved enough money, she still waited three more years before she could actually purchase one due to the rationing system.[24] It is particularly difficult for rural consumers to acquire bicycles. As late as 1978, only a third of rural households owned bicycles.[25] In addition, the development and production of bicycles were always urban-centered. New products were first developed and sold in cities, then modified according to rural needs.[26] Consumption and mastery of sewing machines, on the other hand, was strongly associated with femininity and would indicate likelihood of being a better wife for women, which strengthened gender stereotypes.[27]

The Mao badge was one visible manifestation of inequalities in Maoist-era China consumerism. The Mao badge craze started in the first few months of the Cultural Revolution and quickly faded after 1969.[28] Initially, only a few high-ranking officials were wearing the Mao badges, but soon the fever swept the whole country.[28] With the rapid popularization of them, bigger, newer, and finer Mao badges soon became a way to show off the wearer's status and wealth. Limited editions of Mao badges could be extremely sought after in the black markets and usually fetch very high prices. Wearing a badge was considered a symbol of loyalty to Mao, and the larger and nicer the badge, the greater the loyalty.[29] This led to the swift utilization of the badges as briberies, as gambling chips, or as tools of political repression.[30] Many memoirs of the former Red Guards recorded examples of certain facilities obtained by them through providing Mao badges.[31] Movie theaters in Shanghai would refuse anyone without a Mao badge from entering.[32] In some schools, the Red Guards would check every day to see if students coming to school were wearing Mao badges, and if they weren't, they would not be allowed to enter the school.[33] Wearing a badge was a politically wise move, as it represented the wearer's oath to the Party and would protect the wearer from possible attacks by the Red Guards.[29] Even though owning and wearing Mao badges was never legally or administratively mandatory, the consumer frenzy for these badges was nevertheless a clear manifestation of inequality in consumption in Maoist-era China. Those who could afford larger, newer, and finer badges could easily attain a higher social status than others.[34] Those who did not have, or had fewer badges, were discriminated against and even been attacked.

References[edit]

  1. ^ For socialist and industrialized economies, see Janos Kornai, The Socialist system: the Political economy of Communism (N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992): 318, and Shail Jain, Size Distribution of Income: A compilation of Data (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1975): 41, 107. For Asian economies, see World Bank, China: Socialist Economic Development. Vol.1, the Economy, Statistical System, and Basic Data (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1983): 94, and Jain, Size Distribution, 108. The number of China is for 1979, others are for various years in the early 1970s.
  2. ^ a b c Andrew G. Walder, China Under Mao: A Revolution Detrailed (Harvard University Press): 332-333. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvjf9wzk.19.
  3. ^ a b Joel Andreas, "Reconfiguring China's Class Order After the 1949 Revolution," in Handbook on Class and Social Stratification in China, ed. Guo Y. (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2016): 25.
  4. ^ Joel Andreas, "Reconfiguring China's Class Order After the 1949 Revolution," 23.
  5. ^ Andrew G. Walder, China Under Mao, 331-332. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvjf9wzk.19.
  6. ^ World Bank, China: Socialist Economic Development, Vol. 1, the Economy, Statistical System, and Basic Data (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1983). Adjusting China's 1979 figures for the 19% increase over 1977.
  7. ^ Jean C. Oi, Development Strategies, Welfare Regimes, and Poverty Reduction in China (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2008).
  8. ^ a b Andrew G. Walder, China Under Mao, 333. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvjf9wzk.19.
  9. ^ a b c d e Joel Andreas, "Reconfiguring China's Class Order After the 1949 Revolution," 24.
  10. ^ Joel Andreas, "Reconfiguring China's Class Order After the 1949 Revolution," 22.
  11. ^ a b Joel Andreas, "Reconfiguring China's Class Order After the 1949 Revolution," 22-23.
  12. ^ The 38 enterprises ranged from small factories with several hundred employees to huge firms with over 100 000 employees; most had several thousand employees. The reported wage rates apparently did not include the lower ‘apprentice’ rates paid to new hires. Base pay did not include bonuses, but bonuses made up only a small part of compensation, on average about 6 percent of enterprise wage funds. see B. Richman, Industrial Society in Communist China (New York: Random House, 1969): 789-806.
  13. ^ Joel Andreas, "Reconfiguring China's Class Order After the 1949 Revolution," 29.
  14. ^ Joel Anderas, Disenfranchised: the Rise and Fall of Industrial Citizenship in China (Oxford University Press, 2019): 20.
  15. ^ a b c Joel Anderas, Disenfranchised, 29-30.
  16. ^ a b Joel Anderas, Disenfranchised, 51.
  17. ^ Joel Anderas, Disenfranchised, 87.
  18. ^ Karl Gerth, Consuming China: How the Enemies of Capitalism Become Believers in Consumerism (In Chinese) (Taipei: Taiwanese Commercial Press, 2021): 35. ISBN 9789570533422.
  19. ^ Karl Gerth, Unending Capitalism: How Consumerism Negated China's Communist Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2020): 26. ISBN 9780521688468.
  20. ^ Karl Gerth, Unending Capitalism, 6.
  21. ^ Karl Gerth, Unending Capitalism, 7.
  22. ^ Karl Gerth, Unending Capitalism, 10-11.
  23. ^ a b Karl Gerth, Unending Capitalism, 16-17.
  24. ^ Zhang Xinxin and Sang Ye, Chinese Proflies (Beijing: Chinese Lierature, 1986): 9.
  25. ^ Edward J. M. Rhoads, "Cycles of Cathay: A History of the Bicycle in China," Transfers 2, no.2 (Summer 2012): 108.
  26. ^ Hsia Kung, "Producing Goods for the Peasants," China Reconstructs 13, no. 11 (1964): 18-20.
  27. ^ Karl Gerth, Consuming China, 30-31.
  28. ^ a b Karl Gerth, Unending Capitalism, 202.
  29. ^ a b Jicai Feng, Voices from the Whirlwind: An Oral History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (New York: Pantheon Books, 1991), 211.
  30. ^ Karl Gerth, Unending Capitalism, 208-209.
  31. ^ Ken Ling, Red Guard: From Schoolboy to "Little General" in Mao's China (London: Macdonald, 1972), 286. See also Robert A. White, “Mao Badges and the Cultural Revolution," International Social Science Review, 69 nos. 3–4 (1994), 53–70.
  32. ^ Jin Dalu, 非常与正常: 上海‘文革’时期的社会生活 (The extraordinary and the ordinary: Social life in Shanghai during the “Cultural Revolution”), 2 vols. (Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 2011), 2.177.
  33. ^ Qi Mai, “文革琐记:政治边缘处的众生相” (Remembering the Cultural Revolution: People at the political edge), http://mjlsh.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/Book.aspx?cid=4&tid=1670. Archived November 12, 2017.
  34. ^ Karl Gerth, Unending Capitalism, 209-210.
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Social_Inequality_in_the_Maoist-Era_China&oldid=1191890957"